Re'eh: The Bible Critic and the Rabbi

Over at A Fire Burns In Breslov, a post I'd like to comment on. It is short, so I will first reproduce a good portion of the story which forms the post:

A certain rabbi once ran into a “freethinker” who considered himself quite a scholar. With hardly a word of introduction, the non-believer declared that he was learning Bible criticism and had spoken to many religious people who were unable to reply to the compelling questions he posed. 
The rabbi asked the academic what Rishonim he had learned. The academic was obviously taken aback and his halting reply showed that he had never studied rishonim at all. He defended himself with the statement, “Clearly, the Torah must be a work that is complete in and of itself, requiring no added exposition by the rabbis...” he began.
“Anyone who thinks so has not learned it carefully,” replied the rabbi. “For example, the verse tells us, [Josh: in Re'eh] ‘and you shall slaughter of your cattle...as I have commanded you,’ yet nowhere in the rest of the Torah do we find instructions as to how we are meant to slaughter animals. Obviously, the accompanying instruction was transmitted orally—the oral Torah of the rabbis that you find superfluous.”
The academic was flustered for only a moment before blurted out his ignorant response, “There is no such verse.”
“Try parshas R’ei,” the rabbi replied. “And it’s not just there. Many mitzvos cannot possibly be fulfilled with only the written instructions.....

An inspirational story, meant to inspire. There seem three points to this story.

1. The questions raised by Biblical critics are addressed by the Rishonim.
2. Biblical critics are ignoramuses, which is why they even think these are real questions.
3. And so you should not be threatened by questions raised by them. Even if you don't know, a better educated person would know the answers.
4. Here, indeed, is a great proof 

On the other hand, it might be an authentic exchange. There are some good points made in this story, but others are not so strong. To consider this story line by line:

A certain rabbi once ran into a “freethinker” who considered himself quite a scholar.

This story is then, likely, a polemic, meant to prove a point. Once, a rabbi, a freethinker, and a chimpanzee walk into a bar...

With hardly a word of introduction, the non-believer declared that he was learning Bible criticism and had spoken to many religious people who were unable to reply to the compelling questions he posed.

This is indeed a weak point. Many religious people don't really know how to learn in depth, and are not trained to address specific types of questions. It seems that the rabbi in this story was better prepared to engage Biblical criticism -- even though as it develops, the discussion turns into one of Karaism.

The rabbi asked the academic what Rishonim he had learned. The academic was obviously taken aback and his halting reply showed that he had never studied rishonim at all. He defended himself with the statement, “Clearly, the Torah must be a work that is complete in and of itself, requiring no added exposition by the rabbis...” he began.

This might well be a good response to many an individual. And yet, other Biblical scholars / critics probably have studied at least some rishonim. Just as it was silly for this "Biblical scholar" to think that the inability of random Jews to answer his questions demonstrated anything, it it silly to think that the deficiencies of this particular fellow demonstrates anything about the validity, or lack thereof, of Biblical criticism.

The idea behind this seems to me to be that Biblical critics raise "difficulties" in the text. But these difficulties are not new discoveries, and have been adequately addressed by Rishonim who acted as Biblical commentators.

Now, the assumption in this story appears to be that the Rishonim, as commentators, only act in accordance with Oral Law and tradition. This is not necessarily the case. Some operated on a peshat level, and tried to resolve difficulties not on Oral Traditions (if that is what midrashim are), but based on other textual cues.

“Clearly, the Torah must be a work that is complete in and of itself, requiring no added exposition by the rabbis...” he began.

This is a silly argument by the Biblical scholar. Every text needs exposition. There are scholars of Shakespeare. And there are (religious and nonreligious) scholars of Bible, who explain the meaning of verses. An explanation by Rashi, or Ibn Ezra, of the Biblical text is a deep, close reading of the text itself. Furthermore, if he subscribes to Biblical criticism, why should he think that the Torah, as a single entity, is a complete work? Couldn't something have been left on the cutting-room floor, in a non-canonized work?

“Anyone who thinks so has not learned it carefully,” replied the rabbi. “For example, the verse tells us, ‘and you shall slaughter of your cattle...as I have commanded you,’ yet nowhere in the rest of the Torah do we find instructions as to how we are meant to slaughter animals. Obviously, the accompanying instruction was transmitted orally—the oral Torah of the rabbis that you find superfluous.”

This is Pharisee / Karaite Polemics 101. It is a fairly standard argument in favor of the existence of an Oral Torah. The Bible critic's response,

The academic was flustered for only a moment before blurted out his ignorant response, “There is no such verse.”

is indeed a flustered and ignorant response.

However. Just as this particular Bible critic did not know Rishonim, this particular Rabbi did not know the work of Aharon ben Yosef, the Karaite scholar. This proof is indeed Pharisee / Karaite Polemics 101. And so we should expect the Karaites to have some response to this particular proof. And indeed, the Karaites do respond. Aharon ben Yosef wrote a running commentary on all of Tanach, so you are not going to surprise him with some verse he is unaware of. And he is well aware of the traditional rabbinic interpretation of many pesukim, as well as the commentaries of Rishonim, Ibn Ezra especially.

Since this story turned into an anti-Karaite polemic, I wonder how the story would have developed were the Biblical critic to respond with the Karaite response to this prooftext. That is, the prooftext was about shechitas chullin, in parashat Re'eh. In Devarim 12:

כא  כִּי-יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם, אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לָשׂוּם שְׁמוֹ שָׁם, וְזָבַחְתָּ מִבְּקָרְךָ וּמִצֹּאנְךָ אֲשֶׁר נָתַן ה לְךָ, כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ--וְאָכַלְתָּ, בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ, בְּכֹל, אַוַּת נַפְשֶׁךָ.

21 If the place which the LORD thy God shall choose to put His name there be too far from thee, then thou shalt kill of thy herd and of thy flock, which the LORD hath given thee, as I have commanded thee, and thou shalt eat within thy gates, after all the desire of thy soul.

Yet while earlier, we find commands regarding bringing olot and zevachim, we do not find a place regarding chullin that could function as an expansion of וְזָבַחְתָּ ... כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ.

Therefore, this must have been explained to Moshe orally. That is the proof.

So what do the Karaites respond? Let us look to Aharon ben Yosef, the Karaite scholar:

"כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ, as I have commanded you: you shall [specifically] slaughter and then eat [Josh: as in Devarim 12:15, six pesukim earlier, תִּזְבַּח וְאָכַלְתָּ]. For that which is slaughtered is permitted and not that which is strangled, nor that which had a messed up slaughter. And shechita in the Hebrew language is the severing of the signs of the throat [trachea and esophagus]. And that which is stated [in Bemidbar 14] וַיִּשְׁחָטֵם בַּמִּדְבָּר [Josh: that the Egyptians would say, ch"v, that Hashem has slain the Israelites in the wilderness, in an instance which is not severing of the trachea and esophagus], this is an idiom that He has slain them like sheep.

And it is more correct [to say] that כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ means that he had commanded them in the wilderness that they eat chullin [non-korban meat] according to the laws of the sacrificed, now that He came and permitted them to eat them as chullin, He said 'as I commanded you' when they were korbanot, you shall eat them as chullin in every place, just so long as they are slaughtered as they were initially when they were korbanot."

End quote of Aharon ben Yosef.

To summarize, Aharon ben Yosef does not take כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ to mean the specific details of shechita, which would then need to be explicitly commanded, and would then need to appear in the written text, unless there were an Oral Law. Rather כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִךָ simply means that, as I mentioned immediately above in pasuk 12:15, they need to be shechted. And don't then tell me that the definition of shechted needs to be an explicit Divine definition, and command. The Hebrew language has words, and words have meaning. And the meaning of shechita as a word was known to the Israelites. Further, the link to pasuk 15 can be that it is as I have commanded you in pasuk 15 about korbanot andthat they need shechita, just with this minor other distinction now that your borders have expanded, in pasuk 20.

If so, the Bible critic has his ready answer.

It is nice to have our own arguments, and even to find them convincing. But as we develop, it pays to also understand the difference between peshat and derash, and maybe to realize (if it is indeed so) that there are other ways of understanding the pasuk. This famous explanation of kaasher tzivisicha is found in Rashi, who is citing Chazal:

you may slaughter… as I have commanded you: We learn [from here] that there is a commandment regarding slaughtering, how one must slaughter. [Since this commandment is not written in the Torah we deduce that] these are the laws of ritual slaughtering given orally to Moses on [Mount] Sinai. — [Sifrei ; Chul. 28a]

וזבחת וגו' כאשר צויתך: למדנו שיש צווי בזביחה היאך ישחוט, והן הלכות שחיטה שנאמרו למשה בסיני:

Hataras Nedarim, suspended in air

The Mishna in Chagiga (10a) states (and see here):

מתני' היתר נדרים פורחין באויר ואין להם על מה שיסמכו

"The releasing of vows float in the air, and they do not have upon what to rely."

Yet, Hataras Nedarim works. That is, if one vows, we say that he can seek out a chacham and find a way for release from that vow.

The gemara proceeds to bring down a whole bunch of Scriptural derivations. Thus:

(a) (Beraisa) Heter Nedarim does have a verse to rely upon.
(b) (R. Eliezer) Heter Nedarim is learned from the repetition of "Ki Yafli" (Vayikra 27:2 and Bamidbar 6:2).
(c) (R. Yehoshua) Heter Nedarim is learned from "Asher Nishbati b'Api" (Tehilim 95:11).
(d) (R. Yitzchak) Heter Nedarim is learned from "Kol Nediv Libo" (Shemos 35:5).
(e) (Chananyah) Heter Nedarim is learned from "Nishbati v'Akaymah" (Tehilim 119:106).
(f) (Shmuel) Had I been there, I would have given a source better than all of theirs.

1. "Lo Yachel Devaro" ("he may not annul his word"; Bamidbar 30:3) -- he may not annul it, but others may annul it for him.

(g) (Rava) All of the sources, except for Shmuel's, have questions on them.

1. This is what people mean when they say, "More effective is a single sharp pepper than a basket full of gourds."

And so the typical derivation is that of Shmuel, from the pasuk local to Matos:

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל אי הואי התם אמרי להו דידי עדיפא מדידכו שנאמר (במדבר ל, ג) לא יחל דברו הוא אינו מוחל אבל אחרים מוחלין

For something like this, one would expect comment by the Karaites. And they don't disappoint. Aharon ben Yosef the Karaite writes:

"And I am astounded at the baalei hakabbalah (=Pharisees) who reverse the language of chilul {profane} into a language of forgiveness {mechilah, annulment -- indeed, Shmuel says הוא אינו מוחל אבל אחרים מוחלין}. And had they not relied on Scriptures, it would have been better for them than switching out the matter of prophecy, for this appears as rebellion."


In Chazal's defense, the Mishna does state that it is poreach ba'avir; and so, all these verses may be taken as a remez. Indeed, Rashi there on the Mishna explains that hataras nedarim by a chacham is halacha leMoshe miSinai, but that there is but a bit of remez to it. I suspect that one can say the same despite the conclusion of the gemara. That is, the brayta is clearly responding to the challenge of the Mishna. And so too Shmuel takes up the challenge.


Shmuel knows the Sifrei, cited by Rashi on the pasuk:

3. If a man makes a vow to the Lord or makes an oath to prohibit himself, he shall not violate his word; according to whatever came out of his mouth, he shall do.

ג. אִישׁ כִּי יִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַה' אוֹ הִשָּׁבַע שְׁבֻעָה לֶאְסֹר אִסָּר עַל נַפְשׁוֹ לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ כְּכָל הַיֹּצֵא מִפִּיו יַעֲשֶׂה:

he shall not violate his word: Heb. לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ, like לֹא יְחַלֵּל דְּבָרוֹ“he shall not profane his word,” he shall not treat his word as being unholy. — [Sifrei Mattoth 8]

לא יחל דברו: כמו לא יחלל דברו, לא יעשה דבריו חולין:

and I would venture that he does not dispute this primary meaning.


Leaving aside any of these Scriptural hints, can we account for hataras nedarim, or does it really simply float in the air and appear to be open rebellion against the pasuk which stated לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ?


I would try to support the matter of hataras nedarim as follows. 


1. First, someone who goes to a chacham to release his vow is not treating it as profane. He does not ignore it, or trod over it. That he seeks rabbinic release from it means that he treats it as a serious entity which requires release.


2. Despite this introduction that a vow cannot be violated, the Torah proceeds to list exceptions to this rule, in which a husband or father can annul a woman's vows. She is subject to their approval, or disapproval, of the vow. Well, while the Biblical attitude towards vows might be debatable, Chazal themselves generally looked at vows unfavorably. And rabbinic figures are appointed as leaders of the Jewish community. So, extrapolating from the woman, any person can bring notice of his vows to a chacham and get the vow cancelled under this disapproval. It is not explicitly in the pasuk, but it is an extension and extrapolation of what is already there.


3. The chacham does not simply wave his magic wand. He has to establish charata. Had you known X, would you have vowed? That it, he undermines the force of the initial vow, declaring that it was made in error and not with proper knowledge.


4. One pasuk implies that there is some sort of violation even where the father stopped her vow:

6. But if her father hinders her on the day he hears it, all her vows and her prohibitions that she has imposed upon herself shall not stand. The Lord will forgive her because her father hindered her.

ו. וְאִם הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ אֹתָהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ כָּל נְדָרֶיהָ וֶאֱסָרֶיהָ אֲשֶׁר אָסְרָה עַל נַפְשָׁהּ לֹא יָקוּם וַה' יִסְלַח לָהּ כִּי הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ אֹתָהּ:

but that since her father hindered her, the Lord will forgive her. So too, in an environment in which vows were looked at by Chazal as an incredibly negative social phenomenon (used to bolster hatred between man and his fellow and between husband and wife), they stepped into the breach and encouraged people to nullify their vows via a chacham. And if it be a violation, so be it. vesalachta leavoneinu ki rav hu. Forgive us for our sins because it is the rabbis' fault. They have the broad shoulders, they prevented us, and the Lord will forgive the people for the technical Biblical violation.


5. Perhaps on the Biblical level, there is a difference between neder which is a promise of a korban, and a shevua which imposes a prohibition. According to Resh Lakish (Yerushalmi Nedarim 11:1), only a neder can be nullified, and not a shevua. It is unclear whether to understand this as Biblical or Rabbinic law. But perhaps there is no real Biblical neder to impose a prohibition, and it all operates on a rabbinic level; and so, hataras nedarim can readily work to undo such a vow.


6. Related, לֶאְסֹר אִסָּר עַל נַפְשׁוֹ may not mean 'prohibit'. It can mean bind oneself with an obligation. See Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan who renders it such based on (Yerushalmi, Nedarim 9:1; Septuagint). Assar in Hebrew. If so, all such issurim (or most of them, anyway) stemming from a neder are from Divrei Soferim, and they established it and so can readily take it away.


Perhaps some, or all, of these motivations (plus others) can be read into the prooftexts in the gemara.


See also the Ohr HaChaim on the beginning of Matos. I don't buy his suggestion, but won't explain here why not.

Who was the Shifcha Charufa?

Summary: Is she only not fully redeemed? Or is she actually completely a maidservant? What is bothering Ibn Caspi? We can look to Shadal, I think.

Post: Consider this pasuk and Rashi in Kedoshim. There is a lot to read:

20. If a man lies carnally with a woman, and she is a handmaid designated for a man, and she had not been [fully] redeemed nor had her document of emancipation been granted her, there shall be an investigation; they shall not be put to death, because she had not been [completely] freed.		כ. וְאִישׁ כִּי יִשְׁכַּב אֶת אִשָּׁה שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע וְהִוא שִׁפְחָה נֶחֱרֶפֶת לְאִישׁ וְהָפְדֵּה לֹא נִפְדָּתָה אוֹ חֻפְשָׁה לֹא נִתַּן לָהּ בִּקֹּרֶת תִּהְיֶה לֹא יוּמְתוּ כִּי לֹא חֻפָּשָׁה:
designated for a man: נֶחֱרֶפֶת, designated and specified for a [particular] man. And [regarding this term נֶחֱרֶפֶת,] I do not know of [a term] resembling it anywhere in Scripture, but the Scripture is speaking of a Canaanite handmaid, partly a handmaid and partly a free woman [i.e., she belonged to two partners and one freed his part of her], who is betrothed to a Hebrew slave, who is permitted to [marry] a handmaid. — [Torath Kohanim 19:52; Kereithoth 11a]		נחרפת לאיש: מיועדת ומיוחדת לאיש, ואיני יודע לו דמיון במקרא. ובשפחה כנענית שחציה שפחה וחציה בת חורין המאורסת לעבד עברי שמותר בשפחה, הכתוב מדבר:
and she had not been [fully] redeemed: Heb. וְהָפְדֵּה לֹא נִפְדְּתָה, she is redeemed, but not redeemed. And when the unqualified term פִּדְיוֹן, “redemption” is employed, it means [redeeming with money. — [Torath Kohanim 19:53]		והפדה לא נפדתה: פדויה ואינה פדויה וסתם פדיון בכסף:
nor had her document of emancipation been granted her:[the unqualified term חפשׁ, “freeing,” refers to doing so] with a document [of release]. — [Torath Kohanim 19:53]		או חפשה: בשטר:
there shall be an investigation: Heb. בִּקֹרֶת תִּהְיֶה [which will result in] the woman being given lashes but not the man (Torath Kohanim 19:54) The court is obligated to investigate the matter in order not to sentence him [her] to death, since “she had not been [completely] freed” [and therefore,] her marriage is not completely binding. Our Rabbis, however, learned from [this verse], that whoever is sentenced to lashes [as this woman, those lashes] shall be accompanied by a “recitation” [בִּקֹרֶת בִּקְרִיאָה, derived from the בִּקֹרֶת, so that the phrase בִּקֹרֶת תִּהְיֶה is expounded to mean “she is to be given lashes with a קֹּרֶת, a recitation.” And what is the recitation referred to here? It is] that the judges who mete out the lashes, shall recite to the one receiving them (Deut. 28:58-59),“If you will not observe to fulfill [all the words of this Torah]…the Lord will bring upon you…uniquely [horrible] plagues!”- [Kereithoth 11a]		בקרת תהיה: היא לוקה ולא הוא, יש על בית דין לבקר את הדבר שלא לחייבו מיתה, כי לא חפשה, ואין קידושיה קידושין גמורין. ורבותינו למדו מכאן שמי שהוא במלקות יהא בקריאה, שהדיינים המלקין קורין על הלוקה (דברים כח נח - נט) אם לא תשמור לעשות וגו' והפלא ה' את מכותך וגו':
because she had not been [completely] freed: And therefore, the man is not liable to the death penalty because of [his intimacy with] her, since her marriage is not binding. It follows then, that if she had been freed, her marriage would be binding, and he would be liable to the death penalty. — [Torath Kohanim 19:55; Gittin 43b]		כי לא חפשה: לפיכך אין חייב עליה מיתה, שאין קידושיה קידושין, הא אם חופשה, קידושיה קידושין וחייב מיתה:

Ibn Caspi respectfully declines the opportunity to discuss the Shifcha Charufa. He writes:

"See in the commentary of Rabbenu Shelomo {=Rashi} the tradition of the Talmud, for I am not able to contradict its say-so."

This might be a ringing endorsement. At the same time, one can read in the tension and temptation, that he saw the potential, at least, for interpreting the pasuk in another way, which might strike someone as more along the lines of peshat.

How might we interpret this pasuk otherwise? Let us examine what Shadal says:

כ בקרת תהיה : כפירוש רמב"ן הפקר , כלומר אין לה דין נשואה מאחר שלא חופשה ותהיה נחשבת כהפקר לענין שלא יומתו כנואפים . ולדעתי ולדעת ראב"ע ישראלית היא ולא כנענית ; ולדעת רז"ל ( כריתות י"א ע"א ) אף הכנענית אם נשתחררה , קדושיה קדושין ככל בת ישראל . וטעם המצווה שלא יחשוב האדון להשתמש בה כשפחה , וגם למשכב , אלא או ישחררנה וייקחנה כמשפט הבנות , או תהיה הפקר לו ולאחרים בשווה . והנה גם האשם הזה הוא שגגה 

ignorantia juris, 

 כמו למעלה סימן ה', כי השוכב עמה חושב שהיא הפקר ממש , והרי היא מותרת לכל אדם , ואין הדבר כן , אך בקורת תהיה בדיעבד לענין שלא יומתו , אך לא בקורת היא שיבוא עליה מי שירצה לכתחילה  .

"As in the commentary of the Ramban, hefker, ownerless. That is to say that she does not have the law of a fully-married woman since he did not free her, and so she is considered like hefker in the matter that they shall not die as adulterers.


And in my opinion, and in the opinion of Ibn Ezra, she was an Israelite woman and not a Canaanite. And in the opinion of Chazal (Krisus 11a), even the Canaanite, if she were freed, her kiddushin would be kiddushin like any daughter of an Israelite.


And the reason for the commandment is in order that the owner does not think to make use of her as a maidservant, as well as for intercourse. Rather, he should either free her and take {=marry} her in the proper law of daughters {of Israel}, or else she shall be hefker to him and to others equally. 


And behold, this transgression as well is a shegaga {accident} of ignorantia juris {ignorance of the law, which apparently is so an excuse}, just as above in perek 5, for the one who sleeps with her believes that she is literally hefker, and that she is permitted to every man, while the matter is not so -- rather, she is bikores {=hefker} after the fact, bedieved, in terms of that they shall not die, but she is not bikores such that anyone can sleep with he lichatchila."

As well as in Mishtadel:

 ב " המשתדל " לשד"ל לס' ויקרא בא עוד : האדון משתמש בשפחתו כשפחה וגם למשכב , ואין כן רצון בעל התורה ית', אלא ישחררנה וייקחנה כמשפט הבנות , ואם לא ישחררנה הרי היא " בקורת " כלומר הפקר ( כפירוש רמב"ן ), ואם ישכב איש אותה אין עליו משפט נואף , הואיל ולא חפשה , כי אין אשת איש אלא בת חורין , וכמו שמצאנו באשת יפת תואר לא תתעמר בשפחה אשר עניתה ( דברים כ"א י"ד). והנה האשה הזאת מצד אחד היא מיוחדת לאדוניה אשר קנה אותה ומזונותיה עליו , ואין ראוי לה שתפקיר עצמה לאחרים , ואין ראוי לאחרים שינהגו בה מנהג הפקר , לפיכך השוכב עמה חוטא ; ומצד אחר היא הפקר , כי התורה ענשה את האדון שלא תהיה לו כאשת איש , כל זמן שלא הוציאה לחרות ; לפיכך השוכב עמה יש לו צד היתר ומתכפר בקרבן .

The Mishtadel, from Shadal, on sefer Vaakra further comes to say: "The mater makes use of his maidservant as a maidservant as well as for intercourse, and such is not the desire of the Giver of the Torah, yisbarach. Rather, he should either free her and marry her as the law is for {Israelite} daughters, or, if he does not free her, behold she is bikores, that is to say, hefker (as in the commentary of the Ramban). And if a man sleeps with her, there is not upon him the law of an adulterer, since he {=the master} did not free her, for a married woman is only a free woman, just as we find by an eshes yefas toar, that you shall not betray her as a maidservant with whom you had intercourse. (See Devarim 21:14.) And behold, this woman, by one aspect, is reserved for her master who bought her, and who has her sustenance upon him, and it is not appropriate that she make herself hefker to others, nor is it appropriate for others to conduct themselves with her in a custom of hefker. Therefore, one who sleeps with her sins. And from another aspect, she is hefker, since the Torah punished the master that she is not to him like a married woman, so long as he does not send her out to freedom. Therefore, one who sleeps with her has to himself a side of permission, and is atoned for by a korban."

The Karaites, as well, consider this to be a simple amah ivriyah as discussed in parashat Mishpatim, rather than someone who is half slave and half-free.

Was the naara betrothed at the time?

Summary: And, is this required in order to apply the death penalty? Shadal, Ibn Ezra and Karaites, and Chazal, take different approaches as to when this occurs in the timeline, and the certainty of it.

Post: In Ki Teitzei, there is discussion of a new husband and wife, where he lays charges that she was not a virgin. If it be found to be true, then:

21. they shall take the girl out to the entrance of her father's house, and the men of her city shall pelt her with stones, and she shall die, for she did a disgraceful thing in Israel, to commit adultery [in] her father's house. So shall you clear away the evil from among you.

כא. וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת הַנַּעֲרָ אֶל פֶּתַח בֵּית אָבִיהָ וּסְקָלוּהָ אַנְשֵׁי עִירָהּ בָּאֲבָנִים וָמֵתָה כִּי עָשְׂתָה נְבָלָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ:

Regarding this girl, who committed the sin of לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ, does this mean that she was entirely unmarried when she did this? Or was she betrothed, and so staying still in her father's house before nuptials? How do we know, then, when the offense was committed?

The traditional interpretation of this pasuk may be found in the Sifrei.

. נאמר כאן אביה
 ונאמר להלן (ש מ  בא )  אביה מה אביה האמור
 א)  (להלן) זנות עם זיקת הבעל אף אביה האמור
 (כאן) זנות עם זיקת הבעל. ( ס ״ פ ) :


Thus, the husband already had zika, so she was betrothed. And earlier, it speaks of eidim to this effect.

Ibn Ezra has it as more of a doubt:

[כב, כא]
וסקלוה -שיתכן שאחר שארסה שכב איש אותה כי המארס לא ארס אותה רק היא אומרת שהיא בתולה ומעתיקי הדת בארו הדבר באר היטב

"And they stone her. For it is possible that after she was betrothed, a man slept with her. For her betrothed only betrothed her because she said that she was a virgin. {Yahel Or: And therefore, after she was betrothed she slept with someone else. Therefore, she is liable to stoning.} And the transmitters of the law explained the matter quite well. {Karnei Or, citing HaMaamar: And there is no doubt that the received tradition of Chazal is true and correct, {namely} that she is not executed if witnesses do not come forward that she committed adultery while betrothed, for this is not of the righteous law to execute her just because she concealed from him that she was no virgin {at the time of betrothal}, or upon the doubt that perhaps she committed adultery when betrothed {HaMaamar}. And see Em Lamikra who explains well all of this. {Josh: I don't have access to that sefer.}}

I am not sure that Ibn Ezra intends to explicitly reject Chazal here. Rather, he is doing his best to support the narrative of Chazal, that it is a betrothed woman, but on a peshat level. That is, the groom's assumption at betrothal makes the plain text's assumption that לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ refers to actions in her father's household, but only once she was betrothed. This is then a rejection, both by Ibn Ezra and Chazal, that לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ refers to her actions before even betrothal. Of course, then comes, via developed rabbinic law or via careful diyuk into the pesukim, other requirements. For instance, no literal spreading out of a stained blanket; also, witnesses. That is fine, and part of halachic derash. Ibn Ezra puts us into Chazal's capable hands for that portion. (He certainly is at odds with the application of sekilah based only on a doubt.)

Ibn Ezra often does not arrive precisely at halacha as paskened in the gemara, but in general tries to combat a Karaitic approach and approximates what we find in halacha, arriving at it by peshat methods. (Not that this seems to be the approach of the Karaites here. Rather, they say like Ibn Ezra, as we shall see.)

HaMaamar has an objection to Ibn Ezra, just as Karnei Or mentioned. See the translation above.

Shadal has another developed peshat, in which it is indeed referring to an unmarried and unbetrothed woman, for otherwise they would say לנאוף instead of לזנות, and furthermore, they should execute the adulterer as well. And further the law is trying to curb a primitive society's instinct to punish her for misleading her husband in this way. Thus, it is reformative in nature. I translate, analyze, and in the end reject this idea, in this other parshablog post.

Here is Aharon ben Eliyahu; and here is Aharon ben Yosef. Both are Karaites, and they present more or less the same as Ibn Ezra suggested. He also discusses a related machlokes Chazal in this. Aharon ben Yosef also says that the execution based on the mere doubt is enough to impose the punishment, such that it is appropriate for the Israelites to exert effort to guard their daughters. And if the virginity is spoiled due to some other incident (mukas etz), they should reveal this information to the groom-to-be.

What does 'spill it on the ground like water' teach us?

Summary: Why do we need Rashi's first derasha? It turns out to be an explicit gemara. Also, what would peshat in this be? Maybe like Mizrachi!

Post: From parashat Reeh:

16. However, you shall not eat the blood; you shall spill it on the ground like water.		טז. רַק הַדָּם לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ עַל הָאָרֶץ תִּשְׁפְּכֶנּוּ כַּמָּיִם:
		רק הדם לא תאכלו: אף על פי שאמרתי שאין לך בו זריקת דם במזבח לא תאכלנו:
		תשפכנו כמים: לומר לך שאין צריך כסוי. דבר אחר הרי הוא כמים להכשיר את הזרעים:

Rashi brings forth two derashot on "pouring out like water":

1. to teach you that it does not need covering
2. behold, it is like water, to prepare zeraim {making them susceptible to ritual impurity}

Both of these are derashot, rather than peshat, it seems. The first on the action as a whole, and the second, on the comparison to water.

Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi does not feel that this first derasha is really necessary.

That is, even though both derashot occur in the Sifrei, what is the need for a specific limud about this dam? Isn't it only applicable to birds and wild animals? This is a pasuk, after all. In Vayikra 17:13:

13. And any man of the children of Israel or of the strangers who sojourn among them, who traps a quarry of a wild animal or bird that may be eaten, and sheds its blood, he shall cover it [the blood] with dust.

יג. וְאִישׁ אִישׁ מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמִן הַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּתוֹכָם אֲשֶׁר יָצוּד צֵיד חַיָּה אוֹ עוֹף אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל וְשָׁפַךְ אֶת דָּמוֹ וְכִסָּהוּ בֶּעָפָר:

One never have thought to include domesticated animals, beheimot, in the first place. So, one would say that this includes specifically chaya and of, but not beheima. Mizrachi suggests that perhaps, since the Torah connected it {beheima} to the gazelle and the deer {in the immediately preceding pasuk in Reeh -- הַטָּמֵא וְהַטָּהוֹר יֹאכְלֶנּוּ כַּצְּבִי וְכָאַיָּל} , it should require covering like them.

The Taz addresses this question, as apparently many have before him:

After citing the pasuk, Rashi, and Mizrachi, he notes that many have pointed out that he forgot about an explicit gemara that addresses this very point. In perek Kisuy HaDam (the sixth perek of Chullin), daf 84a:

אמר ליה יעקב מינאה לרבא קי"ל חיה בכלל בהמה לסימנין אימא נמי בהמה בכלל חיה לכסוי אמר ליה עליך אמר קרא (דברים יב, טז) על הארץ תשפכנו כמים מה מים לא בעי כסוי אף האי נמי לא בעי כסוי

Thus, without this verse, we would have indeed thought that beheimah would require kisuy. Maybe because it is encompassed in chayah in the pasuk in sefer Vayikra.

A good answer. It was still a good question. It shows how the meforshei Rashi engage in direct analysis of midrashim, something I've discussed in the past.

In Taama Di-Kra, Rav Chaim Kanievsky addresses this phrase in this pasuk.

He refers to the derashot, and suggests what a remez could be -- that one should only salt meat over a perforated vessel, so that the blood will fall on the ground, and not within the vessel in which the meat rests.

But he notes that on a peshat level, it is extraneous, for there is no nafka mina is you pour it out or not, for the main thing is that you do not eat it.

But perhaps, one could say that the peshat is indeed the derasha, that it does not need kisuy. After all, as Mizrachi suggested -- in lucky ignorance of the gemara -- perhaps since it had been connected in the previous verse to the gazelle and deer, I would think that not only may one not eat it, but that it requires kisuy hadam like them. Therefore, this comes to teach us, on a peshat level, that it does not.

I like to sometimes cite the Karaites. They are concerned with peshat, and when they give forth a derasha from Chazal as peshat, it might be worthy considering that it is indeed peshat, rather than derash.

Here is what the Karaite scholar Aharon ben Yosef has to say:

"and He commanded regarding the blood; now that it {=the beheima} had been associated with the gazelle and the deer, and it appeared from the context that one should cover its blood, it was required to say 'pour it out like water'."

I wonder if this phrase was an existing idiom, that carried a value judgement. We see in Shmuel Beis 14:14:

יד  כִּי-מוֹת נָמוּת--וְכַמַּיִם הַנִּגָּרִים אַרְצָה, אֲשֶׁר לֹא יֵאָסֵפוּ; וְלֹא-יִשָּׂא אֱלֹהִים, נֶפֶשׁ, וְחָשַׁב מַחֲשָׁבוֹת, לְבִלְתִּי יִדַּח מִמֶּנּוּ נִדָּח.

14 For we must needs die, and are as water spilt on the ground, which cannot be gathered up again; neither doth God respect any person; but let him devise means, that he that is banished be not an outcast from him.

This could be a way of connoting utter and irrecoverable loss. Maybe there is an associated message with the nefesh, which is in the blood, being lost, even as one benefits from the flesh. But maybe I'll return to consider this another day.

The reason for mezuza

In parashat vaeschanan, we encounter the mitzvah to put parchment, inscribed with certain words of Torah, on our doorposts. Devarim 6:9:

8. And you shall bind them for a sign upon your hand, and they shall be for ornaments between your eyes.		ח. וּקְשַׁרְתָּם לְאוֹת עַל יָדֶךָ וְהָיוּ לְטֹטָפֹת בֵּין עֵינֶיךָ:
9. And you shall inscribe them upon the doorposts of your house and upon your gates.		ט. וּכְתַבְתָּם עַל מְזוּזֹת בֵּיתֶךָ וּבִשְׁעָרֶיךָ:

Why should we do this? Is it an amulet? Is it a protective measure?

Well, Rambam states rather clearly that one should not regard the mezuzah as an amulet:

… אבל אלו שכותבין מבפנים שמות המלאכים או שמות קדושים או פסוק או חותמות הרי הן בכלל מי שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא, שאלו הטפשים לא די להם שבטלו המצוה אלא שעשו מצוה גדולה שהיא יחוד השם של הקב”ה ואהבתו ועבודתו כאילו הוא קמיע של הניית עצמן כמו שעלה על לבם הסכל שזהו דבר המהנה בהבלי העולם.

… But those who write inside [the mezuzah] the names of angels or holy names or a verse or seals, such people are in the category of those who have no portion in the World to Come.  For these idiots, it is not enough for them that they have [through these actions] negated a positive mitzvah [by invalidating the mezuzah], but they have turned an important mitzvah –viz., the unification of God’s name and the love of God and the worship of God – and made it like it were a kemiya, a magical amulet, whose function is to serve their personal needs, as they tend to think in their foolish thoughts that this [mezuzah] is a thing that affords them benefit in meaningless worldly things.

Rambam, Laws of Mezuzah 5:4

Yet, there are clearly those who so regard it, or else the Rambam would not have to make such a strong contrary statement. Indeed, in the gemara in Menachot 33, there are two positions, one (Rabanan) which stresses the psychological impact of encountering it as one enters one's home, while the other (R' Chanina of Sura) regards it as a protective measure of the entire home. They thus had both 'rationalists' and non-rationalists even in the days of the gemara. Of course, one can explain that it is Hashem who protects the house, and in the merit of keeping his commandments.

For more of a background on this, see this post at The Daily Daf, and this article in Tradition: Mezuzah: Protective Amulet or Religious Symbol.

Here is how I would explain it, both tefillin and mezuzah. We are taking the word of Hashem, His law and His instruction, and binding it on our arm. The arm / hand is the means by which we act in this world. And so we are committing ourselves to acting in accordance with Hashem's will. We also bind it on our head-pate, 'between the eyes'. This might be cast as binding our minds, our selves, to Hashem. We give him our obedience.

Then, we also write these words on the doorposts of our house and on our gates. There was, in the ancient world, family law and city law. Certain things were taken care of in the home. And, as I have suggested, the function of ben sorer umoreh was to move extreme punishments from the realm of possibly biased family law into the public sphere, to the gates of the city where the courts met. The perpetual servant is brought to the doorpost, because that is where he is binding himself until Yovel. And when Boaz wanted to arrange for the marriage of Rut, he organized people at the gate of the city.

Thus, writing these words on the doorposts expresses a commitment to follow Hashem's word in the private realm. Writing these words on the doorposts of our gates expresses a commitment to follow Hashem's word in the public sphere.

Of course, that this is the meaning does not eliminate the need for physically doing it. The Karaites don't wear tefillin or put on mezuzah, because they view the metaphorical message as purely metaphorical. They compare it to Mishlei 3:3's instruction to write truth and justice on the tablet of your heart.

But one need not resort to that. Many ritual actions have deep, meaningful imports, whether overt to us or not. Why physically break the eglah arufa's neck? There is action paired with meaning, whatever it may be. We perform physical bris milah, even though in parashat Ekev, we have the pasuk וּמַלְתֶּם, אֵת עָרְלַת לְבַבְכֶם; וְעָרְפְּכֶם--לֹא תַקְשׁוּ, עוֹד. And we would physically pierce the ear of the perpetual servant. So I would regard these commandments to bind here and there, and write here and there.

Related, see how Isis wearing tefillin increases my emunas chachamim. And this other post, in the comment section, where I converse with a Karaite. We have a tradition on Bein Enecha as head-pate which is confirmed by an ANE text, the Chronicles of Baal. This is not something one would expect were the inteny only metaphorical, with no physical tradition of tefillin from rather early on.

The Rashbam is a different story. The Karaites love to cite him in this context, for here is a Rabbinite who says like them! Here is what the Rashbam writes, on Shemot 13:9, where just tefillin is under discussion:

פסוק ט 
לאות על ידך - לפי עומק פשוטו:
יהיה לך לזכרון תמיד, כאלו כתוב על ידך. כעין, שימני כחותם על לבך. 

I will make the pretty straightforward assumption that by omek peshuto, he means peshat, and not some deeper level. He maintains that le'ot al yadecha means that it should be as a constant remembrance, as if it were written on your hand, in the same manner as {Shir Hashirim 8:6}:

ו  שִׂימֵנִי כַחוֹתָם עַל-לִבֶּךָ, כַּחוֹתָם עַל-זְרוֹעֶךָ--כִּי-עַזָּה כַמָּוֶת אַהֲבָה, קָשָׁה כִשְׁאוֹל קִנְאָה:  רְשָׁפֶיהָ--רִשְׁפֵּי, אֵשׁ שַׁלְהֶבֶתְיָה.

6 Set me as a seal upon thy heart, as a seal upon thine arm; for love is strong as death, jealousy is cruel as the grave; the flashes thereof are flashes of fire, a very flame of the LORD.

I don't have to agree with Rashbam's assessment, of course. I could probably point out at least one disagreement I have with his interpretation on every parsha. But I would still point out that Rashbam did put on tefillin every day with a bracha. And further, if you asked him whether this was a mitzvah deoraysa he was fulfilling, he would almost certainly answer you in the affirmative. For many medieval Jewish commentators, peshat does not mean the one true meaning, where everything else is just made up or an error. Rather, the text was written to be understood on multiple levels. The "derash" of the pasuk referring to tefillin was just as intended by its Divine Author, but runs parallel to the peshat level of the text. This gives him the 'excuse' to interpret the text, all over the place, contrary to decided halacha, and yet not be a Karaite.