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INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

The Glory of Tefillin

by: R’ Zev Busel

ליהודים היתה אורה ושמחה וששן ויקר - the Yidden experienced light and joy, delight and honor. The Gemora in Meseches Megillah tells us that that אורה זו תורה, and that  שמחה זה יום טוב, ששון זו מילה, and ויקר אלו תפילין.  Rashi explains that Haman decreed against the observance of the aforementioned mitzvos and now we are able to observe them.

The Sfas Emes pondered: If so, why didn't the passuk just say that ליהודים היתה תורה יום טוב ומילה ותפילין? The Sfas Emes answers that through the redemption, Klal Yisroel experienced a heightened realization that the true nature of light is Torah; the true nature of joy is Yom Tov; the true nature of delight is bris milah; and that the true nature of honor is tefillin.

Perhaps in regard to tefillin this concept can be explained as follows: Horav Yonasan Eibeschitz in יערות דבש דרוש ג' writes that the sudden rejuvenation of the mitzvah of tefillin subsequent to the miracles of Purim was because tefillin is symbolic of Hashem monitoring one’s thoughts and actions. Everything that transpires in our lives is not teva, natural, but rather the hashgachah protis, Divine providence of the Ribono Shel Olam. The shel rosh symbolizes that all our thoughts are observed by Hashem; the shel yad represents our actions.  Therefore, after the great miracles of Purim, that even in the darkness of galus, where beforehand it was not so recognizable the glory of Hashem, the Jewish people merited to see the yad Hashem, and that created a renewed awareness for the mitzvah of tefillin.

With this we understand why true honor is reflected in tefillin. After the nes of Purim, witnessed by the nations, Klal Yisroel-- as the am hanivchar, the Chosen People, merited special hashgachah protis even in galus. This is the true kavod, as reflected by the mitzvah of tefillin as expressed in the Gemora:  וראו כל עמי הארץ כי שם ה' נקרא עליך ויראו ממך - then all the peoples of the earth will see that the Name of Hashem is proclaimed over you, and they will revere you. When one realizes that the true nature of honor is tefillin, how much more so is it imperative to properly observe this unique mitzvah.

DAILY MASHAL

Tefillin In your Head

It is written: And all the peoples of the earth shall see that the name of Hashem is proclaimed over you, and they shall be in awe of you. It was taught in a braisa: Rabbi Eliezer the Great said: This refers to the tefillin of the head.

The Baal Hatanya notes that it does not say “the tefillin that are on his head,” but rather, “the tefillin in his head.” The tefillin will make an impression on others only if the wearer has internalized the message of the tefillin inside of him. If it is merely resting on his head, it will have no effect on others.

The Minchas Elozar continued and says that in order to reach that level, one must ensure that he has “his head” in the tefillin. One must make a strong effort not to lose focus while he is wearing his tefillin. If one works diligently to have his head in the tefillin, he will eventually reach the level where the tefillin will be in his head.

He used to say to a boy becoming bar mitzvah as he was putting his tefillin on for the very first time: Do not talk idle chatter with your tefillin on! If you guarantee me that that you will never talk idle chatter while wearing your tefillin, I will guarantee you that you will feel the “taste” of the tefillin.

HALACHOS OF TEFILLIN

by: Rabbi Boruch Hirschfeld Shlit”a

When one puts on tefillin he should have the following things in mind:

1. To fulfill the mitzvah of tefillin shel yad.
2. To fulfill the mitzvah of tefillin shel rosh.
3. To subdue my heart, mind and body for Hashem.
4. To remember the miracle of yetzias mitzrayim (shows Hashem’s power over heaven and earth).
5. To minimize the physical pleasures of this world.
6. To believe in the Oneness of Hashem written in the tefillin.
7. To fulfill everything else written in the tefillin (love Hashem, learn Torah, mezuzah, tefillah, mitzvos of Pesach and prohibitions regarding chametz, pidyon haben).

The ideal time for thinking these כוונות is while he puts on the tefillin. If he didn’t, he can think them right after putting them on the tefillin or any time while still wearing them.

Between the של יד and של ראש it is אסור to speak out, even to answer אמן or יהא שמיה רבא. He should just think to be יוצא with what the others are saying.

After finishing tightening and positioning the של ראש, one should say ברוך שם... ועד. One should be very careful not to say ברוך שם till the של ראש is fully positioned.

It is very praiseworthy to learn something while wearing tefillin, before they are taken off.  

Join the Kedushas Tefillin Program!

Who is this program for?

Any boy who has a ratzon to wear his tefillin without talking.

How do I Join?

Contact our Gabbai, Eli Jaffa, @ 216-385-4869, or send us an email @ kedushastefillin@gmail.com.

What are the rules?

See below.

What do I get?

A tremendous reward for davening properly, and for being careful in the fulfillment of this mitzvah. For the “she’lo lishma” part, see below.

How do I keep track?

After you join, you will receive a monthly card.

When Can I start?

The program begins on the second day of Rosh Chodesh Iyar, May 5th

Hatzlachah!!

Kedushas Tefillin Rules

1. You should be davening with a minyan.
2. You should be wearing your tefillin from at least “Boruch she’amar” until after “Aleinu.”
3. There is no talking (including “mouthing”) with your tefillin on.
4. Even if you (mistakenly) talk, you will try not to continue (during that Shacharis).
5. The month begins on Rosh Chodesh (second day, when applicable).
6. You cannot miss-out more than four times during a month.
7. If you have a perfect month, or only miss once - you will receive the following: a set of old coins (which includes: 2 pennies from the 50’s; 2 from the 40’s; 2 from the 30’s), plus you will be entered into three raffles for sets of seforim.
8. If you miss twice or three times, you will still receive the set of old coins, and you will be entered into two raffles for sets of seforim.
9. When you have completed your third month, the set of coins will begin to include the following: Pennies from the 20’s; 10’s; 1900’s; 1890’s; 1880’s and even earlier; nickels from the turn of the century; foreign coins, plus more.
10. Any boy that hands in 12 cards (and did not win any of the monthly raffles) will receive a sefer.

If you would like your school or class to join this project, please contact

Rabbi Adler

@ kedushastefillin@gmail.com.

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Daily Mashal - Zevachim 90

This is the Law of an Olah

It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.

The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.

[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.

The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.

The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]

The Order of Serving Hashem

Our Gemora explains that a chatas should be sacrificed before an „olah but that the Torah put the verses of the „olah before those of the chatas because “for its reading, the Torah gave precedence to it”. Rashi (s.v. Lemikraah) comments: “that it should be read in the subject (of offerings) first” and Tosfos wonder (s.v. Lemikraah): “What kind of chidush is this?” HaGaon Rav Eliyahu Dessler zt”l writes that we can explain Rashi thus: In the order of sacrifices – i.e., in the practical phases of serving Hashem, the chatas – the rectification of sins – precedes the „olah – achieving high levels. But “for its reading” – i.e., to know and perceive high levels – “the Torah gave precedence to it” as even before the sinner finishes rectifying his sins, he should be familiar with all the levels. One cannot serve Hashem from a narrow viewpoint but one must be aware of all the stages of serving Hashem and the high levels that one must strive to achieve (Michtav MeEliyahu, III 174).

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Miracle of the fire - Zevachim 89

Our Mishna says that one must first burn the limbs of an ‘olah and then the parts of a chatas. At the inauguration of the altar in the Sanctuary, the Torah says that they put the ‘olah on the altar and, above it, the parts of the other sacrifices (Vayikra 9). But when the fire came out from before Hashem and “consumed on the altar”, the verse says that it consumed the “’olah and the fats.” In other words, first the fire burned the ‘olah and then the fats above the ‘olah! The Netziv writes that this was a miracle to observe the halachah that the limbs of an ‘olah are burnt before the parts of other sacrifices (Ha’amek Davar, Shemini).

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Ramps in the Mishkan

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Rav Yehudah said: Two small ramps branched off from the main ramp, by which one (on the west side) turned to the base and one (on the east side) to the ledge, and these were also separated from the altar by a hairsbreadth, because it is written: around.

HaRav Dovid Meyers, author of the fabulous sefer on the construction of the Mishkan, Meleches HaMishkan V’Kailav, notes: This is referring to the altar in the Beis HaMikdash. It is logical to assume that there would also be one to the ledge in the Mishkan if the ledge in the Mishkan was for the Kohanim to walk upon. According to Rashi in Chumash there was no ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan, so there was no need for a small ramp to the ledge. There are commentators that maintain that there was a ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan (page 234), so according to them there was a need for a small ramp to the ledge.

Regarding if in the Mishkan there was a small ramp to the base, according to what Shitah Mekubetzes (letter 12) that the purpose of the small ramp to the base was because if the Kohen would have to go down the ramp and then go to the base, the blood might coagulate and become unfit for sprinkling, it would seem that there should also be one in the Mishkan. Even though it would seem that the ramp in the Mishkan was a little shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, it is not logical to say that since the ramp in the Mishkan was a few amos shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, there would be no concern that the blood would coagulate. According to what we have written, it seems that there was only one small ramp in the Mishkan,

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Traveling with the Fire on the Altar

The Gemora says that the fire that came down from the heavens during the time of Moshe did not depart from the copper Altar until the time of Shlomo. The fire that came down from the heavens during the time of Shlomo did not depart until Menashe and removed it.

Kollel Iyun HaDaf http://www.dafyomi.co.il/zevachim/insites/zv-dt-061.htm poses the following question: Rashi in his commentary on Chumash (Shemos 30:3) cites the Mechilta which contrasts the Mizbe’ach ha’Ketores to the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes. The verse says that the Mizbe’ach ha’Ketores had a solid top, while, says the Mechilta, the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes did not have such a top. The Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes was transported merely as a frame, and at each stop in the desert its hollow interior was filled with dirt. The Netziv (Shemos 27:2) therefore questions Rashi’s words from the Gemora here, which states that the fire descended and stayed on the Mizbe’ach. If the earth inside of the hollow of the Mizbe’ach was removed and the Mizbe’ach dismantled each time the Jewish people embarked on a new journey, then where was the fire?

HaRav Dovid Meyers, author of the fabulous sefer on the construction of the Mishkan, Meleches HaMishkan V'Kailav, answers as follows: Firstly, according to the Malbim (Shemos 20, posuk 21) there is an argument in Mechilta whether the Mizbe’ach was carried with the dirt or not. The Malbim also brings another dispute if the fire was on the Mizbe’ach when they traveled or not. The Malbim explains that if the fire remained, then the Mizbe’ach was filled with dirt when they carried it. If it did not remain, then it was carried without dirt.

According to the Shitah Mekubetzes on our Daf (letter 6), in the time they traveled, the fire rested on the edge of the Mizbe’ach.

According to Raaviah (chelek sheini Maseches Chagigah siman 808), the fire rested on a clump of dirt carried with the Mizbe’ach.

According to Anaf Yosef on Tanchuma (Terumah 11) they put a tablet on the Mizbe’ach and it rested on it.

According to Tosafos HaSaleim (Shemos 38, 6-7, letter 1), even according to Rashi, the Mizbe’ach HaNechshes had a top.

The Kollel cites the following answers: The Netziv explains that the Gemora argues with the Mechilta and maintains that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes did have a top on which the fire rested even during the journeys. He finds support for this assertion in the Midrash Tanchuma. He explains that the way the Mizbe’ach was filled with earth was through the bottom of the Mizbe’ach, which had no floor. Upon their arrival at a new location, the Jewish people would make a mound of earth and place the Mizbe’ach over it, effectively filling the Mizbe’ach with earth. When they would leave, they would lift the Mizbe’ach, leaving the earth in its place.

This also seems to be the opinion of the Kereisi u’Pleisi (43:5). The Gemora in Chagigah (27a) derives through a kal va’chomer from the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav that the fire of Gehinom does not affect the transgressors among the Jewish people. Even though the gold covering the top of the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav was only the thickness of a dinar coin, it was not diminished at all throughout the years that it had a fire burning on it. Certainly, then, the transgressors among the Jewish people -- who are full of mitzvos like a pomegranate -- will not be affected by the fire of Gehinom (see Insights to Chagigah 27a).

Tosfos in Chagigah there (DH she’Ein) is bothered by a question, as the Kereisi u’Pleisi explains his words. Why does the Gemora learn this kal va’chomer from the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav, and not from the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes? The only thing offered on the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav was the incense offering, which was burned there once at the beginning of the day and once at the end of the day. There was much more activity on the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes, which had a fire on it at all times, and it too had a coating of gold that did not diminish!

Since the Kereisi u’Pleisi says that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes had a coating of gold on its top, it is clear that he maintains that the Mizbe’ach had a top, like its counterpart, the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav.

The Gemora here may be understood even according to Rashi’s assertion that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes had no top, based on the words of the Shitah Mekubetzes (#6). Rashi here (DH Lo Nistalkah) comments that while the Jewish people traveled in the desert, they used to turn a certain type of vessel over the fire on the Mizbe’ach to preserve the fire. This is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah in Toras Kohanim (Tzav 2:10; see Rash mi’Shantz), and not the opinion of Rebbi Shimon who says that the fire was removed from the Mizbe’ach. This is also the way Rashi explains in Bamidbar (4:13), where he says that the cover of the Mizbe’ach was not burned by the fire underneath it while traveling, due to the vessel which was placed over the fire. If there was no actual top to the Mizbe’ach, though (but rather its frame was filled to the top with earth), and the earth inside of it was removed when the people traveled, where could they place the vessel to contain the fire? The Shitah Mekubetzes explains that they placed the vessel “over the edge” of the Mizbe’ach. This means that the fire on the Mizbe’ach remained on top of the frame of the Mizbe’ach, covered by this vessel.

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Eighty Replies to One Question

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
and Many of our Subscribers

Our Gemora states: Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi said, I have heard that the owner causes piggul. In his opinion, not only a Kohen can disqualify a sacrifice with a thought of piggul (that it will be eaten not in its proper time or place) but the owner of a sacrifice can disqualify it in the same way.

A question that originated in the beis midrash of Rabbi Chayim Berlin zt”l, the Netziv’s son, was discussed in all centers of learning everywhere. In his Sedei Chemed, HaGaon Rav Chizkiyah Medini zt”l collected the replies to this question from outstanding talmidei chachamim in Teveria, Vilna, Germany, etc. The question even graced the world of Torah with the work Gevuros Shemonim which, according to its author HaGaon Rav Yosef Engel zt”l (author of Beis HaOtzar, Asvan D’oraisa, etc.), “discusses one question and answers it in 80 ways”. His pupils related that he had many more answers but he sufficed with publishing 80 of them to give his book its unique name.

The question: If the owner causes piggul, we cannot test a sotah (a woman suspected of adultery) in the Temple, as before she drinks the cursing water, the Kohen has to offer the minchah (Sotah 23a, s.v. Kol) that she must bring. The sotah, who surely wants to be saved from the curse, will cause the minchah to be piggul and without offering the minchah, the water does not test her (Sotah 20b)! Rav Berlin continues that this question is only according to Rambam, that piggul can be caused also by thought but according to Rashi, that piggul is caused only by speech, the sotah can be prevented from saying anything.

She can be taken out of the ‘Azarah: The fifth of the 80 answers is based on Tosfos (above, 29a, s.v. Lamakom), who assert that a thought of piggul disqualifies a sacrifice only in the ‘Azarah. If so, the sotah can be taken out of the ‘Azarah while the minchah is offered. To force her to say the opposite: In the 37th answer, Rav Engel advises that the woman be forced to say explicitly that the minchah will be eaten in its proper time and place. From then on, even if she thinks frantically that it should be piggul, she cannot disqualify anything (according to Pesachim 63a).

The Kohen dispels her thought: In the 18th answer we find an idea based on a fine proof from Rashi on our sugya (s.v. Shama’ti), that the owner causes piggul only if the Kohen remains silent. But if the Kohen announces his pure intentions, the owner cannot cause piggul.

Piggul applies only to shelamim and todos: Rav Zeev Yitzchak HaLevi Dünner of Germany offered the answer that the owner can cause piggul only concerning shelamim and todos, whose meat they eat, but not regarding an asham, chatas orminchah, of which they do not partake (and see ibid, answer 4).

It would appear that the concept of the owner causing piggul is not relevant to the sotah’s minchah. The Gemora (36a; see Rashi ad loc. s.v. Hachi Garsinan Lishna Acharina) says that piggul, which entails intending to eat or burn the korban at the wrong time, only applies if the one causing the piggul can actually do it at the wrong time. But if he himself cannot, intending that others will do it at the wrong time is meaningless. Accordingly, the halachah that the owner can cause piggul would only apply to shelamim and the like, where the owner will indeed be eating the meat, so it is up to him to intend to eat it at the wrong time. But when it comes to the minchah, the woman will not be burning the minchah, nor will she be eating it. All she can do is intend that the Kohen burn or eat it at the wrong time, and that is meaningless.

Let’s remember that the woman is not the sole owner, as the husband is the one "sponsoring" the korban for her, which has many halachic ramifications. Accordingly, it is quite likely that the husband is the one who would have the jurisdiction over the piggul, just as we see in Bava Kama Daf 13a-b that when one person sponsors a korban for another, the sponsor is entitled to the meat.

Rashi writes that the owner can render it piggul if the Kohen had no intent, implying that if the Kohen explicitly intended the proper thought, the owner’s thought would not count. This makes sense, considering that the source for the owner’s power to cause piggul is that he too is called a makriv, but as a makriv, he is definitely secondary to the Kohen. Accordingly, in the case of the sotah, the solution is to ensure that the Kohen specifically intends the right thought.

The most obvious answer seems to be that she cannot overpower the intention of the Kohen doing the avodah. You will note that Rashi says that the owner can cause piggul if he has piggul intention and the Kohen kept quiet. From here it seems that if the Kohen has an active intention the owner’s intention cannot take effect.

Perhaps, since it’s not b’yadah to eat it chutz l’zmano or to be makriv it chutz l’mkomo, she cannot make it piggul.

The Torah says that the husband shall bring her to the Kohen, and therefore it’s his korban not hers.

Perhaps because she would benefit personally from piggul, therefore she does not have believability.

Only an innocent woman will actually drink the waters, so as to prove her innocence. Accordingly, she wouldn’t cause it to become piggul.

The Torah says (Bamidbor 5,15) "Veheivi", which means that the husband brings the minchah, so what makes the wife the owner? And even if the waving (of the minchah) is done by the wife, so what? The Kohen had to do the waving with her as well so he is the owner as well?

In Sotah 19, the Chachamim say (and so is the halachah) that first she drinks and then they start with the minchah. There was no chance to cause piggul before drinking, and R’ Shimon says the minchah was first, but who says that he agrees with Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi?

It would seem to me that if she deliberately has machsheves piggul, she would not be believed to say so since ain odom maysim atzmo rasha. (I assume it is forbidden to deliberately invalidate a korban, and especially to prevent them from fulfilling dinei sotah). The only possible case is if the person says he accidentally had machsheves piggul.

Who said the woman is the owner of the korban. Perhaps it’s being brought for her, not by her, and she can’t cause the piggul.

If we’re concerned that she’ll try to get out of drinking she could do it in an easier way by admitting she was guilty. This would forbid her to her husband, but no death penalty.

Who said the wife is the owner of the minchah? Doesn’t the husband pay for it and have to "bring her"? Isn’t he the owner?

The first though that occurs to me is whether in fact the korban minchah prevents the sotah from drinking, or is it considered a separate and distinct aspect of the overall process, so that even if it invalidated it, she could still drink?

There is a halachah that if the accused sotah declares that she will not drink, then the korban minchah must be burned. Therefore, even according to the opinion of the Rambam, if she is completely silent, we need not be concerned with the possibility of her having a piggul thought, since she did not verbally refuse to drink. Obviously, she feels that she is innocent, and is willing to do ahead with the entire process - including both a proper hakravah of the korban and the drinking.

Rashi there says ‘if the Kohen is quiet while being mekabel…’ – this sounds like the only then does the owner capable of rendering it piggul. Therefore here where there is a concern we’ll just have the Kohen speak out the correct time and day… and therefore even the Rambam will agree that her intention cannot override or have any impact to the Kohen’s expression.

Do we see anywhere that we suspect someone to deliberately render something piggul – is it not kares?

If there is this concern then R’ Chaim Berlin should ask more – how can the Kohen continue to do the different avodah’s on an animal which is suspect to be piggul?

Saying Eizehu Mekoman before Prayer

For very many years it has been the custom to say the Mishna of our chapter, Eizehu mekoman, before shacharis. The Tur (O.C. 50) bases the custom on the halachah that every day one should learn Torah (Written), Mishna and Talmud (Kiddushin 30a). Therefore we say the parashah of the tamid and the verses dealing with the sacrifices for the portion of Torah, Eizehu mekoman for Mishna and Rabbi Yishmael’s braisa for the portion of Talmud. Our chapter was chosen from the 524 chapters of Mishna because the Gemora in Menachos 110a praises those who learn about sacrifices (see Perishah, ibid, S.K. 2 and 4).

Beis Yosef (ibid) cites another reason in the name of the Raah: “because there is no disagreement in the whole chapter and it is a clear Mishna handed down from Moshe from Mount Sinai”. In other words, this chapter does not contain even one difference of opinions and therefore we assume that it has been handed down from Moshe in its present form (Peninim Mishulchan HaGra, end of Shemos, and the Noda’ BiYeudah wrote likewise in Doresh LeTziyon, derush 11). Some also prove thus from the phrasing of the Mishna in this chapter, which evidences its antiquity, as we are told: “…and they are eaten within the curtains (kla’im)”. Curtains were not in the Temple but in the Sanctuary (mishkan). Therefore, the Tanaim did not formulate this Mishna but it originates from the generation of the desert (see Otzar HaTefilos, p. 81 in the remark, and Tiferes Yisrael on our chapter, os 22). ‘Ateres Zekeinim on Shulchan ‘Aruch (ibid) states that the words of this chapter amount to 344 and when we add 1 for reading, we arrive at the numerical equivalent for Moshe – a hint that this chapter was given to Moshe at Mount Sinai in its present phrasing.

Is it really true, many wondered, that there is no difference of opinions in the chapter? Our Gemora explains that the Mishna’s statement, that the pesach is eaten only till midnight, is only according to Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and not according to Rabbi Akiva (see Pri Megadim, ibid, in Eishel Avraham, and see Yeshu’as Ya’akov, S.K. 1). Indeed, the Ritva, the great pupil of the Raah, indicates (Avodah Zarah 19b) that Raah did not mean that this chapter was given to Moshe in its present form but “since the whole chapter is learnt with no difference of opinions mentioned at all, it should be learnt more than other chapters”.

HaGaon Rav Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, who expands on the topic (Responsa Tzitz Eli’ezer, IX, 5), cites the reason of Orchos Chayim (Dinei Meah Berachos, os 16), that this chapter includes the secret of all the sacrifices. Yesod Veshoresh Ha’Avodah says: “A person scrutinizing the writings of the Ari z”l will realize its great import, that every Mishna of this chapter is a rectification (tikun) in itself in the high worlds” (see Tzitz Eli’ezer, ibid).

To conclude, we should mention the statement of Rabbi Shneiur Zalman of Lyadi zt”l (Responsa HaGraz, 1:9), that as saying Eizehu mekoman before prayer was mainly instituted so that a person should learn something each day, a person “who can learn and understand does not have to say the parashah of the sacrifices each day but to say it sometimes suffices”.

DAILY MASHAL

How Could You Write a Book on Eizehu Mekoman?

A person who wrote a commentary on Eizehu mekoman came with his book to Rebbe Baruch of Mezhbuzh for an approbation. The Rebbe replied, “I wonder how you could write such a commentary. When I come to this chapter, I begin to imagine bringing sacrifices to the Temple and the service of the kohanim. My stomach turns over and I’m full of tribulations and suffering” (Ma’yanah shel Mishna).

What Is a Sacrifice?

Our Mishna says “What is the place of the sacrifices?” – i.e., all the sacrifices. Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra writes in his commentary on the Torah (Shemos 20:20): “I saw an apostate…who challenged the chachamim because they said „What is the place of the sacrifices (zevachim)‟. He said that in all the Torah he found zevichah referring only to shelamim, such as „‘olah uzevachim as an ‘olah is a thing for itself and the zevachim are shelamim, as in „…and they offered ‘olos and slaughtered zevachim shelamim” (Shemos 24:5) and thus we find everywhere. I showed him that he wasn’t speaking correctly as we are told: „…and you will slaughter (vezavachta) on it your ‘olos and shelamim.” He then admitted to his sin…that he had disputed men greater than all following generations”

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Story on the Daf

The Gemora states that the terms Mishkan and Mikdash are interchangeable. One must wonder if the terms are interchangeable, why Scripture would not just employ one term, either always using the term Mishkan or always using the term Mikdash. An answer to this puzzle can be found with a story that occurred many years ago.

Rabbi Stein, an executive director of a well-known Yeshiva, rand the doorbell one evening at the Miller’s home. Mr. Miller invited Rabbi Stein inside to partake of supper with Mr. Miller’s family. Rabbi Stein began apologizing for interrupting the family, when Mr. Miller said, “Please, I am certain you are here for an important reason. How can I be of help to you?”

Rabbi Stein explained that the yeshiva was in desperate need of funds, so Mr. Miller sent his son to bring his checkbook. After writing out a very generous check to the Yeshiva and handing it to Rabbi Stein, Rabbi Stein thanked Mr. Miller and rose to leave. “I would like to apologize again for coming at such an inconvenient time,” Rabbi Stein said. “The opposite is true,” declared Mr. Miller. “Let me share with you something.

Reb Yitzchak Hutner of Yeshivas Chaim Berlin calls me from time to time asking for financial assistance for his Yeshiva. When Rav Hutner once called me while I was eating supper, I told Rav Hutner the following: I am very organized in my method of giving tzedakah. I set aside ten percent of my income and I distribute the funds systematically. I would probably give the Rosh HaYeshiva a donation even without the Rosh HaYeshiva calling me, but I actually appreciate the call. I would never interrupt my supper to pay a utility bill, but I will interrupt my supper to give tzedakah, because I feel that this is something that is every important for my children to witness. Rabi Stein, I must thank you too for ringing my doorbell as we were about to commence our supper. You could not have arrived at a better time.”

This story teaches us that there is a Mikdash, a shul, a yeshiva, or any worthy Jewish organization, but there is also a Mishkan, from the generosity and beauty of performing the mitzvah of tzedakah, that allows the Divine Presence to reside in the homes of those who support the Torah.

Sent out of a Walled City

The Gemora mentions that there is a special sanctity regarding cities in Eretz Yisroel that were surrounded by a wall in the times of Yehoshua. Rashi writes some of these halachos: One who sells a house inside a walled city has one year to redeem the house, but if he chooses not to redeem the house, it becomes the property of the buyer permanently; sending a metzora outside the city; and that the open space (1,000 cubits) surrounding the city should be left uncultivated.

Why does a Metzora need to leave a city that is surrounded by a wall, but may otherwise remain in all other cities--as long as they are unwalled? The Be'er Yosef provides a fascinating p'shat based on the Chazal in Erachin (15b) which states that Hashem provided for the tongue two protections -- two walls: one of flesh--the lips, and one of bone--the teeth. A metzora breached his very own walls of protection by speaking lashon hora; he cannot therefore remain in a city protected by a wall!

Hakhel Note: An average city has only one wall--yet Hashem in his benevolence gives us a truly enhanced fortification--a dual safeguard! How can a person be so imprudent, so unwise, so as to take down not only one wall made for his own protection--but two! We will add one other point, as well. One of the most famous Metzora scenes in Tanach is that of Gechazi and his sons outside the city of Shomron (the Haftorah for Parshas Metzora)--perhaps a lesson to us that the sin of Lashon Hora is easily spread within or among a family(Miriam and Aharon speaking regarding Moshe Rabbeinu provides a similar lesson)--and this may be why it is easier to succeed at taking down the 'double wall'--it is an unfortunate and misguided team effort, and one family member encourages the next in what to the casual observer may otherwise be described as a self-defeating struggle. If one sees a weakness in his family--or in a particular family member (even if that family member is himself) -- he should bolster the fortifications--so that the security of the entire family is not breached--and the lips and tongue can take their noble places in protecting home, life and family!

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Sent Goat and Yom Kippur

The Gemora discusses who is the author of the Mishna, which says that the sent goat atones for all sins, apparently even without repentance. The Gemora concludes that Rebbi is the author, as Rebbi says that Yom Kippur atones for all sins, except for three very severe ones, even without repentance. The commentators note that Rebbi does not make any direct mention of the sent goat, but only of the day of Yom Kippur, which seems to be at odds with the Mishna. A number of answers are offered to this question:

1. The day atones partially, and the sent goat achieves full atonement (Tosfos 13a d'ovad)
2. The day atones, but the repentance requirement is waived only if the goat is sent (Ritva)
3. The sent goat atones, but its atonement is due to the power of Yom Kippur day (Tosfos, Rashba)
4. The day atones, but when there is a Bais Hamikdash, it depends on the sent goat being brought (Minchas Chinuch 364)

The Gemora had objected that if one did not repent, the goat cannot atone, as it is a sacrifice of the wicked, which is an abomination. The Ritva explains that Rebbi says that the goat is an exception, and the rule of a sacrifice of the wicked applies only to other sacrifices. The Rashba suggests that since the goat only completes the atonement of the day (following the first explanation above), it is not simply a sacrifice of the wicked, and therefore is effective.

The Gemora introduces a sifra which states that the day of Yom Kippur atones even if the sinner did not commemorate it. The Gemora says that this sifra implies that Yom Kippur atones even without repentance. The Ramban explains that if Yom Kippur needs repentance, it is like any other sacrifice, e.g., chatas, which is not effective if the sinner denies its effectiveness.

Rava says that Rebbi agrees that Yom Kippur does not atone for infractions of the day without repentance. Rava says this must be so, since otherwise there would be no case of one being punished for Yom Kippur prohibitions, since the day itself would atone for them. The Gemora objects, and provides two cases where the day would not atone for the transgression, even if repentance is not generally necessary:

1. The person died choking on food he ate, leaving no time after the transgression for atonement
2. The person ate at the end of the day, leaving no part of the day to atone
Tosfos (13a d'ovad) notes that the goat atones even for sins committed later on the day of Yom Kippur, since otherwise the Gemora should have suggested that the case is one who ate after the goat was sent. Some texts of the Gemora continue by citing a braisa, comparing the atonement of the goat and the day. The braisa states that the goat has the advantage of atoning right away, while the day atones only at the end. The day has the advantage of atoning without a sacrifice, while the goat atones only with a sacrifice. Rashi cites this text and rejects it, noting that it is incompatible with the answers provided by the Gemora, which both imply that any part of the day would atone, not just the end. The Ramban and Rabbeinu Chananel keep the text, and the Ramban explains that this is an alternate answer offered by the Gemora. According to this approach, only the end of the day atones, and therefore one would be liable for violating Yom Kippur if he died before the end of the day.

The Rashba offers two explanations of the advantage of Yom Kippur cited in the braisa:
1. The “sacrifice” refers to sending the goat off the azazel cliff. The braisa refers to this as a “sacrifice” since it is considered a sacrifice like standard ones, and follows its rules.
2. The “sacrifice” refers to the chatas goat whose blood was sprinkled inside the mishkan. The braisa is stating that the atonement of Yom Kippur is independent of this sacrifice, while the sent goat only atones if this sacrifice is also brought.
These two explanations seem to differ as to whether the sent goat is considered a standard sacrifice or not. The answer cited by the Ritva for how the goat atones without repentance seems to consider it a standard sacrifice, while the fact that the goat atones for sins committed later seems to indicate it is not.

The Rambam (Teshuva 1:2) rules that the sent goat atones on all lenient prohibitions (i.e., generic positive and negative commandments) even without repentance, but on all others only with repentance. The commentators attempt to explain the Rambam's source for this ruling, since the Gemora presents the opinions of the Sages, who require repentance, and Rebbi, who does not, with no indication of a middle position. The Lechem Mishne says that the Rambam rules like the Sages, but attempts to limit the extent of the dispute between Rebbi and the Sages. The braisa in which they differ on the explanation of the verse mandating karais is discussing only severe prohibitions, and only in that case do we find the Sages explicitly requiring repentance. The Rambam therefore says that the Sages agree with Rebbi that the sent goat atones for lenient transgressions without repentance. The Meshech Chochma (Vayikra 16:30) explains the Rambam based on the Gemora in Yoma (85b), which says that Rebbi holds that Yom Kippur atones for severe transgressions without repentance, but repentance does not atone for them without Yom Kippur. From here we see that Yom Kippur is more potent that repentance alone. Therefore, the Sages, who say that repentance alone atones for lenient prohibitions, surely say that Yom Kippur alone atones for these.

Sifra's authorship

The Gemora states that an anonymous sifra is Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore proves that Rabbi Yehuda requires repentance for the atonement of Yom Kippur. The Gemora then cites another sifra, which indicates that repentance is not required. Abaye answers that the first sifra is Rabbi Yehuda, while the second is Rebbi. The Ritva asks how Abaye can offer this answer if the Gemora stated that an anonymous sifra is Rabbi Yehuda. He offers two answers:
1. The two sifras are different opinions of Rabbi Yehuda's position. Thus, both follow Rabbi Yehuda, but differ on what Rabbi Yehuda holds on this point.
2. The rule of authorship is a general rule for most sifras, but has exceptions. Similarly, the Gemora identifies anonymous mishnas as Rabbi Meir, since most are, but there are many exceptions to this rule.

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Gezeirah shavah and Rhymes

Gezeirah Shavah
Rava praises Rebbe for his connection of olah v’yored with the prohibition on an impure person eating kodesh, by a gezeirah shavah – a common phrase, since behemah temai’ah – non kosher animal is used in both sections. Tosfos Harosh (7a Doleh) asks why this is so praiseworthy, as one can only use such the textual device of gezeirah shavah if he learned it from his teacher. Therefore, Rebbe must have learned this from his teacher, and showed no innovation. Tosfos Harosh answers that all that one learns from his teacher is the common phrase of the gezeirah shavah, but it is up to the student to know which phrases to use, and what to learn. It is Rebbi’s application of the gezeirah shavah which Rava praised.

Rhymes Purer Than Gold

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The Chasam Sofer revered his mentor – “the great eagle,” Rabbi Nasan Adler zt”l. We see his admiration in a poem he composed in his honor, whose beginning copies the style of our sugya, in which Rava praises Rebbe. The interesting rhymes are written in a style now unknown.
He draws water from deep wells
From him they built eternal ruins; he establishes the institutions of each generation.
His words raise those who falter and are sweeter than honey and mead.
The master’s mouth emits flashes of fire, desirable more than refined gold.
The great Kohen – we shall seek Torah, judgment and rulings from him.
He is the teacher who quenches the thirst of the parched, like flowing water-brooks.
The light of Israel, the strong hammer, cast solid as lustrous bronze,
Nasan the Kohen, a tzadik above chasidim and tzadikim.
He is the great eagle who hovers over his nestlings, his veteran students.
Wings of a dove coated in silver and its wings are like brilliant green-gold
And I am among the young, not from the seasoned,
But from the fragile kids (Responsa Chasam Sofer, Y.D. 167).

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Shades of Leprosy and "the Bald One"

Varying Degrees of White

The Gemora discusses Rabbi Akiva’s and the Sages’ positions on the four categories of whiteness of tzara’as. Rabbi Akiva lists them in order of whiteness, while the Sages list them as two categories, each with its own subcategory.

Rashi explains that Rabbi Akiva holds that the main categories are baheres (snow), and the duller se’ais (wool), but that se’ais has two subcategories, plaster and the duller egg membrane. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva says that the two main categories can combine with each other, since they are on equal footing, but the subcategories only combine with each other and with se’ais, their parent category, but not with baheres, which has no relation to them.

Tosfos (6a Af) disagrees, and says that Rabbi Akiva agrees to the general formulation of two categories, each with a subcategory, but just disagrees on the rules of combinations. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva agrees that the subcategory of baheres is plaster, and the subcategory of se’ais is egg membrane, but says that since plaster is two steps duller than its parent, it can only combine with se’ais.

The Raavad says that, according to the Sages, each subcategory can combine with its parent, and each category can combine with each other.

The Rambam (Tumas Tzara’as 1:1-3) says that all four levels of whiteness can combine with each other.

See the Kesef Mishneh (1:1) for a lengthy discussion of how the Rambam learned our Gemora, and his suggestion that the Rambam understands that the Gemora concludes that there is no dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages. He notes that the Gemora is not clear as to whether a source was provided for Rabbi Akiva’s position on the combination of the differing shades of white.

Rabbi Akiva’s Son

The Gemora cites a braisa which records a dialogue between Rabbi Akiva and his son, Yehoshua. Rashi says that this son is Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah. Since Rabbi Akiva was bald, his son was referred to as the son of Karchah – the bald one.

Tosfos (Bechoros 58a Chutz) disagrees, noting that the chronology would not place Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah early enough to be Rabbi Akiva’s son. Tosfos also says that Rabbi Akiva would not be constantly referred to as karchah – the bald one, as that is a derogatory term. Rather, Tosfos says Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah was a later Tanna, whose father was named Karchah.

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Shame of Tzara'as

Shame and Embarrassment

The examination of the nega’im detailed in our sugya requires much study. When a Kohen goes to see a suspect tsara’as, he is accompanied by many young kohanim who come to learn. It is obvious that the person afflicted does not enjoy great honor in such a situation. According to the Netziv, this is explicitly mentioned in the Torah: “This is the law…to teach about the day of becoming tamei and the day of becoming tahor” (Vayikra 14:54-57). In other words, a kohen calls his students to come with him to be taught. The Torah thereafter concludes: “…this is the law of tzara’as” – this is the penalty of a slanderer, who insulted others (Ha’amek Davar).

Three Sorts of Metzora’im

There are three types of tzara’as: s’eis, sapachas and baheres. HaGaon Rav Moshe Sternbuch explains that these names express the nature of those who slander:
1. S’eis (a raised mark): someone who slanders with the object of rising above another.
2. Sapachas (an “accompanying” mark): someone who slanders because he blindly follows those around him.
3. Baheres (a bright mark): someone who slanders with the object of “clarifying” the truth…
But all of them are “the plague of tsara’as (Ta’am Veda’as, Vayikra 13:2). (Hame’or)

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Redeeming with a Check

The Gemora cites a braisa: Rebbe says that a person can use anything to redeem his firstborn son from the Kohen, aside from documents. The Rabbis say: A person can use anything besides for slaves, documents, and land.

The Chasam Sofer in a teshuva (Y”D 134) discusses if redemption would be valid when the father pays the Kohen by check. Is a check regarded as money because it is accepted as cash all over or do we say that it is regarded as a document since there is no inherent value in the paper itself?

He concludes that a check can be regarded as money for some things, but as a document for others. If it is regarding a matter which is between people, then a check would be considered money, since it is commonly accepted. However, regarding redemption of a firstborn, which is between man and Hashem, a check would be regarded as a document and the redemption would not be valid. He explains: The father is actually redeeming his firstborn son from Hashem, but He gave over the monetary rights to the five selaim to the Kohen. Since it is the Torah that set the requirement for the money, the redemption will only be valid if the father gives to the Kohen something that is itself valued at five selaim.

The Chazon Ish (Y”D 72:10) disagrees and maintains that a check would be regarded as money and the redemption would be valid.

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Poor Man

The Bartenura asks, why did the Tanna use the example of the poor man and not merely state, “the person standing in the public domain?”

1. The Bartenura answers that the Tanna is teaching us that although the householder is giving the poor man charity, he has still violated the Shabbos, because this is what is known as a “mitzvah haba’ah b’aveirah, a positive commandment that was fulfilled by committing a sin.

2. The Tosfos Yom Tov, however, contends that this idea only holds true according to the opinion in the Gemora that one who erred in assuming that he is performing a mitzvah is liable. This would not be reconciled, however, with the opinion that posits that one who erred in assuming that he did a mitzvah is not liable. The Tosfos Yom Tov therefore writes that only regarding mitzvos that one is allowed to perform on Shabbos, such as bris milah, can one suggest that if he performs the mitzvah through the means of a sin, he is not liable. Concerning the mitzvah of tzedakah, however, one is not allowed to give tzedakah on Shabbos, and therefore he is certainly deemed punishable for giving charity to the poor person. [Rabbi Akiva Eiger, questions this, however, as we see that one is not allowed to fulfill the mitzvah of lulav on Shabbos, and yet there is an opinion that maintains that one who was involved in handling a lulav on Shabbos would not be liable a punishment.]

3. The Chemdas Shlomo writes that the only case where we say that one may be exempt from punishment is when he is obligated to perform some act for the mitzvah. In such a situation we can seek leniency for someone who was involved in performing the mitzvah even at a time when he was prohibited to do so. Regarding charity, though, one is not obligated to hand the poor man the article. The householder can leave the article for the poor man, without having to transfer the article from the private domain to the public domain. By transferring the article from one domain to another, the householder has incurred a sin that is liable a punishment.

4. Reb Aharon Leib Shteinman answers that we only say that one who erred in performing a mitzvah is not liable when the involvement in the mitzvah led the person to sin. In the case of the Mishna however, the mitzvah of giving charity did not distract the householder. Rather, the householder erred in not remembering that it was Shabbos or not being cognizant that this was a forbidden act of labor. In such circumstances one is not exempt from the punishment of having committed a sin.

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Temple Mount

Entering the Temple Mount

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

In our Mishna Rabbi Meir says, “All the goats serve to atone for the defilement of the Temple and its holy objects.” In other words, all the goats of the additional sacrifices (musafim) served to atone for prohibitions of defilement committed in the Temple by eating kodoshim (parts of sacrifices) while being defiled (tamei) or by entering the Temple when being tamei.

Does the sanctity of the site of the Temple depend on the Temple’s existence? A defiled person (tamei) who enters the site of the Temple transgresses a prohibition of the Torah and is punished with kareis. According to Rambam (Hilchos Beis HaBechirah, 6:16) and many Rishonim (Tosfos, Yevamos 82b, s.v. Yerushah; Rash on Shevi‟is 6:1; Semag, ‘asin 163; Yereiim Hashalem, 277; Ritva, Megillah 10b and Shevuos 2b; Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvos 184, 362 and 363), the prohibition and the resulting kares are still valid after the Temple’s destruction as “the first sanctification sanctified the place in its time and for the future.” In other words, the site of the Temple was consecrated forever with an unconditional sanctity, independent of the existence of the Temple.

Raavad (ibid) disagrees and believes that once the Temple was destroyed and the gentiles conquered the Temple Mount, its sanctity was rescinded.

Some hold that even according to Raavad, it could be that only the punishment of kares was revoked whereas the Torah prohibition to enter remains (see Responsa Binyan Tziyon, 2, and Responsa Mishpat Kohen, 96). Even if not so, all agree that Chazal decreed that we mustn’t enter the site of the Temple after its destruction because of two reasons: (a) so that when the Temple will be rebuilt, everyone should remember that a tamei must not enter; (b) to preserve the respect for the Temple. Indeed, leading authorities testified that after the destruction of the Temple Jews were always careful to avoid entering the site as the prohibition to enter is also valid in our era from the Torah (d’oraisa) and those who enter are punished with kares (Rabeinu Ovadyah Bartenura in his letter from Eretz Israel of 5248; Maharam Chagiz in Parashas Mas’ei; and see Binyan Tziyon, that that is the ruling of all the poskim).

Rambam’s letter that caused a sensation: A letter sent by Rambam during his visit in Eretz Yisroel (printed in Sefer Chareidim, 65) aroused a great commotion when he wrote that on coming to Yerushalayim, he prayed in the “great and holy house.” Some interpreted this as meaning a synagogue built on the site of the Temple – a contradiction to his ruling that one mustn’t enter there in our era. Still, poskim reject the attempt to present the letter as proof that Rambam changed his ruling, and proved that he referred to a large synagogue called Midrash Shlomo, located near the Temple Mount, whose windows faced the whole area of the site of the Temple (see Responsa Minchas Yitzchak, V, 1, and Responsa Tzitz Eli’ezer, X, 1, and XI, 15, in the name of HaGaon Rav Y. Chai Zarihan).

Montefiore’s visit to the Temple Mount: 136 years ago, in 5627 (1867), Sir Moses Montefiore visited Eretz Israel, accompanied by his private secretary, Dr Levi. To the great surprise of the Yerushalayim community, the two entered the Temple Mount with a special permit issued by the Sultan in Istanbul, attained by the Pashah of Yerushalayim who had been well paid by Montefiore’s aides. The Jerusalemites were shocked and HaGaon Rav Yosef Moshe of Lissa, the son of the author of Nesivos HaMishpat and Chavos Da’as, even blew a shofar in the streets and excommunicated Montefiore. Being deeply religious, the latter rushed to the rabbis and scholars of Yerushalayim and apologized, claiming that he had acted sincerely, having been misled by a certain rabbi that Raavad’s opinion was accepted as halachah. He then accepted certain orders of teshuvah and the commotion subsided (Responsa Tzitz Eli’ezer, XI, 15:5).

May non-Jews enter the Temple Mount?

Now that we know that the Torah’s prohibition to enter the site of the Temple and the penalty of kares are valid in our era, we should examine the halachah pertaining to gentiles. The Mishna in Keilim 1:8 explains that non-Jews must not enter further than the cheil (the fence around the Temple) – i.e., the area of the Temple Mount (except for the cubits adjacent to the surrounding wall) – and Rambam (Hilchos Bias HaMikdash, 3:5) rules accordingly, that “at the cheil gentiles should be sent away.”

The halachos of defilement are only for Jews: The Torah does not apply halachos of defilement (tumah) to non-Jews (Nazir 61b; Rambam, Hilchos Tumas HaMeis, 1:13), just as animals do not become tamei. As a result, the Torah’s prohibition that temeiim must not enter the site of the Temple refers only to Jews. Nonetheless, Chazal decreed tumah on gentiles and the Mishna therefore explains that they must not penetrate the cheil.

May a non-Jew enter the Temple Mount? Some explain (Magid Meireishis in Kuntres Derech HaKodesh) that though non-Jews are allowed to enter the site of the Temple, we are commanded by Chazal to prevent their entry, as Rambam states: “gentiles should be sent away.”Still, the Maharit (cited in Derech HaKodesh by Rav C.A. Alfandari) indicates that Chazal also actually forbade them to enter the site of the Temple (Chazon Nachum on Keilim 1:6).

How the Greeks defiled the oil of the Temple: Every year on Chanukah we praise Hashem for the miracle of the single sealed jug of pure oil found remaining from all the other oil defiled by the Greeks. Apparently, since non-Jews are never tamei, we must understand how they managed to defile the oil.

Tosfos (Shabos 21b, s.v. Shehayah, and see Maharsha, ibid) indicate that the decree to apply tumah to gentiles could have been very early, even before the Mishnaic era, whereas the Re’eim (on the Semag at the beginning of Hilchos Chanukah) remarks that the Greeks defiled all the oil when they entered the Temple because of their garments which were tamei.

Buying water from a well on the Temple Mount: Sdei Chemed (Ma’areches Vav, Kelal 26, os 33) refers to the question of the Jerusalemites as to if they may buy water from Arabs who draw it from a well on the Temple Mount, as they suspected that their demand for water caused the Arabs to go there. He replied that as the water-drawers stay on the Mount all day anyway, there is no prohibition to buy the water. On the contrary, the demand for water causes them to leave the site of the Temple when they bring water to the Jews.

Inserting fingers in the Western Wall: Over three years ago we treated the topic of putting one’s fingers in the cracks of the Western Wall. In that article we cited the Aderes (Mishkenos L’Abir Ya’akov, II) who forbids such for fear of entering the site of the Temple while being tamei. On the other hand, some believe (Maharil Diskin, cited ibid, etc.) that the walls of the Temple Mount were never sanctified and that there is no prohibition (see sefer Meoros HaDaf HaYomi, Vol. II, p. 249).

Permission by the Avnei Nezer: Still, it is interesting to note that the Sochatchover Rebbe zt”l, author of Avnei Nezer (Responsa Avnei Nezer, Y.D., II, 450-51), writes that even if the walls were consecrated, there is no prohibition to put one’s fingers therein because of two halachos: (a) The prohibition to enter refers to the normal manner of entry whereas entry in an unusual fashion is allowed; (b) the prohibition to enter is only for the ways of access to the Temple. Putting a finger in a hole in a wall is not considered a normal manner of entry and is therefore allowed and even if we say that it is a form of entry, that place cannot be reached from inside the Temple and is not regarded as entering a sanctified place (see other reasons ibid).

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Makkos 21 (insights all about shaving)

You can see the most recent Daf at: http://daf-yomi.org/english_dafyomi/makkos_21.pdf

Please click here to view "peyos" poster: http://www.hakhel.info/archivesPublicService/PeyosPoster.pdf

For additional material please visit www.dafnotes.com










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Makkos 20 (plus important detailed poster)

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Makkos Daf 19

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Atonement of an Olah

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Rabbi Yosi HaGelili (Yoma 36) states that a korban olah is brought for the sin of not giving the poor people from your grain, which one is obligated to do. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that a korban olah is brought to atone for transgressing a positive commandment. Chazal say that an olah is a doron - a present to Hashem. The Seforim say that an olah shows a tremendous amount of love between the person and Hashem. The Ramban writes that when one brings a chatas or an asham, he should feel as if he is bringing himself as a sacrifice, for in truth, that is what he deserves. By an olah, it is as if he is giving himself to Hashem out of love.

How do we reconcile an olah being a present and a sign of love with the fact that Chazal say it is brought for transgressing certain sins?

The Aruch L'neir (Makkos 17b) explains the Ritva. The Gemora contrasts a chatas and asham that is coming for atonement and an olah is not. The Ritva asks from the Gemora in Yoma and Zevachim that it does provide forgiveness for some sins, and he answers that when one brings an olah as a donation, it atones for those sins.

Reb Chaim HaQoton elaborates: Rashi, quoting the Midrash, explains that an olah sacrifice is an atonement for one who violates a positive commandment or for one who violates a negative commandment and fails to perform the positive commandment that is supposed to rectify the negative commandment. Rashi explains, in a point further explained by Nachmanides and Rabbi Yaakov Ettlinger, that one is never obligated to bring a olah as an atonement, rather, if one does, he attains his atonement.

Tosfos write that after bringing an olah one’s atonement is “floating. Rabbi Meir Lublin explains that the Tosafists mean that an olah offering only atones for lenient sins, not for the more strict and severe sins.

Rabbi Shlomo Luria explains that the atonement is “floating” inasmuch as the atonement does not occur automatically when one offers an olah sacrifice, rather one must first perform teshuvah (repentance) and return to God before the offering of the sacrifice will complete its powers of atonement.

His words echo that of Rabbi Yaakov ben Asher who explains that the olah only serves as atonement for failing to perform a positive commandment or violating a negative commandment which is to be repaired by a positive commandment, if one repents from one’s sin.

Other Tosafists write that the olah offers an atonement for one who sinned and never knew of his sin. According to this explanation, obviously one cannot be obligate to being an olah for such a sin, because if he never knew about his sin, how can he be obliged to offer a sacrifice to atone for it? Rather, if one brought an olah offering, then it atones for sins unbeknown to him, but if he did not bring one, he is not required to do so. Another Midrash says that an olah is an atonement for one who thinks about sinning and thus has sinned with his intellect, not for one who violates a positive commandment.

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Hasra'ah and Witnesses

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The Purpose of Hasra’ah

By: Rabbi Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora cites various verses as the source for the requirement of hasra’ah (warning).

The Maharatz Chayus points out that there are two sources for hasra’ah. The first is a sevara, - this serves to make sure that the person is aware of the severity and consequences of his actions. Included in the hasra’ah is both the education of the halachah, and the awareness of the action that he is about to do. The second source is the verses that the Gemora quotes which serve as a gezeiras hakasuv, whether they apply or not, that no punishment can be carried out unless there is a warning.

The Maharatz Chayus deduces this from Tosfos who is bothered why the Gemora has to find a source for hasra’ah, to which they answer that it is needed for a non-chaver (someone who isn’t educated in the laws). It is obvious from logic that he requires hasra’ah, because otherwise, he would have no idea whether the action that he is doing is prohibited by the Torah, but, a chaver, who is well educated, knows very well what he is doing and understands the consequences. He shouldn’t require hasra’ah if not for the fact that the Torah would demand it as a gezeiras hakasuv. The verses are the rationale for requiring the details of hasra’ah, such as killing him within the time of an utterance (and perhaps having to accept the hasra’ah).

Based on this, he points out that Tosfos, who asks regarding the source for hasra’ah by an ir hanidachas (subverted town), is difficult. Who says that ir hanidachas has the gezeiras hakasuv requirement of hasra’ah that would involve the details? Perhaps it would only have the sevara aspect of hasra’ah to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate, so that no source is necessary. Clearly, Tosfos assumes that the type of hasra’ah necessary by ir hanidachas is the gezeiras hakasuv type - with all the details, and not just the determination that he was aware of the consequences of his actions.

The Rambam, however, doesn’t seem to follow this same approach. The Gemora 8b and 41a quote Rabbi Yosi bar Yehudah, who says that a Torah scholar doesn’t require hasra’ah, since the sole purpose of hasra’ah is to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate. This would imply that the Rabbis, who hold that even a Torah scholar requires hasra’ah, would hold that hasra’ah is a gezeiras hakasuv, and NOT just to distinguish between unintentional and deliberate. However, the Rambam (Sanhederin 12:2) writes: A torah scholar and an unlearned man require hasra’ah, for the sole purpose of hasra’ah is to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate. This seems to be very strange. The Rambam cites the rationale of Rabbi Yosi bar Yehudah, yet requires hasra’ah even for a chaver! Why?

The Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh explain that according to the Rambam, the Rabbis don’t disagree with Rabbi Yosi bar Yehudah in principal; rather, they hold that because of his concern, we require hasra’ah even by a chaver who knows the law, since he may not be aware of the action he is about to do. The Rambam clearly learns that the concept of hasra’ah is only meant to make him aware of his actions, and educate him about the halachah, not just a gezeiras hakasuv. Nevertheless, the Rambam requires hasra’ah within the time of an utterance of the action, implying that this concept isn’t merely a gezeiras hakasuv, but an actual concern that he may have a very short term memory. It seems that the Rambam doesn’t buy into the two sources for hasra’ah approach; rather, he understands that the rationale for the sources of hasra’ah cited in the Gemora is to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate - to educate and inform.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Eidim P’sulim

The Gemora learns that even if there are a hundred witnesses that witnessed an event, but included in those witnesses were relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses, then the all the witnesses may not testify. Rebbe clarifies that this is only true when the relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses also gave the warning, but if they merely witnessed an event along with others, they can’t nullify the testimony of the other witnesses. Rashi explains that by giving the warning, they show that they too want to be considered witnesses, therefore they negate the other witnesses’ testimony, since part of the witnesses are disqualified.

Who is considered disqualified for testimony?

1) Relatives - Relatives: There are many different scenarios; we will only touch on a few.

We learn that relatives cannot be considered witnesses from the verse: Fathers shall not die through their sons. The Chachamim derived from this verse that the father cannot die due to testimony from his son, and vice versa. Aside from a son there are other relatives that cannot testify; a) brothers, b) grandson, c) first cousins, d) second cousins. All these cases apply to females as well, meaning a sister cannot testify on a brother and vice versa etc. (Choshen Mishpat 33:2)

If one cannot testify regarding a woman (for example a sister), he is similarly prohibited from testifying for her husband, and conversely, if one cannot testify for a certain man, he also may not testify for his wife (ibid 33:3). However, he may testify for that spouse’s relative (ibid 33:5).

Mechutanim may testify for each other (ibid 33:6).

2) Oivrei Aveirah - One Who Committed a Sin: If one transgressed any prohibition that is punishable by either death or lashes, he is disqualified for testimony until he repents. It makes no difference if he sinned due to desire, or if he sinned as an act of rebellion (ibid 34:2).

If one transgressed a Rabbinic prohibition, he is disqualified only on a Rabbinic level (there are halachic differences between them).

3) Other P’sulei Eidus: A minor is disqualified for testimony, even if he is very bright. One leaves the status of a minor once he shows signs of physical maturity, usually when he turns thirteen years old.

One who is incoherent in a certain issue is also disqualified (ibid 35:8). If he is mentally deranged, he is also disqualified (ibid 35:10).

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As they Intended

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The Mishna teaches us that the zomemin witnesses are only punished if they attempted to have someone executed, but they were found to be zomemin before the defendant was executed (as long as it was after the verdict was handed down). However, if they were discredited through hazamah only after the defendant had been executed, they will not be punished. This is derived from the Scriptural verse: as they intended to do; but not as they actually accomplished.

The Kesef Mishnah explains this seemingly perplexing halachah in two manners:
1. When the zomemin witnesses actually carry out their plan and the accused is executed - such a sin is of such a magnitude that they cannot get punished in this world. The punishment for such a hideous sin can only take place in the next world- in Gehinnom.
2. Alternatively, he explains, if the accused was actually executed, we assume that he was indeed guilty and deserved to die. Hashem is present by every court case and it must be attributed to Divine Providence that the second set of witnesses did not arrive until after the defendant was executed.

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