Ibn Caspi on the Avos keeping the entire Torah

Summary: He endorses the idea, kind-of. In one instance, as a restrained and coded rejection. In another, as a philosophical co-opting of the idea. Also, Chizkuni and my own approach to understanding the pasuk that sparks all this.

Post: A pasuk and Rashi, in the midst of parashat Toledot (26:5):

5. Because Abraham hearkened to My voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My instructions."

ה. עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְּקֹלִי וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִּי מִצְוֹתַי חֻקּוֹתַי וְתוֹרֹתָי:

and kept My charge: [Referring to] decrees to distance [himself] from transgressing the warnings in the Torah, e.g. secondary prohibitions to prevent incest from occurring, and the Rabbinic decrees to safeguard the prohibitions of the Sabbath.		וישמר משמרתי: גזרות להרחקה על אזהרות שבתורה, כגון שניות לעריות ושבות לשבת:
My commandments: [Referring to] things, which, had they not been written, would have been fit to be commanded, e.g. [prohibitions against] robbery and bloodshed.		מצותי: דברים שאילו לא נכתבו ראויין הם להצטוות כגון גזל ושפיכות דמים:
My statutes: [Referring to] things that the evil inclination and the nations of the world argue against, e.g. [the prohibitions against] eating pork and wearing garments of wool and linen for which no reason [is given], but [which are] the decree of the King and His statutes over His subjects.		חקותי: דברים שיצר הרע ואומות העולם משיבין עליהם כגון אכילת חזיר ולבישת שעטנז שאין טעם בדבר אלא גזירת המלך וחקותיו על עבדיו:
and My instructions: To include the Oral Law, the laws given to Moses from Sinai. [Yoma 28b]		ותורתי: להביא תורה שבעל פה, הלכה למשה מסיני:

This is based on Yoma 28b, which reads:

  Rab said: Our father Abraham kept the whole Torah, as it is said: Because that Abraham hearkened to My voice [kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws].21 R. Shimi b. Hiyya said to Rab: Say, perhaps, that this refers to the seven laws?22 — Surely there was also that of circumcision!23 Then say that it refers to the seven laws and circumcision [and not to the whole Torah]? — If that were so, why does Scripture say: ‘My commandments and My laws’? Raba or R. Ashi said: Abraham, our father, kept even the law concerning the ‘erub of the dishes,’24 as it is said: ‘My Torahs’:25 one being the written Torah, the other the oral Torah.26

Rabbi Yosef Ibn Caspi writes:

ה)  וישמור  משמרתי  וגו. מה אומר אחרי רבותינו ז"ל
 בפירוש זה שאמרו  קיים אברהם כל התורה כולה  (יומא כ־ח)  פקח:
 עיניך וראה

"What shall I say after our Sages za'l in explanation of this, that they said that Avraham kept the entire Torah (Yoma 28)? Open your eyes and see."

I think that it is fairly clear that Ibn Caspi is speaking in code. Rather than saying explicitly that he disagrees with Chazal in this, he says 'what can I say?' And since he is unable to say explicitly what he wants to, he resorts to "Open your eyes and see."

Compare with what Ibn Caspi wrote on an earlier parashah, Lech Lecha, in his more flowing worth, Tiras Kesef:


ואשיב ואומר כי ידוע שמנהג הארץ  ההיא לקחת  איש אחד
 נשים  רבות, עם  שגם תורתנו התירה זה לעמנו,  ולכן היה מהפלגת
  קדושת  אברהם,  אע״פ שגדלה תשוקתו לבנים שלא נזדווג רק
 לאשתו  הנכבדת,  אשר הוא נעזר ממנה לכל עת צורך,  גם לא
 לשפחותיו הנמצאות אתו  בבית,  ומה טוב מה שאמרו פלוסופי  חכמינו
 קיים אברהם  כל התורה כלה  (יומא כ״ח), ודי במה שזכרנו  מופת
 שהחמיר על עצמו אף במקום שהתירה אותו התורה העתידה להמסר
 לכלל עם ישורון. והנה ביאר כי אברהם לא בקש זה משרה, אבל
 שמע לקולה כאשר בקשה זה מאתו, ובכלל זה שלום הבית  ג״כ
 שהוא עיקר גדול לכל מבקש שלמות .

"And I will further say that it is known that the custom of that land was for one man to take many wives, besides that our Torah permits this to our nation. And therefore it was of the great holiness of Avraham that, despite the greatness of his desire for children, he only paired with his honored wife, from whom he received aid at any time of necessity, and not from his maidservants who were found with him in the house.

And how good was that which the philosophers of our Sages said, that Avraham kept the entire Torah (Yoma 28b). And it is sufficient in that which we have mentioned, the exemplar that he was strict upon himself even in a place that which was permitted by the Torah which was to be transmitted over to the populace of the nation of Yeshurun. And behold, it explains that Avraham did not request this of Sarah, but rather that he hearkened to her voice when she requested this of him, and encompassed with this is the peace of the household {shalom habayit}, which is as well an important fundamental to anyone who desires completeness."

This is not a contradiction. Ibn Caspi does not believe, on a peshat level -- on a literal level or on a historical level -- that Avraham Avinu kept the entire Torah, including eruv tavshilin. This is obvious, and to say otherwise is to subscribe to an obvious anachronism.

Even so, Ibn Caspi seizes upon this Talmudic statement by פלוסופי חכמינו. Indeed, by attributing it to them, he grants the message the status of coded, hidden philosophy. What message can we find* in here?  Don't be so averse to anachronism. Avraham's actions should not be understood as purely a function of his social context. He was not a typical Mesopotamian resident, such that we should explain his every action based on the Code of Hammurabi or the Laws of Eshnunna. He sanctified himself even in the permitted, and his moral compass could and should provide a model for his descendants. Thus, Rav Shimi bar Chiya said that perhaps this וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִּי מִצְוֹתַי חֻקּוֹתַי וְתוֹרֹתָי only refers to the sheva mitzvos benei Noach, which were incumbent upon everyone back then, and this suggestion of Rav Shimi bar Chiya was rejected.

Also rejected was the suggestion that the only extra item Avraham kept was milah, which we see explicitly that he was commanded. Rather, in general, Avraham kept himself to a strict moral code which exceeded that expected within his surroundings. This would be the equivalent of keeping the entire Torah. And he kept things even above the written Torah; even the Oral Torah; and specifically, eruv tavshilin which is rabbinic. Not that he literally kept eruv tavshilin. That would be silly, I think Ibn Caspi would agree. Rather, this is an example of keeping stringencies even above what the Torah would impose.

Does Ibn Caspi really think that this is what Chazal meant by this? Perhaps, though his comment in parshas Toldos suggests otherwise. This could be a philosophical coopting of a derasha of Chazal. I am reminded of what Shadal said about philosophical derash:

And if we turn to the other great commentators -- Ibn Ezra, Radak, and Don Yitzchak Abarbanel, we find that in many places they lean from the path of peshat to another side -- is it not the philosophical derash.

And the man {=the guest} replied to me and said: You have spoken correctly. A great and grievous damage has the mixed up philosophy damaged us -- which spread in the world via the Arabs, who took Aristotle as head and chief, and in his name they swear, and they wish to make his words agree with their beliefs which they received from their fathers, and they innovated a confused wisdom which confuses the hearts - which when the kingdom of Ishmael spread in the lands, this {ideology} also spread, and confused the thoughts and ruined the beliefs.

And the chachmei yisrael also, in order to make the words of this philosophy agree with our Complete Torah, forced and pressed the words of the Torah, Neviim, and the Sages of the Mishnah and the Talmud in order that they say what they did not say and never entered their hearts in {all} their days. And in order to do this they {the chachmei yisrael} brought out the {tools of} derash, remez and mashal {allegory}. And they abandoned the peshat and did not serve it.

How shall we understand this pasuk in Toldos? I'll present Chizkuni on the pasuk, to show one alternate way of processing the pasuk; and then give my own, cruder explanation.

Chizkuni writes:

"עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְּקֹלִי -- this is the Akeida, and so does He say there, 'because you have hearkened to My voice.'


וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִּי -- this is circumcision, that he accepted immediately, as is written 'this is my covenant that you shall תשמרו.'


מִצְוֹתַי -- this is circumcision at eight days, as is written, 'And Avraham circumcised Yitzchak his son at eight days, as Elokim צוה him. 


חֻקּוֹתַי -- that he commanded as well his descendants after him that they be circumcised, as is written, 'And my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant'. {Josh: and chok implies continual.} And it says 'And you shall establish it for Yaakov as a חוק.'


וְתוֹרֹתָי -- that I said to him 'Lech Lecha to the land that I show you.' And a proof to the matter is {Tehillim 32:8}:

ח  אַשְׂכִּילְךָ, וְאוֹרְךָ--בְּדֶרֶךְ-זוּ תֵלֵךְ;    אִיעֲצָה עָלֶיךָ עֵינִי.

8 'I will instruct thee and teach thee in the way which thou shalt go; I will give counsel, Mine eye being upon thee.'

and so too {Tehillim 25:12}:

יב  מִי-זֶה הָאִישׁ, יְרֵא ה--    יוֹרֶנּוּ, בְּדֶרֶךְ יִבְחָר.

12 What man is he that feareth the LORD? Him will He instruct in the way that he should choose.

And all תורה is a language of instruction. 


And according to the peshat, מִצְוֹתַי and חֻקּוֹתַי  are the seven mitzvot which the children of Noach were commanded."

I'll end by saying that on a peshat level, it might not be the correct thing to highlight and analyze each part of this repetitive pasuk עֵקֶב אֲשֶׁר שָׁמַע אַבְרָהָם בְּקֹלִי וַיִּשְׁמֹר מִשְׁמַרְתִּי מִצְוֹתַי חֻקּוֹתַי וְתוֹרֹתָי. Rather, the idea is that Avraham is wholehearted in following Hashem in every sort of command Hashem has or may issue. The duplication with near synonyms, then, does not delineate specific actions, but rather any action under and between each of the terms listed.

-----------------
Footnote:
* Here I am very free and liberal in interpreting Ibn Caspi, so as a reader, perhaps be more cautious.

Who was the Baal HaTurim's Woman?

Another great parsha devar Torah at Revach. He writes:

"Ki Yakum BiKirbicha Navi"; When there will be among you a False Navi who will tell you to worship Avodah Zara...This False Navi shall be put to death" The Baal Haturim states on the words," BiKirbicha" - It is the same Gematria as "Zeh HaIshah" - "This is referring to the woman". What's the pshat in this puzzling Baal Haturim?

Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains, in the time of the Baal Haturim there were many missionaries who were trying to convince the Jews that Christianity was the correct religion. They even went as far as bringing proofs from the Torah. To refute this, the Baal Haturim said, the words "BiKirbicha Navi" has the same Gematria as "Zeh HaIshah UBnah" - in the parsha of Navi Sheker (A False Navi) it alludes to "The woman and her son" - referring to Yoshkeh and his mother. The censors got a hold of this Baal Haturim and took out the word "UBnah" and that's why it only said, "Zeh HaIshah". Later this whole Baal Haturim was removed and can only be found in old manuscripts.

That is, the first word, Bekirbecha, works out to HaIsha, but we can continue the quote to the second word and get Navi, which is the same gematria as Uvenah. And this anti-Christian message was the initial intent of the Baal Haturim, which was lost through successive censorings.

I am not sure if Rabbi Akiva Eiger is saying this as a sevarah or as something he has firsthand knowledge of (or tradition from firsthand knowledge). But we see the same idea propounded in the Baal HaTurim HaAruch:

כי יקום בקרבך נביא. [שמעתי מרב

אחד, שבספר הגמטריאות מרבינו המחבר

היה כתוב, ״נביא״ בגימטריא ״ובגד.״, והושמט

בדפוסים, המו״ל דפוס הנובר]ש

I have not had the opportunity to examine kitvei yad of Baal Haturim myself, so perhaps someone who has access to them can tell whether this is in fact so. If it is so, there is nothing more to say, but if not, I have what to say. As the saying goes, אם קבלה נקבל ואם לדין יש תשובה.

Looking at the Baal Haturim inside, in our printed editions, it would be rather surprising for this to be removed by the censors but not other remarks, such as equating certain gentiles to animals, a bit later on the same page. Perhaps the motivation for censorship was particularly religion -- this could account for it, but I am still somewhat surprised.

The Baal Haturim says in full context what is pictured to the right. And the context is important. Besides saying that bekirbecha is the same gematria as haisha, he also notes that the end of this section on navi sheker, in pasuk 6, leads into ki yesitecha in pasuk 7. Thus:

ו וְהַנָּבִיא הַהוּא אוֹ חֹלֵם הַחֲלוֹם הַהוּא יוּמָת, כִּי דִבֶּר-סָרָה עַל-ה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם הַמּוֹצִיא אֶתְכֶם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם וְהַפֹּדְךָ מִבֵּית עֲבָדִים--לְהַדִּיחֲךָ מִן-הַדֶּרֶךְ, אֲשֶׁר צִוְּךָ ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ לָלֶכֶת בָּהּ; וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע, מִקִּרְבֶּךָ. {ס}	6 And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken perversion against the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed thee out of the house of bondage, to draw thee aside out of the way which the LORD thy God commanded thee to walk in. So shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee.{S}
ז כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ בֶן-אִמֶּךָ אוֹ-בִנְךָ אוֹ-בִתְּךָ אוֹ אֵשֶׁת חֵיקֶךָ, אוֹ רֵעֲךָ אֲשֶׁר כְּנַפְשְׁךָ--בַּסֵּתֶר לֵאמֹר: נֵלְכָה, וְנַעַבְדָה אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים, אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָדַעְתָּ, אַתָּה וַאֲבֹתֶיךָ.	7 If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, that is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying: 'Let us go and serve other gods,' which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers;

and this tells you that you should not heed the meisit.

I think this continuating is very telling.

I would posit that Baal Haturim originally intended haIsha, and this was not a reference to the virgin Mary. And he never wrote about Yushke. Rather, this is a reference to the Aristotelian concept of Chomer, matter. In allegorical philosophical derash of certain Rishonim, the woman refers to Matter while the man refers to Tzurah, Form (and associated to this, Intellect).

The Baal Haturim is highlighting the word bekirbecha, within you, not to mean among the assembled Israelites, but rather within the person himself, within his Intellect. And there should not arise within your Intellect (sechel) thoughts associated with Chomer, Matter, who is "the woman."

I am not making this up. This is precisely how the Baal HaTurim's contemporary, Ibn Caspi, explains a cryptic Ibn Ezra in the next section about the meisis, that in achicha ben imecha, it is a reference to the woman, who is matter, while the father is form. See my post on this.

And indeed, this is where context comes in. See how Baal Haturim continues, connecting the words וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ with כִּי יְסִיתְךָ. The point is that mikirbecha means that this is arising within you, in your intellect, and the reader, knowledgeable of the discussion on כִּי יְסִיתְךָ, is clued in to Baal HaTurim's meaning.

I wonder whether the רב אחד, or Rabbi Akiva Eiger, was aware of this discussion with with Ibn Ezra's comments on the meisis. After all, the entire enterprise of philosophical derash has fallen out of vogue. Does it carry over to kabbalistic interpretations of these pesukim? And if so, would they be aware of the kabbalistic connotations? I don't know.

And of course, as noted above, if it actually does say uvena in a manuscript Baal HaTurim, then this whole theory is nullified.

Why specifically the son of your mother? Ibn Ezra's Philosophical derash

The pasuk in Reeh seems to suggest that it is specifically your maternal brother who will try to tempt you to serve idols. In Devarim 13:7:

ז כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ בֶן-אִמֶּךָ אוֹ-בִנְךָ אוֹ-בִתְּךָ אוֹ אֵשֶׁת חֵיקֶךָ, אוֹ רֵעֲךָ אֲשֶׁר כְּנַפְשְׁךָ--בַּסֵּתֶר לֵאמֹר: נֵלְכָה, וְנַעַבְדָה אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים, אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָדַעְתָּ, אַתָּה וַאֲבֹתֶיךָ.

7 If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, that is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying: 'Let us go and serve other gods,' which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers;

I don't think that this is peshat. Rather, the Torah is engaging in poetry for the purpose of stressing your emotional connection. He is not only your brother, but he is your mother's son. Similarly, the wife of your bosom. And similarly, your close friend who is like your own soul! Why stress this? Because of the followup, to disregard this personal connection, and not to spare or conceal him:

ט לֹא-תֹאבֶה לוֹ, וְלֹא תִשְׁמַע אֵלָיו; וְלֹא-תָחוֹס עֵינְךָ עָלָיו, וְלֹא-תַחְמֹל וְלֹא-תְכַסֶּה עָלָיו.	9 thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him; neither shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him;
י כִּי הָרֹג תַּהַרְגֶנּוּ, יָדְךָ תִּהְיֶה-בּוֹ בָרִאשׁוֹנָה לַהֲמִיתוֹ; וְיַד כָּל-הָעָם, בָּאַחֲרֹנָה.	10 but thou shalt surely kill him; thy hand shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people.

But of course, naturally, he is also your paternal brother. Focusing too much on the words and making close diyukim will take us away from peshat in this instance.

Rashi makes such close diyukim, in order to derive separately the maternal and paternal brother. Thus, he writes:

your brother: from the father[’s side].		אחיך: מאב:
the son of your mother: from the mother[’s side].		בן אמך: מאם:

Ibn Ezra writes on this:

[יג, ז]
כי יסיתך אחיך -
הטעם אפילו אחיך.

וטעם בן אמך
שהייתם בבטן אחת והאם כגוף והאב כצורה והצורה לא יבינוה, כי אם מתי מעט.

He might be saying that there is stress on the fact that it is ben imecha, but that people don't appreciate that emotional connection as much. Or maybe he is agreeing that it is only the maternal brother. I am not certain.

But the supercommentators of Ibn Ezra see a much deeper message in Ibn Ezra's words. Well, not Avi Ezer who thinks they are reading too much into Ibn Ezra. Avi Ezer just notes that many times ach is paired with the aspect of maternal brother. And by "guf" he means that maternal brothers are from one guf, while as for a paternal brother, since they are just in one "tzurah," there is not such a close relationship and brotherly love between them based on the power of souls and traits to pair them, because the animalistic soul and the power of desire which lies in the liver, they have no relationship together except for children of the same mother, for they are from one body. And this is the straightforward meaning of the words of the Rav {=Ibn Ezra}, and the {other} supercommentators go broadly to explain the words of the Rav, and there is no need for this.

While I favor straightforward interpretations such as this, and dislike overinterpretations into texts, in this particular case I believe that the other supercommentators are likely correct in their deep interpretation of Ibn Ezra.

And that is because Ibn Ezra is often cryptic, specifically when he is writing controversial matters or mystical / philosophical matters, and his reference to tzura and guf, and saying that very few understand tzura calls out that he is engaged in some secret, and quite likely philosophical derash. Indeed, of the type of interpreting Biblical terms as references to the Aristotelian concepts of Form and Matter, as discussed in yesterday's post on philosophical derash.

Thus, to the right is Ibn Ezra, with the supercommentary of Mechokekei Yehuda, divided into the shorter Yahel Or and the more lengthy Karnei Or. He explains that by haEm keGuf, Ibn Ezra is referring to the idea that the woman is comparable to the body, which is the Matter (within the Aristotelian concepts of form and matter). He explains that by stating that the father is like the tzura (Form), Ibn Ezra is saying that it is only understable in the Intellect. And when Ibn Ezra says that only a few understand it, Yahel Or explains that this is because it is not possible to depict it {letzayro} except in the intellect.

In Karnei Or, he basically cites at length the words of Ibn Kaspi in explaining this Sod of the Ibn Ezra. As such, I'll translate it after giving the text of Ibn Caspi.

As Ibn Caspi writes in his sefer explaining the sodot of Ibn Ezra (after I fixed up the OCR):

[sic] אמר ר"א : כי יסיתך אחיך, הטעם אפילו אחיך, וטעם בן עמך ,

שהייתם בבטן אחד, והאם בגוף והאב בצורה, והצורה לא יבינהו כ״א

מתי מספר.

החכם ר״א, רצה להודיע לנו ענין מעניני הטבע באמרו והאם

בגוף והאב בצורה, כי באמרו כי יסיתך אחיך בן אמך, נראה כי אין

הכונה על אחיו חמוחש, כי היה די באחיך לבד, אבל יש לומר

שתורתינו רמזה על שאינו מוחש , וכי גם שלמה המשילם באיש ואשה .ק

ועתה בא לומר כאלו השפע האלהי מצוה על המחשבות השכל שהוא

הצורה: הזהר שלא יפתה אותך מחשבות החומר שהוא האם , ובעת שירצו

לפתותך אל תשמע אליהם כי זה הפך מה שאמר הכתוב : ואל אישך

תשוקתך שהוא הצורה, והוא ימשל בך, כי כשלא ימשול החומר

הוא בן חורין, ויקרא עבד י״י, כמו משה, כאמרו: משה עבדי מת

יהושע א׳): ואמרו: כי הצורה לא יבינהו כ"א מתי מספרי בעבור כי)

איננה גוף, וע״כ לא ידעוה אם עצם או מקרה, כי בענינים הדקים

לא דייק אנוש כולי האי, וזהו האמת .

Thus, first he cites Ibn Ezra, and then he explains:

The scholar Ibn Ezra wished to inform us a matter of the natural matters, when he said "and the mother is in {/is like} the body {Josh: as far as I can tell, he has ב rather than כ in בגוף and בצורה. See inside, as least as printed} and the father is in {/is like} the form. For when it said כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ בֶן-אִמֶּךָ, it is apparent that the intent was not on the tangible brother, for then it would have sufficed with "your brother" alone {rather than also "son of your mother"}. But there is to say that our Torah was hinting on that which was not tangible, for also Shlomo {Hamelech} allegorized them as a man and a woman.

And now it comes to say that it is as if the Divine Influence commands the thoughts of the Intellect, which {=the Intellect} is the Form: Be careful that the thoughts of the Matter, which is the mother {em}, do not seduce you, and at the time they wish to seduce you, do not heed them, for this is the opposite of what Scriptures told you {in Bereishit 3:16}:

{

טז אֶל-הָאִשָּׁה אָמַר, הַרְבָּה אַרְבֶּה עִצְּבוֹנֵךְ וְהֵרֹנֵךְ--בְּעֶצֶב, תֵּלְדִי בָנִים; וְאֶל-אִישֵׁךְ, תְּשׁוּקָתֵךְ, וְהוּא, יִמְשָׁל-בָּךְ. {ס}

16 Unto the woman He said: 'I will greatly multiply thy pain and thy travail; in pain thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.' {S}

}

"and they desire shall be to thy husband" -- that he is the Form;

"and he shall rule over thee" -- for when the Matter does not rule, he is a free man, and he is called a servant of God, just like Moshe, as it said (in Yehoshua 1) "Moshe My servant has died."

And he {=Ibn Ezra} said: "For the Form, only a very few understand it" -- for it is not body, and perform one does not know it, whether it is an Intrinsic Aspect of an Accidental Aspect, for in these fine matters people are not so precise, and this is the truth.

Admittedly, I am not expert enough in medieval Jewish philosophy and or kabbalah to know for certain that Ibn Ezra is engaging in philosophical derash, or that if he is, Ibn Caspi has arrived at the correct interpretation of Ibn Ezra's words.

Indeed, my inclination is that at the least, the last part of Ibn Caspi's interpretation is off the mark, and the fact that few understand Form is not a separate meta-comment, but rather a reason why the Form-based thoughts and intellectual seduction are less likely to succeed than Matter-based thoughts and seduction. To expand, though I am again admittedly groping in the dark, on the same pasuk, Rashi writes:

[If your brother…tempts you] in secret: Scripture speaks of what commonly [occurs, but does not exclude the other case, i.e., one who entices publicly], for usually the one who entices speaks clandestinely. Similarly, Solomon [describing an episode of enticement,] says: “In the twilight, in the evening time, in the blackness of night and the darkness” (Prov. 7:9). - [Sifrei]

בסתר: דבר הכתוב בהווה, שאין דברי מסית אלא בסתר. וכן שלמה הוא אומר (משלי ז, ט) בנשף בערב יום באישון לילה ואפלה:

That the Torah speaks of what commonly occurs is a very well-known concept in the realm of parshanut. Since it is quite possible that Ibn Ezra treats this as referring to a maternal brother rather than a paternal brother, or the equivalent Aristotelian concepts in the realm of allegorical philosophical derash, he needs to explain why this is so. And the answer is that דבר הכתוב בהווה. On a literal level, he would hearken more to a maternal brother since they shared the same womb, though at different times. On a philosophical level, there is something about Form and Matter that makes Matter-based intellectual seduction more successful, and part of it is that only a few really work with and deal with Form, because of most people's limitations.

If we say this, it is not a matter of necessarily having Form {or Intellect} ignore Matter. There are two ways one can deviate into heresy and away from Hashem, one in Form and one in Matter. But דבר הכתוב בהווה.

Thus, I have my doubts about Ibn Caspi's particular interpretation of Ibn Ezra, but at the same time I am fully aware of my limitations in this area and must loudly proclaim them. Perhaps someone with more familiarity with these concepts can grapple with this, and tell me if I am off the mark.

Is the Ran an apikores, by his own definition? part three

(See part one and part two.)

There is a famous statement of the Ran, in Derush 5 of Derashot HaRan. (See here.)

וכמו שנצטוינו לילך אחר הסכמתם במשפטי התורה כן נצטוינו לכל מה שאמרו לנו על צד הקבלה מהדעות ומדרשי הפסוקים, יהיה המאמר ההוא מצווה או לא יהיה ,ישראל הנוטה מדבריהם אפי׳ במה שאינו מביאורי המצוות הוא אפיקורוס ואין לו חלק לעוה״ב

In English:

“As we were commanded to follow the consensus [of the Sages] in the laws of the Torah, so we were commanded to [follow] everything they say to us from the aspect of tradition [Heb. al ẓad ha- kabbalah], from among ideas and midrashim of [Scriptural] verses, whether that statement is a miẓvah or not. A Jew who deviates from their words — even in that which does not pertain to explaining miẓvot — is a heretic [Heb. appikoros] and has no share toward the World to Come.”

And yet, as I noted in part one and part two of this short series, Ran himself argues with midrash and presents his own novel "peshat" interpretation of pesukim and Biblical history. Thus, despite a midrash that extends makkat bechorot even to firstborns of their father, Ran insists that it was only the firstborns to the mother, and that some trait associated with developing in a pristine womb was exploited to target only those firstborns. And despite a midrash that states that those building Migdal Bavel sinned by trying to overthrow the Almighty, Ran says that people would have to morons to try this, and instead it was a preemptive matter by Hashem to protect the monotheists from a global government which would grant them no quarter to flee.

If he argues with midrashim, dismisses them as reality like this, and offers his own interpretation, is he an apikores? Does he lose his share in the world to come?

This is something to grapple with, especially if you put forth this quote from the Ran to argue that others must accept all midrashim. And so the previous two posts were about grappling with this question. In this post, I present what I believe to be a strong answer.

It is based on what the Ran writes in Drush 6. The following is my rough translation:

And as the generations became more deficient in the days of Yeshaya, he saw that this heelem {concealment} which David intended {by reducing the mitzvot to eleven} to restore the damage, for they did not complete the eleven, and they selected out for them a smaller number of mitzvot than these which were plentiful in benefits such that they would fulfill them and merit in them. And therefore they established them at six.

And in the days of Micha, where they became even more deficient in completeness, they therefore established them at three. And the three which Micha said were {Micha 6:8}:

ח הִגִּיד לְךָ אָדָם, מַה-טּוֹב; וּמָה-ה' דּוֹרֵשׁ מִמְּךָ, כִּי אִם-עֲשׂוֹת מִשְׁפָּט וְאַהֲבַת חֶסֶד, וְהַצְנֵעַ לֶכֶת, עִם-אֱלֹהֶיךָ. {ס}

8 It hath been told thee, O man, what is good, and what the LORD doth require of thee: only to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God. {S}

And Raza"l explained (there) that asot mishpat are the laws; ve`ahavat chesed -- this is performing acts of kindness; ve`hatznea lechet -- this is taking out {escorting} the dead body and escorting the bride.

And are not these matters a kal vachomer? If things which are not of their way to be performed with hatznea {modest, unassuming}, things whose way is to be performed with tzin'a, all the more so! The aim with this is that even the things which are usually only performed with pirsum {promulgation}, such as those things which they are accustomed to do at the festivities of bridegrooms, it is not proper to increase their pirsum, but rather it is proper to minimize the pirsum as much as possible.

And it is proper, according to this, after the custom has spread to made a derasha at the time of the wedding, that they make the derush in the house of the wedding {rather than in the synagogue to great attendance}, for even in matters where the normal way is not to perform them privately, the Torah said "veHatznea lechet."

So ends my quote and translation from Drashos HaRan. What does this mean? And what is his concern for the derush made at the time of the wedding?!

It is time for a history lesson. The text to the right is taken from People of the Book, by Moshe Halbertal. It is a short excerpt, enough to get across the point, but read the whole couple of pages over at Google Books.

In my first red underline, we see that the famous controversy approximately that time was about a particular rationalist method of interpretation, extreme philosophical derash, in which the Biblical narrative was not historically true but was purely an allegory. Thus, Avraham and Sarah did not exist, but were merely allegories for the Aristotelian concepts of form and matter, tzurah and chomer. Abba Mari, as the text notes, was willing to accept allegorical interpretations of difficult Talmudic passages, presumably aggadah, in accordance with the Rambam. But this was taking it too far!

And this possibly heretical derasha which spurred Abba Mari to begin his campaign against this pattern and method of philosophical derash was one given at a wedding.

Turning back to the text of Derashot HaRan, IIRC, I've seen (I think in a critical edition of it) that the Ran, in discussing the propriety of making the derasha of a wedding feast in public or in private, was referring obliquely to this famous incident.

The next underlined text (above) refers to the great antinomial (against law, that is, undermining halacha) potential of this method of allegorical interpretation. If Avraham and Sarah can be said to be fictional and not intended literally, a next logical step would be to do the same for mitzvot and aveirot.

And the next underlined text (right), that there is a fine line between these two, and the allegorizers were accused of harboring a secret intention to cross that line.

Turning back to the Ran's condemnation of certain people who deny the truth of Chazal's traditional interpretation of Scriptures, he wrote:

“As we were commanded to follow the consensus [of the Sages] in the laws of the Torah, so we were commanded to [follow] everything they say to us from the aspect of tradition [Heb. al ẓad ha- kabbalah], from among ideas and midrashim of [Scriptural] verses, whether that statement is a miẓvah or not. A Jew who deviates from their words — even in that which does not pertain to explaining miẓvot — is a heretic [Heb. appikoros] and has no share toward the World to Come.”

Assuming that he is targeting the allegorizers of Scripture, as I strongly suspect, he is saying that of course if they allegorize the commandments, and in doing so undermine and reject the traditional understanding and interpretation of pesukim relating to mitzvot, they are certainly apikorsim. There is no novelty there. But even if they don't, but just restrict themselves to allegorizing narrative, against the tradition of meaning of those verses, they are already heretics. But the connection was already there because of the aforementioned "fine line."

Abba Mari lived towards the end of the 13th century, and was joined in this by Rashba (1235-1310), who strongly opposed this new method of interpretation which allegorized Biblical history; and imposed a restriction on young men, under the age of 30, from learning secular philosophy or the sciences, except for medicine. (Much as was done in other contexts for the study of kabbalah.) Ran lived in Barcelona just after Rashba (1320-1380), and he would presumably be very cognizant of this dispute. Yet he himself knows philosophy, especially that of Rambam and Ibn Ezra, and Derashot HaRan is a philosophical work.

Even so (if I may put forth the argument), there is philosophy and there is philosophy. Cleaving to philosophy in a way that makes the Biblical text entirely fiction in pursuit of an allegory not only "falsifies" Scripture, but also effectively denies all of the narrative midrash of Chazal. Unless of course one finds a "pnimiyus" interpretation in every single midrash assuming the existence of Biblical figures. I don't know if they were doing this, though Shadal does speak of philosophical derash reinterpreting psukim as well as maamarei Chazal. Even if one does this and is not explicitly against Chazal, for someone who does not believe that such reinterpretation indeed true, then they are in effect arguing against Chazal and putting in place a foreign belief system.

If all this is correct, then it makes perfect sense that while labelling as heretics those who would dismiss and argue with aggada, or the traditional interpretation of pesukim, Ran could still offer his own novel insights and midrashic interpretations. Ibn Ezra, who Ran speaks of positively in derashot haRan, is no heretic, despite arguing on quite a number of occassions with the midrashic interpretation, in ways in which the midrash could not be simultaneously true. This is all no problem, because Ran's target is a much more drastic one. Individual medieval parshanim might argue on a given midrash all the time, and some might even reject many midrashim and adopt a more peshat-oriented approach as most truthful. But they are working within a framework of pardes. And at the very least, they accept that there is a peshat. But these allegorizers would deny that there is any peshat at all, undermining quite a fundamental. It is all to be interpreted on the level of philosophical derash. It is easy to see how he might label an allegorizer an apikores.

Yirmeyahu and Plato, but not in Egypt

When I initially wrote my previous post on the subject, I confused the impact of the missing years. It is under the Jewish, rather than secular chronology, that the churban bayis rishon is contemporary with Plato. It is now corrected.

As an anonymous commenter commented, if this incident occurred in Yerushalayim just after the churban, then even with Jewish chronology there is a problem, because Plato would only be six years old at the time. Luckily for us, in all the versions of the story I cited, this did not occur in Yerushalayim just after the churban, but rather in Egypt, after Yirmeyahu had been exiled there. Indeed, Abarbanel (the rishon cited) puts this in Egypt, and about ten years after the churban, but we can even make it later. And Ibn Yachya based his retelling on the version told by Netanel Ibn Caspi's commentary, which was finished in 1424, before Abarbanel was born, and in that version as well the story is set in Egypt, possibly many years after the churban.

Other versions of the story, which fill in other details (but perhaps not -- we are relying on partial retellings), place it in Yerushalayim. This is the version attributed to Rema in his sefer Torat HaOlah. But Rema is an acharon, and anyway we cannot find this tale in his sefer; indeed, JewishEncylopedia suggests that Ibn Yachya was mistaken in attributing it to Rema. Maybe there was a variant text of the work, but when I looked it up in the sefer in the cited volume and chapter, there were other discussions on how philosophy came from the Jews but not this particular story. Here, I try to track it down to the best of my ability, but I do not get far.

Revach made note of the story last week, saying that this is found in Galus Unechama from Rav Shimshon Pincus, tatza"l. In private communication, he noted that he heard Rav Pincus sometimes read it word for word from one of Rema's seforim. But it seems possible to me that Rav Pincus was actually not reading from Torat HaOlah or one of Rema's seforim, but rather from some other source, such as the one attributed in the sefer, Lev Eliyahu by Rav Elyah Lopian, zatza"l. Of course, the sefer I am looking at, Galus Unechamah, was published posthumously, as it was published in 2002 and Rav Pinchas was niftar in 2001. Anyway, in Galus Unechama:

ירמיה הנביא ואפלטון

בספר תורת העולה לרמ"א (מובא בספר " לב אליהו " בראשית עמ ' רסג) מסופר, שבשעה שראה ירמיה הנביא את חורבן בית המקדש , נפל על העצים והאבנים ובכה . פגש אותו אפלטון - מפילוסופי יון, ושאלו : "אתה החכם שביהודים , אתה בוכה על עצים ואבנים ? ! " ועוד שאל אוהו : "מה לך לבכות על העבר , מה שהיה היה , אדם חכם לא בוכה על העבר , אלא בונה את העתיד". אמר לו ירמיה : " אתה הרי פילוסוף גדול , ודאי יש לך שאלות בפילוסופיה " . אמר לו אפלטון : " יש לי שאלות אבל אינני חושב שיש מי שיורע לענות עליהן ". אמר לו ירמיה : " שאל אותן ואני אשיב לך עליהן " . אפלטון שאל - וירמיה ענה לו על כל קושיותיו, עד שתמה הפילוסוף אם העומד לפניו הוא אדם או שמא מלאך המלא בחכמה נפלאה . אמר לו ירמיה : "דע לך שכל חכמתי היא מאותם עצים ואבנים ! - ומה ששאלת מדוע אני בוכה על העבר, לא אענה לך, כי דבר זה עמוק מאוד ולא תצליח להבינו - רק יהודי יכול להבין את עומק ענין הבכיה על העבר", ש

You can read the story in English, more or less, here.

When Jeremiah returned to Jerusalem from the Babylonian exile and saw the ruins of the Holy Temple, he fell on the wood and stones, weeping bitterly. At that moment, the renowned philosopher Plato passed by and saw this.

He stopped and inquired, "Who is that crying over there?"

"A Jewish sage," they replied.

So he approached Jeremiah and asked, "They say you are a sage. Why, then, are you crying over wood and stones?"

Jeremiah answered, "They say of you that you are a great philosopher. Do you have any philosophical questions that need answering?

"I do," admitted Plato, "but I don't think there is anyone who can answer them for me."

"Ask," said Jeremiah, "and I will answer them for you."

Plato proceeded to pose the questions that even he had no answers for, and Jeremiah answered them all without hesitation. Asked the astonished Plato, "Where did you learn such great wisdom?"

"From these wood and stones," the prophet replied.

One difference in this English story is that Plato also asked what the purpose was for crying about the past, and Yirmeyahu replies that this is a very deep matter which Plato will not succeed in understanding, for only a Jew is able to understand the depth of the matter of crying about the past.

I managed to track down Lev Eliyahu, and it has the same story, also attributed to the sefer Torat HaOlah. But it does not give a volume number or chapter number, and tacked on to it is an analysis by the Sabba of Kelm, Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, so it is possible he heard it second-hand from that source, rather than having seen the Toras HaOlah inside.

In the book Menasseh Ben Israel and His World, the author cites a statement by Abarbanel that the chachmei hayevanim testified that Plato spoke with him {=Jeremiah} in Egypt. He writes {I am expanding this a bit on the basis of other footnotes: "The sources of this view are discussed in detail in Idel, "Kabbalah and Ancient Philosophy in R. Isaac and Judah Abravanel," in The Philosophy of Leone Ebreo, eds. M. Dorman and Z. Levi (Tel Aviv 1985), (in Hebrew), pages 79-86." {Leone Ebreo = Yehuda Abarbanel.} {Note: Does anyone have access to this?}

Perhaps there is another printing of Torat HaOlah which has this? I examined another edition which JNUL just put up and the text is identical to what I posted before. Perhaps there is another sefer where the Rema writes it? As it stands, however, I would guess that Ibn Yachya just misremembered, since the section in Torat HaOlah does refer to Socrates and Aristotle getting their philosophical wisdom from the Jews.

Regardless of whether this is to be found in the writings of Rabbi Moshe Isserles, the details of the story must have come from somewhere. Abarbanel does not mention these details, of Plato's questions and Yirmeyahu's response. And Ibn Yachya does not mention these earlier. If it did not come from Torat HaOlah, then perhaps it came from the other source Ibn Yachya mentioned, which I did not track down. Or else perhaps someone took the existing story and filled in the blanks.

Regardless of whether the story is chronologically plausible, or historically plausible, I doubt that it happened. There is a likelihood, as mentioned, that this whole story came from Christian sources. Indeed, the rishonim refer to this as a story coming from the Greeks. Whatever your feelings on the historicity of midrashim, this is no midrash. This came from non-Jewish sources. As such, to label it ahistorical, or a Christian fiction, should not bother us in the slightest. Except of course that it was adopted by some rather prominent Jewish figures, and some people might be upset at the idea of Rishonim being wrong by relying on contemporary history; or that once a story has been adopted by the community, the consensus creates a "pesak" that it is true. I can speak for myself that I am not bothered by the idea of it being historically untrue.

More than that, the style of the story is such that it is less likely to be true, and indeed less likely to have originally been intended at true. The genre is one of homily, or of kabbalah / philosophy polemic, rather than history. How many stories begin with a philosopher asking a question of a prominent rabbi? For example, the contest between Rabban Gamliel and a philosopher, as discussed in this parshablog post:

פילוסופוס אחד בקש לידע לכמה הנחש מוליד?

כיון שראה אותם מתעסקין זה עם זה, נטלן ונתנן בחבית והיה מספיק להם מזונות עד שילדו.

כיון שעלו הזקנים לרומי שאלו את רבן גמליאל.

אמר ליה: לכמה הנחש מוליד? ולא יכול להשיבו ונתכרכמו פניו.

פגע בו רבי יהושע ופניו חולנית, אמר לו: למה פניך חולנית?

אמר לו: שאלה אחת נשאלתי ולא יכולתי להשיבו.

אמר לו: מה היא?

אמר: לכמה נחש מוליד?

אמר לו: לשבע שנים.

אמר לו: מנא לך?

אמר לו: הכלב חיה טמאה ומוליד לחמשים יום, ובהמה טמאה יולדת לי"ב חודש. וכתיב: ארור אתה מכל הבהמה ומכל חית השדה, וכשם שהבהמה ארורה מן החיה שבעה, כך נחש ארור מהבהמה שבעה.

כמפני רמשא סלק ואמר ליה. התחיל מטיח ראשו לכותל.

אמר: כל מה שעמלתי שבע שנים, בא זה והושיטו לי בקנה אחד

Indeed, it may have begun as someone's wondering how Yirmeyahu would have dealt with Plato's method of dialogue. Or else to convey the notion that it was a very Jewish idea to mourn for the past.