Lottery ticket from Maaser and Shemittas Kesafim

Lottery Ticket

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Buying a lottery ticket for a charitable cause from ma’aser money

Many charitable institutions raise funds by promising prizes to be awarded in a lottery among the contributors. HaGaon Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Responsa Igros Moshe, O.C., IV, 76) was asked if a person could purchase such a ticket from his ma’aser money or if the ticket should be considered as having a monetary value to its holder and thus forbidden to be purchased from ma’aser.

Two types of tickets: Rav Feinstein remarks that we should divide this question into two parts – i.e., two types of lottery tickets. Some institutions issue a fixed amount of tickets, promising that at a certain date or when all of them are sold, the raffle will be held. In such a lottery even the first purchaser knows his chances of winning.

Nonetheless, there is another sort of ticket: Some institutions do not limit the amount of tickets and fix no final date for the raffle. It is obvious, then, that such tickets have no monetary value. A person who purchases such a ticket has no investment, as he has been promised nothing. It is not an investment but a form of charity and may be purchased from ma’aser.

What is the nature, though, of the first type of ticket? First of all, we must examine if we can define the value of something whose worth is unknown. In other words, is a lottery ticket regarded as an item of monetary value although the vast majority of purchasers win nothing?

Estimating the worth of an item whose value is unknown: Rav Feinstein proves from our sugya that we can regard such an article as having value. Our sugya explains that we can estimate the worth of a kesuvah of a woman who has not been divorced by examining the amount merchants would be willing to invest to purchase the rights to the kesuvah once it can be realized. The merchants examine the state of the couple’s health, their relationship and the like. They then estimate the wife’s chances to survive her husband or get divorced and earn her kesuvah. We thus see that we can regard an item whose worth is unknown as an article of monetary value. One should therefore not purchase a ticket of the first sort from ma’aser as the purchaser immediately gets the worth of his investment.

The winner of a lottery: Rav Feinstein adds that if a purchaser of the second type of ticket wins a prize, he should better return the cost of the ticket to his ma’aser money (see Derech Emunah on Matenos ‘Aniyim, Ch. 7, in Beiur Halachah, s.v. V’echad).




Reasons for Shemittas Kesafim

By: Rabbi Moshe Donnebaum

As strange as the mitzvah of relinquishing one's loans may seem, there are important lessons in regard to this commandment. The Sefer HaChinuch explains that the first useful benefit to be gained is the characteristic of generosity. There is none so generous as he who gives without hope of receiving anything in return. So too, relinquishing a loan with no benefit or gain in mind imbues a person with this noble character trait.

The second lesson mentioned in the Chinuch relates to the mitzvah of bitachon - trust in Hashem. Anyone who, upon command, relinquishes all outstanding debts, is continuously strengthening his level of trust in Hashem. The creditor displays trust that any losses incurred will be fully reimbursed to his allocated and pre-determined wealth. The knowledge of G-d as the source of all livelihood and provider of all one's needs is confirmed, and substantiated when releasing a debtor from his debts.

The Chinuch continues that the mitzvah of Shemittas kesafim is also a 'barrier' to keep away from robbery and any desire to own the possessions of one's neighbor, via a kal vachomer. If the Torah decrees that one should leave a loan in his neighbor's hand concerning money that is rightfully owed to him, then certainly he may not obtain his neighbor's belongings, in any way, without his neighbor's consent.

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Women Plowing during Shemitah

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The Gemora in Moed Katan presents a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elozar whether one would incur the thirty-nine lashes if he would plow during Shemitah.

Rashi (2b) states that there is a positive commandment which forbids plowing on Shemitah. It is written [Shmos 34:21]: From plowing and harvesting you shall desist. The point of contention between the two Amoraim is if there is a negative commandment as well.

The Rambam in Hilchos Shemitah rules that one who plows during Shemitah does not incur the thirty-nine lashes. Kesef Mishna explains: Since in our Gemora, it was left ambiguously regarding which Amora held what, we cannot administer the lashes when there is uncertainty.

Sha’ar Hamelech in the beginning of Hilchos Shemitah writes that the Yerushalmi in Shabbos (7:2) states that Rabbi Yochanan is the one who maintains that he does not receive the lashes and the rule is that when Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elozar argue, the halacha is in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan.

Minchas Chinuch (112) comments that women are obligated in this mitzvah even though it is a positive commandment that has a time element to it and the principle is that women are exempt from any positive mitzvah which is governed by time. He explains that this is applicable only regarding a positive mitzvah that is incumbent on the body of the person and not a mitzvah like Shemitah, which is a mitzvah that is dependent on the land (mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz).

Proof to this is cited from the Ritva in Kiddushin (29a). The Gemora rules based on a Scriptural verse that women are not obligated to perform a circumcision on their sons. Tosfos asks: Why is a verse necessary; circumcision is a positive mitzvah which is governed by time since the mitzvah can only be performed by day, and women are exempt? The Ritva answers: Any mitzvah which is not related to the person themselves; this principle does not apply. The mitzvah of milah is to perform the circumcision on the son and therefore women would be obligated if not for the special verse teaching us otherwise.

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An Abbreviated Cycle

The Gemora (Nedarim 61a) presents a dispute regarding the counting of Yovel. The Chachamim hold that Yovel is the fiftieth year in the cycle and the following year is the first year of the next cycle. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the fiftieth year is reckoned for both cycles. It is the fiftieth year of the previous cycle and the first year of the forthcoming cycle.

The Turei Even poses an interesting question according to the viewpoint of Rabbi Yehuda. In the first Shemitah cycle after a Yovel, there will only be five field working years between Yovel and Shemitah since during Yovel one is not permitted to work his field.

In a normal Shemitah cycle, each of the six years has a designated tithing that one is required to separate from his field. One is obligated to take maaser sheini (he would bring one tenth of his produce to Yerushalayim to be eaten there) on the first, second, fourth and fifth years. He would separate maaser oni (given to the poor) on the third and sixth years. The Turei Even wonders what the arrangement would be according to Rabbi Yehuda in the first cycle following a Yovel, where there is only five years.

The Netziv and the Sfas Emes state that in the third year, one would separate maaser oni and regarding the remaining years, he would take maaser sheini. This is because the Torah states that maaser oni should be separated every three years; however the Torah does not prescribe set years for maaser sheini. A year that does not have a requirement for maaser oni, automatically has an obligation for maaser sheini.

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Women and Shemitah

The Chinuch states that there is a positive commandment which forbids plowing on Shemitah. It is written [Shmos 34:21]: From plowing and harvesting you shall desist.

The Minchas Chinuch (112) asks that if so, women should be exempt from this mitzvah, and they should be permitted to plow on shemitah because it is a positive commandment that has a time element to it and the principle is that women are exempt from any positive mitzvah which is governed by time?

He answers that women are obligated in this mitzvah because that rule is applicable only regarding a positive mitzvah that is incumbent on the body of the person and not a mitzvah like shemitah, which is a mitzvah that is dependent on the land (mitzvos hateluyos ba’aretz). This can be better understood based upon our Gemora which says that the shemitah prohibition is on account of the ground.

Proof to this distinction is cited from the Ritva in Kiddushin (29a). The Gemora rules, based on a Scriptural verse that women are not obligated to perform a circumcision on their sons. Tosfos asks: Why is a verse necessary; circumcision is a positive mitzvah which is governed by time since the mitzvah can only be performed by day, and women are exempt? The Ritva answers: Any mitzvah which is not related to the person themselves; this principle does not apply. The mitzvah of milah is to perform the circumcision on the son and therefore women would be obligated if not for the special verse teaching us otherwise.

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Something that will become Permitted

Rabbi Shimon said Nedarim 58a): That Mishna is only referring to the halacha of bi’ur i.e. removing (the produce of Shemitah may be kept as long as that produce is still available in the fields for the animals; afterwards, it may no longer remain in the house).

The Ra”n explains: Since it was possible to eat it before that time, it is regarded as something that can become permitted.

The Sha’ar Hamelech and the Noda B’Yehudah ask: According to this logic, why is it only not nullified if it becomes intermingled with its type? The halacha should be that it should not become nullified even if it becomes mixed up in something that is not its type? For the Ra”n above (52a) explained at great length in the name of the Ri”f that something which is permitted presently to be consumed will not be nullified, even with a mixture of things that aren’t its type?

The Sha’ar Hamelech answers: The Ra”n only said that rule in respect of things that will be permitted forever, such as meat, which will always be permitted to be eaten with other meat or foods that are not from milk. However, here, the Shemitah produce will become forbidden forever, i.e. after the “time of removal.” It is therefore compared to something that will become permitted, where it will not become nullified only in a mixture of things that aren’t its type.

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PRINTER’S MISTAKE IN RASHI - Yevamos 74 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora had stated that the mitzvah of terumah and bikkurim apply during all years of the Shemitah cycle, whereas maaser sheini is separated only in the first, second, fourth and fifth years of the cycle.

It would seem from the language of Rashi that terumah and bikkurim operate only during the six years of the Shemitah cycle, but not during Shemitah itself. The Meiri explicitly states like this. The Commentators explain the reasoning for this: During Shemitah, the produce from the fields is regarded as ownerless; how can there be an obligation to bring your first fruits to the Beis Hamikdosh. Furthermore, you would not be able to recite the verses that you are thankful for the land which was given to me. The Avnei Neizer (Y”D 445) writes that perhaps it can be recited. Since presently, these fruits are his, he can say that the land is his as well.

Rashi, in his commentary to Chumash (23:19) writes: The choicest of the first fruits of your soil Even in the seventh year, the offering of bikkurim is obligatory. The Mizrachi, Maharal and Sifsei Chachamim all state that this must be a printers mistake.

I noticed the following discussion in the Meorot HaDaf Hayomi weekly newsletter.

The Torah commands us to take the first fruit of the seven species, and bring them to the Beis HaMikdash during the period between Shavuos and Sukkos: “And you will take of the first fruits of the earth, that you will bring from the land that Hashem your G-d has given you. You will put them in a basket and bring them to the place Hashem your G-d has chosen to rest His Name upon” (Devarim 26:2). May we merit that the Beis HaMikdash soon be rebuilt, enabling us to fulfill this mitzva this very year.

Your land: The commandment of bikkurim involves bringing the first fruit that grow from our own land - “From the land that Hashem your G-d has given you.” We need not bring bikkurim from ownerless trees. Th¬e Or HaChaim takes this one step further. On Shmitta year, we are commanded to disown our fields and their produce, allowing people and animals to enter freely and help themselves to the fruit. As such, he rules that there is no mitzva of bikkurim on Shmitta, since the produce of the land is not ours for that year.

Rashi’s opinion: ¬The Minchas Chinuch (91:2) cites the Or HaChaim, and notes that not only do the Rambam and Sefer HaChinuch imply that one must bring bikkurim on Shmitta, Rashi in his commentary to the Chumash rules explicitly so. On the words, “th¬e first fruit of the land” (Shemos 23:19), Rashi writes that even on the seventh year we must bring bikkurim. Although the Minchas Chinuch did not find a previous source, Rashi must have based himself on some ruling of the Sages (the Chazon Ish explains how Rashi learned this from the Mechilta).

However, the classic commentaries on Rashi insist that this version of Rashi must be a misprint. How could Rashi reconcile this, with the possuk that requires us to say when bringing bikkurim, “I have brought the first fruit of the land You have given me, Hashem” (Devarim 26:10)? If the land is not ours, how can we say this possuk? Furthermore, in our sugya Rashi seems to imply that we do not bring bikkurim on Shmitta (Rashi 74a, s.v. V’nohagin).

Despite these questions, the Tashbatz (II, 247) writes that there is no misprint in Rashi’s commentary to Chumash. According to him, Rashi indeed holds that we must bring bikkurim on Shmittta.

Fruit that matured before Shmitta: ¬The Chazon Ish (Orla 11, s.k. 18) explains that Rashi refers to fruit that had blossomed (chanata) in the sixth year, and were harvested in the seventh. Th¬ese fruit do not have the sanctity of Shmitta. They belong to the field’s owner, who is obligated to offer from them bikkurim. One might have thought that the mitzva of bikkurim is entirely suspended during Shmitta, even for those fruit that blossomed previously. ¬The Torah tells us that we bring the bikkurim in the season when we rejoice over the harvest (from Shavuos to Sukkos). In Shmitta there is no general harvest. Rashi comes to teach us that nonetheless, we still must bring bikkurim from the fruit that blossomed in the previous year (see also commentary on Minchas Chinuch, Machon Yerushalayim publication, note 3).

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Daf Yomi - Taanis 5 - TIME TO BECOME ROOTED

The Gemora relates that in the times of Yoel, Klal Yisroel planted on the second, third and fourth day of Nissan from the grain with which they had and the second rainfall came down on the fifth day of Nissan. They miraculously were able to bring the korban omer on the sixteenth of Nissan from the new crop which grew. It emerges that grain which normally grows in six months grew in eleven days.

The Maharsha comments that it was necessary for the grain to take root three days before the second rainfall. This is because the Gemora in Rosh Hashanah (10b) states that in order for grain to be considered from the previous year, it is required to be rooted into the ground and that takes three days.

The Metzapeh Eisan asks that this is only correct according to Rabbi Yehuda; however Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon disagree and maintain that it takes two weeks to become rooted in the ground and the halacha is in accordance with their opinion.

Shulchan Aruch (Y”D 293) rules that grain which took root before the sixteenth of Nissan becomes permitted for consumption with the korban omer offered on the sixteenth. The Shach cites the Terumos Hadeshen (191) who states that it takes three days for the grain to become rooted into the ground.

The Dagul Meirvova asks that this is only correct according to Rabbi Yehuda; however Rabbi Yosi and Rabbi Shimon disagree and maintain that it takes two weeks to become rooted in the ground and the halacha is in accordance with their opinion.

The Metzapeh Eisan answers that the Terumos Hadeshen relied on our Gemora that would seem to indicate that three days is sufficient time for the grain to take root into the ground. The Gr”A states that perhaps there is a distinction between trees and grain as to the amount of time it takes for them to become rooted in the ground. He cites a Yerushalmi that makes such a distinction.

The Chasam Sofer (Y”D 284) answers that in truth, there is not a factual dispute as to how many days it takes for a tree to take root since everyone holds that it takes root in three days or less and the facts can attest to this. The argument amongst the Tannaim is regarding a case where for some reason the tree did not take root. After how long can it be stated with a certainty that the tree will not take root any longer. Regarding Shemitah, which is a Biblical transgression, we must rule stringently that grain which is planted two weeks prior to Shemitah receives the sanctity of Shemitah. The prohibition of eating from the new crop outside of Eretz Yisroel is only Rabbinical and therefore we can rule leniently and three days will be sufficient.

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Daf Yomi - Rosh Hashana 15 - Maaser During Shemitah

Rashi cites a drasha from the Mechilta explaining why something that has the sanctity of Shemitah is exempt from the obligation of maaser.

Turei Even asks on the necessity for a special drasha pertaining to Shemitah when we already have a drasha that anything which is hefker (ownerless) is exempt from the obligation of maaser.

Maharit (43) answers that this would be a proof to the viewpoint of his father, the Mabit, who holds that the reason anything with the sanctity of Shemitah is deemed ownerless is not because the owner made his entire field hefker (which is the Beis Yosef’s opinion), but rather due to the decree from the Torah. The Steipler explains that something which is halachicly ownerless and the owner prevents others from acquiring them is not the hefker that is exempt from maaser. There is a special drasha by Shemitah that even if the owner does not want his produce to be hefker, it is nonetheless exempt from maaser.

The Turei Even himself answers that there is a dispute in the Yerushalmi regarding one who is mafkir (render ownerless) his produce to any Jew but not to a gentile, if that is considered hefker to be exempt from maaser. Produce that grows during Shemitah is hefker only to a Yisroel and according to Rish Lakish would not be considered hefker. This is why there is a special drasha stating that the produce of Shemitah is exempt from the obligation of maaser.

The Reshash asks on the Turei Even and states that the two cases are not comparable. In the Yerushalmi’s case, the hefker is not a hefker since he did not render ownerless to everyone and that is why Rish Lakish maintains that it is not hefker to become exempt from maaser. However regarding Shemitah, everyone would agree that the produce is hefker even if it will be only for a Jew and not for a gentile.

The Steipler answers that there would be a difference in the following case: A fruit that began to grow in the sixth year but did not grow a third until the seventh year. If something that grows during Shemitah becomes ownerless because it grew in the seventh year (and not because of its sanctity), perhaps we can say that only the portion of the fruit that grew in the seventh year is ownerless and therefore exempt from maaser, however the part that grew in the sixth year would be subject to the obligation of maaser. We have the special drasha by Shemitah teaching us that any produce that has the sanctity of Shemitah on it will be exempt from the maaser obligations.

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