RABBINICAL OFFENSE IS MORE SEVERE - Yevamos 36 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that the Rabbis were stricter and strengthened their enactments more than for those of the Torah.

The Gemora in Shabbos (110a) cites the verse in Koheles [10:8]: One who breaks through a stone wall will be bitten by a snake. This is referring to someone who does not heed the words of the Sages. One is not permitted to scoff at the decrees of the Rabbis. The Gemora in Eruvin states that one who transgresses the words of the Chachamim is liable to death at the hand of Heaven.

Rashi in Avoda Zarah (27b) states that even if he will be given medicine for this snake bite and will be healed, other snakes will come and he will eventually die.

The Maharal explains: The Rabbis goal was to erect a fence to safeguard the commandments of the Torah. One who negates these decrees is causing a breakdown for the mitzvos of the Torah. This is why we deal with him so harshly.

Rabbeinu Yonah explains why one who violates a Rabbinical decree is dealt with in a stricter manner than one who transgressed a Torah commandment. One who violates a Biblical prohibition respects the law, but he is motivated by his physical desires to sin. He is not rebuffing his obligation, rather it can be regarded as a momentary slip in his observance. One who violates a Rabbinical enactment does so because of a lack of regard for their decrees. He belittles them on account that they were not written in the Torah and there is no real necessity to keep them. He is rejecting his obligation and therefore deserving of death.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 36 - Highlights

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Yochanan (who maintains that one who performed chalitzah or yibum with his pregnant yevamah and subsequently she miscarries, she is not required to have a chalitzah from the brothers) from a braisa: One who performed a yibum with his yevamah, and it was found that she was pregnant; the yevamah’s co-wife may not marry because the child might be viable.

The Gemora emends the braisa to say as follows: One who performed a yibum with his yevamah, and it was found that she was pregnant; the yevamah’s co-wife may not marry because the child might not be viable.

According to Rabbi Yochanan that the yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is considered valid, why don’t we allow the co-wife to marry?

Abaye answers: Rabbi Yochanan never meant to dispute that a yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is considered valid (since this is a forbidden action, it is deemed to be invalid); he only argued regarding a chalitzah performed with a pregnant yevamah.

Rava objects to Abaye’s answer: If the yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is not considered valid, the chalitzah cannot be valid either; for we have learned that whoever is subject to yibum is subject to chalitzah and whoever is not subject to yibum is not subject to chalitzah?

Rava answers Rabbi Yochanan’s opinion differently: This is what the braisa means: One who performed a yibum with his yevamah, and it was found that she was pregnant; the yevamah’s co-wife may not marry because the child might be viable, and a yibum or chalitzah with one’s yevamah who is pregnant with a viable child is certainly not valid, and the child does not release the co-wife until he enters into the world.

The Gemora cites a braisa supporting Rava’s position. (35b – 36a)

Rish Lakish explains the braisa as follows: A yibum or chalitzah performed with a pregnant yevamah is not considered valid, but perhaps the co-wife can be released because the majority of women give birth to viable children; the braisa teaches us that a child does not release the yevamah from her attachment to the yavam until the child enters into the world. (36a)

Rabbi Elozar attempts to cite support to Rish Lakish from a Mishna. The Mishna (119a) states: If a woman’s husband and her co-wife went overseas and they informed her that her husband has died (based on the report, she would be free to remarry, however, it is uncertain if she falls for yibum), she should not marry or be taken in yibum until she determines if her co-wife is pregnant or not. Rish Lakish asks: It is understandable why we do not permit her to be taken in yibum for perhaps the co-wife will have a viable child and the yavam will have transgressed the Biblical prohibition of taking his brother’s wife (when there is no mitzvah of yibum); however, why can’t she perform chalitzah with the yavam during the nine months of her husband’s death and get married afterwards? (By the fact that this option is not permitted, it would indicate that a chalitzah with a pregnant yevamah (or the co-wife) has no legitimacy.)

The Gemora rejects this proof: Even according to Rish Lakish, why don’t we permit her to perform a chalitzah after the nine months, which certainly would be valid?

Abaye bar Abba and Rav Chin’na bar Abaye both say that chalitzah is not an option, for if the child is viable, we will require an announcement that she is permitted to marry a Kohen (since the chalitzah was invalid).

The Gemora asks: So, why don’t we make the announcement?

The Gemora answers: Perhaps someone will be present by the chalitzah and will not hear of the announcement; he will be under the false impression that a chalutzah is permitted to a Kohen.

The Gemora cites a braisa: One who performed chalitzah with his pregnant yevamah and subsequently she miscarries; she would require chalitzah from the brothers. This is a proof to Rish Lakish. (36a)

The Mishna had stated: One who performs yibum with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant and later gave birth; if the child is not viable, he may keep her as a wife.

Rabbi Eliezer is cited in a braisa: He is required to divorce her. (Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Tanna of the Mishna and maintains that he must divorce her as a penalty for taking a risk of violating the prohibition against taking one’s brother’s wife when yibum would not apply.) (36b)

Rava says: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing. Rabbi Eliezer; we mentioned above. Rabbi Meir; it was taught in a braisa: (The Rabbis decreed that one should wait twenty-four months for otherwise she might become pregnant from her new husband and will be compelled to wean her previous child.) One should not marry a pregnant or nursing woman, and if he did marry her, he must divorce her and he is prohibited from marrying her again; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. The Chachamim say: He must divorce her, but he may remarry her at the appropriate time (after the twenty-four months). (It emerges that both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer hold that one who marries a woman prematurely is required to divorce her forever.)

Abaye asked Rava: Why do you say that the two rulings are similar? Perhaps, Rabbi Eliezer ruled accordingly only because the yavam was risking violating a Biblical prohibition of marrying his brother’s wife, but in the other case, where he is only violating a Rabbinical decree, he would agree to the Chachamim (he may remarry her). Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Meir issued his ruling only in a case where the man violated a Rabbinical decree, and the Rabbis were stricter and strengthened their enactments more than for those of the Torah.; however, here, when a Biblical prohibition is involved, the Chachamim did not find it necessary to penalize the yavam because people generally distance themselves from Biblical prohibitions. (36b)

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Dikduk and Chazal - Yevamos 35 - Daf Yomi

Why does the Mishna say that the yavam performs chalitzah with the yevamah; doesn’t the passuk say that the yevamah is the one that performs chalitzah by removing the yavam’s shoe?

The Nimukei Yosef writes (104b) that throughout Meseches Yevamos, the Gemora states that he is performing the chalitzah except for a case of a mute yavam.

The Noda B’Yehudah (I, E”H, 94) writes that as a child he would think that Chazal were not diligent in writing with correct grammar (because they wrote that he performed the chalitzah, when in truth, she is the one that performs the action), but afterwards he realized that their language is extremely precise.

The Gemora later (102b) states that the term chalitzah can mean the putting on of a shoe as well. This is what the Gemora means when it says that he performs the chalitzah. The yavam puts his shoe on in order to enable the yevamah to remove his shoe.

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Was Promiscuity Common? - Yevamos 35 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that it is uncommon for a minor to engage in an illicit relationship.

It can be inferred from here that it is common for an adult to engage in an illicit relationship.

This is why the Mishna in Kesuvos (2a) states that they established that marriages involving a virgin should take place on a Wednesday because of the concern that she engaged in an illicit relationship during the erusin.

The Rivash writes that in his times, it was common practice to engage in illicit relationships and they did not heed any rebuke.

The Chasam Sofer (E”H, 133) comments that the unmarried women were promiscuous and they only acted with modesty after they were married. A woman is believed after she is married that she will not cause her humble to stumble since she has “her bread in the basket.”

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 35 - Highlights

The Gemora cites two versions of Shmuel’s rulings regarding the waiting period of a woman before she gets married after cohabitating with a man.

Shmuel, according to the first version states: All women, whose husband’s died or they got divorced, are required to wait three months prior to getting married again (this is done in order to determine the paternity of the child), except for a girl who converted as a minor or a slave that was freed as a minor.

A Jewish girl who performed a mi’un (refusal) to her husband (she is obviously a minor) is not required to wait three months until getting married again. A minor who got divorced or one that had an illicit relationship is required to wait three months until getting married again. (Although minors cannot conceive, this was a precautionary decree because of adult women in a similar situation.)

Even though the Mishna rules that a minor girl is not required to wait three months before she marries again, Rav Gidel explains in the name of Rav that this was a ruling of the moment because the case was a highly uncommon one and the Rabbis did not issue their decree for this incident.

Shmuel, according to the second version states: All women, whose husband’s died or they got divorced, are required to wait three months prior to getting married again except for a girl who converted as an adult or a slave that was freed as an adult (since Shmuel follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosi who permits them to marry immediately because they utilize certain birth-control methods) and by a Jewish girl who had an illicit relationship as a minor (since it is uncommon, they didn’t decree on this).

Abaye explains the viewpoint of Rabbi Yosi: Women who engage in illicit relations invert themselves after cohabitation in order to avoid becoming pregnant. Rabbi Yehudah disagrees because he is concerned that they will not do so properly. (34b – 35a)

The Mishna had stated regarding the case where the two men inadvertently cohabitated with the wrong women that if they were daughters of Kohanim, they are disqualified from terumah.

The Gemora asks: This halacha should be the same even if they were not daughters of kohanim; they will be forbidden to their husbands if they are married to Kohanim?

The Gemora emends the Mishna to read, “If they were wives of Kohanim.”

The Gemora asks: The halacha is that even a wife of a Yisroel who has been violated and is permitted to her husband will nevertheless be forbidden to marry a Kohen in the future?

Rava answers: The Mishna is actually discussing the daughters of Kohanim. (Normally, a daughter of a Kohen who married a Yisroel, will be permitted to eat terumah after her husband dies and she has no children.) If she has been violated during the marriage, she will be disqualified from eating terumah forever. (35a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, ARBAAH ACHIN

The Mishna states: One who performed chalitzah with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant (there is a decree against performing chalitzah with a yevamah within three months since her husband’s death) and later gave birth; if the child is viable, he will be permitted in her relatives, she will be permitted in his relatives and she is not disqualified from marring a Kohen (because the chalitzah was not valid since the brother did not die childless). If, however, the child is not viable, he will be prohibited in her relatives, she will be prohibited in his relatives and she is disqualified from marrying a Kohen.

One who performs yibum with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant and later gave birth; if the child is viable, he must divorce her and they are required to bring a chatas offering. If, however, the child is not viable, he may keep her as a wife. If the child is viable, but we are uncertain if the child is a nine-month-old baby from the first brother or the seven-month-old child of the second brother; he must divorce her, and the child is deemed to be legitimate, and they are required to bring an asham taluy (a korban that one is required to bring if he is uncertain if he mistakenly committed a transgression). (35b)

The Gemora states: One who performed chalitzah with his pregnant yevamah and subsequently she miscarries; Rabbi Yochanan rules that she is not required to have a chalitzah from the brothers (the chalitzah has been retroactively determined to be valid). Rish Lakish says: She would require chalitzah from the brothers.

The Gemora explains their opinions: Rabbi Yochanan maintains that she is not required to have a chalitzah from the brothers because the chalitzah has been retroactively determined to be valid, and performing a yibum with a pregnant yevamah who subsequently miscarries is retroactively determined to be valid. Rish Lakish disagrees: He maintains that she would require chalitzah from the brothers because a chalitzah performed with a pregnant yevamah is not valid and a yibum performed with a pregnant yevamah is not considered a valid yibum, even if she later miscarries.

The Gemora elaborates further regarding this dispute: It can be explained that they argue based on the understanding of a verse or it can be explained based on logic.

The dispute based on logic can be explained as follows: Rabbi Yochanan holds that if Eliyahu would have informed us that she is going to miscarry, wouldn’t she be regarded as fit for a chalitzah or a yibum, now too, it is retroactively determined to be valid. Rish Lakish disagrees with this logic.

Alternatively, the dispute can be based on the understanding of the verse [Devarim 25:5]: And he has no child (then there is an obligation for yibum). Rabbi Yochanan says: He died without having a child. Rish Lakish says: Expound the verse to mean “Examine him.” (If he died with any type of child, including a fetus, the yibum or chalitzah is not valid.) (35b)

The Mishna had stated: One who performed chalitzah with his yevamah and she was found to be pregnant and later gave birth; if the child is not viable, he will be prohibited in her relatives, she will be prohibited in his relatives and she is disqualified from marrying a Kohen.

Rish Lakish explains the prohibition for her to marry a Kohen as a Rabbinic decree because in truth, the chalitzah was not valid. (35b)

[END]

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Desecrating his Words - Yevamos 34 - Daf Yomi

The Mishna in Makkos states that a person can commit one action of plowing and be liable for eight transgressions.

The Gemora asks: Couldn’t the Mishna list a ninth; if he took an oath not to plow on Yom Tov?

The Gemora answers: He has already been sworn from Har Sinai not to violate Yom Tov and therefore the oath does not take affect.

The Ran explains the principle: An oath must be regarding something voluntary; anything that a person is obligated to do regardless of his oath is not binding. However, this is only relevant to the bringing of a korban chatas if he would violate the oath, but in respect of transgressing the oath intentionally, he would incur the thirty-nine lashes.

Reb Akiva Eiger asks on the Ran from the Gemora in Makkos: The Gemora was discussing the amount of lashes one could possibly receive for committing one action that entails many different transgressions. The Gemora states that an oath cannot be included for a person is sworn from Har Sinai prior to uttering the oath against plowing on Yom Tov. According to the Ran, it should still be included because it is another prohibition that incurs the penalty of lashes?

Reb Akiva Eiger understands the Gemora that the oath does not have any validity whatsoever because of the principle that one prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition.

Reb Shmuel Rozovksy asks: Why don’t both prohibitions take effect simultaneoulsy; the oath does not take effect until the beginning of Yom Tov and that is precisely the same moment that the prohibition against engaging in labor on Yom Tov commences?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman states: The principle that one prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition is not applicable to an oath. He cites a Tosfos as proof to this: Tosfos states that the principle of one prohibition not taking effect on an existing prohibition would not apply to a case where one eats on Yom Kippur and simultaneously carries the food in his mouth from one domain to another. Although, the swallowing of the food causes both transgressions it is regarded as two different actions; swallowing and carrying.

Reb Elchonon explains regarding one who violates an oath by eating something he swore not to eat or by plowing a field when he swore that he wouldn’t; the transgression is not the eating or plowing, but rather the desecration of his words the oath. It is therefore not considered the same action which causes the other prohibition, and the principle of one prohibition not taking effect on an existing one would not be applicable.

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WHERE DOES THE SECOND PROHIBITION GO? - Yevamos 33 - Daf Yomi

The Shach (Y”D 238) rules that one who takes an oath that he will not eat neveilah (an animal that was not slaughtered properly), and subsequently got sick in a manner that he was permitted to eat neveilah; he is allowed to eat it, and he is not required to have his vow annulled.

The Peri Megadim in his introduction to Hilchos Pesach asks on this ruling. He states: That which we say that one prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition merely means that the he will not be liable for violating both prohibitions; however, he is violating two prohibitions and he will be buried together with the completely wicked.

Accordingly, he asks on the ruling of the Shach: While it’s true that the prohibition stemming from his personal oath not to eat neveilah will not take effect because he is already prohibited from eating neveilah from the Torah, nevertheless, the oath is valid and is existent; he will not be liable for transgressing the oath. However, when he is dangerously ill and he is permitted to eat neveilah, the oath would subsequently take effect and he must have it annulled.

The Avnei Miluim (teshuva 12) does not agree with the way the Peri Megadim understands the Shach. He states: The ruling of the Shach is not based on the principle of one prohibition not taking effect on an existing prohibition, but rather, it is because of the principle mentioned specifically regarding an oath. One oath cannot take effect on another one and every person took an oath at Mount Sinai that he will not eat neveilah; this is why his personal oath is not valid and does not require annulment.

He explains the distinction between the two principles: One cannot be liable for a second prohibition when a previously existing prohibition is in effect, but there are obviously both prohibitions present. Regarding an oath, one does not have the capabilities to take an oath prohibiting himself on something that he already is sworn to uphold anyway; the second oath has no legitimacy whatsoever.

Rav Shach in Hilchos Shavuos (5:16) asks on the premise of these Acharonim. If the second prohibition is present, why isn’t one liable for violating it? If a second prohibition cannot take effect on an existing one only means that we do not administer punishment for the second prohibition, why should there be an exception for an extensive or an inclusive prohibition? He therefore learns that the second prohibition does not take effect at all. The Gemora, which states that one who violates such a prohibition will be buried with the completely wicked does not mean to say that he has indeed violated two transgressions; rather, it means that he is regarded as completely wicked since he is committing an action which involves two prohibitions even though in fact, he has only violated one.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 33 - Highlights

The Gemora cites a dispute regarding a non-Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos. Rabbi Chiya maintains that he has violated two transgressions; one for a non-Kohen performing the Temple service and the other for desecrating the Shabbos. Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one; for a non-Kohen performing the Temple service.

Rabbi Chiya jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression.

Rabbi Chiya explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing labor on Shabbos. Permission was granted to perform labor in the Beis HaMikdosh only for Kohanim. It is therefore logical to assume that a non-Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing labor on Shabbos. Permission was completely granted to perform labor in the Beis HaMikdosh (and it was not specific to the Kohanim). A non-Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos has violated only one transgression; for a non-Kohen performing the Temple service, but not for violating the Shabbos. (32b)

The Gemora cites a similar dispute between Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara: A blemished Kohen performed the Temple service (we are referring to a communal offering whose time is fixed, which is permitted to be brought by Kohanim in a state of tumah) while he was in a state of tumah. Rabbi Chiya maintains that he has violated two transgressions; one for performing the Temple service with a blemish and the other for performing the Temple service while he is tamei. Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one; for performing the Temple service with a blemish.

Rabbi Chiya jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression.

Rabbi Chiya explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah. Permission was granted to perform the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah (for a communal offering) only for unblemished Kohanim. It is therefore logical to assume that a blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from performing the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah. Permission was completely granted to perform the Temple service while they are in a state of tumah (and it was not specific to unblemished Kohanim). A blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh while he was tamei has violated only one transgression; for performing the Temple service with a blemish, but not for performing the service while he was tamei. (32b)

The Gemora cites a third dispute between Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara: A non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah (a Kohen pierces the back of the bird’s neck with his fingernail – this is valid only by a sacrificial offering, otherwise, it would be deemed a neveilah and could not be eaten). Rabbi Chiya maintains that he has violated two transgressions; one for a non-Kohen eating sacrificial food and the other for eating neveilah. Bar Kappara said: He is only liable for one; for a non-Kohen eating sacrificial food.

Rabbi Chiya jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara jumped up and swore that he had heard from Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression.

Rabbi Chiya explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from eating neveilah. Permission was granted in the Beis Hamikdosh (for a bird offering) only for Kohanim. It is therefore logical to assume that a non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara explained his position: All Jews are prohibited from eating neveilah. Permission was completely granted in the Beis Hamikdosh (and it was not specific to Kohanim). A non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah has violated only one transgression; for a non-Kohen eating sacrificial food, but not for eating neveilah. (32b)

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara are arguing in regards to an inclusive prohibition (more objects become forbidden to the same people) taking effect on an existing prohibition, and according to Rabbi Yosi (who maintains that one prohibition can take effect on an existing one). Rabbi Chiya holds that Rabbi Yosi maintains that the inclusive prohibition does take effect and therefore he has violated two transgressions. Bar Kappara holds that it does not take effect and he has violated only one prohibition. (33a)

The Gemora asks: What are the inclusive prohibitions in each of three cases cited above?

The Gemora answers: The first case is where a non-Kohen performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos. The non-Kohen is permitted to perform labor, but is prohibited from perform the Temple service. When Shabbos arrives, we can say that since he is now prohibited from engaging in any labor, he also is prohibited from performing the Temple service on account of Shabbos. (This is an inclusive prohibition since more objects become forbidden.)

The second case is where a blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh while he was tamei. The blemished Kohen is permitted to eat portions of the sacrificial offerings, but he is prohibited from performing the Temple service. When he becomes tamei, we can say that since he is now prohibited from eating portions of the sacrificial offerings, he is also prohibited from performing the Temple service on account of tumah. (This is an inclusive prohibition since more objects become forbidden.)

The Gemora asks that the third case cannot be explained to be referring to an inclusive prohibition taking effect on an existing prohibition since both prohibitions take effect simultaneously. As soon as the melikah is performed, the meat of the bird offering becomes forbidden to a non-Kohen and it becomes a neveilah at the same time. (33a)

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara are arguing in regards to simultaneous prohibitions, and according to Rabbi Yosi (who maintains that he would be liable for two prohibitions). Rabbi Chiya holds that Rabbi Yosi maintains that the inclusive prohibition does take effect and therefore he has violated two transgressions. (Rabbi Yosi must be referring to the following case: Two brothers designated one agent to go and betroth two sisters. The sisters also appointed an agent to accept the betrothals for them. The agent of the brothers gave the two betrothals to the agent of the sisters simultaneously. The prohibition of his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife occurred simultaneously.) Bar Kappara holds that it does not take effect and he has violated only one prohibition. (33a)

The Gemora asks: What are the simultaneous prohibitions in each of three cases cited above?

The Gemora answers: The first case is where a non-Kohen performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh on Shabbos. This is referring to a case when he grew the two pubic hairs that render him an adult on Shabbos. The prohibition against a non-Kohen performing the Temple service and the prohibition against engaging in labor on Shabbos occur simultaneously.

The second case is where a blemished Kohen who performed the Temple service in the Beis HaMikdosh while he was tamei. This is referring to a case when he grew the two pubic hairs that render him an adult after he had a blemish and became tamei. These two prohibitions occur simultaneously. Alternatively, we can say that his finger got cut off with a knife that was tamei. (The third case, we explained previously.) (33a)

The Gemora asks on this explanation: According to Rabbi Chiya, we can understand Rebbe’s two statements; the statement that he has violated two transgressions is following Rabbi Yosi’s opinion and the statement that he has violated only one transgression is following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. However, according to Bar Kappara, was Rabbi Chiya lying when he stated in the name of Rebbe that he has violated two transgressions? (33a)

The Gemora explains that Rabbi Chiya and Bar Kappara are arguing in regards to simultaneous prohibitions, and according to Rabbi Shimon (Rabbi Chiya maintains that by simultaneous prohibitions, he would be liable for two prohibitions, and not by an inclusive prohibition, and Bar Kappara holds that he will never be liable for two transgressions).

The Gemora asks on this explanation: According to Bar Kappara, we can understand Rebbe’s two statements; the statement that he has violated only one transgression is following the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and the statement that he has violated two transgressions is following Rabbi Yosi’s opinion. However, according to Rabbi Chiya, was Bar Kappara lying when he stated in the name of Rebbe that he has violated only one transgression?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Chiya could say that Bar Kappara was mistaken when he quoted Rebbe as ruling that one is liable for only one transgression in all three cases. Although it is true that Rabbi Shimon would hold that in cases of an inclusive prohibition, he is liable for only one; but in cases involving simultaneous prohibitions, Rabbi Shimon would concede that they both take effect. Rebbe did not issue a ruling to bar Kappara regarding the third case where a non-Kohen ate the meat of the bird offering which was slaughtered through melikah. This case can only be referring to simultaneous prohibitions and not an inclusive prohibition. Bar Kappara erroneously (according to Rabbi Chiya) grouped this case together with the other two and stated that Rebbe maintains according to Rabbi Shimon that one is liable for only one transgression even when the prohibitions occur simultaneously. Rabbi Chiya disagrees and holds that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yosi by simultaneous prohibitions that one would be liable for two transgressions. (33b)

The Gemora cites a braisa which refutes the opinion of Bar Kappara. It is evident from the braisa that Rabbi Shimon only disagrees with Rabbi Yosi by an inclusive prohibition, but agrees that one will be liable for two transgressions when the prohibitions occur simultaneously. (33b)

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THE PROHIBITION OF A WIFE’S SISTER EVEN AFTER THE WIFE’S DEATH - Yevamos 32 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora cites a braisa: (Three were two brothers, Reuven and Shimon that were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum to Shimon. Shimon cannot perform a yibum at this time for Rochel is his wife’s sister.) If Shimon went ahead and cohabitated with Rochel (while his wife was still alive), he has violated two prohibitions; his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. These are the words of Rabbi Yosi. Rabbi Shimon said: He is only liable for the prohibition against taking one’s brother’s wife.

Rashi specifically mentions that this dispute is referring to a case where he cohabitated with her while his wife was still alive. The Rashba and other Rishonim explain that Rashi is coming to exclude the opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel, who understands this sugya as referring to a case where his wife had already died (like the case of the Mishna).

All the Rishonim ask on Rabbeinu Chananel: How can he possible learn that these Tannaim are discussing a case where his wife had already died and nevertheless, there should still be a prohibition against taking one’s wife’s sister? There is no argument to the halacha that a wife’s sister is permitted after one’s wife has already died.

Reb Avrohom Erlanger in Birchas Avrohom attempts to answer this question. He prefaces his remarks by saying that what he is about to say is a novel idea, but we must at least attempt to explain the viewpoint of Rabbeinu Chananel.

Let us examine the permissibility of the wife’s sister after the wife dies. Is the name of the initial prohibition “a wife’s sister, while the wife is alive”? (It would not be called a prohibition that is dependent on time, i.e. the lifespan of his wife because the prohibition is only until then.) Or perhaps the prohibition of a wife’s sister is forever, similar to any other ervah; the Torah reveals to us that the death of the wife permits her sister to be taken by the husband?

A possible difference in halacha between these two possibilities would be in a case when we are uncertain if the wife died. Would there be a chazakah that the wife’s sister is still forbidden to him? Reb Elchonon Wasserman states that the principle of chazakah can only be applicable if the original prohibition was forever and the uncertainty is regarding a change in the status.

Although the simple explanation would be that the wife’s sister prohibition is initially only relevant during the lifespan of his wife; if we learn differently, we can explain the opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel.

He maintains that the prohibition of a wife’s sister is forever, but there is a halacha that the death of the wife is a matir, permits her to be taken by the husband.

Reb Shimon Shkop states that in order for one prohibition to take effect on an existing prohibition, it must have halachic ramifications. Perhaps we can say similarly regarding the permission emerging form the death of the wife. If her death will result in a permission for the sister to be taken by the husband, the death will permit her; however, if the wife’s death will not bring about such a consequence because she will anyways be forbidden to the husband on account of being his brother’s wife, the death of the wife will not remove the wife’s sister prohibition, and she will still be forbidden to the husband on account of being a wife’s sister as well.

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Daf Yomi - Yevamos 32 - Highlights

The Mishna states: Three were two brothers, Reuven and Shimon that were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum to Shimon. (Shimon cannot perform a yibum at this time for Rochel is his wife’s sister.) Afterwards Shimon’s wife dies and now Rochel would be permitted to Shimon (since one’s wife’s sister is permitted to him after his wife dies). Shimon is still forbidden from performing a yibum with Rochel, his wife’s sister because once a yevamah is prohibited to the yavam, she is forbidden forever. (32a)

The Gemora asks a question on our Mishna based on a Mishna we had learned previously (30a). (The Mishna had stated: There were three brothers, Reuven, Shimon and Levi. Reuven and Shimon were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum to Shimon and Levi. Shimon cannot perform a yibum at this time for Rochel is his wife’s sister. Levi performed the yibum, and subsequently, Leah, Shimon’s wife died. Levi died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum again to Shimon. This time, however, she is not forbidden to Shimon because Shimon’s wife had died. The Mishna taught us that nevertheless, Shimon cannot perform a yibum with Rochel because once she was forbidden to Shimon, she remains forbidden to him forever.) The Gemora asks: If in the previous Mishna, when the yevamah was not completely rejected from this house (since she was permitted to Levi), nevertheless, we rule that she remains forbidden to the other brother (Shimon) forever; in our Mishna, where she is completely rejected from this house (for Shimon was the only brother), she should certainly remain forbidden to Shimon (even after his wife dies). Why was it necessary to teach this case?

The Gemora answers: Originally, the Tanna of the Mishna was of the opinion that only in our case would the yevamah remain forbidden because she was completely rejected from this house, however, in the case when she was not completely rejected from the house, the Tanna maintained that she would be permitted (he therefore omitted this case). Afterwards, the Tanna reversed his opinion and ruled that she would remain forbidden in both cases, even when she was not completely rejected from the house. Since this case was dear to him, he inserted it prior to the other ruling; and since the other ruling was taught already, it was not moved from its original place. (32a)

The Gemora cites a braisa: (Three were two brothers, Reuven and Shimon that were married to two sisters, Rochel and Leah. Reuven died childless, leaving his wife Rochel to fall for yibum to Shimon. Shimon cannot perform a yibum at this time for Rochel is his wife’s sister.) If Shimon went ahead and cohabitated with Rochel (while his wife was still alive), he has violated two prohibitions; his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. These are the words of Rabbi Yosi. Rabbi Shimon said: He is only liable for the prohibition against taking one’s brother’s wife.

The Gemora asks a contradiction from a braisa: Rabbi Shimon said: He is only liable for the prohibition against taking one’s wife’s sister.

The Gemora answers: The first braisa is referring to a case where the prohibition of the brother’s wife preceded the prohibition of the wife’s sister; the second braisa is discussing a case where the prohibition of the wife’s sister preceded the prohibition of the brother’s wife. (Rabbi Shimon holds that a prohibition cannot take effect on an existing prohibition.) (32a)

The Gemora asks on Rabbi Shimon: In the first braisa, where the wife’s sister prohibition does not take effect, why can’t Shimon perform a yibum in this case; the only prohibition is the brother’s wife and the mitzvah of yibum overrides that?

Rav Ashi answers: The wife’s sister prohibition is pending; if at any point in time, the brother’s wife prohibition is lifted, the prohibition of taking one’s wife’s sister will take effect. It is for this reason that the brother’s wife prohibition remains in effect. (32a)?

The Gemora discusses Rabbi Yosi’s opinion: Rabbi Yosi maintains that he is liable for two prohibitions; his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. It emerges that Rabbi Yosi would hold that a prohibition can take effect on an existing prohibition.

The Gemora asks from a braisa: If one committed a transgression that entails two different death penalties, he receives the one that is stricter. Rabbi Yosi says: He incurs the first punishment. Rabbi Yosi explains in a different braisa: If the woman was first his mother-in-law and later became the wife of another man, he is subject to the mother-in-law prohibition. If the woman was first the wife of another man and later became his mother-in-law, he is subject to the wife of another man prohibition. Thus we see that Rabbi Yosi maintains that one prohibition does not take effect on an existing prohibition.

Rabbi Avahu answers: Rabbi Yosi maintains that one prohibition does not take effect on an existing prohibition; however, he agrees in a case that the second prohibition can take effect if it is a more extensive prohibition. (This explains why Rabbi Yosi maintains that if Shimon went ahead and cohabitated with Rochel, he has violated two prohibitions; his brother’s wife and his wife’s sister. When Shimon married, Rochel was forbidden to him on account of being his wife’s sister. When Reuven married Rochel, she became prohibited to the other brothers besides for Shimon. This prohibition includes more people, so it takes effect on Shimon as well. In a case where the second prohibition is not more extensive, Rabbi Yosi concedes that the second prohibition does not take effect. This would explain Rabbi Yosi’s opinion in the second braisa. A married woman is forbidden to the entire world; becoming his mother-in-law does not create any new prohibitions to any others. This is why the mother-in-law prohibition does not take effect. If she was his mother-in-law first and then she got married, the wife of another man prohibition will take effect. If he committed the transgression unintentionally, he will be required to bring two chatas offerings. If he sinned intentionally, he will be subject to two death penalties, but since he can only be executed once, he will receive the stricter type of execution.)

The Gemora asks: This would only be understandable in a case where the prohibition of the wife’s sister preceded the prohibition of the brother’s wife; since the brother’s wife prohibition includes more people (the brothers), it is deemed a more extensive prohibition and it will take effect. However, where the prohibition of the brother’s wife preceded the wife’s sister prohibition, why would Rabbi Yosi hold that the second prohibition takes effect?

Perhaps you will answer that the second prohibition does add more people; when Shimon marries his wife, he becomes prohibited to all her sisters besides the one who was already his brother’s wife. Let us say that Rochel will be subject to the wife’s sister prohibition besides the brother’s wife prohibition based on that? The Gemora states that this would not be considered an extensive prohibition (the forbidden object becomes prohibited to more people). This is an inclusive prohibition (more objects become forbidden to the same people) and Rabbi Yosi does not hold that the second prohibition takes effect when it is an inclusive one.

Rava answers: Although Rabbi Yosi maintains that he is liable for one prohibition (since the second one does not take effect), he is considered a completely wicked person (for violating two prohibitions) and will be buried in a cemetery reserved for those that were executed by burning or stoning. (32a – 32b)

[END]

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FROM THEIR MOUTHS AND NOT FROM THEIR WRITING - Yevamos 31 - Daf Yomi

The Gemora states that testimony is valid only from the mouths of the witnesses, not on the basis of any documents. It is evident that writing is not the same as talking.

The Gemora Chagigah (10b) cites Shmuel who states that one who resolves to make a vow must express the vow with his lips; otherwise, it is meaningless.

The Noda b’Yehudah (Y”D I: 66) inquires if an oath that was written down but not expressed would be valid as an oath. His underlying question is: Do we regard his written word as an expression of his lips?

This should be dependent on a dispute between the Rambam and Rabbeinu Tam regarding the validity of testimony from a written document. The Rambam maintains that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony. Rabbeinu Tam disagrees and holds that one who is physically capable of testifying may testify through the means of a document.

He concludes, however, that even the Rambam would agree that writing is considered testimony and yet, a written document cannot be accepted by Beis Din. The logic for this is as follows: An act of writing can constitute speech, but only during the time that it is being written. Beis Din will only accept an oral testimony when they hear it directly; hearsay is disqualified. Witnesses who signed a document are testifying, but Beis Din is not present at that time. If they would sign in front of Beis Din, that would be considered valid testimony.

With this principle, you can answer what would seemingly be a contradiction in the Rambam. He rules in Hilchos Eidus (3:7) that testimony must be from the mouth of the witnesses and a document will not be Biblically acceptable for testimony; yet later in Perek 9:11, he writes that one is required to testify with his mouth or at least that he is fitting to testify with his mouth. This would imply that if he is fitting to testify with his mouth, he would be permitted to testify through the means of a document. According to the Noda b’Yehudah’s explanation, it can be said that the Rambam allows witnesses to testify through the means of a document, but only if they sign the document when Beis Din is present. Accordingly, we can say that an oath taken through writing will be binding.

Reb Akiva Eiger discusses some other practical applications for this principle.

(http://weeklyshtikle.blogspot.com/2007/05/weekly-shtikle-emor.html) The Weekly Shtikle writes the following: The topic is the discussion as to whether or not writing may qualify as a valid means of fulfilling the mitzvah of Sefiras HaOmer. That is, if one was to write, "Hayom Yom X La'Omer," would that be sufficient to fulfill one's obligation and would this action disallow one from repeating the count with a brachah?

The discussion of this halachic quandary follows an interesting family tree. This issue is first dealt with in Shaalos uTeshuvos of R' Akiva Eiger, siman 29. The teshuvah is actually written by R' Akiva Eiger's uncle, R' Wolf Eiger. Unable to attend his nephew's wedding, he made a simultaneous banquet of his own to celebrate the occasion. He wrote to his nephew about this halachic issue which was discussed at the banquet. He cites a number of related issues which he builds together to try to reach a conclusion. The gemara (Yevamos 31b, Gittin 71a) teaches that witnesses may only testify by means of their mouths and not by writing. The gemara (Shabbos 153b) states that mutes should not separate Terumah because they cannot say the brachah. It is assumed that writing the brachah would not have been sufficient. Also, there is a discussion amongst the commentaries with regards to the validity of a vow that is written and not recited. R' Wolf Eiger concludes that writing is not a sufficient means of fulfilling the mitzvah of Sefiras HaOmer. However, this sparks a debate between him and his nephew which stretches out to siman 32.

This issue is eventually discussed in Shaalos uTeshuvos Kesav Sofer (Yoreh Dei'ah siman 106) by R' Avraham Shmuel Binyomin Sofer, R' Akiva Eiger's grandson who was, in fact, named after R' Wolf Eiger. He covers a host of related topics and eventually discusses the exchange recorded in his grandfather's sefer. The debate, although it encompasses various pertinent issues, never produces any concrete proof directly concerning the act of counting. However, Ksav Sofer quotes his father, Chasam Sofer, in his footnotes to Shaalos uTeshuvos R' Akiva Eiger (his father- in-law) where he provides a more concrete proof. The gemara (Yoma 22b) teaches that one who counts the number of B'nei Yisroel transgresses a prohibition as it is written (Hoshea 2:1) "And the number of B'nei Yisroel shall be like the sand of the sea that shall not be measured nor counted." The gemara cites two examples (Shmuel I 11:8, 15:4) where Shaul HaMelech went out of his way to avoid this prohibition by using pieces of clay or rams in order to perform a census. Chasam Sofer suggests that Shaul could simply have counted the men by writing down the numbers and not saying them. Since Shaul went to far greater lengths, we are compelled to say that writing the number of men would still have qualified as counting them and he would hot have sufficiently dodged the prohibition. Thus, concludes Chasam Sofer, if one has explicit intention to fulfill the mitzvah, writing is a valid means of performing the mitzvah of Sefiras HaOmer. However, Kesav Sofer suggests that perhaps the brachah should not be recited in this case.

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