Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 111 - Highlights

Living in Eretz Yisroel

The Gemora cites a braisa: A person should always live in Eretz Yisroel, even if it is in a city which has a majority of idolaters living there. A person should not live outside of Eretz Yisroel, even if it is a city which has a majority of Jews living there. For one who lives in Eretz Yisroel is regarded as one who has a God, and one who lives outside of Eretz Yisroel is regarded as one who does not have a God.

The Gemora asks: How can it be that one who lives outside of Eretz Yisroel is regarded as one who does not have a God?

Rather, the Gemora says: One who lives outside of Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he worships idols. (110b)

Oath not to Ascend to Eretz Yisroel
Rabbi Zeira desired to leave Bavel and ascend to Eretz Yisroel. He avoided Rav Yehudah (for he was concerned that Rav Yehudah would decree that he may not leave Bavel for Eretz Yisroel), as Rav Yehudah interpreted the verse, they shall be brought to Babylonia and they shall remain there, to mean that one is forbidden to leave Bavel to ascend to Eretz Yisroel. One who does so has transgressed a positive commandment. Rabbi Zeira, however, interpreted the verse to be referring to the vessels of the Beis Hamikdosh, which the prophet foretold would remain in exile for a while.

Rav Yehudah cites other Scriptural verses which teach us that we are bound by an oath not to ascend to Eretz Yisroel as a group by force, or even as individuals.

Rabbi Zeira says that those verses are needed for the teachings of Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina. For Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina said: What was the purpose of these three oaths? One is that the Jewish people shall not go up to Eretz Yisroel all together in a wall of force; the second is that the Holy One, Blessed be He, adjured the Jewish people that they shall not rebel against the nations of the world; and the third is that the Holy One, Blessed be He, adjured the idolaters that they shall not oppress the Jewish people too much.

Rav Yehudah says that it is derived from the redundancy in the verse that there is also an oath against individuals from immigrating to Eretz Yisroel.

Rabbi Zeira says that the redundancies appearing in the verses are needed for the teachings of Rabbi Levi. For Rabbi Levi said: What was the purpose of these six oaths? Three oaths have already been mentioned above. One is that the prophets should not reveal when the Final Redemption will occur; the second is that the Jewish people should not cause a delay in the coming of the Final Redemption (through their sins); and the third is that they should not reveal the secret (intercalation; the fixing of the calendar or the reason behind the commandments of the Torah) to idolaters.

Rabbi Elozar expounds the verse: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the Jewish people, “If you will keep the adjuration (and not force the Redemption), it will be well and good for you, but if not, I will permit your flesh to be a prey like that of the gazelles and the hinds of the field.” (110b – 111a)

Greatness of Eretz Yisroel
Rabbi Elozar says: One who lives in Eretz Yisroel lives without sin (their sins are forgiven).

Rav Anan says: Whoever is buried in Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he were buried under the Altar (it serves as an atonement for his sins).

It was common practice for Ula to ascend to Eretz Yisroel. He died outside of Eretz Yisroel. When Rabbi Elozar heard this, he exclaimed, “You, Ula, shall you die upon a contaminated land?” He was told that Ula will be buried in Eretz Yisroel. Rabbi Elozar said, “There is no comparison between Eretz Yisroel absorbing someone while he is alive than absorbing someone after he dies.”

A certain man whose brother died childless and the sister-in-law resided in Bei Chozaah (in Bavel). He came to Rabbi Chanina and asked him whether it was proper for him to descend there to perform the mitzvah of yibum. Rabbi Chanina replied, “His brother married a Cuthean woman (since they lived outside of Eretz Yisroel) and died; blessed be the Omnipresent Who killed him! Should this one go and follow him?” (111a)

Greatness of Bavel
Rav Yehudah says in the name of Shmuel: Just as one is prohibited to go from Eretz Yisroel to Bavel (since he will no longer be obligated to observe certain mitzvos), so too it is prohibited to go from Bavel to any other country (because of the Torah study that took place in Bavel).

Rabbah and Rav Yosef both said: The worthy persons of Bavel are absorbed by Eretz Yisroel, and the worthy ones of other countries are absorbed by Bavel.

The Gemora asks: In what respect is this referring to? If you will suggest that it is in respect of purity of descent (that such persons may marry into any pure families of Eretz Yisroel and Bavel), surely that cannot be the case. For didn’t the master say: All countries are like dough (a mix of many ingredients; a metaphor for a mixture of unblemished people and other with tainted lineage) in comparison to Eretz Yisroel and Eretz Yisroel is like dough in comparison to Bavel (it emerges that Bavel is completely pure, even more than Eretz Yisroel)?

The Gemora answers: They are referring to burial (the worthy people that die in Bavel are buried in Eretz Yisroel and the worthy people from faraway lands are buried in Bavel).

Rav Yehudah said: One who lives in Bavel is regarded as if he were living in Eretz Yisroel.

Abaye said: One who lives in Bavel will not experience the sufferings before the arrival of Mashiach. (111a)

Resurrection
Rabbi Elozar said: Those that are buried outside of Eretz Yisroel will not be resurrected.

Rabbi Avahu said: Even a Canaanite maidservant who resides in Eretz Yisroel is guaranteed to have a share in the World to come.

Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Anyone who walks four amos in Eretz Yisroel is guaranteed to have a share in the World to come.

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Elozar: Is it possible to say that the righteous people who are buried outside of Eretz Yisroel will not be resurrected?

Rabbi Ila answers: Their bones will roll to Eretz Yisroel, and only then will they be resurrected.

Rabbi Abba Sala the Great asked: Why do the righteous have to suffer in this manner?

Abaye answers: They will stand on their feet and travel through tunnels in the ground until Eretz Yisroel; there, they will emerge from the ground. (111a)

Burial in Eretz Yisroel
Karna said: Yaakov, although he knew that he was completely righteous, and if he would be buried outside of Eretz Yisroel, he would still be resurrected, he was, nevertheless concerned that he would be unworthy (see Maharsha) of walking through the tunnels.

Rabbi Chanina said similarly: Yosef, although he knew that he was completely righteous, and if he would be buried outside of Eretz Yisroel, he would still be resurrected, he was, nevertheless concerned that he would be unworthy (see Maharsha) of walking through the tunnels and that is why he troubled his brother to carry his body four hundred parsaos.

The brothers of Rabbah (wanting him to come to Ererz Yisroel) sent him the following message: Yaakov, although he knew that he was completely righteous, and if he would be buried outside of Eretz Yisroel etc. Ilfa added to this the following incident. A man was once troubled on account of his inability to marry a certain woman who lived outside of Eretz Yisroel. He wanted to go down to her, but as soon as he heard this (regarding Yaakov), he decided to stay in Eretz Yisroel and remain unmarried until the day of his death. Although you (Rabbah) are a great scholar, you know that a man who studies on his own cannot be compared with a man who studies from his teacher. Perhaps you might think that there is no teacher good enough for you here, we may inform you that you will have one, and he is Rabbi Yochanan. If you decide not to come up, we advise you of the following three things: Do not sit too long, for long sitting can result in hemorrhoids; do not stand for a long time, because that is harmful to the heart; and do not walk too much, because excessive walking may be harmful to the eyes. Rather, you should spend one third of your time sitting, one third standing and one third walking. Standing with support is better than sitting without support. (111a – 111b)

Ignorant of Torah
Rabbi Elozar said: People who are ignorant of Torah knowledge will not be resurrected.

The Gemora cites a braisa which corroborates Rabbi Elozar’s statement.

Rabbi Yochanan disagreed: The braisa is referring to people who are lax in their observance of Torah which leads them to stray after idols.

Rabbi Elozar replied by citing another verse and expounding: One who uses the light of Torah, the light of Torah will revive him; those that do not use the light of Torah, the light of Torah will not revive them.

Rabbi Elozar saw that Rabbi Yochanan was disturbed by his ruling. He therefore said: There is a remedy for them. If they marry off their daughter to a Torah scholar, or engages in business on behalf of a Torah scholar, or he gives pleasure to Torah scholars from his property, the Torah considers it as if he is clinging to the Divine Presence. (111b)

There will be a Time…
Rav Chiya bar Yosef said: The righteous will arise in Yerushalayim.

He stated further: The righteous will be resurrected in their clothes.

He also said: There will be a time when the land of Eretz Yisroel will produce (ready-made) baked cakes and fine woolen garments.

The Gemora cites a braisa: There will be a time that a stalk of wheat will grow straight up similar to a palm tree until it is of the same height as the tree. It will not be any trouble to harvest this wheat, for Hashem will cause the wind to blow and fine flour will fall from it. People will go to their fields and gather a palmful of flour and that will be sufficient to support his entire household.

There will be a time that wheat will be as large as two kidneys of a huge ox. This should not come as a surprise, for a fox lived inside a large turnip; they weighed the turnip and it contained sixty litrin.

There will be a time that every grapevine in Eretz Yisroel will require the entire city to pick its grapes.

There will be a time that every nonfruit tree in Eretz Yisroel will produce fruit to load up two donkeys. These grapes will produce tasty red wine that will be intoxicating and it will provide pleasure for both young and old men. (111b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 103 - Highlights

Residing with her Mother

The Mishna had stated: If someone marries a woman and promises to support her daughter (from a previous marriage) for five years, he must do so. If she (is divorced from him and) marries someone else (within those five years), and she makes that same condition with her new husband, he must keep this condition as well. The first husband cannot say, “If her mother would be married to me I will feed her.” He is obligated to bring her food to where her mother resides.

Rav Chisda says: From the Mishna, it may be derived that a girl, whether she is an adult or whether she is a minor, resides with her mother. This is true even if she is being supported by her brothers.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps the Mishna is only referring to a minor girl and that is when she resides with the mother? We would be concerned because of the following incident cited in a braisa: If someone died and he left over a young son to his mother; the heirs of the father claim that the son should reside with them and his mother claims that her son should reside with her, the halacha is that we place him with his mother and not with those who would inherit him (if he would die). There was such an incident and they place the son with his relatives. The very first evening, the relatives killed him (in order to take the inheritance; it is this very concern that causes us to say that the girl should reside with her mother and not with her relatives because she also receives a tenth of her father’s property).

The Gemora answers: If the Mishna would be referring only to a minor girl, it should have stated, “He brings her the food to where she is residing” (and it would be self evident that the minor girl is with her mother and the adult girl is with the brothers). By the fact that the Mishna said that the food is brought to where her mother resides, we learn that she resides with her mother, even if she is an adult. (102b – 103a)

Paying Twice

The Mishna had stated: Both husbands cannot say that they will split the costs of her food, but rather one buys her food and the other gives her the monetary equivalent.

The Gemora records a related incident: A certain man once leased his mill to another for the consideration of the latter’s services in grinding his wheat to sustain his household. Eventually, he (the original owner of the mill) became rich and he bought another mill and a donkey (in order to sustain his household himself). Thereupon, he said to the other, “Until now I have had my grinding done by you, but now (that I can grind myself), pay me rent for the mill. The other replied, “I will continue to grind for you.”

Ravina intended to rule that it involved the very same principle that was taught in our Mishna: Both husbands cannot say that they will split the costs of her food, but rather one buys her food and the other gives her the monetary equivalent (so too, in this case, the owner can demand to be paid with cash even though the original arrangement was for payment in service).

Rav Avira said to him: Are the two cases comparable? There, the daughter has only one stomach, not two; but here, the renter might tell the owner, “Grind with your own mill and sell it and that which I grind for you in mine, you shall keep for your household. This halacha is only applicable in a case where the renter has no other people that need grinding at his mill (and he himself must use the mill), but if he has sufficient orders for grinding at his mill, he may in such circumstances be compelled not to act in the manner of Sodom (and he would be required to pay the rent with money). (103a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If a widow said, “I do not want to leave my husband’s house,” the heirs may not say to her, “Go to your father’s house and we shall support you,” but rather they support her in her husband’s house and they provide her with a room in accordance with her condition.

If she said, “I do not want to move from my father’s house,” the heirs may say to her, “If you reside with us, you will be maintained, but if you do not reside with us, you will not be maintained.” And if she claims, “It is because I am young and they are young (and she is concerned that a sin will be committed),” they support her even if she remains in her father’s house. (103a)

Widow’s Dwelling

The Gemora cites a braisa: A widow may use her deceased husband’s dwelling just as she used it during his lifetime. She may also use the slaves, the cushions, the coverings and the silver and gold utensils just as she used them during his lifetime. For he wrote for her in the kesuvah: And you shall dwell in my house and be supported from my estate throughout the duration of your widowhood in my house.

Rav Yosef taught: This halacha is only applicable if the husband left for the widow a house to dwell in; however, if he left only a shack, the inheritors live there, but not the widow (she must find her own place of lodging).

Rav Nachman said: If the orphans sold the house that was reserved for the widow, the sale is not valid.

The Gemora asks: Why is it different than that which Rav Assi taught in the name of Rabbi Yochanan? For Rav Assi taught in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If the male orphans pre-empted the female orphans (before it came to Beis Din) and sold property from a small estate, their sale is valid (even though the daughters should have legally received the estate and the sons would go begging door to door)?

The Gemora answers: There, the property was not mortgaged to the daughters during her father’s lifetime, but here, the house was mortgaged to the widow during her husband’s lifetime.

Abaye stated: It has been our tradition to rule that if a widow’s dwelling collapsed, the inheritors are not obligated to rebuild it.

The Gemora cites a braisa which supports this ruling: If a widow’s dwelling collapsed, the inheritors are not obligated to rebuild it. Furthermore, even if she says, “Let me rebuild it at my own expense,” we do not listen to her (and the orphans can do whatever they desire with the property).

Abaye inquired: What is the halacha if she fixed up the house (in a manner that it will last much longer than previously anticipated; can the orphans demand that she leave the house after she lives there for the amount of years it would have lasted without her repairs or not)?

The inquiry remains unresolved. (103a)

Blessing, Wealth and Healing

The Mishna had stated: If she said, “I do not want to move from my father’s house,” the heirs may say to her, “If you reside with us, you will be maintained, but if you do not reside with us, you will not be maintained.”

The Gemora asks: Shouldn’t they be obligated to support her even in her father’s house?

The Gemora answers: This would support that which Rav Huna said. For Rav Huna said: The blessing of a house is proportionate to the amount of people residing in the house (and if she does not stay with them, the blessing is diminished).

The Gemora asks: But shouldn’t they be obligated to support her and deduct the amount of the loss?

The Gemora answers: That is precisely what the halacha is.

Rav Huna said: We can derive blessing, wealth and healing from the language of the Chachamim. In respect to ‘blessing,’ we have the statement just mentioned. ‘Wealth’ is learned from the following Mishna: If one sold fruits to his fellow and the buyer pulled them (effecting a kinyan), though they have not yet been measured, he has acquired them. If, however, they have been measured, but the buyer has not pulled them, he has not acquired them. But if the buyer is wise, he should rent the place where they are kept (and then he acquires the fruits and the seller cannot retract before the buyer pulls all the fruit; this is where the Chachamim taught us how to become wealthy). ‘Healing’ is derived from the following Mishna: A man should not chew wheat and place it on his wound during Pesach because it ferments (it becomes chametz from his saliva; the Chachamim taught us a remedy). (103a)





Rebbe’s Instructions

The Gemora cites a braisa: When Rebbe was about to depart this world, he said, “I require the presence of my sons.” When his sons entered, he instructed them, “Take care that you show proper respect to your mother. The candle shall continue to burn in its usual place. The table shall be laid in its usual place and my bed shall be spread in its usual place. Yosef of Chaifa and Shimon of Efrat who attended on me during my lifetime shall attend on me after I die.”

The Gemora explains Rebbe’s instructions: “Take care that you show proper respect to your mother.” The Gemora asks: Isn’t this a Biblical commandment? The Gemora answers: She was their father’s wife (not their mother; she merely raised them). The Gemora asks: There is a Biblical obligation to honor a father’s wife as well? The Gemora answers: That is only when the father is alive; after he dies, there is no obligation to honor his wife.

“The candle shall continue to burn in its usual place. The table shall be laid in its usual place and my bed shall be spread in its usual place.” The Gemora asks: What was the reason for these instructions? The Gemora answers: Rebbe used to come home every Erev Shabbos. On a certain Erev Shabbos a neighbor came to the door calling aloud, when his maidservant whispered, “Be quiet for Rebbe is sitting there.” When he heard this, he came no longer, in order that it should not look bad for earlier righteous people (who were denied the privilege of returning to their home after their death).

“Yosef of Chaifa and Shimon of Efrat who attended on me during my lifetime shall attend on me after I die.” He was understood to mean that they should attend to him in this world by burying him. When it was seen however, that their biers preceded his (they were buried before Rebbe), it became evident that Rebbe was referring to the World to Come. And the reason why Rebbe mentioned this was in order that people would not say that they were guilty of some sin and that it was only with the merit of attending to Rebbe that protected them until that moment.

The Gemora continues with its recording of Rebbe’s instructions prior to his death. Rebbe said, “I require the presence of the Chachamim.” When they entered, he instructed them, “Do not eulogize me in the towns (as my coffin is being carried to my place of burial). Begin studying Torah again in the Beis Medrash thirty days after my death (don’t eulogize me any longer). Shimon, my son is very wise, but my son Gamliel shall be the Nasi. Chanina bar Chama should be appointed the head of the Yeshiva.”

The Gemora explains Rebbe’s instructions: “Do not eulogize me in the towns (as my coffin is being carried to my place of burial).” They thought that Rebbe was concerned that it would be an unnecessary burden on the townspeople. However, once they saw that when he was eulogized in the big cities, all the townspeople came to participate, they realized that the purpose of his instructions was to honor the Torah (by having more people attend his eulogy).

“Begin studying Torah again in the Beis Medrash thirty days after my death (don’t eulogize me any longer).” This was because Rebbe did not wish to be greater than Moshe Rabbeinu, who was eulogized for thirty days and no longer. The Gemora recounts that they eulogized Rebbe for thirty days and thirty nights. Afterwards, they either eulogized him by day and studied Torah at night, or they eulogized him at night and studied Torah by day, until he was eulogized for the entire year.

The Gemora records: On the day that Rebbe died, a Heavenly voice went forth and announced: “Whoever has been present at the death of Rebbe is destined for the life of the World to Come.” A certain laundryman who used to come before Rebbe every day, failed to come on that day. When he heard this (the announcement), he went up upon a roof, jumped to the ground and died. A Heavenly voice came forth and announced: “That laundryman also is destined for the life of the World to Come.”

“Shimon, my son is very wise, but my son Gamliel shall be the Nasi.” The Gemora asks: Why did Rebbe say that Shimon his son was wise? The Gemora answers: He was saying that although Shimon was wise, Gamliel should be the Nasi. The Gemora explains: If not for Rebbe’s explicit instructions, Gamliel would not have been appointed Nasi even though he was older, for he was not as worthy as his brother Shimon. The Gemora asks: So why did Rebbe choose Gamliel over Shimon? The Gemora answers: In respect to his fear of sin, Gamliel was the most suited of all his brothers.

“Chanina bar Chama should be appointed the head of the Yeshiva.” The Gemora records that Rabbi Chanina did not accept this position, for Rabbi Afeis was two and a half years older than him. Rabbi Afeis was appointed head of the Yeshiva, and Rabbi Chanina sat outside. Levi went and joined Rabbi Chanina. After some time, Rabbi Afeis died and Rabbi Chanina was appointed head of the Yeshiva. Levi did not have a partner to sit with outside, so he went to Bavel.

And this is in accordance with what the Chachamim said to Rav: A great man (Levi) arrived in Nehardea, and he limped and he ruled that a woman may wear a tiara on Shabbos (although there was a decree against wearing adornments on Shabbos in a public domain, Levi ruled that a tiara was permitted; since they were only worn by prominent women, we were not concerned that they will remove their jewelry to show to their friends). Rav said: It is understood that Rabbi Afeis has died and Rabbi Chanina is now the head of the Yeshiva. Levi, evidently, did not have a partner to sit with outside, so he came to Bavel.

The Gemora asks: Perhaps it was Rabbi Chanina who died, and Rabbi Afeis was still the head of the Yeshiva? The Gemora answers: Levi would have studied under Rabbi Afeis (since he was younger than him). Alternatively, since Rebbe had declared that Rabbi Chanina the son of Rabbi Chama would be the head of the Yeshiva, Rav knew that this would eventually happen. This is because it is written that a righteous person decrees and Hashem fulfills his words.

The Gemora asks: Why didn’t Rebbe appoint Rabbi Chiya as the head of the Yeshiva? The Gemora answers: Rabbi Chiya had already died. The Gemora asks: But Rabbi Chiya said: “I saw the coffin of Rebbe and I cried over it”? The Gemora answers: It must be that Rebbe said that regarding Rabbi Chiya. The Gemora asks: But Rabbi Chiya said: “On the day that Rebbe died, holiness ceased.”? The Gemora answers: It must be that Rebbe said that regarding Rabbi Chiya. The Gemora asks further: But we learned in the following braisa: When Rebbe became sick, Rabbi Chiya came to visit him and found that he was crying. Rabbi Chiya asked him: Why are you crying? Didn’t we learn that if a man dies smiling, it is a good omen for him; if he dies weeping, it is a bad omen for him; if he dies with his face upwards, it is a good omen, if he dies with his face downwards, it is a bad omen; if he dies with his face towards the public it is a good omen, if he dies with his face towards the wall, it is a bad omen. If his face is greenish, it is a bad omen; if his face is bright and ruddy, it is a good omen. If he dies on Erev Shabbos, it is a good omen; if he dies on Motzoei Shabbos, it is a bad omen; if he dies on Erev Yom Kippur, it is a bad omen; if he dies on Motzoei Yom Kippur, it is a good omen. If he dies because of a stomach disease, it is a good omen because most righteous men die from stomach sickness. (Why are you crying, Rabbi Chiya was asking him?) Rebbe replied: I weep because I will no longer be able to study Torah and to perform the mitzvos. (It emerges from this braisa that Rebbe died before Rabbi Chiya?)

The Gemora answers: We must reverse the namesin the braisa. Alternatively, we can answer that Rabbi Chiya was engaged in the performance of mitzvos, and Rebbe thought that it would be best not to disturb him by becoming the head of the Yeshiva. (103a – 103b)

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 101 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: A minor girl who has refused her husband (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.); a woman who is a secondary ervah (Rabbinically forbidden to marry this man); and the aylonis (a woman incapable of procreating) have neither a kesuvah, nor the produce (this refers to the fact that the husband will ransom her if she is taken captive, which is in exchange for his rights to her produce), nor the support, nor the worn-out articles.

If at the outset, he married her knowing that she was an aylonis, she has a kesuvah.

If a widow is married to a Kohen Gadol, a divorced woman or a chalutzah to an ordinary Kohen, a mamzeres or a nesinah to a Yisroel, the daughter of a Yisroel to a nesin or to a mamzer, they receive their kesuvah. (100b)

Does the Argument Between Rav and Shmuel Have an Earlier Source?

Rav learned the Mishna as follows: A minor girl who is divorced does not receive a kesuvah and certainly a minor girl who refused her husband. Shmuel learned: A girl who refused her husband does not receive her kesuvah, but a minor girl who is divorced does receive her kesuvah (he obviously maintains that the marriage of a minor girl is valid).

Let us say that this argument (between Rav and Shmuel) is an argument among the Tanaim. Rabbi Elazar says: The actions of a minor (girl regarding marriage) are insignificant. Her husband is not entitled to the lost objects that she finds; he does not receive her earnings; he cannot annul her vows; he does not inherit her and he cannot become impure to her (if she dies and he is a kohen). The rule is that she is not considered his wife regarding anything, aside for the fact that to get out of the marriage, she must perform mi’un (refuse the marriage).

Rabbi Yehoshua says: The actions of a minor (girl regarding marriage) are significant. Her husband does acquire lost objects that she finds; he is entitled to her earnings; he can annul her vows; he inherits her and he can become impure to her (if she dies and he is a kohen). The rule is that she is considered his wife regarding everything, aside from the fact that she is able to get out of the marriage by performing mi’un (refusing the marriage).

The Gemora asks: Let us say that Rav holds like Rabbi Elazar and Shmuel holds like Rabbi Yehoshua.

The Gemora answers: This that you said that Rav holds like Rabbi Elazar while Shmuel does not is clearly true. The argument between Rav and Shmuel can even take place according to Rabbi Yehoshua. It is obvious that Shmuel can hold like Rabbi Yehoshua. How can Rav hold like Rabbi Yehoshua? Rav will say: Rabbi Yehoshua only said that she is considered his wife in regards to what she gives him (or what he has rights to in her, i.e. denying her vows). However, regarding his obligations to her, even Rabbi Yehoshua would agree that he is not obligated like he would be to a regular wife. (100b – 101a)

Shmuel’s Statement

Rav Huna bar Chiya said to Rav Kahana: You told us in the name of Shmuel that (the Mishna’s statement that he does not have to return used clothes) this only applies to nichsei melog (possessions brought into a marriage that a husband may freely use). However, this does not apply to nichsei tzon barzel (possessions brought into a marriage that a husband must return at the value that they were evaluated at the beginning of the marriage).

Rav Papa wondered: Which case in the Mishna is Shmuel’s statement referring to? If it is talking about a girl who performs mi’un, then if the clothes still exist, it makes sense she should take both types of clothes with her out of the marriage! If they are not extant, she should not be able to take both types! [Rashi explains that he can claim that he will only give back their value when he divorces her, as he still has the potential to inherit her.]

Rav Papa therefore entertains that this is referring to an aylonis (a woman with no signs of femininity, see Yevamos 80b). The Gemora asks: If the clothes still exist, it makes sense she should take both types of clothes with her out of the marriage! If they do not exist, then the opposite should be true. The clothes that are nichsei melog which he has no right to use up (his right to benefit is not a right to destroy) should go to her. The clothes that were nichsei tzon barzel that were not in her possession (and which he had a right to use) she should not receive!

The Gemora therefore concludes that this statement of Shmuel is referring to a shniyah (a woman who is forbidden to marry based on a rabbinic prohibition). The Rabbis gave each of them a fine. She loses what she would normally collect from him, and he loses what she would normally let him keep.

Rav Simi bar Ashi says: We see from here that a coat (that is nichsei melog) is considered principle, and a husband cannot wear it (saying that he is merely benefiting) until it gets worn out. The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rav Nachman say such usage is appropriate benefit? The Gemora answers: Rav Nachman argues. (101a)

Additional Amounts

Shmuel says: When the Mishna says these women do not have a kesuvah, it means they do not have the standard amounts of one (widow) or two hundred (never married). However, they do receive the additional amounts pledged to them.

The following Beraisa supports this statement. The Beraisa states: The women who the sages said do not have a kesuvah, for example a girl who does mi’un and others listed with her, do not receive one or two hundred, but they do receive the additional monies. The women whom the sages said must get divorced without a kesuvah, like woman who sins (see 72a) and her friends, do not receive additions, and certainly not one or two hundred. A woman who is divorced because of a bad name (that she was promiscuous), takes what is in front of her (nichsei melog) and leaves. (101a)

Does She Lose Her Clothes?

This supports the statement of Rav Huna. Rav Huna said: If she was promiscuous, she does not lose the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog).

A Beraisa was taught in front of Rav Nachman: If she was promiscuous, she loses the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog). Rav Nachman said: If she was promiscuous, were her clothes promiscuous? Rav Nachman therefore said the correct text must be: If she was promiscuous, she does not lose the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog).

Rabah bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: These (the text as it was presented to Rav Nachman) are the words of Rabbi Menachem Stimtah. However, the Chachamim say the correct text is that if she was promiscuous, she does not lose the clothes that are extant (that are nichsei melog). (101a – 101b)

Knowing Beforehand

Rav Huna said: An aylonis is sometimes considered like a wife and sometimes not. A widow who marries a kohen gadol is like a regular wife. An aylonis is sometimes considered like a wife and sometimes not, as if he knew beforehand she was an aylonis (and agreed to marry her anyway) she receives a kesuvah, but if he didn’t know she does not. A widow who marries a kohen gadol receives a kesuvah, whether or not he knew she was a widow. Rav Yehudah argues: In both cases she only receives a kesuvah if he knew of her status beforehand.

The Gemora asks from a Beraisa. The Beraisa states: If he married her knowing that she was like this and she indeed was, she receives a kesuvah. This implies that if it was simply not discussed, she does not receive a kesuvah!

The Gemora answers: The implication could be otherwise. It could be that if he married her based on a lie (that she had never married previously) and he later realized she was a widow, she does not receive a kesuvah. However, if it was never discussed, it is possible she does receive a kesuvah.

The Gemora asks: If this is true, why doesn’t the Beraisa state this case instead (where nothing was discussed), and we would certainly know about a case where it was discussed that she would receive a kesuvah! Additionally, there is another Beraisa that explicitly states that if he knowingly married her as a widow, she receives a kesuvah. If he married her without having discussed her status, she does not receive a kesuvah. This seems to be a strong question on Rav Huna!

The Gemora explains that Rav Huna made a mistake in understanding the text of the Mishna. He thought that because the Mishna only discussed this difference regarding an aylonis and not a widow, it must be that a widow would receive a kesuvah when the topic was not discussed. This, however, was incorrect. The Mishna’s statement about a widow was based on the previous distinction made by aylonis. (101b)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
ALMANAH NIZONESS

Mishna

If someone marries a woman and promises to support her daughter (from a previous marriage) for five years, he must do so. If she (is divorced from him and) marries someone else (within those five years), and she makes that same condition with her new husband, he must keep this condition as well. The first husband cannot say, “when she comes to me I will feed her.” He is obligated to bring her food to where her mother resides. Both husbands cannot say that they will split the costs of her food, but rather one buys her food and the other gives her the monetary equivalent. If the daughter marries within this time, her husband gives her food and the husbands give her their monetary equivalent. If the husbands die, their daughters are fed from possessions that do not liens, and this daughter (that we are discussing) can be fed from possessions that do have liens, as she is considered like a creditor. Smart people who were asked to make such a condition (before marrying a woman) would stipulate that they would support their wife’s daughter as long as they stay married. (101b)


Talking About Owing Money in a Document

It is taught: If someone says to his friend “I am obligated to give you a manah,” Rabbi Yochanan says he is indeed obligated, while Reish Lakish says he is not. The Gemora asks: In what case are they arguing? If the case is where he took witnesses aside beforehand and said “you are my witnesses that I am obligated etc,” why would Reish Lakish say he is not obligated? If he didn’t say this, why would Rabbi Yochanan say he is obligated?

The Gemora answers: The case is where he did not say this. He said: “I owe you a manah as stated in this document.” Rabbi Yochanan says he is obligated, because saying that it is stated in the document is as strong as saying “you are my witnesses.” Reish Lakish says he is not obligated, as just the statement and the giving over of a document (that Rashi says merely states “I owe you a manah”) is not as strong as a statement along with saying “you are my witnesses.” (101b)

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 100 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: The property sold according to the assessment of the judges who undervalued it by one sixth or added one sixth, their sale is void. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Their sale is valid, for otherwise, how is the power of the Court superior?

However, if they made a letter of inspection (a public announcement of the impending sale, whereupon people may inspect the property and assess its true value), even if they sold what is worth a maneh for two hundred, or what is worth two hundred for a maneh, their sale is valid. (99b)

An Undercharging Agent
The Gemora inquires: What is the halacha if an agent makes a mistake?

Rava said in the name of Rav Nachman: The agent is like the judges (the sale is valid as long as the mistake was less than a sixth). Rav Shmuel bar Bisna said in the name of Rav Nachman: An agent is like a widow (any mistake, even minimal, invalidates the sale).

The Gemora explains their respective opinions: Rava maintains that an agent is comparable to the judges because they both are not selling the property for their own sake. Rav Shmuel bar Bisna compares an agent to the widow because they are both individuals; Beis Din, on the other hand, are many people.

The Gemora rules: An agent is like a widow.

The Gemora asks: Why is this case any different than that which we learned in the following Mishna: If one tells an agent, “Separate terumah for me (without specifying an amount), he should separate according to what the agent perceives is the mindset of the owner (either one-fortieth, one-fiftieth or one-sixtieth). If he cannot ascertain what the owner would want, he should separate one-fiftieth. If the agent has separated one in forty or one in sixty as terumah, the terumah is nevertheless is valid. (It is evident that although the agent has made a mistake, his actions are nevertheless valid?)

The Gemora answers: By the terumah, the agent has a valid excuse; he can say that he figured that the owner would separate terumah in a stingy manner or generously; however, in this case (where the agent charged too little for the property), the owner may tell the agent, “You should not have made a mistake.” (99b – 100a)
Beis Din Errs
The Mishna cites the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Chachamim.

Rav Huna bar Chanina rules in the name of Rav Nachman: The halacha is in accordance with the Chachamim (if Beis Din makes a mistake of a sixth in the selling of a field, the sale is invalid).

The Gemora asks: Doesn’t Rav Nachman agree with the following logic (of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel): “How is the power of the Court superior”? But Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel: If a father dies leaving over minor orphans, Beis Din sets up for each of them a guardian, and the guardians choose a positive portion for them. When they become adults, they can protest, and claim that they would like to redivide the property. Rav Nachman himself states: They cannot protest, for otherwise, it degrades the power of Beis Din. (We see that Rav Nachman does use this principle?)

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where the Beis Din made a mistake (in that case, Beis Din is not superior). Rav Nachman’s ruling was in a case where the Beis Din did not make any mistake.

The Gemora asks: If there was no mistake, why are the orphans protesting?

The Gemora answers: They are claiming that they desire a field in a different location (which shares the boundary of an independently owned field).

When Rav Dimi came to Bavel from Eretz Yisroel, he said that there was such an incident (like in the Mishna) and Rebbe ruled in accordance with the Chachamim (and the sale was deemed invalid). Rebbe was asked, “If so, how is the power of the Court superior”? Rebbe, upon hearing the question, reversed his ruling.

Rav Safra learned the above incident differently: Rebbe wanted to rule in accordance with the Chachamim (and the sale was deemed invalid). Rebbe was asked, “If so, how is the power of the Court superior”? Rebbe, upon hearing the question, did not rule in that manner.

The Gemora comments: Let us say that Rav Dimi and Rav Safra disagree regarding the following concept: One holds that in a case where a judge makes an elementary mistake, written explicitly in a Mishna, the ruling should be retracted. The other argues that even in such a case, it should not be retracted.

The Gemora answers: No, this cannot be, as everyone agrees such a mistake must be retracted. They are arguing as to how the incident occurred. (100a)
The Orphan’s Guarantee
Rav Yosef ruled: When a widow sells property from her husband’s estate with a guarantee (that the purchaser will be compensated if the land is seized by a creditor), the obligation to pay for this guarantee rests upon the orphans (because they are responsible to pay for her support and kesuvah). The same applies if Beis Din sells the property.

The Gemora notes: The novelty of Rav Yosef’s ruling is that even when Beis Din sells the property, the orphans are obligated to honor the guarantee. We might have thought that one who buys from Beis Din understands that this was a public sale (and it should be regarded as if he purchased it without a guarantee); Rav Yosef informs us that this is not the case. (100a – 100b)
Up Until Half
The Gemora had stated: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: The property sold according to the assessment of the judges who undervalued it by one sixth or added one sixth is valid.

The Gemora states that the sale is valid as long as Beis Din did not sell the property for less than half of its true value.

The Gemora cites a braisa where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states this ruling explicitly. (100b)
Public Announcement
Ameimar said in the name of Rav Yosef: If Beis Din sold the orphan’s property without publicly announcing the sale (prior to the sale), it is as if they made a mistake regarding an explicit ruling of a Mishna, and the sale is deemed invalid.

The Gemora asks on the language, “it is as if.” Didn’t we learn a Mishna in Arachin explicitly like that?

The Gemora answers: Without this ruling, we would have thought that the Mishna is only referring to a case where an agent made a mistake; Rav Yosef informed us that this ruling is applicable even if Beis Din made the mistake.

Rav Ashi asked Ameimar from our Mishna: The property sold according to the assessment of the judges who undervalued it by one sixth or added one sixth, their sale is void. It can be inferred that if the price would have been equal to its value, the sale would be valid. This would be so even though there was no public announcement prior to the sale.

The Gemora answers: No! The sale would only be valid if there was a public announcement prior to the sale.

The Gemora counters: Since the latter ruling of the Mishna is when there was an announcement, the first part of the Mishna is referring to a case where there was no announcement, and yet the sale would be valid if it was sold for equal value!?

The Gemora answers: Our Mishna is referring to things which are not announced prior to the sale, such as slaves, movables and loan documents.

The Gemora explains the reason: We do not issue a public announcement prior to the sale of slaves, for we are afraid that they will run away. We do not announce the sale of movables or documents because we are afraid that they will get stolen when they are being shown to the public.

Alternatively, we can answer that our Mishna is referring to cases where we do not publicly announce the sale prior to the sale. For they said in Nehardea: For taxes, support and burial, we sell the property of orphans without an announcement.

Alternatively, we can answer that our Mishna is referring to places that they did not issue public announcements. For Rav Nachman said: They never issued a letter of inspection in Nehardea.

The Gemora thought that the reason for that custom was because they were experts in property assessment, but then they were told that it was because people were embarrassed to buy property that was auctioned by Beis Din. (100b)
Selling Orphan’s Possessions
Rav Yehudah ruled in the name of Shmuel: The movables of orphans must be assessed and sold immediately. Rav Chisda ruled in the name of Avimi: They are to be sold in the markets.

The Gemora explains: There is, however, no difference of opinion between them. Rav Chisda is discussing a place in the proximity of a market, whereas Rav Yehudah is dealing with a case where the time for the market is far off.

The Gemora relates an incident: Rav Kahana had in his possession some beer that belonged to the orphan Rav Mesharshiya bar Chilkai. He kept it until the festival, saying, “Though it might begin to spoil, it will bring in quick money then.”

The Gemora records another related incident: Ravina had in his possession some wine belonging to the orphan Ravina Zuti, his sister’s son. He also had some wine of his own which he was about to bring to Sichra to sell. He came to Rav Ashi and asked him: May I take the orphan’s wine with my own (or perhaps I should be concerned that the ship will sink)? Rav Ashi told him: You may take it with you, for it is not superior to your own wine. (100b)

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 99 - Highlights

A Deviating Agent

The Gemora states a different version of the inquiry. Others say: There is no inquiry regarding the following case: If the owner told the agent, “Go and sell for me a lesech (half of a kor) of my fields,” and the agent went and sold a full kor. The agent is certainly adding on to the owner’s instructions (by selling more, and the sale of the lesech is valid). The question would be in the following case: If the owner told the agent, “Go and sell for me a kor of my fields,” and the agent went and sold only a lesech.

The Gemora explains: Do we say that the agent will tell him, “It is advantageous for you to sell only half the field because if I would have sold the full kor and then you would realize that you do not need the money, you would not be able to retract on the deal”? Or perhaps, the owner will say, “I do not wish to have so many documents saying that I sold a field (now that he will sell the other half with a new document)”?

Rav Chanina from Sura cites a Mishna as an attempt to resolve this inquiry. The Mishna states: If an owner gave an agent a golden dinar and told him, “Buy me a shirt with this money,” but the agent bought a shirt for three selas and a cloak for three selas (there are six selas in a dinar), they both have committed me’ilah (it was subsequently found out that the dinar was in fact consecrated money; one who has unintentionally benefited from hekdesh or removed it from the ownership of the Beis Hamikdosh has committed the transgression of me’ilah, and as a penalty, he would be required to pay the value of the object plus an additional fifth of the value; he also brings a korban asham).

Now, if the agent is merely adding to the owner’s instructions (for he meant that not more than a dinar should be spent on the shirt), it is understandable why the owner has committed me’ilah, for the agent followed his instructions. However, if the agent is violating the owner’s instructions, why has the owner committed me’ilah?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where the agent bought a shirt that was worth six selas at a discounted price of three selas.

The Gemora asks: If so, why has the agent committed me’ilah?

The Gemora answers: He has committed me’ilah on account of the cloak.

The Gemora asks: If so, let us examine the end of the Mishna. The Mishna states: Rabbi Yehudah says: In this case as well, the owner has not committed me’ilah, for he can say, “I wanted a bigger shirt, and you bought for me a small and inferior shirt.” (If we are referring to a case where he purchased the shirt that the owner requested at a discounted price, how can the owner claim that it is small and inferior?)

The Gemora answers: The owner meant that he should have bought a shirt for six selas that would be worth even more than twelve selas.

The Gemora provides support for this explanation from a braisa.

The Gemora attempts to resolve the original question by citing our Mishna: If her kesuvah was worth four hundred, and she sold property worth one hundred to one person and property worth one hundred to another, and to the last person, she sold property that was actually worth a manah and a dinar for just a manah, only the last sale is invalid and the others are valid. (Although the widow has deviated from the instructions of the inheritors by selling less than the intended amount (in the initial three sales), they are nevertheless valid; this would prove that the agent is keeping with the instructions of the owner, and not violating them.)

The Gemora deflects the proof by saying that the Mishna can be interpreted using Rav Shisha the son of Rav Idi’s explanation. For he said that the Mishna may be discussing a case where there were four small parcels of land (that could not be used by one individual, and obviously were never intended to be sold together). (99a – 99b)

A Deviating Agent (again)

The ruling in the following case is simple: If a person told his agent, “Sell the field to one person and not to two people,” the sale is invalid if the agent sells the field to two people. What is the halacha if he says, “Sell the field to one person” and he does not specify, “and not to two people”?

Rav Huna says: He meant that it should be sold to one and not to two. Rav Chisda and Rabbah bar Rav Huna says: He meant that it may be sold to two people, and even to a hundred people.

The Gemora relates an incident: Rav Nachman came to Sura and Rav Chisda and Rabbah bar Rav Huna came to visit him. They asked him: What is the halacha in such a case (if he says, “Sell the field to one person” and he does not specify, “and not to two people”)? Rav Nachman responded: He meant that it may be sold to two people, and even to a hundred people. They asked him: Would the halacha be the same if the agent made a mistake (and sold it for less than the value)? He replied: I was not discussing such a case. They asked him: But didn’t you say that there is no law of onaah (price fraud) in respect to land? Rav Nachman replied: That is correct when the owner made a mistake; however, when the agent made a mistake, he may be told, “You were sent to help my situation, not to make it worse.”

The Gemora cites a Mishna in Kiddushin as proof for Rav Nachman’s distinction between the owner making a mistake and the agent making a mistake. (99b)

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 98 - highlights

Seizure Regarding Vows and Evaluations

There was a woman who seized a silver cup as partial payment for her kesuvah, and then demanded food support. When they came to Rava, he said to the orphans: “Give her food support, as nobody holds like the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who say that we do not say that some of the money is like all of the money.

Rabbah the son of Rava sent the following question to Rav Yosef. If a woman sells without Beis Din, does she need to take a vow (that she did not receive more money than what she claims she received for the sale)?

Rav Yosef replied: You should first ask whether or not she must announce the sale of the possessions (in order to get as much money as possible for the good of the estate)!

Rabbah replied: I do not have any question about announcement. This is because Rabbi Zeira says in the name of Rav Nachman that if a widow seizes a field for herself based on her own evaluation of the property, what she has done is invalid. What is this case? If she announced beforehand that the property was for sale, why is what she has done considered invalid? She must not have announced, and the seizure is invalid because she seized the field for herself. This implies that if she would have seized it and sold it to someone else, it would be valid even without announcement.

The Gemora answers that this is not proof, as the case is where she did announce that the field was up for sale. She is told: “Who evaluated this for you?” [This is why her seizure is invalid.]

This is akin to a case of someone who had deposited by him a large amount of fodder (or coral, see Rashi DH “Kista”) which belonged to orphans. He evaluated it at four hundred (zuz) and took it for himself, and it then went up in value to six hundred. When the case went before Rabbi Ami he said to the man: “Who evaluated this for you?” The law is she needs to take a vow, but she does not need to announce the sale.

Mishna

A widow whose kesuvah was worth two hundred, and she proceeded to sell something from the estate worth one hundred for two hundred, or something worth two hundred for one hundred, has received her kesuvah. A widow who kesuvah is worth one hundred and she sells something worth a manah and a dinar for just one hundred, the sale is invalid. Even if she says I will give back a dinar to the inheritors, the sale is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that her sale is always valid (she just makes up the monetary difference to the inheritors). This is true unless she got cheated to the point where the amount would but an entire nine kav of field, half a kav of garden, or according to Rabbi Akiva a beis rova (a different size that according to Rabbi Akiva is called a garden). If her kesuvah was worth four hundred, and she sold one hundred to one person and one hundred to another, and to the last person she sold something that was actually worth a manah and a dinar for just a manah, only the last sale is invalid and the others are valid.

Who Gets the Profit?

The Gemora asks: Why is the case where she sells something worth two hundred for one hundred different, in that we say she has to take the loss? The Gemora assumes that it must be because the orphans say to her that she lost out on her own value of the item she was given (that was two hundred). Accordingly, the Gemora asks: Why in the case where she sold something worth one hundred for two hundred can’t she say that she is still owed one hundred, as the extra hundred was her self-made profit!

Rav Nachman says in the name of Rabah bar Avuhah: Rebbi taught here that all of the profit goes to the owner of the money (not a messenger who sells for more than instructed).

This is as stated in the following Beraisa. The Beraisa states: If another unit was given to the messenger (who was making a purchase for someone), Rabbi Yehudah is of the opinion that everything goes to the owner of the monies. Rabbi Yosi states: They divide the money.

The Gemora asks: Didn’t Rabbi Yosi state in a different Beraisa that this goes to the owner? Rami bar Chama answers: This is not difficult. In a case where the seller is suuposed to supply a certain amount of goods and he adds units to the buyer, the addition is a present which the messenger and owner split evenly. In a case where the sale is for a set value and the seller decides to reduce the price of the buyer, the addition is a reduction in the sale which goes to the owner.

Rav Papa states: The law is that where the sale is for a set amount of units, the messenger and owner split what is extra. If the seller merely reduces the price for the buyer, the addition is to the benefit of the owner.

The Gemora asks: What is novel about this teaching? The Gemora answers that Rav Papa is confirming that the answer stated above (Rami bar Chama’s explanation of Rabbi Yosi) is halachically valid.

The Rebellious Messenger

The Gemora inquires: If someone told his messenger to sell a half-kur of land, an instead he sold an entire kur, what is the law? Did he merely add on to his instructions, in which the case the sale for the half-kur should still be valid? Or is he considered to have went against orders, and therefore the entire sale is invalid?

Rav Yaakov from Pakod River said in the name of Ravina that we can answer this question from the following Beraisa. The Beraisa states: If a person said to his messenger to give a piece of food (i.e. meat) to each guest, and the messenger instructs each to take two pieces, and they each take three pieces, everyone has transgressed using hekdesh (items dedicated to the Temple, as the food had been dedicated to be sold/used for the Temple). Rav Yaakov explains that if the messenger is considered to have merely added another piece to the instruction of the host, it is understandable why the owner is considered to have used hekdesh. However, if he is considered to have totally disobeyed the orders of the host, why should the host be considered to have transgressed hekdesh? Doesn’t the Mishna say that if a messenger carries out such orders the owner (in this case host) transgresses, but if he did not the messenger transgresses?

The Gemora answers: The case above is where the messenger said to the guests to take one piece with the permission of the owner and one more because the messenger allowed. The guests went ahead and took three pieces.

[END]

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 97 - Highlights

Widow Selling the Estate

The Gemora asks: How does the widow sell her husband’s property (to be used for her support)?

Rav Daniel bar Katina said in the name of Rav Huna: We allow her to sell his property once a year, and the buyer pays her in installments once every thirty days (it is done in this manner in order to ensure that she does not take money that doesn’t belong to her; she is to be supported only until she remarries).

Rav Yehudah says: We allow her to sell his property once every six months, and the buyer pays her in installments once every thirty days.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rav Huna’s opinion and then cites a braisa supporting Rav Yehudah’s opinion.

Ameimar rules in accordance with Rav Yehudah. (97a)

Widow Seizing Land that she Sold


They inquired of Rav Sheishes: If the widow sold property from the husband’s estate in order to be supported, may she collect from that very same property for her kesuvah?

The Gemora explains the inquiry: Rav Yosef ruled: When a widow sells property from her husband’s estate with a guarantee (that the purchaser will be compensated if the land is seized by a creditor), the obligation to pay for this guarantee rests upon the orphans (because they are responsible to pay for her support and kesuvah). Since the orphans are responsible, she may seize the property that she previously sold, or perhaps, the purchasers can tell her, “If others would seize the property, the orphans are responsible for your guarantee, but you did accept to guarantee that you yourself will not seize the property”?

Rav Sheishes proves from a braisa that she may not collect for her kesuvah from land that she had sold as means to be supported. (97a)


A Seller Rescinding


The Gemora inquired: If a seller of property decided that he did not need the money (it was well known that he was selling property because he needed cash for another business transaction, and now, the other sellers retracted from the deal), is the sale automatically invalid (as if it was stipulated that he was selling the property on condition that the money would be used for this other transaction) or not?

The Gemora attempts to bring a proof from the following incident: A man sold property to Rav Papa for he needed money to buy oxen. At the end, he did not need the money and Rav Papa returned the property to him.

The Gemora deflects the proof: Perhaps Rav Papa was acting beyond the literal letter of the law?

The Gemora attempts to bring a proof from another incident: There was once a food shortage in Nehardea. All the people sold their mansions. Eventually, wheat arrived and Rav Nachman told them: The law is that the mansions must be returned to their original owners!

The Gemora deflects the proof: There also, the sales were made in error since it became known that the ship carrying the wheat was waiting in the port.

The Gemora notes that this would explain the following conversation: Rami bar Shmuel said to Rav Nachman: If you rule like this, you will cause them trouble in the future (for people will be fearful of selling). He replied: Is a food shortage a daily occurrence? Rami bar Shmuel retorted: Yes, a food shortage in Nehardea is indeed a common occurrence!

The Gemora issues a ruling: If a seller of property (thinking that he needed the money) decided that he did not need the money, the sale is automatically deemed invalid. (97a)

Mishna


The Mishna states: A widow, whether after the erusin or after the nisuin, may sell without Beis Din (provided that three people determine that she is not underselling the property).

Rabbi Shimon says: After the nisuin, she may sell without Beis Din (for she is selling it to be supported and she is not required to wait); after the erusin, she may sell only through Beis Din because she does not a right to be supported, and whoever does not have this right may sell only through Beis Din. (97a)


Moveable Property for her Support


The Gemora asks: Why does the Tanna Kamma permit the widow from erusin to sell the property without Beis Din; she is not selling it to be supported?

Ula says: It is because of favor (a woman will not refrain from marriage if she realizes that it is not so difficult to sell the property).

Rabbi Yochanan said: It is because a man would not want that his wife should be exposed to a court of law.

The difference between them would be a case of a divorcee.

The Gemora cites the next Mishna which states: A divorcee may sell only through Beis Din. This would provide support to Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion, for according to him, it is understandable why there is a distinction between a widow and a divorcee.

The Gemora defends Ula by stating that this Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. (97a – 97b)

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 96 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: A widow is supported from the property inherited by the orphans and they are entitled to her earnings. They are not obligated in her burial. Her inheritors, the inheritors of her kesuvah are obligated to bury her. (95b)

Orphans Supporting the Widow

The Gemora inquires: Does the Mishna say, “A widow is supported,” or is it saying, “A widow who is supported”?

The Gemora explains: Is the Mishna saying that the widow is supported from the property inherited by the orphans, and it would be like the people of Galil, and the orphans will always be obligated to support the widow (as the people of Galil would explicitly write in their kesuvahs)? Or perhaps, the Mishna is saying that the orphans can support the widow, but if they desire, they would not be required to support her; and this would be like the people of Yehudah (who write that the orphans will support her until they decide to pay her the kesuvah)?

The Gemora attempts to bring a proof from that which Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Shmuel: The findings of a widow belong to herself. If the orphans are always obligated to support her, her findings should belong to them, just as her findings would belong to her husband! This proves that the orphans may decline to support her by paying her the kesuvah.

The Gemora deflects the proof: The reason why the findings of a woman belong to her husband is because we do not want there to be animosity between them; however, by the orphans, there is no such concern, and perhaps, she may keep possession of her findings. (95b – 96a)



Chores of a Widow and a Student

Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina said: All chores that a wife performs for her husband, the widow must perform for the orphans, except for diluting the wine, making his bed and washing his hands, face and feet.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: All chores that a slave performs for his master, a student must perform for his teacher, except for untying his shoes (people might thing that he is a Canaanite slave).

Rava qualifies this ruling: If people recognize the student, he may untie his teacher’s shoes.

Rav Ashi qualifies this ruling: If he is wearing tefillin, he may untie his teacher’s shoes even if people do not recognize him.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a teacher prevents his student from serving him, it is as if he is withholding kindness from him.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: It is also removing from the student his fear of Heaven. (96a)

Moveable Property for her Support

Rabbi Elozar said: If a widow seized moveable property (as support; although only real estate is mortgaged for this), she is not required to return it.

The Gemora cites a braisa which supports this ruling.

Rav Dimi related an incident that occurred with the daughter-in-law of Rabbi Shabsai, where she grabbed a sack full of money, and the Chachamim did not have the strength to take it away from her.

Ravina qualifies the ruling: This is true only in respect to her support; however, if she took moveable property for her kesuvah, she is required to return it.

Mar bar Rav Ashi challenges Ravina: What should be the difference between her support and her kesuvah?

Rabbi Yitzchak bar Naftoli said to Ravina: Rava has ruled according to you. (96a)

Widow’s Silence Regarding Support

Rabbi Yochanan ruled in the name of Rabbi Yosi ben Zimra: A widow who did not demand support for two or three years loses her right to be supported.

The Gemora states: A rich widow loses this right only after remaining silent for three years, whereas a poor widow loses her right even after two years.

The Gemora also differentiates between a modest widow, who loses this right only after remaining silent for three years, whereas an immodest widow loses her right even after two years.

Rava rules: She only loses her right to be compensated for the pat years; however, she may now demand to be supported for the future. (96a)

Rabbi Yochanan’s Inquiry

Rabbi Yochanan inquires: If the orphans claim that they gave her money for support, but she denies it, who is required to present proof?

The Gemora explains: Is the property of the deceased husband regarded as being in the orphan’s possession, and therefore, the widow is required to bring proof (for she is attempting to take money which is in their possession)? Or perhaps, the property of the deceased husband is regarded as being in the widow’s possession, and therefore, the orphans would be required to bring proof that they did indeed pay her?

The Gemora attempts to resolve this inquiry by citing the following braisa: Levi taught: If the widow has not remarried, the orphans are required to bring the proof; if she has remarried, she is required to bring the proof.

Rav Simi bar Ashi said: This is actually a Tannaic dispute. For we learned in the following braisa: A widow may sell portions of her deceased husband’s estate, but she must specify in writing, “These I have sold for my support,” and “These I have sold for my kesuvah.” These are the words of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Yosi, however, ruled: She may sell portions of his estate and she is not required to specify the purpose in writing, and so her power is great.

Rav Simi explains the dispute: Rabbi Yehudah maintains that she is required to specify the purpose of the sale because he holds that the property of the deceased husband is regarded as being in the orphan’s possession, and therefore, she is the one required to bring the proof. Rabbi Yosi, however, holds that she is not required to specify the purpose of the sale because he maintains that the property of the deceased husband is regarded as being in the widow’s possession, and therefore, she is not required to bring any proof.

The Gemora disagrees with the proof: Perhaps both Tannaim hold that the property of the deceased husband is regarded as being in the widow’s possession, and the orphans are required to bring the proof; Rabbi Yehudah does not obligate her to bring proof; rather, he is offering her good advice, so that people will not refer to her as a woman with an insatiable appetite.

Alternatively, we can disagree with Rav Simi’s proof as follows: Perhaps both Tannaim hold that the property of the deceased husband is regarded as being in the orphan’s possession; Rabbi Yosi maintains that she does not have to specify the purpose of her sale in accordance with Abaye the Elder. For Abaye the Elder said: To what may the ruling of Rabbi Yosi be compared to? To the instructions of a dying man who said, “Give two hundred zuz to So-and-so, my creditor.” The creditor may take them as settlement of his debt or, if he prefers, he may take them as a gift. Now, is he not at an advantage if he chooses to take them as a gift, for then, he can still collect his debt from land which was sold? (96a – 97a)

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 95 - Highlights

Two documents in Nissan

There were two documents regarding the sale of the same piece of property that were brought before Rav Yosef. In one of the documents, it was recorded that the document had been written on the fifth of Nissan, while the other document said that it had been written in Nissan (but no specific date was mentioned). Rav Yosef gave the property to the one whose document was dated on the fifth of Nissan. The other fellow asked Rav Yosef, “Why should I lose out”? Rav Yosef replied, “You are at a disadvantage because perhaps your document was signed on the twenty-ninth of Nissan.” He asked Rav Yosef, “Will the master write for me a document stating that I may seize any properties sold by the seller from Iyar and on?” Rav Yosef responded, “The purchasers can tell you, ‘your document was signed on the first of Nissan (and therefore, the buyer holding the document dated on the fifth of Nissan took the property that actually belongs to you).’”

The Gemora asks: is there any remedy for this buyer?

The Gemora answers: The holders of the two documents should write out authorizations for each other (so that the purchasers cannot rebuff any of them because he can demand reimbursement for himself or on behalf of the other fellow, who appointed him as a “power of attorney” to seize the property for him). (94b – 95a)

Mishna

The Mishna states: If one was married to two wives, and sold his field (which was pledged for their kesuvos), and the first wife wrote to the purchaser, “I have no right or claim against you,” (after the husband dies) the second wife may take from the purchaser, and the first one from the second one (since the first one waived her rights in this property only to the purchaser), and the purchaser from the first one (since she waived her rights to him); and they go around in circles until they reach a compromise among themselves. And similarly, this would apply to a creditor and a woman who is her husband’s creditor. (95a)
Surrendering her Rights
The Gemora asks: Does she in fact surrender her rights to the property when she waived her rights to the purchaser? But we learned in a braisa: If one says to his fellow (a partner in the field): “I have no claim or rights regarding this field,” or he says: “I have no business with it,” or he says: “My hand is removed from it,” it is considered as if he said nothing (since he is not stating that he is giving his share to his partner)?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is discussing a case where the buyer made a kinyan (chalipin; one took a kerchief from the other in order to formalize the transfer) with the wife.

The Gemora asks: Why does the kinyan help? Let the wife say that she only agreed to the sale in order to please her husband (for this way, it would be easier for him to sell the property)? The Gemora proves that this is a valid claim from a Mishna in Gittin (55b).

Rav Zeira answers in the name of Rav Chisda: Our Mishna is following the opinion of Rabbi Meir and the Mishna in Gittin is following the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. For we learned in a braisa: If a husband wrote a contract for the first buyer of a field of his wife, and she did not sign a consent form and then he wrote a contract for another buyer of a field of hers and that she did sign for, she loses thereby her claim to her kesuvah (if her husband has no free property left; she cannot obviously collect from the second field because she has agreed that the husband should sell it; she cannot recover her kesuvah even from the first buyer since he will claim that when he had bought his field, her husband was still left in the possession of that field which he subsequently sold to the second purchaser); these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah, however, said: She may claim, “I merely meant to please my husband; what claim can you have against me?” Rebbe ruled anonymously in our Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Meir and he ruled in Gittin like Rabbi Yehudah.

Rav Papa answers: Our Mishna can be referring to a divorcee (where, she obviously cannot claim that she only waived her right to please her husband), and it would be according to everyone.

Rav Ashi offers an alternative answer: Both Mishnayos reflect the view of Rabbi Meir, for Rabbi Meir maintains his view (that she would forfeit her kesuvah) only there, where two buyers are concerned, since in such a case, they can tell her, “If you only consented in order to please your husband, you should have done so in the case of the first buyer,” but where there is only one buyer, even Rabbi Meir would admit that the sale is invalid. And our Mishna is referring to a case where the husband had first written a contract for another buyer (and his wife did not agree, and then he made another sale, which is the case of our Mishna, where she did agree; she cannot present the claim that she only consented to please her husband, for she should have done the same by the first sale as well). (95a)
Collecting from Mortgaged Property when Free Property has been Ruined
The Gemora cites a Mishna in Gittin (48b): A creditor may not collect from mortgaged property (that has been sold) when there is still available free property (by the debtor).

The Gemora inquires: If the free property became ruined, may the creditor collect from the properties that have been sold?

The Gemora attempts to resolve this inquiry from the following braisa: If a husband wrote a contract for the first buyer of a field of his wife, and she did not sign a consent form and then he wrote a contract for another buyer of a field of hers and that she did sign for, she loses thereby her claim to her kesuvah; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Now, if you would think that if the free property became ruined, the creditor may collect from the properties that have been sold; while it is understandable that she has lost the right to collect her kesuvah from the second field, shouldn’t she be entitled to collect her kesuvah from the first field (which was akin to being ruined when she initially lost her right to collect from it)?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers: The braisa only meant that she lost her right to collect her kesuvah from the second field.

Rava challenges this answer: Firstly, the language of the braisa strongly indicates that she has completely lost her right to the kesuvah. Secondly, there is a different braisa, where it can be derived that in our case, the woman, after forfeiting her right to collect from the second field, cannot go and collect it from the first one!

The Gemora answers: There (by signing an agreement on the second sale), she has caused the loss with her own hands (and that is why she cannot collect from the first one; it is not similar to the case of our inquiry, where the field became ruined by itself).

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi (attempting to resolve this inquiry): It is everyday incidents (that creditors collect from sold properties after free property has been ruined). For there was a borrower who once pledge a vineyard to the lender for ten years (the terms of this deal were that the creditor was to enjoy the produce of the vineyard during the ten years in payment of his loan, while the vineyard itself was to return to the borrower at the end of that period without any further payment or obligation on his part) but it aged after five years (and could not produce grapes any longer). When the lender came to the Rabbis, they wrote out a document allowing him to collect from the purchasers. (This demonstrates that creditors collect from sold properties after free property has been ruined.)

The Gemora notes: There also, it was they who caused the loss with their own hands to themselves. For, it is common knowledge that a vineyard should age, and they should not have bought any of the debtor’s mortgaged land.

The Gemora rules: The law, however, is that where free property has been ruined; they may collect from mortgaged property. (95a – 95b)
Abaye’s Ruling
Abaye said: If a man said to a woman, “My property shall be yours and after you (your death) it shall be given to so-and-so,” and then she got married (and later died), her husband is regarded as a purchaser of her property, and her successor has nothing in place of her husband.

The Gemora asks: In accordance with whose view was Abaye’s ruling made?

The Gemora answers: It is reflecting the opinion of the following Tanna. For it has been taught in a braisa: If one man said to another, “My property shall be yours and after you it shall be given to so-and-so,” and the first recipient went down and sold the property, the second one may take the property from those who bought it (after the first one dies); these are the words of Rebbe. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel ruled: The second one may receive only that which the first has left.

The Gemora asks: But could Abaye have issued such a ruling? Didn’t Abaye say: Who is a cunning rogue? One who advises (the first recipient) to sell the property in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel.?

The Gemora answers: Did he say that she may marry? He only said that the woman got married. (95b)
Abaye’s Second Ruling
Abaye said: If a man said to a woman, “My property shall be yours and after you (your death) it shall be given to so-and-so,” and the woman sold the property and then died, her husband may take the property from the buyer, and the woman’s successor may take it from the husband, and the buyer may take it from the successor. And ultimately, the property remains in the possession of the buyer.

The Gemora asks: But why should this case be different from our Mishna which ruled in a similar case that and they go around in circles until they reach a compromise among themselves?

The Gemora answers: in the Mishna’s case, they are all suffering some loss (because the women are owed their kesuvah and the purchaser spent money on the property) but here, it is only the buyer who suffers the loss.

Rafram reported this ruling to Rav Ashi and he asked: Could Abaye have issued such a ruling? Didn’t he, in fact, rule that a man said to a woman, “My property shall be yours and after you (your death) it shall be given to so-and-so,” and then she got married (and later died), her husband is regarded as a purchaser of her property, and her successor has nothing in place of her husband.? (How could he rule in the second case that the successor takes it away from the husband?)

Rav Ashi replied: There, Abaye was discussing an unmarried woman (and perhaps the man did not wish that the property should go to the successor even if she would get married), but here, where she was already married, he was obviously saying that the successor should acquire it, and the husband should not. (95b)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
MI SHEHAYA NASUI

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 94 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: If a man was married to four wives, and died, the first precedes the second (and she may collect the entire amount pledged to her even if nothing will be left for the second woman), and the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first swears to the second (that she did not previously collect any portion of her kesuvah), and the second to the third, and the third to the fourth, and the fourth is paid without taking an oath.

Ben Nanas says: And because she is last she benefits? She also is not paid except with an oath.

If they were all written on one day, whoever precedes the other even by one hour, acquires her portion. And in Yerushalayim, they would write down the hours in their documents.

If they were all written in the same hour, and there is only a maneh in his estate, they all share equally. (93b)

Explaining the Dispute Between the Tanna Kamma and Ben Nanas

The Gemora asks: What is the point of contention between the Tanna Kamma and Ben Nanas?

Shmuel said: They argue regarding the following case: It was found that one of the fields (which were given to the three earlier wives) did not belong to the husband. (It may be assumed that the person who owns the field might appear at any moment to claim it, and one of the three wives will be deprived of her field. She would then proceed to make her claim against the field that had been reserved for the fourth wife. Ben Nanas maintains that the fourth wife must also swear that she did not previously collect any portion of her kesuvah.) The argument is regarding a later creditor who took before an earlier creditor, if his collection is deemed valid. The Tanna Kamma holds that his collection is invalid (and therefore, in our case, the collection of the fourth woman will be invalid once it becomes known that one of the three earlier wives lost the field that she initially collected with; consequently, she will go to the fourth woman and take that field). Ben Nanas maintains that the collection of a later creditor who took before an earlier creditor is deemed valid (and therefore, the fourth woman may not collect her portion without taking an oath first).

Rav Nachman in the name of Rabbah bar Avuhah offers a different explanation: Everyone agrees that the seizure of a later creditor before an earlier creditor is invalid. Here the question is whether or not we suspect that the field (collected by the fourth woman) will be neglected (and hence deteriorate). The Tanna Kamma says that we do not suspect the field will be neglected, and Ben Nanas says that we do suspect the field will be neglected.

Abaye states: They argue about the law of Abaye Keshisha. Abaye Keshisha taught: The orphans discussed (that one who collects from them can only collect if he takes a vow) are adult orphans, and this is certainly true regarding orphans who are minors. The Tanna Kamma does not agree with Abaye Keshisha, while Ben Nanas does agree with Abaye Keshisha. (93b – 94a)
Do Partners or Brothers Represent Each Other in Beis Din?

Rav Huna states: If two brothers or two partners have a case against someone, and only one of them goes to court, the other brother or partner cannot later say to that person “You are not the person who I went to court with.”[He cannot say afterwards that he wants to judge his portion of the case separately.] Once the other brother or partner went, we assume him to be a messenger of the other brother or partner in the case.

When Rav Nachman went to Sura they asked him: What is the law in the case stated above? He answered: This is a Mishna. The first wife swears to the second wife, the second wife swears to the third wife, the third wife swears to the fourth wife. The Mishna does not say that the first wife must also swear to the third wife. Why? This is because the second wife is like the messenger of the third wife.

The Gemora asks: Is this comparable (to the case of two brothers or partners)? In the case of our Mishna, taking a vow against one person is akin to taking a vow against one hundred people (with the same claim), but in this case the partner or brother can claim that if he was present he would have made better claims.

The Gemora says: This that we say that the brother or partner can have another trial is only if he wasn’t in the city for the first trial. If he was, he cannot have another trial, as he should have come. (94a)

Selling the Same Field on the Same Day to Two Different Buyers

The law was taught regarding a case of someone who sold the same field to two people on the same day. Rav says they should split the field, and Shmuel says the law is the choice of the judges (they should decide who to give it to).

The Gemora asks: It seems that Rav holds like the opinion of Rabbi Meir that the signatures on a document are what validates a transaction, and Shmuel holds like Rabbi Elozar that the witnesses of the giving over of a document validates a transaction.

[Rav must say the field should be split because the documents say the exact same thing, meaning that there is no reason one should be chosen over the other. However, Shmuel who says one can be chosen over the other must reason that the giving over of the document, which may have been done at different times, should qualify the earliest recipient as the owner. One therefore can be chosen over the other.]

The Gemora answers: This is incorrect. Both Shmuel and Rav agree with Rabbi Elozar that the giving over of the documents validates the transaction. They are merely arguing what is a more appropriate ruling in this situation. Rav says it is more appropriate to divide the field, while Shmuel says the choice of the judges is more appropriate.

The Gemora asks: Can we in fact establish that Rav holds like Rabbi Elozar? Didn’t Rav Yehuda say in the name of Rav that the law follows Rabbi Elozar only in regards to divorce documents, and Shmuel remarked even in regular documents? This shows that regarding regular documents Rav generally did not hold like Rabbi Elozar!

The Gemora therefore concludes that the original answer, which is that Rav holds like Rabbi Meir and Shmuel holds like Rabbi Elozar, is correct.

The Gemora asks a question from a Beraisa: If two identical documents (of sale to two different people) are dated on the same day, the two parties split what was sold. This Beraisa is clearly a strong question on the opinion of Shmuel!

Shmuel answers: This (Beraisa) is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and I hold like Rabbi Elozar.

The Gemora asks: If this is Rabbi Meir, how can this be reconciled with the second part of the Beraisa that states if someone wrote a document for one person, then wrote a second document and gave it to someone else, the person who received the document first makes the acquisition? If this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, why should he acquire? Rabbi Meir holds the acquisition is validated by the document being written and signed by witnesses!

The Gemora answers: Rav and Shmuel’s exact argument is indeed argued by the Tanaim. The Beraisa says that (in a case where a messenger is sent to give money to someone who he finds to be dead, and then he hears that the person who sent him died) the Chachamim say the money should be divided. [This means it should be divided among the inheritors of the intended recipient and the inheritors of the person who sent the messenger.] However, here they say that the messenger should give it to whom he feels should get it.

One morning, the mother of Rami bar Chama wrote that her possessions should go to Rami bar Chama. Later that afternoon, she wrote that she is giving all her possessions to Mar Ukva bar Chama. Rami bar Chama came before Rav Sheshes, who said that he should keep the possessions. Mar Ukva bar Chama came before Rav Nachman, who said that he should keep the possessions.

Rav Sheishes said to Rav Nachman: Why did you rule this way? Rav Nachman retorted to Rav Sheishes: Why did you rule this way? Rav Sheishes replied: He (Rami) was first. Rav Nachman replied: Are we in Yerushalayim where the hour is written on the document? Rav Sheishes said: Even so, why did you rule the way you did? Rav Nachman replied: It was the choice of the judge. Rav Sheishes said: I also ruled by choice of the judge! Rav Nachman replied: Firstly, I am a professional judge and you are not. Secondly, you did not originally issue your ruling because of “the choice of the judge” (but rather because of your mistaken assumption that because the document was chronologically first it should have more validity). (94a – 94b)

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Daf Yomi - Kesuvos 93 - Highlights

Mishna

The Mishna states: If someone was married to three wives, and died, this one's kesuvah is a maneh, and this one’s two hundred, and this one’s three hundred, and there is only a maneh (and each of their kesuvah’s were signed on the same day), they all share equally (since they all have a lien of one hundred on his property).

If there were two hundred (in his estate), the one of a maneh takes fifty, whereas the one’s of two hundred and three hundred each receives three gold dinars (seventy five zuz; they all have a lien on the one hundred, but only two of them have a lien on the remainder).

If there were three hundred, the one of a maneh takes fifty; the one of two hundred takes a maneh; and the one of three hundred, takes six gold dinars.

And similarly, if there were three people who put money in a fund, and it diminished or increased, they divide it in the same manner. (93a)


Explanation of the Second Ruling
The Gemora asks (on the Mishna’s second ruling): Why does the first one receive fifty; the one hundred should be divided amongst the three of them and she should only take thirty-three and a third?

Shmuel answered: The Mishna is referring to a case where the one who is entitled to the two hundred zuz wrote to the woman who was entitled to one maneh, “I have no claim whatsoever upon the maneh.”

If so, asks the Gemora, let us examine the latter part of the ruling: Whereas the one’s of two hundred and three hundred each receives three gold dinars. Why, let the third woman tell the second one, “You have removed yourself from the first maneh” (and therefore, the second woman should only receive fifty)?

The Gemora answers: She only removed herself from any claim upon the first maneh (she did not remove herself from the kesuvah itself; she didn’t remove herself from any claim regarding the third woman either; she, therefore, receives an amount equal to that of the third woman). (93a)

Explanation of the Third Ruling
The Mishna had stated: If there were three hundred, the one of a maneh takes fifty; the one of two hundred takes a maneh; and the one of three hundred, takes six gold dinars.

The Gemora asks: Why does the second one receive a maneh, she should only be entitled to seventy-five zuz (since we are discussing a case where the second woman wrote to the first woman, “I have no claim whatsoever upon the maneh”)?

Shmuel answered: The Mishna is referring to a case where the one who is entitled to the three hundred zuz wrote to the woman who was entitled to the two hundred zuz and to the one who was entitled to one maneh, “I have no claim whatsoever upon the first maneh.” (The second woman, however, did not waive any of her rights; therefore, the first two women divide the one hundred equally and the second two women divide the second hundred equally; the third woman takes the third hundred herself.) (93a)

An Alternative Explanation
Rav Yaakov from Nehar Pekod offers an alternative explanation to the Mishna: The first case (the second ruling) is referring to a case of two seizures (of moveable, mortgaged property by the wives) and the latter case is referring is referring to two cases of seizures.

He explains: They initially seized seventy-five zuz (and therefore, they each received twenty-five zuz). Then, they seized one hundred and twenty-five zuz (and now, we consider again the debt owed to each woman; hence, they divide the seventy-five zuz owed to them, with each receiving twenty-five, and the remaining fifty is divided amongst the last two women).

The latter case is explained as follows: They initially seized seventy-five zuz (and therefore, they each received twenty-five zuz). Then, they seized two hundred and twenty-five zuz (and now, we consider again the debt owed to each woman; hence, they divide the seventy-five zuz owed to them, with each receiving twenty-five; the next hundred zuz is divided equally amongst the last two women and the remaining fifty zuz belongs to the third woman). (93a)
Dissenting Opinion
The Gemora cites a braisa: The Mishna’s rulings follow the opinion of Rabbi Nosson; however, Rebbe says: I do not agree with Rabbi Nosson regarding this and I hold that all the monies are divided equally (the estate being equally mortgaged to all three women, the woman who claims the smallest amount has no less a right to it than the women who claim the bigger amounts have a right to theirs; only in the case of contributors to a common fund are profits and losses to be divided in proportion to the respective amounts contributed). (93a)
Money in a Fund
The Mishna stated: And similarly, if there were three people who put money in a fund, and it diminished or increased, they divide it in the same manner.

Shmuel said: If two people put money into a fund, one gave a maneh and the other gave two hundred zuz, the profit is shared equally.

Rabbah said: It stands to reason that Shmuel’s ruling applies where an ox was jointly purchased for plowing and was used for plowing (so that the share of one partner in the ox is as essential as that of the other, the animal being useless for work unless it is whole); where, however, an ox was purchased for plowing and was used for slaughter, each of the partners receives a share in proportion to his investment (since the animal can be divided).

Rav Hamnuna, however, ruled: Where an ox was jointly purchased for plowing, even if it was used for slaughter, the profit must be equally divided.

The Gemora asks on Rabbah from the following braisa: If two people put money into a fund, one gave a maneh and the other gave two hundred zuz, the profit is shared equally. Is this not referring to a case where the ox was purchased for plowing and was used for slaughter? It would then be a refutation to Rabbah!

The Gemora deflects the challenge: It is referring to a case where the ox was jointly purchased for plowing and was used for plowing.

The Gemora asks: But we may then infer that if the ox was purchased for plowing and was used for slaughter, the halacha would be that each of the partners receives a share in proportion to his investment. Then, we could have learned that case in the end of the braisa instead of the following case which was taught: If one person purchased healthy oxen for two hundred zuz and the other person purchased weak oxen for a hundred zuz and afterwards, they formed a partnership, each of the partners receives a share in proportion to his investment (since weak oxen do not perform work equal to that of healthy oxen). The braisa should have made a distinction in the first case itself? The following is what the braisa should have taught: When do these words (the profit is shared equally) apply? It applies only when the ox was purchased for plowing and was used for plowing; however, if it was purchased for plowing and used for slaughter, the halacha would be that each of the partners receives a share in proportion to his investment.?

The Gemora answers: That is actually what the braisa was in fact saying. When do these words (the profit is shared equally) apply? It applies only when the ox was purchased for plowing and was used for plowing; however, if it was purchased for plowing and used for slaughter, it is as if one person purchased healthy oxen for two hundred zuz and the other person purchased weak oxen for a hundred zuz and afterwards, they formed a partnership, and the halacha would be that each of the partners receives a share in proportion to his investment.

The Gemora asks from our Mishna which states: And similarly, if there were three people who put money in a fund, and it diminished or increased, they divide it in the same manner. Now, if the Mishna means that they suffered a loss or that they generated a profit, and nevertheless, the Mishna rules that each of the partners receives a share in proportion to his investment. This would be inconsistent with Shmuel’s opinion!

Rav Nachman answers in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: No! The Mishna is referring to a case where they now have new coins (which are easier to spend) or they now have coins that were voided by the government, and are now only suitable to be used as an application upon a wound on the bottom of one’s foot (since the face value of the coins are still the same, they each would receive a share in proportion to their investment). (93a – 93b)

[END]

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