Showing posts with label Meshech Chochmah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Meshech Chochmah. Show all posts

Sunday, August 09, 2009

Specifics in Tefillah

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

by: Rabbi Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora inquires: What if the landowner said to the tenant-farmer, “Plant wheat,” and he went and planted barley, and then the greater part of the valley was blasted, and his barley too was blasted? Do we say that the tenant-farmer can claim, “Had I planted wheat, it also would have been blasted,” or perhaps the landowner can respond, “Had you planted wheat, the Scriptural blessing of “You will make a plan, and it shall be established for you” would have been fulfilled for me?

Rashi writes that the landowner counters by saying, “If you would have planted wheat, the field would have quite possibly been spared, for I was praying at the beginning of the year regarding a successful wheat crop; not for barley.”

The focus on the “beginning of the year” is that even though the landowner realized later that the farmer planted barley rather than wheat, and from the time of planting he was praying for a successful barley crop, he can still claim that before the planting season, he has already been praying for success regarding wheat, not barley, and perhaps it was that prayer that would have been listened to.

This idea that a prayer will only work for what a person is explicitly requesting, and not merely for what he was intending, can be traced to a Rashi in Chumash (Parshas Chukas 21:1). Rashi explains that the Amaleikites dressed as Canaanites so that the Jews should pray that the Canaanites should be delivered in their hands. Since in fact, they were fighting with Amaleik, their prayers would be useless.

The Mesech Chochmah makes the connection to our Gemora. He explains that even though they would have surely prayed against Amaleik had they known their true identity, tefillah does not accomplish when one is praying for the wrong thing.

We learn from here that when we daven, although it is important to make the tefillah specific (as we see from Chazal in the way they instituted the Shemoneh Esrei, asking for specific requests, not just “all good things” - this is also clear from Tosfos that if one davens very generally for success, it is not a strong tefillah, so Hashem is less likely to listen and he therefore has no claim, but when he davens for something specific, Hashem is more likely to listen and therefore he has a claim), we should leave our tefillos open enough, so that if we are mistaken about certain facts, the tefillah will still be applicable; rather than limiting the tefillah based on facts that will be realized to be wrong, rendering the entire tefillah futile.

Read more!

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

Borrowing with the Owner

Subscribe to the Daily Daf Yomi Summary here.

By: Reb Avi Lebovitz

Rav Hamnuna holds that the exemption of borrowing an animal with its owner only applies to a case where the owner is borrowed to work in the same labor as the animal, AND that the owner was there at the time that the accident occurred.

This approach in שאלה בבעלים is certainly the most rationale, because the reason for the exemption is that since the owner was there at the time of the accident doing the same work, he should have watched his own animal.

This is the approach of the GR"A in Aderes Eliyahu to explain the concept of שאלה בבעלים. However, the Meshech Chochma (Mishpatim 22:3) points out that this approach doesn’t at all work with the halachic ruling, rejecting Rav Hamnuna entirely. We hold that שאלה בבעלים is completely dependent on the time that the object was borrowed, the owner must have already been in the borrower service (or at least begin immediately), AND it makes no difference if the owner is working with the object that has been borrowed or in something else. What then is the rationale behind this halachah?

The Meshech Chochma suggests that the rationale is based on a Gemora in Megillah (26b) which states that the sanctity of a Shul would go away, not only through a sale, but even if it is given as a gift because: if they would not have received any benefit from the recipient, they would not have given it to him (therefore it is like a sale). Here too, it is not common to do such a huge favor for the borrower to lend him an object and work for him at the same time. Therefore, we assume that the owner is only lending and working in exchange for something that he received. Since the owner received something in exchange, the borrower is no longer a borrower, but has been downgraded to a renter, who is exempt if an unavoidable accident occurs.

This approach doesn’t explain those who hold that negligence is also exempt, and it also doesn’t explain why he is exempt for theft according to those who hold a renter is normally liable for theft (like a spaid custodian). Perhaps we will have to assume a “lo p’lug” (no distinction) to explain those opinions.

With this, we can somewhat explain the Gemora’s question (96a) whether שאלה בבעלים applies when the owner sends his messenger rather than going himself. Does the sending of a messenger also indicate that the owner must have received something significant in return for lending and supplying a worker, or do we only assume that when he himself goes? However, if this is in fact the question of the Gemora, it shouldn’t really be dependent on the halachah of שלוחו של אדם כמותו anywhere else; it should be an isolated question regarding the assumption in this specific situation. Yet, the Gemora compares it to the general halachah of שלוחו של אדם כמותו by the annulment of vows.

Read more!

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

A Woman Shaving

The Torah writes [Vayikra 19:27]: Lo sakifu pe’as rosheichem. You shall not round the corners of your head. Here, it is written in a plural form “rosheichem.” Yet, by the destruction of one’s beard, it is written: V’lo sashchis pe’as z’kanecha. And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard. There, it is written in the singular form, “z’kanecha.” Why does the Torah change?

The Meshech Chochmah explains according to the following Rambam (Avodah Zarah 12:5): Although a woman is permitted to shave the corners of her head, she is prohibited from shaving the corners of a man’s head. However, with respect to the prohibition of destructing one’s beard, the Rambam (12:7) writes: A woman is permitted to destroy her own beard if she has beard hair, and if she destroys the beard of a man, she is exempt. It emerges that there is a clear distinction between the halacha of a woman rounding the corners of a man’s head and her shaving a man’s beard.

Accordingly, it can be understood why the Torah uses the plural form when discussing the prohibition of rounding one’s head, for a man and a woman are included in this prohibition. However, with respect to the prohibition of destroying one’s beard, the Torah uses the singular form, because only the man is liable, not the woman.

Read more!

Monday, October 16, 2006

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 45 - How does Bamboo Grow?

The Gemora states in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai that all mitzvos must be perfomed by holding the object in the manner in which it grows.

The Tur writes that there are some that rule that the walls of the sukkah when they are constructed with wood must be positioned in the way which they grew. The Tur disagrees and maintains that one does not have to be strict regarding this since the walls can be made from things that do not grow from the ground such as metal and there obviously this halacha would not apply, so too when they are made out of wood this halacha doesn't apply.

According to this, s'chach which must be from items that grow from the ground would have this requirement to be positioned in the manner in which they grew. The Bach writes that since the essense of s'chach is to cover the width of the sukkah, it is self evident that the Torah did not prescribe that this mitzva must be done in the manner in which it grew.

Meshech Chochmah writes that this requirement only applies by a mitzva that stands by itself, such as a lulav or the wood for the Mishkan; however the walls and s'chach of the sukkah that are dependent on each other does not have this halacha.

Rav Elyashiv states that this halacha only applies by a mitzva where the Torah mandates that the item should be in the same form as it grew; however by s'chach and the walls of a sukklah, one could theoretically grind up the wood or branches and use the pieces for his sukkah. Obviously there is no requirement that it should be positioned in the same manner in which it grew.

Read more!

Tuesday, August 22, 2006

Daf Yomi - Yoma 76 - Manna Due to Yehoshua

The Gemora states that in the merit that Yehoshua waited for Moshe at the bottom of the mountain, maana fell for him in the amount fitting for the entire Klal Yisroel. What was the point for this? Even if you collected more, you nevertheless only were able to get according to the amount of people in your household and only a set amount per person?

Meshech Chochma has a novel approach to this Gemora. Klal Yisroel received the manna in the zchus of Moshe. Moshe died on the seventh of Adar. The manna lasted for them until the sixteenth of Nissan when they entered Eretz Yisroel. These forty days, the manna was in the zchus of Yehoshua. This was a direct result from the forty days that Yehoshua waited for Moshe.

Read more!