Koy and Chatzi Shiur - Yoma 74

 On Yoma 74:

איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש אין לי אלא כל שישנו בעונש ישנו באזהרה כוי וחצי שיעור הואיל ואינו בעונש יכול אינו באזהרה תלמוד לומר כל חלב מדרבנן וקרא אסמכתא בעלמא

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from what was taught in a baraita with regard to the prohibition of forbidden fat: I have derived only that anything that is included in the punishment of karet is included in the prohibition. However, one might have thought that there is no prohibition to eat fat of a koy, or a half-measure of forbidden fat, since there is no punishment for those. Therefore, the verse states: “ All fat” (Leviticus 7:23), indicating that there is a prohibition to eat any kind of fat, including fat of uncertain status and a half-measure of fat. Therefore, a half-measure of fat is prohibited by Torah law. Reish Lakish rejects this argument: This prohibition is rabbinic, and the verse brought as a proof is a mere support. It cannot be claimed that there is such a prohibition by Torah law.

Why would the brayta put together koy and chatzi shiur. Is the focus of Rabbi Yochanan's question just the latter part, the chatzi shiur, but these are just linked together in the derasha?

We could possibly answer based on Rav Chisda's understanding of a kvi / koy. On Chullin 79b, he defines it as a hybrid of a he-goat and a doe. Thus, it has aspects of both. And only the chelev of beheimot, not chayot, are prohibited. This is not a matter of safek, but rather of an instrinsic chatzi shiur.

Shabbat 75: Keeping the chilazon alive

For today's daf yomi, Shabbat 75a, let us consider the chilazon. Does the gemara's description of it match up with what contemporary scientific sources say about it? In particular, here is Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia, Book 9, Chapter 60.

The quote I would like to focus on is this:

"People strive to catch this fish alive, because it discharges it juice with its life; and from the larger purples they get the juice by stripping off the shell, but they crush the smaller ones alive with the shell, as that is the only way to make them discharge the juice."

This matches up with some of the statements in the gemara. My concern is more with statements of named Amoraim. Statements of the setama degemara, which might well be from the Savoraim or later, do not concern me as much, as they never saw a murex snail and were far in time from when the chilazon was available.

A brayta firstly talks about first catching and then being "potzeia" a chilazon:

הַצָּד חִלָּזוֹן וְהַפּוֹצְעוֹ — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם. שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: פְּצִיעָה בִּכְלַל דִּישָׁה. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אֵין פְּצִיעָה בִּכְלַל דִּישָׁה.

The Tanna Kamma says he is liable for two acts, while Rabbi Yehuda says only for one act. That is slightly ambiguous, because perhaps Rabbi Yehuda holds there is no such thing as catching a slow-moving chilazon. The brayta (maybe a later stratum) continues and clarifies that all hold there is a liability for the catching, and the dispute is about potzea - whether this is like disha, threshing.

What is petzia? Rashi writes:  הפוצעו - דוחקו בידיו שיצא דמו: That is, he squeezes / crushes it in his hands so that the blood will come out. Potzea usually means to crush or crack open. See Jastrow.

I am not sure if I am forcing this explanation, but perhaps we can say that the brayta is ambiguous. Is it possible to that petzia is the same as the "stripping off of the shell" of the larger murex, and that there is some cracking open that is possible here, that does not kill it?

Rava says that this is only an issue of whether disha (threshing) applies only to plants.

אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן — קָסָבְרִי אֵין דִּישָׁה אֶלָּא לְגִדּוּלֵי קַרְקַע.

The setama degemara objects that there is the issue of taking a life! This is a prelude to the (earlier) statement of Rabbi Yochanan, that we are dealing with a dead murex:

וְלִיחַיַּיב נָמֵי מִשּׁוּם נְטִילַת נְשָׁמָה! אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שֶׁפְּצָעוֹ מֵת.

And Rava disagrees and says that it could even apply to a live murex, because that is not his intent.

רָבָא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא שֶׁפְּצָעוֹ חַי, מִתְעַסֵּק הוּא אֵצֶל נְטִילַת נְשָׁמָה.

The setama degemara objects that this is a statement by Rava, and Abaye and Rava agree about pesik reisha velo yamut. And answers that here, it is not in the person's interest that the murex dies, because if extracted while alive, the dye will be clearer.

 וְהָא אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַויְיהוּ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בִּ״פְסִיק רֵישֵׁיהּ וְלֹא יָמוּת״! שָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּכַמָּה דְּאִית בֵּיהּ נְשָׁמָה טְפֵי נִיחָא לֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלֵיצִיל צִיבְעֵיהּ.

This reason, that its dye will be clearer, is Rashi's explanation, and Rashi's girsa of the gemara. (He says "Hachi Garsinan").

דליציל ציבעיה גרסינן - שתהא מראית צבעו צלולה:

What would be the alternative? Maybe a sense of hatzala, saving its dye. It is like hatzala. The variant manuscript in question is ktav yad Vatikan. Here, from the Hachi Garsinan website, is a comparison of several manuscripts:

And it glosses delitzlei as denitzlach, that it be saved.

Dr. Mendel Singer, a Radziner chassid, in his article about the criteria for the chilazon, in which he tries to show that the murex does not match, writes:

Dye is better while chilazon is alive: We learn in the Gemara that people try not to kill the chilazon when extracting the dye because the dye is better if extracted while the chilazon is alive.[42] From this Gemara we learn that there is a significant difference in the dye when extracted while the chilazon is alive and when it is extracted just moments after its death. Petil followers argue that the murex secretion (mucus) loses its dyeing power a few hours after the snail's death. This doesn't help since the Gemara is speaking not of a few hours, but mere moments after death. Another problem is Pliny's statement that the murex discharges its dye upon death.[43] If so, the reason not to kill the murex when removing the gland containing the dye is because otherwise the precious few drops of dye will be lost!

I personally would not try, like the Petil people, to make the setama's statement accord with contemporary observed reality. In terms of Rabbi Yochanan, he could be dealing with a dead chilazon. In terms of Rava, he could be dealing with a live chilazon. But we see from Pliny that people prefer, at least with the large snails where it is possible, to not crush it with the shell. It is only the smaller snails that they crush with the shell. It could be that this brings in impurities, because you are mixing it with bits of shell and other flesh of the snail. Indeed, the extracted dye will not be tzalil, pure. You would need to filter it. As the setama describes, perhaps.

I am a bit stymied by Dr. Singer's last two sentences, though:

Another problem is Pliny's statement that the murex discharges its dye upon death.[43] If so, the reason not to kill the murex when removing the gland containing the dye is because otherwise the precious few drops of dye will be lost!

I can only surmise that he was exposed to Pliny secondhand, and so did not see the full context. Recall that Pliny wrote:

"People strive to catch this fish alive, because it discharges it juice with its life; and from the larger purples they get the juice by stripping off the shell, but they crush the smaller ones alive with the shell, as that is the only way to make them discharge the juice."

The same Pliny who wrote that it discharges its dye upon death said immediately that they crush the smaller murex alive with its shell, to make them discharge the juice. Obviously Pliny is not saying that when you crush a live murex, killing it, the drops will be lost! That would be nonsensical.

Rather, Pliny seems to mean that, if a murex dies in the water, it discharges the dye into the water, and so you will not have a chance to extract it. But once you catch it alive, you can do with it what you will - strip off the shell for larger murex, crush it alive for smaller murex. And then they will discharge their juice / dye, which you can use.

So Dr. Singer presumably did not see Pliny inside, and kvetches him beyond recognition. However, if Dr. Singer does want to say that the concern of the gemara should be is that precious drops of dye will be lost, he can always use the Vatican manuscript, which interprets the word as hatzala, דנצלח צבעיה, or even interpret our own girsa in like manner.

Berachot 62: Roman Replacement

In today's daf yomi, Berachot 62b:

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר עָל לְבֵית הַכִּסֵּא. אֲתָא הַהוּא רוֹמָאָה דַּחֲקֵיהּ. קָם רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וּנְפַק. אֲתָא דְּרָקֹונָא שַׁמְטֵיהּ לְכַרְכְּשֵׁיהּ. קָרֵי עֲלֵיהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: ״וְאֶתֵּן אָדָם תַּחְתֶּיךָ״, אַל תִּקְרֵי ״אָדָם״ אֶלָּא ״אֱדוֹם״.

The Gemara relates that Rabbi Elazar entered a bathroom. This Roman came and pushed him away. Rabbi Elazar stood and left, and a serpent came and ripped out the intestines of the Roman. Rabbi Elazar recited the following verse about the Roman: “Therefore I will give man [adam] for you” (Isaiah 43:4); do not read it as adam, but rather read it as Edom, meaning a Roman.

Rashi translates כַרְכְּשֵׁיהּ as חלחולת שהרעי יוצא בו שקורין טבחיא, and so Artscroll translates it as rectum. (Rect 'um? Dang near killed 'im!)

I think the derasha here is more than the al tikrei for Adam / Edom. It is also based on the word tachtecha. Therefore I will give an Edomite as for your rectum.

Assuming the Babylonian Amoraim were Ashkenazim, there could be a similar derasha at play in the segment that follows, on the pasuk: ״וְאָמַר לַהֲרָגֲךָ וַתָּחָס עָלֶיךָ״, about what happened when King Shaul went to relieve himself.

Berachot 58a: No Reshut HaRabbim

On today's daf (Berachot 58a), the following statement of Ulla, accompanied by a brayta:

אָמַר עוּלָּא: נְקִיטִינַן אֵין אוּכְלוּסָא בְּבָבֶל. 

תָּנָא: אֵין אוּכְלוּסָא פְּחוּתָה מִשִּׁשִּׁים רִבּוֹא.

Ulla said: We hold there is no multitude in Babylonia. 

The Sage taught: A multitude is no fewer than six hundred thousand people. 

Artscroll points us to Kesef Mishneh to Rambam Hilchot Berachot 10:11, that the blessing (chacham harazim) is only said in Eretz Yisrael, and to Maadanei Yom Tov on the Rosh that it is inappropriate to make such a blessing on Jews in exile.

That is one possible interpretation. Another is that there won't be a gathering of shishim ribo in Bavel, and perhaps by extension elsewhere in exile. And that might have repercussions elsewhere.

We should connect it to another statement of Ulla, which he might have made. People wonder at the basis of Rashi's statement that a reshut harabbim requires 600,000. That is, in Eruvin 6b, Rashi writes:

רה"ר - משמע רחב שש עשרה אמה ועיר שמצויין בה ששים ריבוא ואין בה חומה (או) שהיה רה"ר שלה מכוון משער לשער שיהא מפולש דומה לדגלי מדבר:

The Meira and Ravya each refer to a (slightly different) Talmudic text of Shabbat 6a that we don't have in our printed edition. But it exists in Ktav Yad Vatikan and in a rubbed out marginal text in Ktav Yad Minkin. You can read more about this on the Eruv Online blog. Here is the image from the Vatican manuscript of Shabbat 6a:

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That is, that there is no reshut harabbim in Bavel. And further, from Rabba bar bar Chana, if not for the walls of Yerushalayim closed at night, people would be liable because of Reshut HaRabbim.

This accords well with the Resh Lakish's opinion in the Yerushalmi Eruvin that there is no reshut harabbim nowadays. It will technically exist sometime in the messianic future, when all hills and mountains are flattened. This is a general trend of eliminating the reshut harabbim deorayta, so that various halachic positions can be applied.

Eruv Online also mentioned a Gra, who asks how Ulla can say there is no uchlesa (=shishim ribbo) in Bavel, if the same Ulla says (Ketubot 54a) that Mechoza would be a reshut harabbim if not for their closing their doors at night, given that Rashi there says that there was shishim ribbo in that city. And he cites an answer I don't like so much, about Bavel the city vs. Bavel the country, and then points out a Tosafot that contradicts that assumption.

I think the answer is straightforward. Ignore the details. Ulla in both cases comes to undo the status of reshut haraabim. There are ways of doing it: Resh Lakish's nuclear option; Ulla's statement that there is no multitude (=shishim ribbo); and Rabba bar bar Chana's statement about Yerushalayim and closing the doors at night.

That Ulla in Ketubot instead applies Rabba bar bar Chana's rule, to the Babylonian Mechoza, rather than the rule he possibly stated elsewhere, about shishim ribo, is not surprising. There is an overarching aim, and he could get to it in either way. He didn't have to resort to a population count given that the city closed its doors.



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Bechorot 46: In defense of Shmuel

The Mishna:

On the point of whether the live head of a nefel which was then retracted prior to the twin's birth effectively is poter (either "exempts" his brother, or consider: effects a peter rechem -- each has the same effect). The Mishna states that it would.

However, the language of the Tosefta strongly suggests otherwise: Tosefta perek 6:

That is, it just says שיצא but does not specify the head. Indeed only for the viable nine-month infant who died is the head mentioned. And then, we see rosho verubo mentioned in the general rule. This Tosefta would be like Shmuel, in the gemara, who is "refuted" by the Mishna.

I think that because of this, the Minchat Bikurim emends the text of the Tosefta, so that it would match the Mishna.

Here is the start of the Gemara:

However, I personally believe that it is difficult to refute Shmuel based on the Mishna, as the setama degemara eventually concludes. He is a first generation Amora, just like Rav (who sometimes is a Tanna who can effectively argue). He surely knows the text of the Mishna. He is arguing with it. And it turns out, there is a brayta that supports him!

If so, I don't think we need to reinterpret the Mishna as the gemara first attempts. If we do, I am somewhat convinced by the reinterpretation - that the focus in the reisha was on the aspect of bechor lanachala rather than on the peter rechem, and the author of the Mishna tried too hard to set up a minimal pair, of a contrasting case, because the main focus was the law in the seifa, where a live head would not only not be a bechor lanachala but even not for peter rechem. That some other distant Mishna states that novelty explicitly or implicitly does not mean, to me, that the gemara is right that the novelty is no longer necessary, and so the kvetch is unnecessary, which means we cannot reinterpret the Mishna. I don't accept the tanina, which I am not sure is even so regularly applied. Rather, it shows that the "novelty" is indeed something that is true, that holds in general. And so the Tanna's focus was similarly on this law, and in this focus ended up loosening the precision of the reisha. Indeed, I suspect that the Tosefta, and its language, is an earlier form of the gemara in reinterpreting the Mishna. (Thus for example the emphasis on rosho verubo.)

But even if we do say the Mishna is against Shmuel, we have a brayta that supports him. This is no refutation.

Bechorot 37-38: Trephination

Once again, I find myself taking issue with a Talmudology post. Trephination might be mentioned in the Mishna / Talmud, but why did the ancients practice this art?

Let us start by establishing the meaning of the word מקדח. It literally means a drill or borer, rather than the hole made by a drill. To cite Jastrow:

Talmudology writes:

בכורות לז,ב

ובגולגולת ב"ש אומרים כמלא מקדח וב"ה אומרים כדי שינטל מן החי וימות

Concerning the deficiency in the skull: Beit Shammai say that it must be missing a piece like the size of a drilled hole, and Beit Hillel say: It must be missing an amount that if removed from a living person, he would die.

But just how big is Bet Shammai’s “size of a drilled hole?” In tomorrow’s daf (38a) we learn that it is the size of “the small drill hole, used by physicians” (בקטן של רופאים). So around the first century BCE there were physicians going around drilling holes (of various sizes) into the skulls of the living. Why on earth would they do such a thing, and just how common was this practice?

I believe that this is a mistaken translation. It is not that the physicians were drilling holes of various sizes, large and small. Rather, there were drills of various sizes. The Mishna in Ohalot, cited by our gemara, contrasts Rabbi Meir's position that it was a hole made by a small drill, that of doctors, to the chachamim who say it is the hole made by a larger drill, used in the Temple:

דתנן באיזה מקדח אמרו בקטן של רופאים דברי רבי מאיר וחכ"א בגדול של לשכה

As we learned in a mishna (Oholot 2:3): With regard to which drill did Beit Shammai state their opinion concerning an incomplete skull? It was with regard to a small drill of doctors, used for drilling bones. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: It was with regard to a largedrill, such as that used in the Temple chamber. According to the mishna concerning a window that imparts impurity, the size of this drill is like that of a sela coin, and the opinions of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel would still be identical.

So it is not a small vs. large hole that doctors make, but rather a smaller hole, made by the smaller drill, which is the standard drill doctors use. Nothing in the Mishna or gemara itself states that doctors use this to drill a hole in a skull - trephination -  rather than in other bone, but Rashi does in fact make the leap and state that the doctor drilled a hole in the skull:

באיזה מקדח אמרו - ב"ש בגולגולת כמלא מקדח כקטן של רופאים שקודרין בו את הראש לתקן את המכה:

Along the way, Rashi also gives an explicit reason the doctors would drill such a hole - to fix a head injury.

This is also where I think Talmudology missed the boat. Why did the doctors drill into the skull? He should mention Rashi. Instead, the only scientific discussion is why it was practiced in rather ancient cultures, as a result of superstition:

“..an opening in the head, trephination, could be “the activating element,” the act that could allow the demon to leave the body or the good spirit to enter it, for the necessary “undying” process to take place. If deities had to enter or leave the head, the opening had to be sufficiently large…The head was chosen for the procedure, not because of any particular intrinsic importance or because of magic or religious reasons, but because of the unique and universally accumulated experience observed by primitive man in the Stone Age with ubiquitous head injuries during altercations and hunting. Otherwise, the pelvic bone or femur could have served the same purpose. We must recall that even the much more advanced ancient Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Hindu, and even Hellenic civilizations believed the heart to be the center of thought and emotions, not the brain. In fact, the association of the heart with emotions lingered to the present age.

And so it was that the procedure came to be practiced across the world. This may also explain how it also ended up being used in ancient Israel, and trickled down into a teaching about ritual impurity cited by Bet Shammai.

If the purpose was to discuss the science of the Talmud, it seems that here would be a place to discuss trephination as contemporary science, as practiced by Galen, or by Hippocrates. For instance, here is Hippocrates:

That is just a taste. It is utterly confounding that he doesn't present this from a medical perspective.

Bechorot 36: The Truth Will Come Out!

The Talmudology blog is an excellent Daf Yomi blog. Its author, a doctor, looks at the modern scientific evidence for or against ideas presented in the Talmud. On today's post, about milta de'avida li'igluyei, I would have to say that he is off the mark.

In evaluating the veracity of a scientific claim in the Talmud, there are two steps. The first is establishing the content of the scientific claim. The second is checking whether the content matches the modern observable facts. I think the blogpost fails on the first step, by misidentifying the content of the claim. The disproof in the second step then misses its mark.

The claim, as put forth by Talmudology:

בכורות לו, א

מילתא דעבידא לאיגלויי לא משקרי בה אינשי

People do not lie about something that may later be revealed [as having been false]

Can a Cohen may be relied upon to testify that first-born animal in his possession has been declared by an expert to have a blemish (which would widen its permitted uses)? Rav Yehuda ruled (in the name of Rav) that the Cohen should indeed be believed. Since that expert could come forward and state that he issued no such ruling, the Cohen would not risk being discovered as having lied. In a small village or town of a few dozen to a few hundred families, this ruling is reasonable. To lie would expose the Cohen to the risk that his fraud might be exposed. But does Rav Yehuda’s no-lying rule make sense in today’s society?

The full quote is actually כל מילתא דעבידא לאיגלויי לא משקרי בה אינשי, but the omission of the word kol is not relevant. What is relevant is the English word I bolded in red above, "may".

As a contrast, this is how the Koren Talmud translated it (from Sefaria):

With regard to any matter that is likely to be revealed, people do not lie about it.

This is a major distinction. If Rav Yehuda, citing Rav, or even the setama degamara explaining him, asserts that one will not lie about anything which may / might be revealed, that means that where there is any level of risk in the matter, the person will not lie. And that is easily falsifiable. Students regularly cheat on tests, and are caught. People regularly lie, and they are caught in the lie, so there was obviously some risk. This assertion is easy to falsify.

If Rav Yehuda citing Rav asserts that this holds only when the truth is likely to come out, then that is more difficult to falsify. One would need to present studies where people lied even though there was a good likelihood that the truth would eventually come out.

The word דעבידא in the Aramaic strongly suggests the latter interpretation. That we can somewhat expect it to be revealed. The cases in which this is applied in the gemara also lends support to this interpretation. A woman claims her husband died, and we allow her to remarry. Because people know other people, the husband walking around when he is reported dead can be expected to eventually come to light. In terms of blemishes of bechorot declared by an expert, a bechor is big news, and the expert circulates. A local expert is somewhat likely to hear, and the lie will be found out.

Meanwhile, all of Talmudology's studies have to do with people who lie, either with no risk, or some risk, of being caught. This is "may", not "likely". Therefore, it is irrelevant.

Talmudology's blogpost concludes:

People will lie even if there is a risk of being discovered, and will do so brazenly and without concern for others. Just ask Elizabeth Holmes. Actually, don’t ask her, since she’d probably lie you. Rav Yehuda’s rule that people will not lie if there is a risk of their lie being uncovered is at best aspirational. Sadly, it is no-longer an accurate description of social norms. (Perhaps it never really was.) But wouldn’t it be wonderful if it were so?

Perhaps Elizabeth Holmes is somewhat who lied while knowing that she would eventually be caught out. Perhaps she dug herself into a hole and then lied in order to push off the inevitable fallout. Regardless, an anecdote is not data, and the plural of anecdote is not data. Indeed, the gemara in Bechorot itself pointed out a counterexample and dismissed this anecdotal evidence:

רפרם בפומבדיתא הוה ליה בוכרא ויהביה ליה לכהן בלא מומא אזל שדא ביה מומא יומא חד חלש בעיניה אייתיה לקמיה א"ל בכור זה נתן לי ישראל במומו ארפסיניה לעיניה חזייה בשקריה א"ל לאו אנא דיהיבתיה לך

In this regard, the Gemara relates that Rafram, who resided in Pumbedita, had a firstborn animal and he gave it to a priest in an unblemished state. The priest went and caused a blemish in it. One day, Rafram had an affliction in his eyes, which rendered it difficult for him to open them. The priest to whom Rafram had given the firstborn animal brought it before him,as an expert examiner, for him to deem the animal permitted. The priest said to him: An Israelite gave me this firstborn animal with its blemish upon it. Rafram forced his eyes open and saw the animal and recognized it [bashkerei] as the one he himself had given the priest. Rafram said to the priest: Is it not I who gave this firstborn animal to you?

ואפ"ה לא חש לה למילתא האי הוא דחציף כ"ע לא חציפי

The Gemara notes: And even so, Rafram was unconcerned by the matter of the priest’s attempted chicanery, as he maintained that it is only this priest who is impudent, but all other priests are not impudent. This scenario did not cause Rafram to discredit any other priest’s claim that he received a blemished firstborn animal from an Israelite, as this was an exceptional case. This priest demonstrated extreme impudence by bringing it to be examined by Rafram himself, and therefore one cannot draw conclusions about the behavior of other priests from this incident.

In sum, the Rav Yehuda's assertion was not disproved and shown to be merely "aspirational". Rather, the assertion was misunderstood (IMHO) and what was disproved was an assertion prime.

Daf Yomi: Zevachim 107 - hidden derashot

There are some awesome hidden derashot on Zevachim 107a. (I call a derash hidden if there is a surface and superficial way of reading it that seems 'light', but an alternative way of reading it with greater depth.)

הדתנן הזורק מקצת דמים בחוץ חייב מנלן
 נפקא ליה מדתניא
 דם יחשב לרבות הזורק דברי רבי ישמעאל רבי עקיבא אומר או זבח לרבות את הזורק

The 'straightforward' understanding of Rabbi Yishmael's derasha requires that we consult Rashi, who includes a later phrase from the pasuk as well (matching how they brayta appears in Sanhedrin):

דם יחשב דם שפך - לרבות את הזורק והאי קראי בשחוטי חוץ כתיבי:

That is, it is considered 'blood' guilt (liability) for spilling (throwing) blood. That is how Artscroll (footnote 16, in brackets) explains the difficult derasha.

I would suggest that the derasha simply focused on the words 'dam yechashev'. The peshat is that for **slaughtering** the sacrifice outside the Temple, it is considered bad, bloodshed, blood-guilt, shedding of blood. Rabbi Yishmael, in order to arrive at a (previously known?) halacha that throwing the blood also counts, narrowly focuses on the words 'dam yechashev' out of context (significance maximalism, context minimalism) and translates it as  'blood is also reckoned'.

What about Rabbi Akiva? His derasha is:
או זבח לרבות את הזורק

The full pasuk for Rabbi Akiva is:

וַאֲלֵהֶ֣ם תֹּאמַ֔ר אִ֥ישׁ אִישׁ֙ מִבֵּ֣ית יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל וּמִן־הַגֵּ֖ר אֲשֶׁר־יָג֣וּר בְּתוֹכָ֑ם אֲשֶׁר־יַעֲלֶ֥ה עֹלָ֖ה אוֹ־זָֽבַח׃

The simple meaning is that the pasuk is talking about someone who offers a burnt offering (olah) or a sacrifice (zevach), but outside the Temple. And the simple derasha is that since it does not say 'olah u-zevach', using the 'and' conjunction, but instead adds a whole word (and an alef) to make it 'olah `o zavach', using the 'or' conjunction, this is a 'ribbuy', an inclusion. And we can use inclusions to include whatever we like which is somewhat related to the context, so we are including not just the act of bringing the korban, but also the act of sprinkling. (And so the gemara goes on the 'or' being used to divide, that one need not bring both an olah and a zevach, and then goes on a sytematic derasha chain, how each interprets the others source text.)

I would suggest an alternative understanding of the derasha. The last word in the pasuk is zevach. But since it is the last word of the pasuk, it takes on a pausal form, zavach, with a kametz, yet retaining the stress on the first syllable. With the 'and' connective, it would be clear that this is a noun, and the 'olah uzavach' are the object of 'asher yaaleh'. With the 'or' connective, the word zavach can be read as a verb instead. Namely, the past tense of 'zoveach'. Then, there are two actions. Asher = who. Yaaleh olah = brings (ascends) a burnt offering. O Zavach = or who was 'zoveach'. And this other action would then be the closely related act of 'yaaleh', namely sprinkling the blood.

Avoda Zara 60b: Falling into a vat

This is inyanei de-yoma, since this appears in today's daf, and since tomorrow is St. Patrick's Day. :)

In today's daf, we have the following:

נפל לבור ועלה: אמר רב פפא לא שנו אלא שעלה מת אבל עלה חי אסור מ"ט אמר רב פפא דדמי עליה כיום אידם: 

§ The mishna teaches that if a gentile fell into the wine collection vat and emerged, it is not prohibited to derive benefit from the wine. Rav Pappa says:The Sages taught this halakha only in a case where the gentile emerged from the vat dead. But if he emerged alive, the wine is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the wine is prohibited? Rav Pappa said: Sincethe gentile was rescued from death, he considers that day like their festival day, and he offers the wine as an idolatrous libation in thanksgiving.

Rashi explains Rav Pappa's reasoning as follows:

דדמי עליה כיום אידם - ואזיל ומודה על שניצל ומסתמא נסכיה בעלייתו ואסור בהנאה

That is, since he was saved, he will thank his deity, and therefore as he is pulled out of the cistern containing the wine, he will presumably libate some of the wine.

I would suggest another possibility, that since he lives, he was happy to be in the wine cistern, since he gets to enjoy the wine! And his thrashing around in there is shichshuch of someone who having a festival day.

Talking about Yom Eidem, festival days, tomorrow is St. Patrick's Day. And this story is just on point:

Old man O'Malley had worked down at the brewery for years, but one day he just wasn't paying attention and he tripped on the walkway and fell over into the beer vat and drowned. The foreman thought it should be his job to inform the Widow O'Malley of her old man's death. He showed up at the front door and rang the bell. When she came to the door, he said, "I'm sorry to tell you, but your poor husband passed away at work today when he fell into the vat and drowned." She wept and covered her face with her apron and after a time, between sobs, she asked, "Tell me, did he suffer?" "Knowing Brian O'Malley as well as I did, I don't think so," said the foreman, "He got out three times to go to the men's room."

Daf Yomi, Shevuot 47

Something to consider when learning Shevuot 47.

The gemara reads:

חזרה שבועה למקומה:

להיכן חזרה א"ר אמי רבותינו שבבבל אמרו חזרה שבועה לסיני רבותינו שבארץ ישראל אמרו ^בחזרה שבועה למחויב לה אמר רב פפא רבותינו שבבבל רב ושמואל רבותינו שבארץ ישראל ר' אבא 

Thus, according to Rav Pappa, by "rabotainu" of Bavel, he meant Rav and Shmuel, and by "rabotainu" of E"Y, he meant Rabbi Abba, even though Rabbi Abba is just one person and even though, as Tosafot makes a diyuk from the language which says that Rabbi Abba sat before Rabbi Ammi, Rabbi Abba was a student rather than a teacher.

However, Rabbi Ami was an Amora of Eretz Yisrael (third generation). If we look at the Yerushalmi, we see Rav Hoshaya (third generation) tell Rabbi Ami this limmud.  And while the raboteinu of Bavel are left unspecified, the rabotainu of E"Y is Rabbi Yochanan citing Rabbi Yannai. These would certainly qualify as rabotainu.

ירושלמי

דף לו, ב פרק ז הלכה ד גמרא

רב הושעיה אמר קמי ר' אמי בשם רבנין דתמן חזרה שבועה לסיני רבי יוחנן בשם רבי ינאי חזרה שבועה לבעלין.  מאן דמר חזרה שבועה לסיני כמי שאין כאן עדות המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה ומאן דמר חזרה שבועה לבעלין ממה דהוא גברא חשוד ולא יכיל מישתבע לי 

קום שלם לי:

Further, if we look at the Tosefta (thus, a Tannaitic source) , we will find an explicit statement like the raboteinu of Bavel, together with a scriptural derivation. This could then be the source.

תוספתא

ו,ג  שכנגדו חשוד על השבועה כיצד זה נשבע ונוטל.  היו שניהם חשודין פטורין שנא' (שמות כב) שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם בזמן שאחד מהן חשוד לא בזמן ששניהן חשודין.  בין שניהם יוצא מבין שניהם אם הנשבע נשבע על שקר סוף שהשבועה חלה עליו ואם המשביע משביע על שקר סוף שהשבועה חלה עליו שנא' (זכריה ה) ולנה בתוך ביתו וכלתו בוא וראה דברים שאין האש אוכלתן שבועת שקר אוכלתן.

Rav Pappa could either be unaware of the identities, or is trying to associate certain known Amoraim of E"Y and Bavel, based on their statements elsewhere. But this involves some kvetches, and applying a principle from a different case to our local case. One could question whether they are indeed applicable. For instance, we end up having Rav and Shmuel establish a general principle of what happens when one is obligated in an oath and cannot swear, applying it then to our local case, while the Tosefta deduces from the pasuk, it for just this particular case, namely when both of them are unable to swear.

Meanwhile, these sources I mentioned are explicit in their position, rather than being a transfer from what they said elsewhere.

Another point. Towards the end of amud aleph, we see Rava's support for Rabbi Abba based on a brayta brought by Rabbi Ammi, in which they darshen the pasuk of shevuat Hashem tihyeh bein shneihem  -- velo min hayorshim:

דתני רבי אמי (שמות כב, י) שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם ולא בין היורשין

On the next amud, the gemara asks what the opposing position - that is, Rav and Shmuel - would do with that pasuk, since they must not hold like that brayta. And the setama degemara points us to another brayta that uses it for a quasi-homiletic purpose, namely:

ורב ושמואל האי שבועת ה' מאי קא דרשי ביה מיבעי ליה לכדתניא שמעון בן טרפון אומר שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם מלמד שהשבועה חלה על שניהם

We need not say this. We could say like the Tosefta, which explicitly takes this very pasuk to teach the very law in question - that only when one of them is suspect, and not when both of them are suspect. (Unless you want to interpret Shimon ben Tarfon's derasha to be precisely that...)

Sanhedrin 11: Where does Rav Pappa's statement end?

At the bottom of Sanhedrin 11a going on to the top of Sanhedrin 11b:

אמר רב פפא ^זרצו חדש רצו שלשים יום
 תא חזי מאי איכא בין תקיפאי קדמאי לעינוותני בתראי

This is typically understood, within the flow of the gemara, as two separate statements. That is, first Rav Pappa resolves a seeming contradiction within Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel as to whether they wait a month (29 days) or thirty days, and he says that it is up to them. Then, the setama degamara transitions to a new topic, contrasting the behavior of the earlier, purportedly arrogant Rabban Gamliel (who yet said that he and his colleagues saw fit to declare) and the later, purportedly humble Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (who said he saw fit by himself to declare). And the answer of the setama degemara is that דילמא בתר דעברוהו, perhaps it was after they had removed him (Rabban Gamliel) from office.

I would suggest that we read both of the above quoted statement as a single continuous statement from Rav Pappa. Rather than תקיפאי meaning powerful / arrogant, let it refer to the tekufa, the solar-based season. After all, one of the reasons for declaring an extra month is על התקופה. And קדמאי refers to relative earliness between the solar and lunar calendar. Further, rather than עינוותני meaning humble, let it refer to lunar time (an onah), and have בתראי refer to relative lateness.

That is, Rav Pappa is saying that we already have computed calendars and know how much it would be appropriate to correct to get them in sync, so use that number of days.

This does not seem to work with what follows. What would be the question from that brayta regarding Rabban Gamliel? (The question, we should note, is not made explicit.)  The answer certainly seems to speak to Rabban Gamliel's stature, of lack thereof, where it says

דילמא בתר דעברוהו

However, note the root עבר in the word דעברוהו. Sure, it means that he was removed from office. But isn't it odd that the topic under discussion here is עיבור השנה? Perhaps we can (poorly, as I am grasping here) reframe the question as why he used various seasonal signs rather than the calculation, or why he phrased something some way in his message. And the answer is that perhaps this was after he or they had already intercalated the year.

Praising those with whom you disagree (Bava Basra 176)

Today we finish Bava Batra. The Mishna (on the previous page) recorded a dispute, in a practical case, between Rabbi Yishmael and Shimon ben Nanas. After Ben Nanas presented his argument, Rabbi Yishmael praised Ben Nanas to the heavens:

To become a Chacham, one should study monetary laws. It is the greatest field in Torah; To learn monetary laws, one should study under Ben Nanas.

With such high praise, one might think that Rabbi Yishmael retracted. However, the gemara reports (via Rabba bar bar Chana) that not only did Rabbi Yishmael still hold firm in his position, the halacha is like him. And it turns out that even in the case of promise of repayment to save the borrower from choking, which was the comparison Ben Nanas offered, and which Rabbi Yishmael praised -- even there, Rabbi Yishmael disagrees, and the halacha is like Rabbi Yishmael.

This is a nice way to end a masechta, and is fitting for the three weeks. We can learn from Rabbi Yishmael's example. Even when we believe someone's halachic positions are wrong, we can still be polite to them, and even praise their character or thought process. All the while, holding true to what we believe is the correct halacha. And such niceness does not mean that we will lose the day.

________

Some thoughts about Rav Papa, especially after seeing the Rif and the Rosh. We saw on the previous daf that the Amoraim of Bavel were all aligned to say that Shibud is not Biblical, while all the Amoraim of Eretz Yisrael were aligned to say that it was Biblical. And when, for a moment, it seemed that a statement of Rabba indicated the opposite, the gemara explained that he was explaining it according to what the Amoraim of Eretz Yisrael held.

Then, we have Rav Pappa. He is the fifth generation, is thus Batrai, the halacha is like him, and he employs the word hilchesa. With whom does he align? Like Ulla that it is Biblical, or like Rabba that it is Rabbinic? The text of Rav Pappa in our gemara appears in the chart below, on the left hand side.

He stakes out a practical position regarding inheritors and purchasers, and the words he uses for each match exactly to what the gemara offers ("mai taama") to explain Rabba. And he is an Amora of Bavel. So it makes sense to place him as Shibud being Rabbinic. That is why a reason needs to be given to collect from the inheritors, of not closing the door before borrowers. If it were Biblical, then there would be no need to give a justification.

But the gemara in Kiddushin 13b has a different version of Rav Pappa, where his reason for inheritors is that Shibuda deOraysa, is Biblical! 

Rif and Rosh harmonize, and say it is not a dispute. Rather, Shibud is Biblical, but the reason the Rabbis didn't nullify it (as they did by purchasers, in the sefa) is the reason given, of not shutting the door before borrowers. This works. And there is a general trend of harmonizing sources to arrive at a globally optimal explanation.

There is a different derech halimud (IIRC popular in Spain before the expulsion) in which we identify the primary sugya where something is discussed and follow that. And look to a locally optimal explanation. And reasoning or interpretations from elsewhere, where it is brought it, are left there as interpretations brought to make things work.

In Kiddushin 13b, it definitely is a haavara, a transfer. The gemara introduces it that they hold (and are teaching here) that Shibud is Biblical, and then asks that they have taught this already once. Then it goes on to cite the foreign sugya, and ends with a slightly different version of Rav Pappa.

אלמא קסבר שיעבודא הוה דאורייתא והא פליגי בה חדא זימנא דרב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו מלוה על פה אינה גובה מן היורשין ולא מן הלקוחות ור' יוחנן ור"ל דאמרי תרוייהו מלוה על פה גובה בין מן היורשין בין מן הלקוחות צריכא דאי איתמר בהא בהך קאמר שמואל משום דלא מלוה כתובה בתורה היא אבל בהך אימא מודה להו לרבי יוחנן ולר"ל ואי אשמעינן בהא בהא קאמר ר' יוחנן דמלוה כתובה בתורה ככתובה בשטר דמיא אבל בהך אימא מודה ליה לשמואל צריכא אמר רב פפא הילכתא מלוה על פה גובה מן היורשין ואינו גובה מן הלקוחות גובה מן היורשין שיעבודא דאורייתא ואינו גובה מן הלקוחות דלית ליה קלא:

Also of interest is Tosafot there, who ask that Rav Pappa is different in Kiddushin and Bava Batra. But Tosafot's version of Bava Batra is different from ours:

Tosafot, Kiddushin 13b

Namely, they have explicitly in the sefa of Rav Pappa that Shibud is not Biblical. This is a quote from Tosafot, not an explanation by Tosafot. And they harmonize, but that is not our interest.

I would suggest further that, as in the case of Rabba, the primary statement by Rabba is positional, what to do in each case, as stated always in Hebrew. And the explanation (with mai taama for Rabba and bald for Rav Pappa) is the explanation by a setama, and that can be be more fluid across texts.

Bava Basra 152: Mit eyn hintn zitst men nit af tsvey ferd

There is a Yiddish idiom, which appears in various forms, Mit eyn hintn zitst men nit af tsvey ferd. מיט אײן הינטן זיצט מען ניט אױף צװײ פֿערד‫.‬
This appears in English as "You can't ride on two horses with one arse."

This idiom appears at the top of today's daf, Bava Basra 152.

"The academy of Rav said in the name of Rav, you are causing him to ride on two steeds / saddles."

The setama degemara proceeds to interpret this as a positive thing, giving the transaction some of the force of a shechiv mera and some of the force of the kinyan of a healthy person. This is problematic, because it contradicts an explicit statement of Rav elsewhere, that it will not work because a kinyan is the opposite of matnat shechiv mera. But the gemara manages to harmonize it.

This idiom only appears once in Shas, namely here. Later posekim seem to employ it in a very different sense than the setama interprets it, namely that of tartei desasrei (two contradictory aspects which will therefore not work.)

Given that it is an idiom, and it is easy to misinterpret an idiom without direct knowledge of its usage, perhaps we can suggest that the setama degemara misunderstood the idiom. (Yes, they are closer in time and place, so maybe we are misunderstanding it, but on the other hand, we have the other statement of Rav.) If its intent is indeed the same as the Yiddish expression, and the same as the later posekim, then the is the same as Rav's position elsewhere, and the contradiction was never a contradiction, but was rather explicit agreement.

Sources for Bava Basra 45

 

Yerushalmi:

דף יג, ב פרק ד הלכה ב משנה  ולא את הבור ולא את הדות אע"פ שכתב לו עומקה ורומה וצריך ליקח לו דרך דברי רבי עקיבה וחכמים אומרים אינו צריך ליקח לו דרך ומודה ר' עקיבה בזמן שאמר לו חוץ מאילו שאינו צריך ליקח לו דרך מכרן לאחר ר' עקיבה אומר אינו צריך ליקח לו דרך וחכמים אומרים צריך ליקח לו דרך:

דף יג, ב פרק ד הלכה ב גמרא  לאיזה דבר כתב עומקה ורומה שאם רצה להשפיל ישפיל הגביה יגביה.  רבה בר רב הונא בשם רב הלכה כרבי עקיבה דידן דהוא רבנן דרבי חייה.  ר' זעירא רב ירמיה בשם רב הלכה כרבי עקיבה דרבי חייה דהוא רבנן דבבלאי. 

תמן אמרין אדמון ורבי עקיבה אמר ר' לא בסתם חלוקין. 
מה נן קיימין אם דבר בריא שיש לו דרך כל עמא מודי שאין צריך ליקח לו דרך אם דבר בריא שאין לו דרך כל עמא מודו שהוא צריך ליקח לו דרך.  אלא כי נן קיימין בסתם רבי עקיבה אומר אינו צריך ליקח לו דרך וחכמים אומרים צריך ליקח לו דרך:

Tosefta:

 ואע"פ שאומר לו הוא וכל מה שבתוכו אני מוכר לך לא מכר לו את הבאר ולא את השידה ולא את הדותות והיציעים ולא את המערות שבתוכו א"כ למה כתב עומקא ורומא שאם רצה להגביה מגביה להשפיל משפיל 

How modern academic Talmud scholars can fulfill timcheh et zecher Amalek

In yesterday’s Daf Yomi, Bava Batra, Moo amud bet, there is a surprising mnemonic, עמלק סימן. That is, the four cases under discussion in the following section are arev (guarantor), malveh (lender), lokeach rishon (first purchaser) and qablan (a different type of guarantor), who may or may not testify on behalf of a certain other party as to ownership of a field. The letters spell out Amalek.

This is surprising, to use Amalek as a mnemonic, when we are supposed to blot out the memory of Amalek. And Hagahot Yaavetz (Rav Yaakov Emden) has an explanation about how it is OK to use it to remember Torah, and how there is a tipcha (disjunctive accent) on the lo of lo tishkash, לֹ֖א תִּשְׁכָּֽח , somehow telling us that it is sometimes OK for the sake of not forgetting.

The Masoret HaShas, besides pointing us to the Hagahot Yaavetz, points out that the Dikdukei Soferim notes that in many kitvei yad, this mnemonic isn’t present.

Thus, for example, we don’t find it in Ktav Yad Firenze, Paris, or Vatican.

Ktav Yad Vatican

Ktav Yad Firenze

Ktav Yad Paris

If so, perhaps we should cross out this siman, this zecher, from our gemaras. In this way, we can literally fulfill the positive command of תִּמְחֶה֙ אֶת־זֵ֣כֶר עֲמָלֵ֔ק.