Targum Yonasan in support of a minhag taus

Summary: Birkas Avraham debunks a support to a minhag taus from Targum Yonasan. The targum states 'and she called his name Onan, for ברם upon him his father would in the future mourn.' However,
they should not interpret it as  'and she called his name Onan, for ברם [only] upon him [and not his older brother Er] his father would in the future mourn.' Rather, it should be understood as  'and she called his name Onan, for ברם [also] upon him [just as upon older brother Er] his father would in the future mourn.'

He explains and I agree. Then, I add a bit of my own analysis.

Post: I don't always pick on Birkas Avraham. Indeed, I like his style, and I like his subject matter. Just like Birkas Avraham, I enjoy analysis of 'non-standard' rabbinic texts, such as Targum Yonasan. And I enjoy divrei Torah centered on analyzing trup. Perhaps, as a result, I direct more attention to what he writes. And then, when I do find cause to disagree, I disagree.

At any rate, here is one analysis is Birkas Avraham with which I pretty much disagree agree. He is a bit harsh in his last sentence, but I agree with that sentiment as well.

He writes, on parashat Vayeshev:

"In Targum Yonasan ben Uziel upon the verse (Bereishit 38:4) ותהר עוד ותלד בן ותקרא שמו אונן, there is the translation of וקרת ית שמיה אונן, ארום ברם עלוי עתיד  אבוי לאתאבלא -- 'and she called his name Onan, for ברם [only] upon him [and not his older brother Er] his father would in the future mourn.'

{Josh: I interjected above in [bold] according to the interpretation offered in the next paragraph.}

And in Sefer Gan Raveh [from R' Hanoch Henich Ersohn], citing Yesod Ohel Moed, as well as in the Chidushei Maharil Diskin, and in Sefer Pardes Yosef,  and other sefarim as well, and preceding all of them, in Sefer Naftali Seva Ratzon -- they write that from these words of Targum Yonasan ben Uziel there is a source for the minhag which was rejected in the responsa of the Rivash, siman 95; and the Rama in Yoreh Deah (siman 374 seif 13) he brings the Rivash, that there were those who had the custom not to mourn upon a firstborn son, for he was holy to Hashem.

However [ברם -- heh], with apologies to the honor of these Gedolim, it is an error to deduce this from the Targum Yonasan. And just the opposite, there is from this Targum Yonasan an explicit contradiction to the rejected custom.

For in many places in Targum Yonasan, the Targum utilizes the word ברם to say גם ['also']. Such as on the verse (Bereshit 7:3) גם מעוף השמים, in the Targum of Yonasan ben Uzziel there is translated ברם מן צפרי. And so too in the verse (Bereishit 35:8 [about the death of Devorah, Rivkah's maidservant]), וברם תמן אתבשר יעקב על  מיתת רבקה אמיה, see our words there. And on the verse (Shemot 36:7) דים לכל המלאכה לעשות אותה  והותר, there is in the Targum Yonasan ועבדו יתה וברם  שיירו, and its meaning is וגם {and also} left over. And in parashat Naso, in the matter of the Sotah, that the water which she drinks tests also the male adulterer, there is in Targum Yonasan (Bemidbar 5:27) ברם לגיורא בדקין מיא {with ברם meaning also}. And in the verse (Bemidbar 11:4), ויבכו גם בני ישראל, it translates ובכו ברם  בני ישראל. And so too on the verse (Devarim 23:4) גם דור עשירי לא יבא, it translates in Targum Yonasan ברם דר עשיראי לא ידכי.

And so too on the word לחוד, whose simple meaning is one of reduction, of אך and רק, we find in Targum Yonasan and Targum Yerushalmi that they offer it as translation of the word גם, such as (Bereishit 3:22) ולקח גם מעץ החיים, the Targum Yerushalmi renders 'לחוד מן פירי אילנא חייא '. And in Targum Yerushalmi on the verse (Bereishit 31:16) הלא נכריות, etc., ויאכל גם אכול את כספנו, upon the גם is rendered לחוד כתובתין. And in Targum Yonasan on the verse (Shemos 1:10) ונוסף גם הוא על שונאינו, it translates  לחוד

הינון על סנאינן. And on the verse (Shemos 2:12) וגם דלֹה דלה לנו, it translates לחוד מדול. And in Targum Yonasan on the verse (Devarim 7:20) וגם את הצרעה, it translates ולחוד ית מחת.

And the words of the Targum Yonasan here are straightforward, that after he saw with ruach hakodesh that also upon him, his father would require to mourn and the mourning would thus increase, he called his second son based on the increase of aninut, and Hashem Yisbarach should shower upon us double joy. 

And this as well is a model to that that some suspend derashot of hevel in the Targumim, from lack of understanding and lack of knowledge of their basis in lashon hakodesh and in midrashim."

I would add that perhaps in some of these cases, or in others, it is not that ברם and לחוד mean 'also'. Rather, גם was being used in Biblical Hebrew as an intensifier -- 'indeed', 'truly', 'surely' -- and the word ברם and לחוד are used as intensifiers as well. Thus, Jastrow renders ברם as:

1. besides
2. however
3. (the interjection): truly, surely!

I would add one further point that the words אך and רק, according to modern Biblical scholars, serve a similar function in Biblical Hebrew. That it, they never mean 'only' and 'but', as exclusions. This was Mishnaic Hebrew usage, which was then read back into the Biblical verses for the sake of midrash aggadah and midrash halacha(!). But אך and רק really mean 'truly' and 'surely'. This would then possibly account for many of the uses of ברם and לחוד even as translations of אך and רק -- though I don't know that that would have necessarily been the intent of the Targumist.

Finally -- and this is perhaps a slight nitpick -- it was not Yehuda who named Onan, and could do so with ruach hakodesh. Rather, it was the daughter of Shua, the Canaanite (or else, merchant). And she did not have ruach hakodesh, I would think. Therefore, it would just be a providential name pick.

The source for not using a fork

In a comment or two on my previous post about eating herring with your hands, frequent commenter Yosef Greenberg writes:

Dr. Segal was right, it seems.

See here from the Munkatcher Rebbe.

You weren't serious in your imaginings, I hope. They do use forks in other occasions. Regardless, would it have been such an issue the Church was mechaven to the same thing?

and

Whoops. He does write there that the Rebbe never used a fork.

He didn't use a spoon in this case either, though.

What Dr. Segal had cited was the old-timers in a particular shul, explaining why they are fish with their hands on the basis of וּבְכָל-דְּגֵי הַיָּם, בְּיֶדְכֶם נִתָּנוּ. As Yosef Greenberg points out, it states in Darkei Chaim veShalom that:

והי׳ מדקדק לאכול את

העין וגם מהראש של הדגים. ולא אכלן ע״י כף (וע״י מזלג שקורין גאפי״ל

לא השתמש בשום מאכל ) רק באצבעותיו. ואמר הרמז שנאמר וכל דגי הים

״בידכם״ נתנו.. לאכול דייקא בהידים ולא ע״י דבר אחר

And he was medakdek to eat the eye as well as from the head of the fish. And he did not eat them via a spoon (and via a fork, which they call a guppel, he never made use of it for any food) but rather with his fingers. And he said that the remez to it is that is stated "and all the fish of the sea I have given over in your hands. To eat specifically with the hands and not via another implement.

Did I mean the church parallel seriously? Half-seriously. Simple practices can become encoded as minhag.

And newfangled utensils could be regarded as a change from tradition.

We see this idea in the very same sefer, about eating fish:

שצד . (א) וכדי להשביע צחצחות את הנפש המתחקה אחר שורשן ומנהגן של

צדיקים איך שדקדקו בכל דבר כחוט השערה אפי׳ בהקדמת מאכלא׳

לחבירו לא אמנע פרי עטי לכתוב מה שסיפר רבינו ז״ל מעשה שהי׳ אחרי

הסתלקות אביהן ורבן של ישראל בעל דברי חיים מצאנז זי״ע שחי׳יו שב בראש

אדמו״ר הגה״ק בעל דברי יחזקאל משינאווע זי״ע והקדים לאכול סתם דגים

ואח״כ אכל דגים חמוצים ועמד אחיו הגה״ק הר״ב מגארליץ זי״ע וצווח ואמר

איך בשבת הראשון כבר אתה משנה מנהג אבינו רועינו אשר דרכו בקודש

לאכול מקודם הדגים חמוצים ואח״כ הסתם דגים. והשיב אחיו מרן משינאווא

והדים קולו ואמר רבותיי כתיב והייתם נקיים מה' ומישראל ויען כי אחי אמר

עלי שאני משנה מנהג אבי ע״כ אגיד לכם למען תדעו כי אבי הקדוש כשהי ׳ רב

בדודניק ושם לא הי' דגים מצויים ודאג כל השבוע שיהי' לו דגים על שב"ק

ובתחלת השבוע כשנזדמן בביתו דגים קנו אותן מידו כדי שלא יתקלקלו החמיצו

אותן שיוכלו לעמוד על ש״ק מבלי הפיג טעמם . ואח״כ סמוך לשבת ובעש״ק

כשנזדמנו דגים חיים לקנות קנו והכינו ובישלו אותן לכבוד ש״ק בלי חימוץ

וממילא כשהי' לפניו שני מיני דגים הללו הקדים לאכול את החמוצים מטעם

שהי' תדיר אצלו ותדיר קוד ם ואח״כ כשנעשה רב בצאנז . שכאן הדגים מצויים

ולא הוצרכו להכין באיזה ימים מקודם דגים חמוצים לצורך שבת רק עשו

הדגים חמוצים ג״כ בעש״ק אך עכ״פ כיון שהי' נהוג מאז לאכול הדגים חמוצים

בראשונה לא רצה גם בצאנז לשנות מנהגו להקדים הדגים חמוצים באכילתן

תמיד . משא״כ אנכי (סיים הגה״ק משינאווא ) מעולם לא באתי לידי כך שיהיו

הדגים חמוצים אצלי תדיר. ורגיל יותר כי על כן אין זה שינוי ח״ו רק הדגים

פשוטים הם חשובים וחביבים אצלי ביותר ועדיף להקדים אכילתן . ע״כ .

It is strange to apply tadir kodem to this. Regardless, simple actions such as having pickled fish were encoded as minhag even though the original reason (possible unavailability of the fish) no longer applied. And people got extremely upset over something as trivial as changing the order of the courses, until a reason was given explaining that he was applying halachic principles to the metzius just as the father would have done in a different situation.

So is it so surprising that forks, or spoons for fish, could be avoided for similar reasons. That is, to cite Wikipedia about the spread of forks:

The fork's adoption in northern Europe was slower. Its use was first described in English by Thomas Coryat in a volume of writings on his Italian travels (1611), but for many years it was viewed as an unmanly Italian affectation. Some writers of the Roman Catholic Church expressly disapproved of its use, seeing it as "excessive delicacy": "God in his wisdom has provided man with natural forks — his fingers. Therefore it is an insult to Him to substitute artificial metallic forks for them when eating." ^[5][6] It was not until the 18th century that the fork became commonly used in Great Britain, although some sources say forks were common in France, England and Sweden already by the early 1600s.^[7][8]

It seems quite plausible to me that forks were not in use by the early rebbes, and a people so punctilious about table conduct, who ritualize every aspect of it, even those dictated by practical concerns, would view the introduction of a fork as a great heresy. Even as it spread in the general public, they would maintain their fork-free meals.

Of course, what is being dealt with here is a spoon. Perhaps if one does not eat with a fork, eating with a spoon is unwieldy. Or it was prepared in a way that no spoons were initially required. And that became encoded as minhag.

Why we should ban playing dreidel, pt ii

Continuing the previous post about gambling and dreidel playing, we have some further sources to present. Firstly, from the Zchus Avos blog, we have that playing cards and klipos is well connected. I do not believe that they are really well connected, on a spiritual level. If playing cards for money is problematic, it is because of halachic violations involved, or developing certain negative middot from the type of attitude one must take in playing cards. And whether or not the specific rabbonim believed their statements about klipot and connection to satan, etc., or whether this was a poetic way of expressing their opposition, in the end, at the least, the opposition is the same.

Thus, the Bnei Yissasschar found an appropriate gematria to satan, but one can easily come up with gematrias that fit. He knew to look for this gematria (and to choose this particular word of קרטן and switch the kuf and resh for the numerically equivalent sin) because he knew it was bad to do. But you obviously cannot argue that tennis is similarly forbidden because כדור טניס is the same gematria (359). And he knew that one could not argue that it is an appropriate way of having simchat Yom Tov on Chanukkah, because the same is the gematria of חג שמח. (The same Bnei Yissasschar speaks of mystical aspects of the dreidel.)

And connecting it to klipot -- how can one write a post on the subject without making the obvious connection between klafim (from klaf, parchments, thus playing cards) to klipot. Perhaps because it was so obvious. But it is best made overt. And when the words are the same, except for the feminine vs. masculine ending, is there to wonder that R' Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev made the connection and said that in each card there is a big klipah?

But moving on. Card play = bad. Dreidel = good, for the most part.

But dreidel is a fairly modern invention. To cite the seforim blog (Dan Rabinowitz), from 2005. After giving all sorts of mystical explanations for features of dreidels:

Despite all of these explanations, in truth, dreidel is not Jewish in origin. Rather, driedel is really the rather old game of teetotum. Teetotum, which uses a top with four sides and four letters is one and the same with dreidel. The letters that appear on the dreidel are really just the Hebrew letters that appear on a German or Yiddish teetotum, G, H, N, S. G= ganz (all), H halb (half), N nischt (nothing) and S schict (put). Teetotum dates back to at least the 16th century long before we have any Jewish allusions to dreidel(it was originally totum or top, but became TEEtotum due to the use of T for take all, on the top). The well-known depiction of children's games done by Brueghel in 16th century includes Teetotum(see here and here for the complete painting). The earliest Jewish mention of dreidel or the significance of it dates to the late 18th century.

The story connecting dreidel to the ruse of the Maccabis was first published in the book Minhagi Yeshurun, which was first published in 1890 (the name was changed to Otzar Kol Minhagi Yeshurin in the third edition, which is available online here from Hebrewbooks.org . The author included a nice picture of himself at the beginning, although he was a Rabbi in Pittsburgh at the turn of the twentieth century, he is holding a quill pen.) His source is a contemporary of his. [As an aside, although his explanation of dreidel is well-known he offers a similar explanation for playing cards on Chanukah, i.e. that the Maccabi did so. However, that one is not nearly as well know (sic).]

Since the time that blog post was published, many of the links have become defunct. Including the one to HebrewBooks.org, and a search could no longer locate that sefer at that site. Lucky for us, we still have archive.org, which maintained several copies. (See page 95 in the PDF.)

{Update: Thanks to an anonymous commenter who provided the following new links on HebrewBooks.org, here and here.}

I am pretty sure I disagree with the Seforim blogger's categorization of Ozar Kol Minhagei Yeshurun's explanation playing of cards. I present it here for your consideration (see right). He uses the term naaseh heter, with the implication that it is not really permitted. And he says mishum shechoshvim -- that they believe -- though it is not really so. And that they believe it is a zecher of the wars that the Maccabees did in those days. Not that it is a zecher to the wars, because the Maccabees did this (playing cards), which is apparently how the Seforim blogger is reading it. (Unless my reading is off.) And therefore it has no basis in out religion and faith. And it is sufficient (??) for gentile children. And in a footnote, a haarah that it was created as a game for the many wives of a certain king.

So it is not the case that he offers a similar explanation for playing cards.

However, this is apparently the first written source for dreidel, in seif 4. To see that again:

"4: The children play on Chanukkah with a game of tops (dreidel).
The reason is that they decreed that they should not learn Torah, just as we say in Al HaNisim, 'to cause Your Torah to be forgotten,' and at that time, they all learned orally, and in one band, in order that each person should remind his brother, lest he forget a matter. And the decree was that they should not gather in a single place in bands. The Sages found, at the time of the decree, a wondrous suggestion, in this that they made the game of dreidel to show their enemies if they were discovered, that they were playing with the game of tops, and that they were not learning. And with this development like this they were able to learn and teach. Therefore, it remains for us this game, as a remembrance of the miracle, that because of it the Torah of Hashem was not forgotten, that it stood for our fathers and us. (In the name of the rav, the author (?) of sefer Avodat Eved and the sefer Tiferet Tzvi, and the Rav Ziw (?) brings it down.)

I would guess, if the author of Avodat Eved is his contemporary, that this is the sefer being referenced, printed in 1877.

Of course, if the dreidel is known to have been invented much later than the Chashmonaim, then this is a spurious etiology of the practice.

Indeed, it calls to mind the rather similar story with Rabbi Akiva and his students, going hunting with bows and arrows as a pretext for going off together, where the real intent was to learn and teach Torah. So I would doubt this explanation. And rather, just as they played one form of gambling -- card playing -- they played this other form of gambling as well, and then all sorts of mystical explanations were attached to it in the 1900s. So one false explanation failed, and one took off. But such that there is no real distinction between playing cards for pennies or playing dreidel for pennies.

Meanwhile, here is another writeup of the practice of playing dreidel.

Note: I see nothing wrong with playing dreidel on Chanukkah, but this post was not intended as halacha lemaaseh. If you really have questions on how to act, consult your local Orthodox rabbi.

Peyos Up Or Down?

A post from SemGirl from a month ago got me thinking. It was already fodder for one post here on parshablog, in terms of the tzavaah of Rabbi Yehuda haChassid and the practice of not marrying someone with the same name as your parent. But there is also:

A friend of mine really worked overtime, laboriously for months, making a Shidduch. Boy likes girl, girl likes boy , blaaaa blaa, blaaa. Wonderful, they get engaged. Dont say Mazal Tov, just yet. One set of in-laws was adamant that the Choson wear his payos up, the other was just as adamant that he wear them down. Ultimately, it proved to be such a bone of contention that the engagement was called off. After much heated negotiation and mediation, they got back together. Even though, the Shadchan was in Israel on business, they were cajoled into proceding , as its such a volatile situation, it was too risky to wait . I kid you not. I thought of the perfect compromise. How about, one payos up, and one payos down..

And see the discussion at WolfishMusings.

At first glance, it seems like a triviality. And indeed it is. Who cares whether the long peyos are up or down?!

But then I thought about it some more, and I can see in it a dispute which is happening over and over again in modern society. It is a contention between mimetic tradition vs. book learning, and between certain poskim (and kol korei writers who champion said poskim) vs. established Jewish practice.

Indeed, it is quite possible that we can lay the blame for breaking up this shidduch at the doorstep of Rav Chaim Kanievsky, shlita.

How did it develop that the peyos in some communities are worn up, and in others down? There are different theories, but it may be a valid question whether those theories are ex-post-facto rationalizations, or whether they are in sync with the facts.

For example, wear peyos up, based on a Zohar and thus a kabbalistic idea that the peyos of the head should not touch the peyos of the beard. Or one should really wear the peyos down, but people used to hide their peyos because of decrees from the Czar that they should not go about with long peyos. Or it is more convenient to have them back, so that they don't get caught in the heavy machinery. ;)

Apparently, Rav Kanievsky wrote in a sefer (see here) that the reason was the decrees. And nowadays there is no decree, and so the proper thing to do is be proud you are a Jew and wear them down.

Fine. That is a wonderful psak, and many rabbonim the world-over make similar declarations about major or minor things for their constituents.

However, IMHO, it would be a good thing to keep in mind that not everyone is Rav Kanievsky's constituent. Many people in other communities follow other rabbonim and poskim, and they might not suddenly drop the practice of their community, which their rabbis and poskim themselves practice, at the mention of Rav Kanievsky's opinion in the matter. And at the same time, some of Rav Kanievsky's constituents are idiots who do not realize this, and think that Rav Kanievsky and Rav Elyashiv are the gedolei hador, such that anyone who acts otherwise to their opinion is a mechutzef and an apikores.

When people from other communities wear their peyos up behind their ears, they are most certainly not stating that they are embarrassed about being a Jew. Quite likely, they are growing a long beard at the same time, chassidishe malbush, and so on, such that they are clearly identifiable as Jews. Indeed, they may keep their peyos up for convenience, or because they believe that this is a holy minhag of their community, perhaps based on kabbalistic reasons. And even if a great Rabbi from Eretz Yisrael declares that the optimal course of action is otherwise, they have their own mehalech, and own mimetic tradition on the matter.

I wonder whether Rav Kanievsky is aware that when he makes such a statement verbally or in print, some people might then try to impose this as psak on other unwilling groups of frum Jews -- and if he is aware of this, whether he should hedge his remarks to make it clear that he is not condemning those who continue in their own practice. (Just as Rav Yaakov Yosef recently opposed the census in Israel but made clear that he was not protesting against those who follow other positions.)

My guess -- the SemGirl post is not specific on this point -- is that the chassan wore his peyos up behind his ears. Meanwhile, the girl's parents were from a community that wore their peyos down, and or they encountered the statement from Rav Kanievsky, or some other modern posek, that the ideal was wearing them down, so as not to be ashamed of one's Judaism.

The girl's parents told the boy about this, expecting him to comply with the words of the Gedoylim, namely the "psak" of Rav Kanievsky. But should the chassan abandon something he considers an important practice, and minhag of his community, because he has been told that a certain Rav has paskened otherwise? Perhaps he has his own poskim. Should he deligitimize the minhag of his community, when Minhag Yisrael Torah Hi?

The sensible answer is that of course he should cave. Pru eRevu is a Biblical commandment, and whatever kabbalistic reasons, or whatever status of this minhag, in pales in comparison. Plus there is also the consideration of shalom, and of shalom bayis.

In some families, they make a potato kugel and a lukshen kugel, with the second kugel being called the shalom bayis kugel. Because the wife's family's minhag was potato kugel and the
husband's family's minhag was lukshen kugel, and so they make both to preserve both minhagim and to maintain shalom bayis. Perhaps the same should apply here, and the chassan should have caved. (The compromise of one-up and one-down would not have worked, because besides looking silly, it would be a violation on one side, since quote unquote "al pi din," the peyos had to be down.)

But of course, people are people. And the reaction was probably "How dare they say that our minhag is invalid, worse than theirs, and a practice based on shmad? We are not going to cave? We are holy Jews, with holy minhagim, and we are not going to change because of someone ignorantly spouting that our minhag is wrong." And as the personalities on both sides, of both in-laws got into the picture, the fight escalated until finally the shidduch was broken off - at least until it was resurrected.

And they may have had a point. This particular case, or whether the peyos are up or down, is just silly. But in general, what is going to happen in the marriage when the chassan's community has one halachically-grounded practice, which is his minhag, and his in-laws come at him with some psak from Rav Kanievsky or Rav Eliashiv?? To take some examples from Rav Eliashiv, Rav Elyashiv holds that one must wait six hours between yellow cheese and meat (see here), and perhaps he does not hold of this. Or Rav Elyashiv is against modern sheitels. And Rav Eliashiv is apparently against using psychiatrists and psychologists. And against heter mechira. Not to argue against these particular psakim, but the point is that there are certainly other great rabbis who take contrary opinions, which this chassan and his community might well hold of. Is this peyos dispute, and resolution, a good precedent, and a good template for interactions in their marriage in the future? The establishing of such boundaries seems critical.

Daf Yomi Kiddushin 31a: Walking Four Cubits BeKomah Zekufah, and With Uncovered Head, pt i

Recently, in Daf Yomi, we encountered an interesting gemara. To cite my translation of the Rif, who cites the gemara lehalacha:

{Kiddushin 31a}

אמר ר' יהושע בן לוי אסור לאדם שיהלך ארבע אמות בקומה זקופה
שנאמר מלא כל הארץ כבודו

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: It is forbidden for a person two walk 4 cubits while standing erect, for it is stated {Yeshayahu 6:3}:

ג וְקָרָא זֶה אֶל-זֶה וְאָמַר, קָדוֹשׁ קָדוֹשׁ קָדוֹשׁ ה צְבָאוֹת; מְלֹא כָל-הָאָרֶץ, כְּבוֹדוֹ.

3 And one called unto another, and said: Holy, holy, holy, is the LORD of hosts; the whole earth is full of His glory.

רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע לא מסגי ארבע אמות בגלוי הראש
אמר שכינה למעלה מראשי

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua did not walk four cubits with head uncovered. He said "the Divine Presence is over my head."

The Rif cites it lehalacha, as does Rosh. Indeed, this makes it into Shulchan Aruch. This all makes me somewhat ... unsatisfied.

I have my issues with even the first statement, by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. Specifically,
1) elsewhere Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi sometimes makes homiletic comments. For example, a recent one from masechet Kiddushin:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Whoever teaches his son Torah, it is as if he received it from Mount Sinai.

And he then cites a prooftext, from Devarim.

2) The prooftext in this case is from sefer Yeshaya, or Nach. We don't derive Biblical law from Nach, in general. Perhaps this is as a gillui milta bealma, about the nature of the manifestation of the Divine Presence? Or perhaps we should cast this as a rabbinic enactment he made, such that it is derabbanan, upon recognizing this fact about reality, proven from this citation from a sefer in Nach. I would much more lean toward it being mussar, showing how one should recognize the Ominpresent aspect of the Divine Presence, such that one should not walk bekomah zekufah. And as such, I would treat it as a type of middat chassidut, rather than binding law, despite the rather strong use of the word assur.

On the other hand, we see elsewhere Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi derive halacha from Nach, such as rules for cohabitation based on a pasuk in sefer Iyyov. And he does say assur. So perhaps this is of kind.

3) The content of the statement strikes me as more along the lines of mussar, as it channels ideas of humility and recognition of the Divine Presence.

So I have my bone to pick with this first statement, from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. But the second statement, about Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua strikes me as even more clearly an example of middat chassidut. Namely,

1) Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua is a 5th generation Babylonian Amora. At least Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is a fairly early Amora, such that he could be stating a quasi- (or entirely) Tannaitic halacha which others then followed. But here, it seems like this requirement, if it is such, only surfaced fairly late, a student of Rava and contemporary of Rav Pappa. Certainly we find such late halachot, but this was not stated by him, but practiced by him. The implication is that earlier generations did not practice this, but that it was something which was his innovation, and for the reason he gave.

2) Indeed, even within his own generation, all it says is that he did it, not that others in his generation were so makpid.

3) And the juxtaposition with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's statement leads to the distinct impression that this is a fulfilling of the ethos of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's statement. So if Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi was stating law rather than middat chassidut, others would have kept it by following Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's instruction. It seems that, perhaps as a middat chassidut (or an extension of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's middat chassidut), Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua extended it to a further recognition of Hashem's all extending Presence.

4) There are, of course, other sources about head-covering for men which might (and indeed do seem to) cast a different light to it. For example, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak also seemed to have a head-covering, for similar reason. And earlier references as well. He might have been applying this existing practice to the extent he applied it, based on this idea that Hashem being everywhere.

But working just based on this gemara (and perhaps working with these other sources as well), I would certainly walk away with this impression that it is a middat Chassidut.

As such, I would consider the latter requirement to be one purely of middat chassidut, and if so, would be careful in any halachic work to label it as such.

Even as a middat chassidut, one need not adopt every middat chassidut that someone, even someone respected, innovates, to be a frum, God-fearing individual. Other Amoraim, it would seem, were frum, yet did not adopt his innovation.

Of course, in practice, I always wear a kippah wherever I go. Of course, I never learned this sugya in great detail before now, such that I did not know the nature of the obligation. But even now, I would feel and act the same, for reasons historical and sociological, which determined the role of the yarmulka in present-day Orthodox Judaism. And because of binding minhag, and because it is nice to do middat chassidut, for the reasons given as the motivation. And because this is what I have done and feel comfortable with.

As mentioned, Rif and Rosh both record the gemara, with no further comment. The implication is that a halachically practicing Jew should keep this practice, whatever its nature.

As we explore some of the later sources, we will see that they vary in their treatment of it, and to whether it is a halachic requirement or a middat chassidut.

Rambam also lists this in his halachic code, but in such a way that it seems a middat chassidut. He writes (Hilchot Deot, perek 5):

י [ו] צְנִיעוּת גְּדוֹלָה נוֹהֲגִים תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים בְּעַצְמָן: לֹא יִתְבַּזּוּ, וְלֹא יְגַלּוּ רֹאשָׁן וְלֹא גּוּפָן.

This indeed seems to be a middat chassidut, a tzniut gedolah. And a bit later,

יד [ח] לֹא יְהַלַּךְ תַּלְמִיד חֲכָמִים בְּקוֹמָה זְקוּפָה וְגָרוֹן נָטוּי, כְּעִנְיַן שֶׁנֶּאֱמָר "וַתֵּלַכְנָה נְטוּיוֹת גָּרוֹן, וּמְשַׂקְּרוֹת עֵינָיִם

As we will see in a bit, Kol Bo cites Rambam as this being a middat chassidut, and it indeed seems borne out in Rambam's own words. (Though a talmid chacham perhaps, just based on this, is being strongly encouraged, perhaps required, to keep this middat chassidut.)

Let us continue with Tur, son of the Rosh. He writes in Tur, Orach Chaim, siman 3, what is pictured to the right. He cites both Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's statement, and the practice of Rav Huna brei deRav Yehoshua, lehalacha. He omits the 4 cubits in Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's statement, but I am not certain that this omission was intentional. Or perhaps not even unintentional. We will see in a moment that Beis Yosef cites the gemara with identical language, and so it is quite possible that they simply had a different girsa. But then, Rosh, his father, does have 4 cubits in that statement.

Beis Yosef is pretty straightforward about endorsing this. He writes (same page) the text to the right. In both the case of walking entirely erect and walking bareheaded, he simply notes the relevant gemara, which is the first perek of Kiddushin.

And then in Shulchan Aruch (right), he repeats this, without elaboration as to its nature.

Rama in this siman in Shulchan Aruch does not contradict this (see above). On the other hand, he notes that it is a more complicated picture, in his Darkei Moshe on the Tur. He writes what is pictured to the right. Click on the image to see it larger. The text is so small, you really have to do this here. He writes:

* בטור, ויכסה ראשו – וכתב הכלבו בשם הר"מ, דאינו אסור לילך תחת אוויר השמים בגילוי ראש; כי מה שאמר: רב הונא כו' – זה היה מידת חסידות. והרי"ף כתב שאסור לילך בגילוי ראש לב"ה. ובפסקי מהרא"י סימן ר"ג כתב: על מה ששאלתם, שהשלטונים גזרו על היהודים המחוייבים שבועה להישבע בגילוי ראש, לא מצאנו בזו איסור בהדיא.
אמנם בבית יוסף לקמן סימן ח' משמע דאסור לילך תחת אוויר השמים בגילוי ראש. אך פשט דברי רבינו הטור שם משמע כדברי הר"מ, כמו שאכתוב לקמן. וכן משמע לקמן סימן צ"א דשרי בלא זמן תפילה.
* כתב באור זרוע: איתא במדרש פרשת מצורע בסופו. "'בעצלתיים ימך המקרה': על ידי שאדם מתעצל לכסות ראשו כראוי, 'ימך המקרה', הרי הוא נעשה דומי". פירוש, נזיקין.

Rama cites the Kolbo, citing the Rambam in turn, that it is a middat chassidut. The Rif writes that it is forbidden to go with bare head to the synagogue. In Piskei Maharai he writes a kulah in a case where the rulers ruled on the Jews to swear with bare heads, that we find no explicit issur in this. But Beis Yosef in Siman 8 writes that it is forbidden to go under the air of the sky with uncovered head. But the pshat in Tur there implies like the words of Rambam, as he will write there. And so too later in siman 01, that it is permitted not during the time of prayer. He finally cites the Or Zarua who cites a midrash, about damage coming because of uncovered head. So it is strange that he does not clarify in Shulchan Aruch as well the parameters of this. Perhaps since it is a middat chassidut, he is willing to leave well enough alone.

Bli neder, perhaps a follow-up on those two simanim, in a different post.

Bach has an extensive writeup (right, but you must click on it), in which he discusses the language of Tur, whether he considers each to be a din or a middat chassidut, and whether there is a difference in middat chassidut or stringency regarding 4 cubits or less than 4 cubits, and in the house vs. outside, in each case. I am not so convinced by his conclusions about the nature of the middat chassidut, but read it all inside.

Perisha (right) notes that head-covering for men is a middat chassidut, that it is dispute between Beis Yosef and Rama, and Rama says what he says in siman 91.

Three final sources. There are many more that I am not citing, such that this is not comprehensive. First, Be'er Heitiv, which gives some perspective of how some understand what is the middat chassidut, though I do not necessarily agree.




The next is the Likutei Megadim, who brings down other interesting Tannaitic sources. See them inside.






Finally, we have the teshuva of the Maharshal, siman 72. The question posed to him was למי שראשו כבד יש לו היתר לישב ולאכול בגלוי ראש. He writes what follows. Wow! The contents are so great, and astounding, I feel compelled to transcribe it (perhaps in translation), but will leave this for a subsequent post. For now, see the images! For example, he proves from a Midrash Rabba that it is better with uncovered head, but Hashem does not impose upon us this requirement when saying Shema. Even if he does not come to this conclusion entirely in the end, for reasons he explains.

Note: Do not pasken from blogs. This was not intended halacha lemaaseh, and it is not comprehensive. Consult your local Orthodox rabbi for any practical application.

Related: A Simple Jew happens to cite Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz on wearing a yarmulke.

Covering One's Succah With the Arba Minim? pt iv

See previous posts in the series. part i, part ii, part iii.

In an earlier post in this series, I noted the practice mentioned in the sefer Minhagim of the Maharil, of children burning aravot taken off the top of succahs on Simchat Torah. This shows that they covered the succah with aravot. Perhaps this means the walls, but see the next quote, from earlier in the sefer, where it is clear that the aravot were for sechach.

Taken from the relevant page in that sefer, available here (pg 105), is the text of the Maharil. He addresses the potential halachic problems with the practice of these children, and why it is not problematic.

The Maharil says: That which the youths take an aravah {willow} and burn it on Simchat Torah, it is a good minhag for the joy of Yom Tov. And there is not in it an issue of taking down {unbuilding} a tent, if they take down the Succah, for it is not called setirah to make one liable unless {J: reading ach instead of af} one takes down for the purpose of building. And also the burning is not forbidden, even though it is not for cause {letzorech}, for there is no Biblical prohibition, for we are experts in the establishing of the moon, and only the first day of Yom Tov {Shemini Atzeres} is Biblical, and {yet} is is the custom of our fathers in our hands to make a second day of Yom Tov {Simchas Torah}. And furthermore, only the minors are doing this, and we are not required to separate them {from doing it}, just as by a minor who is eating neveilot {improperly slaughtered meat}, Bet Din need not separate them {from it}. And so did Maharam permit minors to drink the wine of kiddush in shul, even though there is no kiddush except in the place of the meal. Both those subject to the commandments {Benei Mitzvah, non-minors} are not acting appropriately, to take down and to burn the fire.

And so he said, that his father, Maharam {=Moshe} Segal {Segan Leviim} would protest, in the days of his youth, that they should not take down any Succah nor burn the fire on Simchat Torah.

{IIRC, in the critical edition of Maharil I was reading, or elsewhere in the Maharil, it was brought down that despite this position of his father, Maharil would specifically make sure children would take from his succah for this purpose, perhaps because this way they would not be committing theft as well, by taking aravot which did not belong to them and which the owners were not OK with them taking. But I would have to look back in that edition.

As Lurker points out, and as the Jewish Week article mentioned,

"At the end of the holiday, Samaritans burn the sukkah’s branches."

}


A bit earlier in the book (pg 101), we have clear reference to the arava, where he says "lehachazik et ha'aravah."

Note: Even though this is a halachic source, and does not contain any {or much} of my own contributions, not to be taken halacha lemaaseh. Consult your local Orthodox rabbi.

Schmoozing During Yizkor

Here is another flier / poster that was distributed in my shul this past Shavuos. (Here is where I discussed the previous one.) This flier read:

Please post this ad in your shul for Shavuos While our chaveirim remember their loved ones during Yizkor on Yom Tov, let's remember how fortunate we are to remain outside. Hazkoras Neshomas -- the memorial service for the departed -- is an ancient Minhag based on the fundamental Jewish belief that the Neshama is eternal. For those who leave the shul for this poignant Tefillah, this brief recess is a perfect time to thank Hakadosh Baruch Hu for our good fortune and to be sensitive to the other members of the Kehillah. Gedolei Yisroel suggest that we seize this opportunity to do something productive, such as reciting of learning one of the following:

• Three Kapitlach Tehillim
• Mishnayos
• Hilchos Lashon Horah
• Hilchos Kibbud Av Va'aim

[For free color posters or to sponsor flyers, posters and additional materials, please call: [Redacted]

לזכות רפואה שלימה לחולי ישראל

Once again, we have well meaning people trying to be mezakeh the rabbim, albeit anonymously. What could I possibly find wrong with this? :)

Let us dissect this poster. The first paragraph, "While our chaveirim..." possibly carries with it an attempt to guilt people into a change of behavior. Look how good you have it! We must remember how fortunate we are to remain outside, and therefore it continues with recommended actions. The implication is that Hashem has granted us this tovah, and it shows ingratitude to misuse the time to shmooze amongst ourselves.

This is made more explicit in the next paragraph, where they state "this brief recess is a perfect time to thank Hakadosh Baruch Hu for our good fortune and to be sensitive to the other members of the Kehillah." The idea is then that to shmooze during this time -- which is what everyone for decades has done -- is kafuy tovah to Hashem, and is being insensitive to the people in shul.

The next paragraph says that "gedolei Yisroel suggest." Who are these gedolim? Why were they not mentioned by name as supporting this endeavor? I would like to know their identities so as to know whether I consider them my gedolim. And I also need to know to be able to (theoretically) make inquiries to make sure that the information transmitted in their name was accurate. If they are not identified, that even if gadol X does not support this, perhaps gadol Y is the one who supported it. Also, I would like to know exactly how the question was phrased, and exactly what they answered. And we would need to know their identities to be able to clarify their intent.

Imagine someone goes to the gadol and asked, "Is it a good thing to learn Torah, or the halachos of Shmiras haLashon, during this time?" What Gadol would say no? But such a question and response is a far cry from stating that the present practice -- of shmoozing outside during Yizkor -- is a bad practice, which shows ingratitude to Hashem and insensitivity to those who have lost loved ones. Would these Gedolim consider it forbidden because it is bittul Torah, or not?

By putting Shmiras haLashon in there, there is the additional potential implication that allowing people to hang out a schmooze is bad because they will be saying lashon hara to one another.

As I discussed quite a while ago (in a post titled "why I support talking in shul") , there is value to socialization in and around shul. And that is to allow people to live Jewishly, to hang out with Jews. The demise of the kiddush club because of alchoholism and disrespecting the rabbis derasha has something to it, but on the other hand there is value in making connections an a personal rather than religious level to other Jews. Furthermore, there is a concept of chatzi lachem and chatzi laShem. Whoever put this leaflet together quite possibly does not like the idea of chatzi lachem. There cannot be any time which is not programmed time, controlled in some way. There is value, I think, in simply letting people be. Hanach lahen leYisrael! Leave them alone. Not every single second needs to be controlled and directed towards learning / self improvement. For yourself, sure, it is a positive attitude to take. But not to direct this towards the general community, as a required activity, in the name of nameless Gedolim.

What actually happened in shul? Personally, I learned through the Aruch haShulchan on the laws of the beracha of birchas haGomel. But that was not because of the flier, but because I am an introvert, and because that is what I like to do. But as far as I could tell, other people from the shul people stood outside (in the hot sun) and shmoozed for a bit, before going inside, thus paying no heed to the poster. Good for them.

Note: Not halacha lemaaseh. Just commenting on the idea of anonymous leaflets counseling changes in practice.

Halacha Alert! How to fold your tallis on Shabbos and Yom Tov

So screamed the kol korei distributed in my shul, this past Shavuos.

Halacha Alert !
How to fold your tallis on Shabbos and Yom Tov.

It says in Sh'miras Shabbos K'hilchosah (15:44:46):
"One must not fold a garment or cloth back into already existing creases... Consequently, one should not fold a tallis or a tablecloth into its previous creases... Any article may be folded if one takes care not to fold it into its original creases (e.g. one can fold it into the reverse of its folds) but one {meaning may} should re-fold it into its normal creases after Shabbos or Yom Tov."

The strong implication of this leaflet is that there is only one proper way to fold the tallis, and that anyone who acts differently is acting in ignorance and contrary to halacha. Also implied is that there is no contrary position. Thus, it is a HALACHA ALERT! You are doing it wrong.

The leaflet is unsigned by the person who printed it up/distributed it, and they presumably thought that there is no need to do so. After all, the author of Shmiras Shabbos Kehilchaso is a big talmid chacham and posek.

But of course, not everyone follows this particular posek in all their Shabbos practices. And further, this is a quote from the English sefer. Many know that the English version is the strict one, while the Hebrew one, with the same text, has footnotes, where the real kulos are. In this particular instance, the footnotes don't say the kula explicitly, but does give a reference to Aruch haShulchan among other sources, and the Aruch HaShulchan is where the kulah can be found.

The following is the text, and rough summarization (not intended as translation, though I sometimes wander into translation) of the Aruch haShulchan, Orach Chaim, siman 302:

Seif 10: There is a major conceptual dispute between Rambam and Raavad as to the nature of the prohibition of "folding."

Rambam groups it with making pleats on cuffs, just as one it metaken them during a weekday. And then mentions folding.

Thus, says Aruch haShulchan, Rambam considers this a problem of metaken kli. And so Rambam does not hold the gemara is talking about regular folding, but rather a type of folding which is craftsmanship, just as he talks about making pleats on clothing. {Perhaps Aruch haShulchan thinks the Rambam considers making pleats and folding the same, though one can argue it as that they are different actions but both work of a craftsman.} But regular folding (like folding your tallis), there is no concern at all in any form.

Meanwhile, Raavad holds that the prohibition is not because of tikkun kli but rather because he is matriach, taking pains, on Shabbos, for something needed during the week.
As he will develop it, it is only according to Raavad that folding a tallis is problematic.

Seif 11: Here Aruch haShulchan makes this distiction. According to Rambam, since there is no reason of tircha, it is permitted to fold any garment with a regular folding, since there is no tikkun kli, even if for the week.

However, according to Raavad, such would be forbidden for the reason of tircha from Shabbot for chol.

Further, he suggests that Raavad holds this is a problem even where there is no issue of metaken, but just the tircha. He connects this to Tosafot. For they write "from here we learn that it is forbidden to fold tallitot of the synagogue, because they are needed for the next day." And what seems apparent is that there is no issue of metaken kli at all. Rather, the prohibition is because of tircha.

Furthermore, he adds that even according to Raavad/Tosafot, one is not going to simply cast it aside without any folding, for this is not miderech benei Adam. {I, Josh, would note that this appears to be the derech of chassidim. :) } Rather, even according to this, in inexact folding would still be OK. He attributes this as the intent of the Mordechai in the next seif.

{I would add that this kippul she`aino meduyak might well not be the same as Shmiras Shabbos KeHilchoso's taking care not not to fold it in the original creases. But here is not the place to expand on this idea..}

Seif 12: Aruch haShulchan now turns to the Mordechai. He says that the Raaviah wrote that the white taleisim which one does not need on that day of Shabbos, after leaving shul, it is forbiddden to fold them, then even where all the other conditions from the gemara {of Rav Yannai} are satisfied, because those were the conditions for something that was needed that day. However, if it not in its original folding {seder kipulo} it is permitted, even with two people doing the folding.

The Bet Yosef brings this position down and agrees with it.

This, says Aruch haShulchan, is even within Tosafot's position about tircha from one day for the next. Such is apparent.

Then he sets out to explain how each Rishon and Acharon holds along this dispute of whether the problem is tikkun keilim or tircha lemachar. Tur holds the problem is metaken, and explains how by new and white clother, the tikkun is not so much. So also seems implied in Rashi.

Finally, he has a defense of the modern practice in which everyone folds their tallis normally on Shabbos. He suggests that with our folding of talleisim, there is no tikkun, such that there is no issue according to Rambam et al. Meanwhile, the idea of tircha lemachar they do not hold by, but rather hold like Rashi, Rambam, Tur and Shulchan Aruch about the nature of the prohibition being tikkun rather than tircha lemachar.

Furthermore, he cites the Kolbo saying the same thing, more or less, also defending existing practice of folding talleisim: "And nowadays that they are accustomed to folding all clothing, it is possible that our folding is not comparable to their folding, that they were extremely insistent to smooth out its folds, and we do not do so." [And the Tur and Shulchan Aruch actually separate the law of making folds in cuffs from this law, and do not bring the law of making up beds.]

All this, I would note, is something of a chiddush. It is not clear to me that Tur or Bet Yosef actually make the distinction between these two reasons so clearly, and perhaps conflate the two. And see what Mishnah Brurah does with this, harmonizing reasons. Still, Aruch haShulchan is someone upon whom one can rely.

One more seif before my own suggestion and general discussion.
.
Seif 13: is about the other law brought down in that same Mishnah, making up the bed on Shabbos, either for Shabbos or after Shabbos. So, insights into one may shed light on the other.

He suggests that the Mishna which prohibits setting up the beds on Shabbos for after Shabbos was talking about where the beds were in a separate room for the beds, where one did not go into that room all the day. But we have the bedroom as it as one of the rooms of the house, and people go in their during the day. It would look messy and not nice. Therefore, setting up the bed is to make the house look nice, and thus is specifically for the honor of Shabbos, and not for machar. He cites Magen Avraham to this effect.

And this is the widespread, common custom everywhere.

As an additional reason for permitting, he brings in his discussion from the previous seifim, about the distinction between metaken and tircha lemachar. He suggests that they hold the reason is metaken, and the way we set up the beds, it is not called metaken, in accordance with the Kol Bo said.

He also draws a distinction between setting up the beds for beauty {which is what we do when we set beds} and setting of the beds to sleep upon.

I {=Josh} would add a few points to what was discussed above. Certainly, when we make up the beds, one cannot easily sleep in them, for the top sheet or blanket is too tight, and in some cases the pillow is covered, etc., etc. It is all done for presentation, so that the bed looks good when it is not being used. It is thus for beauty, and for kavod haBayit and thus lekavod Shabbos. This was my inclination, to make such a distinction, before reading Aruch haShulchan on this, so Baruch Shekivanti!

But I had a similar reaction to the issue of tallis. Why does one fold a tallis? I can testify about myself that I am not always as neat as I should be. My clothing gets rumpled and I leave my bed unmade. My wife is not always so happy about this. And there may be various halachic problems with what I do in this regard, for a talmid chacham {if that is what I am} is supposed to always look extremely presentable. But it means that I am in general not so makpid that my clothing is always neat and pressed.

Yet, I always fold up my tallis after I am done with it. Why is that?? Am I really trying to keep the tallis smooth and unwrinkled for the next day?

I don't think so. Rather, there are two reasons:

1) Ritual. I have a specific ritual for putting on tefillin and putting away my tefillin. A specific order, a specific number of wraps around my arm for tefillin. Indeed, my father taught me the family minhag or wrapping tefillin, which is distinct from the way anyone else I have encountered ever does it. But other people also have distinct ways of wrapping tefillin. Those are more common ways, but they do vary somewhat. On the shel yad, do all the wrappings go on one side, or on both sides.

The same is true for the tallis. My father has a specific minhag of how to fold the tallis, which is distinct from most other people's. I never bothered to learn the intricacies of it exactly, but one of these days I will, bli neder.

The fact that such distinct customs can arise means that putting away the tallis has acheived a status of ritual. If so, people folding their tallit are not going through tircha to put away their tallis for the next day. Indeed, it would be easier to just let it lie there unfolded, because then it would be more accessible the next day! Rather, the seder of putting on a tallis in shul involves the ritual of taking it off and putting it away as well. So the intent is not metaken keli, and one can argue there is no tikkun kli at all. And even if you hold the problem in general is tircha lemachar, like Raavad and Tosafot, this is not tircha for machar, but rather is just part of the donning and doffing of the tallis.

2) Zilzul mitzvah. A related but distinct point. Even if we do not say it is part of the ritual, and that is why I and others fold the tallis, we can say it is a matter of treating tashmishei mitzvah with respect. To cite the Aruch HaShulchan from above, though he was making a slightly different point: "However, to cast aside a garment without any folding at all is not from the derech benei Adam."

That is why we fold our tallis. Why do we carefully wind up the tefillin from one day to the next. It takes time to unroll it. But not only is it not mentchlech in general to cast clothing about haphazardly, it would be a zilzul hamitzvah to simply leave the tefillin with the straps lying about, not in the batim, etc.

So too, the tallis gadol. We do not just want to leave it lying around. So we put it in the tallis zekel. And it is surely improper to just stuff it in, so we fold it. Even if we fold it neatly, exactly on the creases, I would argue that this is the way one puts it away bederech kavod. And it is thus not tircha lemachar.

We do not need to go this far, even though I think what I said is true. We have the Aruch haShulchan, and his reasoning to rely upon. And he is citing Kol Bo, and relying on Rambam et al. (Beis Yosef also cited this Kolbo, though he did not bring it lehalacha in Shulchan Aruch.)

Furthermore, the gemara itself never spoke about folding a tallis. We see it only in a diyyuk that Tosafot made from the Mishna and gemara. And in three generations, at least, masses of Jews did not pay heed to the restriction as it applied to folding a tallis: In the generation of Kolbo, in the generation of Aruch haShulchan, and in our own generation.

One could appeal to the principle established in Pesachim 66a, as cited by Hilel haBavli:

אמר להן הלכה זו שמעתי ושכחתי אלא הנח להן לישראל אם אין נביאים הן בני נביאים הן למחר מי שפסחו טלה תוחבו בצמרו מי שפסחו גדי תוחבו בין קרניו ראה מעשה ונזכר הלכה ואמר כך מקובלני מפי שמעיה ואבטליון

and assume that if many Jews are doing it, it is quite possible they have valid halachic reason for doing so. Especially for something like this which has aspects of mimetic tradition to it. This is not the assumption made in the leaflet. On the other hand, hilchos Shabbos is complication, and surely a lot of things are violated in ignorance, so it is a question of how far one would apply this principle I cited. And further, see in Korban Nesanel on the Rosh (note tzaddi) on Shabbos 113a that after citing the relevant Tosafot, he says וראוי להזהיר העולם על זה. Which firstly shows that in his days, the common practice of many Jews was to fold their tallis regularly on Shabbos. And secondly shows that he wanted to correct this erroneous practice. And the author of this leaflet was doing exactly that. Though perhaps the Korban Nesanel was not aware of other approaches which would permit the common custom.

Still, I hope that in general, this illustrates the problem of this kol korei/leaflet approach. One should really learn through the relevent sugyas. If you want to convince someone to take on a different practice, one should tell them all the relevant details, not just give out an anonymous kol koreh, effectively trying to pasken for them. And tell them to consult their local orthodox rabbi, who can instruct them if it is proper to change one's practice.

Please note: This is not intended halacha lemaaseh. I deliberately did not include in the above my father's practice, which is to always fold it backwards, against the creases, even during the week, so as not to err on Shabbos (which might have its own problems), or what my own practice is. I am not trying to forbid and not trying to permit here, but rather to discuss the issue and its complexities, in order to argue against the kol korei approach to such issues.