Halachos of the Daf - Bava Basra 87

A Minor as a Shliach

A non-Jew cannot be made a shliach (agent), for any type of shlichus. Nor can a Jew be made a shliach for a non-Jew for any type of shlichus.

All Jewish men and women, and non-Jewish slaves and maidservants, may be used as a shliach. A deaf-mute, a deranged person and a minor (boy younger than 13, girl younger than 12), may not be made a shliach. Therefore if the father sent a minor to a store with a dollar and a flask in order to buy oil which costs 50 cents, and then the storekeeper measured for the child 50 cents worth of oil, and gave him 50 cents change, and on the way home, the child lost the flask of oil and the change, the storekeeper is liable to pay the father for the flask, oil and the 50 cents change.

The reason being, since the father only sent the child to the store to let the storekeeper know that he needs 50 cents worth of oil, and the father expected the storekeeper to send it with someone else. According to the Rema the storekeeper is liable to pay for the flask only if the storekeeper took the flask from the child and measured the oil. However if the storekeeper merely poured the oil into the flask which never left the child’s hands, then he does not have to pay for the flask.

The S”ma and others disagree. They maintain that the storekeeper is never liable for the flask, since by giving the flask to the child, the father essentially was mafkir it, and the storekeeper is not required to guard it. Rather the storekeeper is liable for the dollar (50 cents change, and 50 cents worth of oil), since he should have either sent back the dollars worth (the oil and change) with someone else, or waited until he met the father and then given him back the money. If the storekeeper gave back the dollar to the child, then he is not liable at all.

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Marrying off a Minor Daughter

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 51) challenges Rava from the following Mishna: If one marries off his daughter to a man, but he does not specify which daughter he is giving, the adult daughters are not included (for the father has no authority over them). It can be inferred from here that his minor daughters are included (and they all would require a get). But why should this be? It is a case where the marriage does not have the possibility of cohabitation. This is a refutation of Rava (for he holds that such types of kiddushin are not effective)!?

Rava answers: the Mishna is dealing with a case where he only had one adult daughter and one minor daughter (the key point being that there was only one minor daughter, for she is the only one that the father could have married off).

The Gemora asks: What then is the novelty of this Mishna?

The Gemora answers: The Mishna is referring to a case where the adult daughter appointed her father as her agent to accept kiddushin for her. You might have thought, that in this case, the father is accepting kiddushin for his adult daughter. The Mishna teaches us that the father would not leave something from which he would derive benefit (the kiddushin money that he receives for marrying off his minor daughter).

The Gemora asks: Are we not referring to a case where the adult daughter told the father that he can keep the kiddushin money?

The Gemora answers: The father would not leave a mitzvah that he is obligated to perform (marrying off his minor daughter) and perform a mitzvah that is not his obligation (accepting kiddushin for his adult daughter).

The Ritva asks: How can the Gemora say that it is a mitzvah for a father to give his minor daughter in kiddushin? Did we not learn before (41a) that it is forbidden for a man to marry off his minor daughter until she is mature enough to say that she wants to be married to a certain man?

He answers: That Gemora is referring to a case where there is a concern that she will not desire that specific man, and eventually, she will perform mi’un. (A girl whose father had died could be given in marriage while still a minor (under the age of twelve) by her mother or older brother. This marriage is only valid Rabbinically. As long as she has not attained the age of twelve, she may nullify the marriage by refusing to live with her husband. This act of refusal, referred to as mi’un nullifies the marriage retroactively.). However, in cases where there is no such concern, the father certainly has a mitzvah to marry her off.

Alternatively, he answers that our Gemora can be referring to a na’arah, who already is mature enough, but nevertheless, the father can marry her off, and he has a mitzvah to do so.

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Chalifin for a MInor - Gittin 65

Rava said: There are three categories of a minor: If he would be given a rock, he would discard it, but if given a walnut, he would accept it, he can make an acquisition on things, but he may not acquire for others.

Tosfos asks that it seems from a Gemora in Bava Basra that a minor does not have the ability to acquire anything!?

Tosfos answers: The Gemora there could be referring to a minor who has not yet reached this stage of understanding.

Alternatively, they answer that the Gemora there is referring only to a kinyan chalifin (acquiring something through an exchange with a kerchief or other object), where a minor has a more difficult time grasping the mechanics of the kinyan.

The Ra”n explains that the Rabbis instituted for a minor only those kinyanim where the object is raised or pulled by the minor; however, other types of kinyanim, where the concepts are difficult to grasp, are not effective for the minor.

The Rashb”a adds that since we rule that the object being used for the chalifin must be owned by the one making the acquisition, it emerges that the minor must convey the object to the seller. He does not have enough knowledge to accomplish that and therefore the kinyan is not effective.

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Minor Writing a Get

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 22b) had stated: Everyone is qualified to write a get, even a mute, one who is insane, or a minor.

Tosfos asks: Since a minor in not a “bar kerisus,” he is incapable of divorcing his own wife, he therefore should be disqualified from writing a get for someone else!?

Tosfos answers: Since he will eventually grow into an adult, he is not regarded as someone who is incapable of divorcing his wife, and therefore, he is still eligible to write a get.

The Noda b’Yehudah (O”C §1) asks: Why is the halacha of writing a get different than the halacha of writing tefillin? A minor is excluded from writing tefillin, since he is not a “bar keshirah,” he is not obligated in the mitzvah of tefillin. Why don’t we say that since he will be obligated in the mitzvah when he becomes an adult, he should be eligible to write tefillin?

Reb Elchonon Wasserman answers: That which we say that someone who is not a “bar kerisus” cannot write a get is only if he is excluded inherently from the subject of divorce. A minor, however, cannot issue a divorce, not because he is excluded, but rather, it is because he is incapable of marrying. He, therefore, can still be regarded as a “bar kerisus,” and can therefore be eligible to write a get. However, with respect of tefillin, a minor is excluded from the obligation of tefillin, and therefore, he is not considered a “bar keshirah,” and is therefore not disqualified from writing tefillin.

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An Idolater is Stricter than a Jew

The Rishonim ask: It is evident from our Gemora that according to the one that holds that an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can only Rabbinically pronounce a vow, but Biblically, it will not be effective; nevertheless, with respect to an idolater, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, may pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically binding. Why would this be? How can an idolater be more stringent that a Jew?

The Mefaresh explains that there are other examples where we find that the law is stricter with an idolater than it is with respect of a Jew. The Mishna in Bava Kamma teaches us that if the ox of idolater gores an animal belonging to a Jew, the idolater is liable to pay full damages, even if the ox gored for the first time. A Jew, however, whose ox gores for the first time, will only be liable to pay half-damages.

Tosfos suggests the following: A Jewish adult is subject to the prohibition against desecrating his word. Accordingly, we expound that any Jew who is not included in this prohibition cannot pronounce a vow. A minor, who is not subject to this commandment, cannot therefore utter a vow, which would be Biblically valid. An idolater, however, who is not included in this prohibition, cannot be excluded from pronouncing a vow based on this, and therefore, even a minor’s vow would be Biblically binding.

It is evident from Tosfos that the prohibition against desecrating his word is not applicable to an idolater. The Mishna L’melech cites proofs that an idolater is obligated to keep his word based upon the prohibition against desecrating his word.

The Ohr Sameach answers this question by citing the Chasam Sofer, who says that any idolater, even a minor is obligated to observe their commandments. This explains why with respect to idolaters, an informed minor, who has not quite reached manhood, can pronounce a vow and it will be Biblically valid, whereas a Jewish minor cannot. By an idolater, there is no distinction whatsoever between a minor and an adult. Proof to this is from the Rosh, who states that the guidelines for a minor to reach adulthood are learned from an oral tradition that was transmitted to Moshe at Sinai with respect to all measurements. These laws were given to the Jewish people; not for the idolaters.

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The Nazir's Allowance to Become Tamei

It is evident from the Rambam in Hilchos Nezirus (7:12) that the reason that a nazir may become tamei to a meis mitzvah is because of the mitzvah of burial. However, from Tosfos, it would seem that there is a different reason. Tosfos writes that it is permitted for the nazir to move the corpse from the sun to the shade. This would indicate that the allowance for the nazir to become tamei is not on account of the mitzvah of burial, but rather it is due to the obligation of respecting the dead.

The Rogatchover Gaon notes the following distinction between the two reasons: If a father imposed nezirus upon his son, and the son, as a minor, comes upon a meis mitzvah. If the reason for the permission to becoming tamei is because of the mitzvah of burial, a minor who is not obligated in mitzvos, would not be allowed to become tamei to the corpse. However, if the allowance is based upon respecting the dead, the minor would also be obligated to bury him, for he is also responsible to see that a corpse does not lie in degradation.

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Redemption with a Minor Kohen

The Pischei Teshuva (Y”D 305:4) cites a Chasam Sofer who holds that one may not redeem his firstborn son by using a Kohen who is a minor. For, generally, the Kohen uses his ability to remove the obligation of redemption from the father; a minor does not have the power to accomplish this.

Reb Chaim Kanievsky proves from our Gemora (Kesuvos 102a)otherwise. The Mishna (Bechoros 51a) states: If one wrote a document to a Kohen which said, “I am obligated to you for five selaim,” he is liable to pay him five selaim, but his son is still not redeemed (one who has a firstborn son is obligated to give five selaim to a Kohen in order to redeem him; since this document is regarded as an admission to a debt, it cannot be used for the independent obligation of redeeming his firstborn; if this document is an unsigned one, and nevertheless, it is regarded as a valid and binding admission to a debt, it would be following the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan and not Rish Lakish).

The Gemora deflects the proof: This case is different because there is a Biblical obligation to the Kohen (this, in turn, strengthens the unsigned document and renders it effective even according to Rish Lakish, just as if it would be a signed document).

The Gemora explains that the son is not redeemed because of Ula’s decree. For Ula said: Biblically, his son would be redeemed when he gives the money; the Rabbis decreed that he is not redeemed because people might mistakenly say that one may redeem a firstborn son with a third-party debt document (and those are Biblically invalid for redemption; his own debt document, like in our case, would be Biblically valid, but the Rabbis were concerned that people would not understand the difference between the two types of documents).

Reb Chaim states: It is evident from the Gemora that the father did not inform the Kohen that he was giving him the document for the sake of redemption, for if he would have done so, it would not be regarded as a new obligation according to Rabbi Yochanan.

It would emerge from here that if one gave money to a Kohen without informing him of the purpose, his son would be considered redeemed. This would prove that the Kohen is not actually effecting anything; it is the father’s giving of the money that accomplishes the redemption. Therefore, one would be able to give the five selaim to a Kohen who is a minor, and his firstborn son would be redeemed.

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Marriage of a Minor

Rabbi Yehoshua says (Kesuvos 101a): The actions of a minor (girl regarding marriage) are significant. Her husband does acquire lost objects that she finds; he is entitled to her earnings; he can annul her vows; he inherits her and he can become impure to her (if she dies and he is a kohen).

*** Rashi in Yevamos (108a) explains that the husband is entitled to her earnings because the Rabbis enacted that her findings are regarded as ownerless in respect to the husband.

The Aruch Lener asks: Why didn’t Rashi explain differently; the findings of every wife belong to the husband, for otherwise, it would create animosity between the two of them?

He answers: Since Biblically, the findings of a minor belong to her father; the logic of “not creating animosity” would not suffice to take the findings away from her father and give it to her husband. It is only because the Rabbis made it ownerless that the husband is entitled to it.

*** Tosfos writes that even if the vows of someone close to adulthood are Biblically valid, the husband can nevertheless annul her vows even though they are only Rabbinically married. This is because when a wife pronounces a vow, she does so with the understanding of her husband, and therefore, he has the ability to annul her vows.

*** Tosfos also explains that the husband is allowed to contaminate himself to her even if he is a Kohen although their marriage is only Rabbinic in nature. This is because his wife is regarded as a meis mitzvah, a corpse that nobody is interested in burying. Since he inherits her, there is no one else who is willing to get involved in her burial.

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A Minor Getting Married

The Mishna (Kesuvos 90a) discussed a case where a minor was married off by his father. The Rishonim (Shitah Mekubetzes, Tosfos Yevamos 62b) bring proof from here that there is no prohibition for a minor to get married, for otherwise, the Mishna would not have mentioned this case without informing us that it is indeed forbidden.

The Rambam, however, in Hilchos Ishus (11:6) rules that it is forbidden to marry off a minor, and it is regarded as a promiscuous cohabitation.

The Pischei Teshuva (E”H, 1:3) cites a Knesses Yechezkel, who explains the Rambam’s opinion. The Rambam is referring to a case where the minor married a woman by himself, without his father. Our Mishna is referring to a case where the father married him off.

The explanation for this distinction is as follows: A minor who marries a woman by himself cannot obligate himself to pay the kesuvah and therefore, it is regarded as a promiscuous cohabitation since we have learned that one who cohabits with his wife when she doesn’t have a kesuvah is regarded as being involved in a promiscuous relationship. However, when the father marries him off, he has the ability to obligate himself to the kesuvah and there is a lien on the property; then, it is not regarded as a promiscuous cohabitation.

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