What is Interest?

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The Gemora states that living rent free in a debtor's house seems like interest, and is therefore forbidden.

Tosfos discusses the parameters of this prohibition. The Gemora states that living rent free is categorically prohibited, even if the debtor would have allowed the creditor to do so independent of the loan. Tosfos questions how a debtor can do any favors to his creditor, since these also would appear to be interest. Tosfos states that the prohibition only includes conspicuous activities, like living in someone's house, but not things like renting out tools.

The Shach (Y”D 166:1) rules that any inconspicuous favors that the debtor would have done anyway for the creditor may be done. In addition, if they were known to all to be such close friends that they would have allowed each other to dwell rent free, this also may be done.

The Maharshal, however, states that any conspicuous favor may not be done, even if all knew that they would have done this favor without the loan in place.

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Raising Dogs

Rabbi Eliezer Hagadol (Bava Kamma 83) stated that one who raises dogs is equivalent to raising pigs, and he therefore is included in the curse of the Sages. The Shitah quotes Rav Yehonasan who says that the opinion in the first braisa agrees that a dangerous dog may not be raised, but only due to the verse of ma’akeh (a fence), which states lo tasim damim – you shall not introduce blood in your house.,which was quoted on BK 15.

The Maharshal (BK 7:45) discusses why the prevalent custom in his time was for Jews to have dogs in their property. He first considers the possibility that since we live amongst non Jews, some of whom are hostile to us, we may raise the dogs for protection, just as the Gemora allows this for border towns, including Nehardea. He rejects this possibility, since even when kept for protection, the dog must be chained down during the day (when people walk around and may get hurt), and only let loose at night (when people are not walking around). The prevalent custom is to keep the dogs unchained even during the day. He therefore states that the Gemora’s statements on daf 15 and 83 are referring solely to a kelev ra – a bad dog, which can harm and scare people, by harming or barking. The Mishna therefore referred to one who raises Hakelev – the dog, i.e., the prohibited kelev ra – and not just kelev – a dog. However, our dogs, which are docile and do not scare or hurt people, are not included. Instead, they are included in the category of kelev kufri (80a), which Rashi explains as either small or docile dogs. People are used to these dogs, and are not even scared of them. Any dog that scares people – even if it cannot harm them - is forbidden, as indicated in the story of the pregnant woman.

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Seudas Mitzvah

Seudas Mitzvah

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 80) tells Rav and Shmuel and Rav Assi once met at a circumcision of a boy, or as some say, at the house for the salvation of a son (the redeeming of a firstborn). Rav would not enter before Shmuel, nor Shmuel before Rav Assi (for Rav Assi was greater), nor Rav Assi before Rav (for Rav Assi was Rav’s student). They therefore discussed who should go in last, and they decided that Shmuel should go in last, and that Rav should enter and then Rav Assi.

Rashi comments that the “week of the son” refers to a bris milah, whereas the “salvation of the son” refers to a party that was done for the pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn).

The Maharsha points out that from Rashi we find a source for making a party for pidyon haben, but it is not a source for making a party for a bris milah.

The Maharsha seems to understand that the requirement to make a party for pidyon haben is better sourced than the requirement to make one for bris milah. However, the Maharshal (Yam Shel Shlomo 37), in his famous discussion about seudas mitzvah asks a question from the Gemora in Chulin 95b which states that Rav did not partake in any “voluntary” feast!? Why then was Rav participating in this seudah? The Maharshal explains that by milah, the feast itself is a mitzvah just like it is by a wedding, however, there is no mitzvah to have a party by pidyon haben. The Maharshal clearly understands that whether it was milah or pidyon haben, Rav was joining and eating at the party. He assumes that the requirement to have a seudah for milah is more basic than having one at pidyon haben. Since the seudah of pidyon haben is only voluntary, how could Rav join and eat? [Evidently he holds that it is not a mitzvah at all by pidyon haben!?]

From this, the Maharshal is mechadesh a major yesod that any seudah whose purpose is to give praise to Hashem and either publicize a mitzvah (such as pidyon haben) or a miracle (such as the birth of a child which is Rabbeinu Tam's explanation of “salvation of a son” i.e.a shalom zachor) qualifies as a seudas mitzvah.

The source for a siyum on a masechta of Gemora qualifying as a seudas mitzvah, the Maharshal says, is from a Gemora in Shabbos 118b that Abaye would make a party when he would see a torah scholar finish a masechta (the Maharshal then launches into a suggestion to make the bracha of “hasimchah bi’me’ono” at a siyum, which he retracted from after he felt that it was the reason that a siyum he once attended was totally ruined). At the end of the perek, the Maharshal continues to show from this Gemora in Shabbos that even those who aren't actually finishing the masechta should celebrate with the one completing the masechta, just as we find that Abaye would make the seudah for his students even when he didn't actually learn it with them.

The Maharshal also points out that the Gemora in Ta'anis 30b cites that one of the reasons for establishing a Yom Tov on the fifteenth of Av was because it was the day that they completed the mitzvah of cutting the wood for the mizbei’ach. Just as there is a point to make a seudah and Yom Tov upon the completion of a mitzvah, so too, there would be with the completion of a masechta, because there is no greater mitzvah than completing a sefer. As surprising as it may seem, the seudah at the siyum masechta seems to be better sourced as a seudas mitzvah, more than bris milah (which the Maharsha questions) and pidyon haben (which the Maharshal initially questioned).

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Between Eighty and One Hundred

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 28a) had stated: If an agent was bringing a get and he left the husband old or sick, he may give the get under the assumption that the husband is still alive (for we assume, based upon the principle of chazakah, that nothing changed from the status quo). [If we would be certain that the husband died before the agent delivered the get to the wife, he may not give it any longer.]

The Chasam Sofer says: By the fact that the Mishna did not say ‘an old and sick person,” we may infer that if in fact the husband was old and sick, the agent would not be allowed to deliver the get, for then we can no longer assume that he is still alive.

The Chasam Sofer adds that this would apply for anyone over sixty years old.

The Maharshal in Yam shel Shlomo disagrees and says that even if the husband is old and sick, we nevertheless, assume that he is still alive, and we deliver the get. He adds that this is only if he is younger than eighty years old. However, if he is over eighty, it would depend upon his strength.

Reb Akiva Eiger in Shulchan Aruch writes that he is uncertain as to what the halacha would be if the husband was old and sick.

The Shiltei Giborim writes that when the Mishna rules that if the husband is sick, we still assume that he is alive, that is only if he is the sickness befell him from the hand of Heaven, such as a sickness which was caused by exposure to the cold or the heat. However, if he was knifed in the stomach or his skull was crushed, we do not assume that he is still alive, and we would not deliver the get.

The Yam shel Shlomo rules as follows: If the husband is over the age of one hundred, the agent may deliver the get even if he is sick as well. However, if he is over eighty years old, but not yet one hundred, the agent should not deliver the get if the husband is sick. The distinction between them is as follows: The Gemora refers to someone alive over eighty as a “ben gevuros,” a man of strength. This is true if he is healthy. However, if he took ill, then he is not at full strength, and therefore we cannot assume that he is still alive. Contrast this to someone who is over one hundred years old. Someone so old is always frail and weak, and there should not be any assumption that he will remain alive. However, the Gemora applies the logic that once he has reached such an age (over one hundred), he is regarded as an exceptional person (due to his longevity), and we may therefore assume that he is still alive, even if he is sick.

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Food for Thought - Kesuvos 58

*** There are several different opinions as to the amount of terumah a groom should provide to his bride prior to the nisuin.

Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira said: We give her two thirds terumah and one third chulin (unconsecrated produce).

Maharshal comments: An average time for a woman to menstruate (consequently, she is tamei and forbidden from eating terumah) is once every thirty days. The normal flow of blood is for three days. In addition, she must observe seven days of cleanliness prior to becoming tahor and only then will she be permitted to eat terumah again.

Rav Elyashiv Shlita asks: Where did the Maharshal find that an ordinary woman menstruates for three days? It is our custom to wait five days!?

*** The Mishna had stated: The yavam does not entitle his yevamah to eat terumah.

The Gemora explains the reason for this: It is written [Vayikra 22:11]: The acquisition of his money, he may eat of it. Only a Kohen’s own acquisition may eat terumah; however, a yevamah is the acquisition of his brother, not his own.

Rashi maintains that even if the yevamah began eating terumah while her husband was alive, she will be required to cease eating terumah once he dies.

Rabbeinu Tam disagrees and holds that Biblically, once a yevamah obtained the right to eat terumah, she preserves that right even after the husband dies. It is merely a Rabbinical prohibition; the verse cited in the Gemora is only an asmachta (used as support for the Rabbi’s decree).

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (183) asks: Why does Rabbeinu Tam hold that the yevamah is Biblically permitted to eat terumah even after her husband died? She is not the wife of a Kohen any longer; she doesn’t have any offspring from the Kohen (which would have allowed her to continue eating terumah) and she is not yet the acquisition of the yavam!?

[Perhaps, this challenge can be answered by examining the concept of the zikah-attachment between the yavam and the yevamah.]

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