Accepting Charity from an Idolater

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The Gemora states: An act of kindness or charity performed by an idolater is regarded as a sin. This is because they are only performing these good deeds to live longer, or that their reign should continue, or in order to glorify themselves, or to rebuke the Jews.

The Gemora in Sotah (47a) states: When there increased the number of Jews who accepted charity from idolaters, the idolaters were on top and Israel was on bottom.

Our Gemora says that when idolaters give tzedakah it serves as an atonement for them. Because it serves as an atonement, Rav Ami refused to accept tzedakah from Ifra Hurmiz. Even Rava only accepted it for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government, but otherwise, he would not have accepted it. This is based upon a verse which teaches us that the idolaters will become weak and broken once their charitable deeds have dried up, and therefore, we don’t give them opportunities for more merits. However, the Gemora says that if we were to use the funds to support non-Jewish causes (which Rashi explains that we support anyway for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government), it would not give them any special merit. It is only if we use the funds to support Jews that it is considered a merit for them.

Tosfos (8a d.h. yasiv) points out that the Gemora in Eruchin (6b) implies that we would accept donations to synagogues that come from idolaters. Why? Tosfos explains that donations to synagogues are considered like korbanos and we do accept korbanos from idolaters.

The Gemora (Nazir 62a) cites a Scriptural source to teach us that an idolater can vow vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings just like Jews.

The Haga’os Ashri (here) brings the following question in the name of the Maharich: Why are we not allowed to accept charity from an idolater, but we are permitted to accept his korbanos?

He answers in the name of his Rebbe: A voluntary korban is not brought to serve as atonement, and therefore, we are not concerned if they offer a sacrifice, for those do not bring about forgiveness and they will not serve as a protection for them. However, one who gives charity receives atonement for his sins, and merits protection for his good deed. It is not in our best interests to assist them in this matter.

What does the Haga’os Ashri mean that vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings are not meant for the purpose of atonement? What is accomplished for the idolaters aside from atonement? Furthermore, the Gemora says in Sukkah (55b) that the idolaters destroyed the Holy Temple, not realizing what they will be losing. When we had the Temple, the Altar served as an atonement for them, but now they have nothing to atone for them. The Gemora in Sukkah clearly implies that the purpose for their korbanos were to be an atonement, which contradicts the Haga’os Ashri?

The distinction of the Haga’os Ashri is found in the Shach and Taz (Y.D. 254:4) to explain the Rama who says that we do accept donations to synagogues from idolaters, but don’t accept tzedakah from them (unless the money was air-marked for tzedakah and must be accepted for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government).

Reb Avi Lebowitz suggests the following: Perhaps the Gemora in Sukkah is not referring to the vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings that the idolaters bring, rather the Holy Temple, in general, served as an atonement for the entire world, including the idolaters. But the vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings, and donations to synagogues that we accept from idolaters is because it allows them to have a share in our prayers, but it will not serve as an atonement to prevent them from being destroyed for sins that they have committed. Tzedakah to the poor which would serve as an atonement for sins that they have committed, we refuse to accept from them unless we have no choice (such as for the sake of peaceful relationship with the government).

The Chochmas Adam (146:3) explains this idea a bit further: Tzedakah to the poor is tantamount to a korban chatas which we do not accept from idolaters because we don’t give them opportunity for atonement, but freewill-offerings, we do accept from them, so we can also accept gifts to synagogues.

It would seem that this prohibition, which forbids accepting tzedakah from them, only applies to tzedakah to the poor, but donations to Yeshivos and donations for kindness activities which do not go to the poor, would be like vowed-offerings and freewill-offerings that we can accept from them. But perhaps when it comes to the studying of Torah, where the donation buys them a share in the Torah, we should not provide them with that opportunity either.

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Destroying a Shul

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By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora says that one cannot destroy a synagogue until the replacement is rebuilt. The Gemora quotes two reasons for this prohibition:
1. Negligence - maybe an accident will occur (Rashi) that prevents the building of the new synagogue.
2. No place to pray - in the meantime there won't be anywhere to pray.

The Shulchan Aruch (152) rules like the first reason, therefore it would be prohibited even if there was another place to pray.

The Mishnah Berurah (5) says that when there is another synagogue in town that can fit the entire congregation, the Taz permits its destruction, but the Magen Avraham is stringent.

The Biur Halachah explains that one can rely on the Taz since we are only dealing with a Rabbinical prohibition, and many Rishonim allow the synagogue to be destroyed, even according to the first reason, when there is an established synagogue to pray in; not just a place to pray (Tosfos). Based on this, a synagogue may be destroyed in order to rebuild, so long as there are other synagogues in the community that can hold all the members of the one that is rebuilding.

The Gemora says that the entire prohibition only applies when the synagogue is in good condition, but if it starting to decay and therefore not functional in its present state, one can destroy it to build another.

The Gemora also says that the only Bava ben Buta gave Hurdus advice to destroy the Beis Hamikash in order to rebuild it because they began to see cracks there.

The Mishnah Berurah (2) proves from here that even if the intent is to make a much nicer synagogue, it is forbidden, so long as the first one is still functional.

However, the Taz (quoted in M.B. 9) is liberal about the definition of “rotting.” The Taz holds that when the first synagogue is too far from where the community lives, such as outside the wall of the city, “there is no greater crack than this,” and it can be rebuilt in a more appropriate location. Similarly, Tosfos explains that a summer synagogue in winter or vice versa, can qualify as a “crack,” and it may be destroyed.

It is important to note that the entire issue of destroying a synagogue is only considered a Rabbinic prohibition because it is being done for constructive purposes, i.e. to rebuild another in its place or elsewhere. However, when the synagogue is being destroyed for a destructive purpose, it is a Biblical prohibition, at the Mishnah Berurah (11) points out that it is derived from the verse: One should not do this to Hashem, your G-d.

The Biur Halachah explains that this not only applies to items that are attached to the ground, but even destroying movable items, such as the bimah and amud are Biblical prohibitions.

The Maharam Padawa allows the removal of the tangible items from the synagogue, and it is not a violation of this prohibition, since it is not destroying the actual structure (unlike the removal of bricks).

Ariach and Levainah

By: Reb Binyomin Adler

The Gemora cites a Mishna, which states that the beam has to be wide enough to support an ariach, a half-brick. We find that the term ariach is used in other instances, i.e. by the Shiras Hayam, the Song sung by the Jewish People at the Red Sea. There the Gemara mentions that the Shirah is written ariach al gabei levainah, a half-brick on top of a full brick, which means that one line of the Song is written like a half-brick, and the line beneath it is a full brick. We can interpret the terms ariach and levainah homiletically. A half-brick symbolizes that a person’s heart should be contrite and broken, and by demonstrating sincere remorse for one’s transgressions, Hashem will grant him atonement, as the word levainah connotes atonement. The word lavan, which is closely associated to the word levainah, means white, and white reflects atonement.

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Bar Metzra

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Our sugya treats the definitions and halachos of a bar metzra, an adjacent neighbor whose field borders yours. If you offer land for sale, you must prefer selling it to a bar metzra if he wants it. If two or more adjacent neighbors simultaneously compete for the premises, you must sell a same-sized portion to each (see bottom of 108b). If an owner ignores a bar metzra and sells his property to one who is not an adjacent neighbor, the bar metzra may even evict the new owner, compensating him for the price at which he bought the property, and assume its possession. The following case, judged by the Chasam Sofer, allows us to understand the basic source of this halachah.

Son-in-law vs. Neighbor for Liquidated Apartment

A rich man became bankrupt and the beis din ordered him to relinquish his home to the creditors. Fortunately, one creditor was his beloved son-in-law and the house was transferred to his possession. The latter allowed his father-in-law to continue living there for free, but just as the older man started to feel more at ease, his adjacent neighbor complained to the beis din that he had been mistreated. After all, he was a bar metzra, and the beis din, as receivers of the property, should have offered to sell it to him first. However, the Chasam Sofer (Responsa, C.M. 11) refuted his claim, stressing that Chazal learnt the halachah of adjacent neighbors from the commandment in Devarim 6:18: do what is upright and good. The owner of a field next to one offered for sale profits from buying it by enlarging his property and should be preferred but not if he thus harms the seller. If, in this case, the beis din sells the home to the neighbor, he would evict the owner, who would become homeless. The house should remain the son-in-laws’s for the previous owner’s sake, who is being allowed to live there, as the neighbor is also commanded to “do what is upright and good”! (See Chasam Sofer, ibid, who cites more reasons as to why the principle of adjacent neighbors does not apply to such cases).

Buying Seats in a Shul

Buying a seat in a synagogue can become an ordeal to make people swallow their pride. The poskim mention several interesting cases and a long-discussed difference of opinions as to whether the concept of adjacent neighbors pertains to such seats. Should a person occupying a seat next to one being sold be preferred to buy it? Some Rishonim (see Beis Yosef C.M. 175:85) say the rule of bar metzra applies.

Raavad writes that the idea is inconceivable regarding synagogue seats as the original principle applies if, by buying adjacent property, a neighbor expands his use to the added area. An apartment owner, for example, may expand his premises to include a newly bought apartment next-door. A congregant, though, doesn’t need and even cannot sit on two places and therefore does not have to be preferred (see Beis Yosef, ibid, who uses this explanation and Sema’, ibid, S.K. 99). However, all agree that if a bench is too short for a certain number of congregants, they may buy a place next to them to expand their use and ensure their comfort.

Meoros HaDaf Hayomi

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