Shades of Leprosy and "the Bald One"

Varying Degrees of White

The Gemora discusses Rabbi Akiva’s and the Sages’ positions on the four categories of whiteness of tzara’as. Rabbi Akiva lists them in order of whiteness, while the Sages list them as two categories, each with its own subcategory.

Rashi explains that Rabbi Akiva holds that the main categories are baheres (snow), and the duller se’ais (wool), but that se’ais has two subcategories, plaster and the duller egg membrane. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva says that the two main categories can combine with each other, since they are on equal footing, but the subcategories only combine with each other and with se’ais, their parent category, but not with baheres, which has no relation to them.

Tosfos (6a Af) disagrees, and says that Rabbi Akiva agrees to the general formulation of two categories, each with a subcategory, but just disagrees on the rules of combinations. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva agrees that the subcategory of baheres is plaster, and the subcategory of se’ais is egg membrane, but says that since plaster is two steps duller than its parent, it can only combine with se’ais.

The Raavad says that, according to the Sages, each subcategory can combine with its parent, and each category can combine with each other.

The Rambam (Tumas Tzara’as 1:1-3) says that all four levels of whiteness can combine with each other.

See the Kesef Mishneh (1:1) for a lengthy discussion of how the Rambam learned our Gemora, and his suggestion that the Rambam understands that the Gemora concludes that there is no dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages. He notes that the Gemora is not clear as to whether a source was provided for Rabbi Akiva’s position on the combination of the differing shades of white.

Rabbi Akiva’s Son

The Gemora cites a braisa which records a dialogue between Rabbi Akiva and his son, Yehoshua. Rashi says that this son is Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah. Since Rabbi Akiva was bald, his son was referred to as the son of Karchah – the bald one.

Tosfos (Bechoros 58a Chutz) disagrees, noting that the chronology would not place Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah early enough to be Rabbi Akiva’s son. Tosfos also says that Rabbi Akiva would not be constantly referred to as karchah – the bald one, as that is a derogatory term. Rather, Tosfos says Rabbi Yehoshua ben Karchah was a later Tanna, whose father was named Karchah.

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Shame of Tzara'as

Shame and Embarrassment

The examination of the nega’im detailed in our sugya requires much study. When a Kohen goes to see a suspect tsara’as, he is accompanied by many young kohanim who come to learn. It is obvious that the person afflicted does not enjoy great honor in such a situation. According to the Netziv, this is explicitly mentioned in the Torah: “This is the law…to teach about the day of becoming tamei and the day of becoming tahor” (Vayikra 14:54-57). In other words, a kohen calls his students to come with him to be taught. The Torah thereafter concludes: “…this is the law of tzara’as” – this is the penalty of a slanderer, who insulted others (Ha’amek Davar).

Three Sorts of Metzora’im

There are three types of tzara’as: s’eis, sapachas and baheres. HaGaon Rav Moshe Sternbuch explains that these names express the nature of those who slander:
1. S’eis (a raised mark): someone who slanders with the object of rising above another.
2. Sapachas (an “accompanying” mark): someone who slanders because he blindly follows those around him.
3. Baheres (a bright mark): someone who slanders with the object of “clarifying” the truth…
But all of them are “the plague of tsara’as (Ta’am Veda’as, Vayikra 13:2). (Hame’or)

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Four People are Considered as Dead

The braisa (Nedarim 64b) states: Four people are as if they are dead. These are a poor person, a leper, a blind person, and someone who does not have children. A poor person is as if he is dead, as derived from the passuk above, ““Because all of those (who have sought to kill you) have died.” A leper is considered like he is dead, as the passuk states, “let her not be as if she is dead.” A blind person is considered dead, as the passuk states, “In the darkness he placed me like the dead of the world.” Someone who does not have sons is considered dead, as the passuk states, ““give me children, and if not I am dead.”

Reb Chaim Shmulevitz explains that the common denominator among these four is that they do not feel someone else’s pain and that they cannot provide benefit for others.

A poor person is considered as dead not because he is lacking himself, but rather, it is because he cannot give to others.

A blind person cannot see others and therefore, he is unable to perceive their pain or suffering. He cannot join in his tribulation.

A metzora is banished from the camp and therefore, he is unable to offer assistance to others.

One who does not have children to nurture is lacking the ability to provide benefit to those that are dear and close to him. It is a natural instinct for a person to desire to give whatever he has to his children.

Only a life where one can share with others is worth living.

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Sacrificing One's Life for Another

The Gemora (Kesuvos 61b) records an incident: Ameimar, Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi were once sitting at the gate of King Izgur’s palace (a Persian king). The King’s table-steward passed them by (carrying food for the king). Rav Ashi, observing that Mar Zutra turned pale in the face, took some of the food with his finger and put it into his mouth. “You have ruined the king’s meal,” the table-steward exclaimed. “Why did you do such a thing?” he was asked by the king’s officers. Rav Ashi responded, “The man who prepared that dish has rendered the King's food objectionable.” “Why?” they asked him. “I noticed,” he replied, “leprous pig meat in it.” They examined the dish but did not find anything. Rav Ashi took hold of the chef’s finger and put it on one piece of meat, and he asked them, “Did you examine this part?” They examined it and miraculously found it to be as Rav Ashi had said. The Rabbis asked him, “Why did you rely upon a miracle?” Rav Ashi replied, “I saw the demon of leprosy hovering over him.”

The Maharsha explains that the Rabbis asked Rav Ashi: Why did you put yourself into a severely dangerous predicament in order to save Mar Zutra from a minor danger.

What did Mar Zutra answer? Reb Avi Lebovitz explains: The Gemora answers that Rav Ashi saw the demon of leprosy hovering over him. One could interpret that he wasn't relying on a miracle since he saw that there were signs of leprosy on the meat. However, Rashi implies that Rav Ashi’s answer was that he saw signs of leprosy on Mar Zutra, indicating that the element of danger for Mar Zutra was actually more severe, therefore he was willing to give up his own life to save the life of Mar Zutra.

The Chasam Sofer proves from this dialogue that one is obligated to risk their own life in order to save another. Although this Gemora doesn't prove any obligation, and would only prove that one is allowed to risk their life to save another; the Chasam Sofer seems to hold that when it comes to life, there can't be a choice; it is either mandatory to sacrifice one’s own life or a prohibition.

The Radvaz rules that one is not permitted to sacrifice a limb of his own in order to save the life of another.

The Chasam Sofer challenges this form our Gemora. He understands that the danger to Rav Ashi was that the king will sever his finger. Rav Ashi relied on the miracle in order to save the life of Mar Zutra, for if would not have interceded, Mar Zutra would have died.

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Positive Commandment Overriding a Negative One

The Gemora (Kesuvos 40a, Shabbos 132a) states that a positive commandment can override a prohibition that carries with it a standard punishment.

The Gemora provides an example for this: The positive commandment of performing circumcision overrides the negative commandment of cutting off tzaraas.

My brother, Reb Ben cites the opinion of Rabbeinu Nisim Gaon, who writes the following: Many people cast doubt on this precept, as we know that a negative commandment is more stringent than a positive commandment, so why should a positive commandment supersede a negative commandment? Rabbeinu Nisim answers that a positive commandment is set, and if there is a negative commandment, the negative commandment only functions if there is no contradiction to the positive commandment. This is what Hashem decreed, that the positive commandments remain in place, and the negative commandment only functions if there is no contradiction to the positive commandment. The Ramban , however, writes that the reason a positive commandment supersedes a negative commandment is because in reality, a positive commandment is greater than a negative commandment. A positive commandment is a reflection of the love Hashem has for us, because one who fulfills the instructions of his master is beloved by his master and the master will have compassion on him. A negative commandment, however, is a reflection of Hashem’s Attribute of Judgment, and stems from fear. Since love is greater than fear, the Torah states that a positive commandment supersedes a negative commandment.

Based on this premise, the Meshech Chochmah explains that one who violates a negative commandment deserves a greater punishment than one who does not fulfill the will of Hashem. Nonetheless, since it is the will of Hashem that one observes both positive and negative commandments, one who fulfils a positive commandment demonstrates his love for Hashem. One who does not violate a negative commandment, however, merely demonstrates that he is afraid and nothing more. For this reason, the torah states that a positive commandment supersedes a negative commandment. An example of this is one can wear Tzitzis with Techeiles on a garment of linen, as the positive commandment of wearing Tzitzis supersedes the negative commandment of shaatnez. The reason for this is that one who wears shaatnez does not transgress the will of Hashem. In fact, the opposite is true, as by donning Tzitzis, he is fulfilling the will of Hashem.

In regards to the question: Why is it that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition and yet the punishment for transgressing a prohibition is much more severe than the punishment for not fulfilling a positive commandment?, Reb Yossie Schonkopf said over a parable from his Rebbe: A trucker is hired to transport a load across the country and the owner warns him not to go beyond the speed limit, not to crash the vehicle and to follow all the road instructions. If the trucker does everything perfectly but doesn't unload the goods at his destination; rather, he arrives at the destined location and immediately turns around carrying the same load, what is accomplished by the fact that the trucker obeyed the speed limit and followed all the rules?

The meaning is as follows: Our mission in life is to accomplish in this world and 'build the love towards HaShem,’ therefore, this building overrides the transgressions. The prohibitions are only there to protect what has been built and not to suffocate the building.

This concept is elucidated by the Ramban in Parshas Yisro. He states that the fulfillment of a positive commandment is based on ahavas HaShem, loving HaShem and refraining from committing a transgression is based on yiras HaShem fearing HaShem. It is a higher level to serve HaShem through love, but it is worse to violate a prohibition, which is based upon fearing HaShem.

My brother, Reb Ben asked a similar question: The Gemora states that a positive commandment will override a negative commandment when both commandments are performed simultaneously. It is noteworthy that the Gemora in Sota states that a mitzvah cannot extinguish an aveira, a sin, yet an aveira can extinguish a mitzvah. Apparently, the principle that a positive commandment can override a negative commandment is not a contradiction to this Gemora. Perhaps the idea is that when one performs an aveira intentionally, he has rebelled against HaShem, and it is not possible for one to appease HaShem with a mitzvah when he has just committed an act of rebellion. When one is simultaneously overriding the negative commandment by performing a positive commandment, however, he is demonstrating that he is fully aware that he is performing a negative commandment, yet he is permitted by the Torah to override the negative commandment. This principle allows him to perform the positive commandment and be rewarded for its performance.

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DIVINE RETRIBUTION - Yevamos 77 - Daf Yomi

The Gemara in Sanhedrin (106b) describes Doeg’s downfall:

Rabbi Ami said: Doeg did not die until he forgot his learning, as it is stated: He shall die bereft of wisdom, led into error by his great folly. Rav Ashi said: Doeg was afflicted by tzaraas before he died, as it is stated: You cut down (hitzmatah) all who stray from You. The verb hitzmatah alludes to tzaraas, as follows: It is written there, in connection with the Yovel year: litzmisus, which Targum Onkelos renders as lachalutin; and we learned in a Mishnah: There is no difference between a confined metzora and a confirmed (muchlat) metzora except the regulations concerning letting the hair grow and rending the garments. The term muchlat, which is used in this Mishnah in connection with tzaraas, has the same root as lachalutin, which is the Targum for litzmisus. It follows that hitzmatah, which has the same root as litzmisus, also alludes to tzaraas. Thus, scripture implies that Doeg was afflicted with tzaraas.

One may wonder why it was necessary for Doeg to be afflicted with tzaraas before he died. Was it not sufficient for him to die young?

My brother, Reb Binyomin, in his sefer on Sanhedrin explains: Let us understand the punishment of tzaraas. One who slanders someone is liable the punishment of tzaraas, as we see from numerous incidents in the Torah with Moshe disparaging the Jewish People, Miriam talking ill about her brother Moshe, and other instances. The affliction of tzaraas is meant to demonstrate to the sinner that he is an outcast, and the sinner must mend his or hers ways before being allowed normal social interaction. Doeg had slandered Dovid and thus earned the punishment of tzaraas. Although Doeg’s punishment is only inferred from the exposition of the Gemara, the Gemara is teaching us that no one can escape Divine Retribution. Reb Moshe Feinstein, in the Sefer Derash Moshe, explains that this is the reason why the plague of Barad, fire and hail, only affected the flax and the barley in Egypt, while the wheat and the spelt were not struck, as Hashem only punished the Egyptians commensurate with their evil deeds. If we would recognize that Hashem rewards our good deeds five hundred fold , then we would make every attempt to study Torah whenever possible, and perform as many mitzvos as possible.

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More Food For Thought - Yevamos 62 - Daf Yomi

Some heoros on the Daf by Reb Ben:

This question may sound strange, but isn't there room to think that even Moshe, the greatest prophet, should be married to a woman? We always say that the beauty of Yiddishkeit is that we believe in marriage and bearing children, as this is part of our service of HaShem. I understand that Moshe needed to be constantly in a state of readiness to receive nevuah, but even the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur had a wife designated for him so that the dictum of vicheper baado uvead baiso could be fulfilled. Furthermore, would HaShem reveal Himself to Moshe even at times when He knew that it was not suitable for nevuah?

Why did Moshe make a kal vachomer from Pesach? If the luchos had to be broken, then break them. It seems like there was an issur to break the luchos. The Yerushalmi in Taanis states that since it says, vayispos , I grabbed, we infer that Moshe and HaShem struggled over the luchos but Moshe won out.

Tosfos quotes the Medrash that Tzipporah said, " woe to the wives of these, because from the day that HaShem spoke to Moshe, he separated from me. Did Tzipporah not understand that the nevuah of Moshe was different? Furthermore, if Tzipporah felt the same as Aharon and Moshe, why did she not get tzaraas? ( I think I once saw this question somewhere.)

It has always bothered me why we need a drasha from the word asher to learn yeiyasher kochacha sheshibarta. Yeiyasher means strength and asher means "that." Although we can suggest that the root is shur, wall, or the like, it would seem from the passuk that HaShem is just informing Moshe that he broke the luchos, not that he is giving him a haskama.

The students of Rabbi Akiva died between Pesach and Atzeres. Pesach is referred to in the Gemara as dabcha (like Zavcha) which means slaughter. Thus, the time period alludes to their death (Rabbi Akiva himself was actually slaughtered as the Gemara in Pesachim states that Rabbi Eliezer said regarding Rabbi Akiva, his dearth will be by slaughtering.) Atzeres means to refrain, as they stopped dying by Shavuos.

Rav Volhbe zt"l quoted sefarim (Probably Arizal) that state that HaShem fulfilled the dictum mentioned in our Gemara that one should be poked his wife before he goes on the road. Subsequent to the destruction of the first Bais HaMikdash, Hashem gave the Jewish People the prophecy of Yechezkel where he saw the merkavah. Subsequent to the destruction of the second Bais HaMikdash, we received the Zohar through Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai.

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