Blackmailing Father

By: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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And Rav Yosef said: If a man says, “So-and-so committed sodomy with me against my will,” he himself with another witness can combine to testify against the perpetrator. If, however, he said, “So-and-so committed sodomy with me with my consent,” he is a wicked man and the Torah states: Do not use a sinner as a witness.

Rava said: Every man is considered a relative to himself, and he cannot incriminate himself (as a sinner).

The following question was raised to the poskim years ago: A man testified in Beis Din that he married off his minor daughter, but he refused to state the identity of this man. His intention was to put pressure on his wife for her to accept a divorce without receiving any alimony payments and to have equal visitation rights for the children. Do we accept his testimony and consider the girl as a married woman?

Rav Eliyahu Pesach Ramnik, Rosh Yeshiva of Ohavei torah in Far Rockaway applied the principle of ‘a person is not believed to establish himself as an evil person’ as the basis for his ruling. He explained: The father, who is testifying that he married off his minor daughter, is establishing himself as a wicked person for several different reasons. Firstly, if in truth, he has married her off in order to extort money from his wife, using a mechanism of the Torah in this manner causes a tremendous desecration of Hashem’s Name, and if the wife does not concede to his demands, the child will remain an agunah her entire life. This will result in an even bigger chilul Hashem. Secondly, he is transgressing the prohibition of paining another fellow Jew. The pain and the embarrassment that he is causing his wife and daughter to endure is indescribable. Thirdly, the Gemora in Sanhedrin (76a) states that one who marries his daughter to an elderly man transgresses a Biblical prohibition of causing his daughter to sin, since she will not be satisfied in that marriage; certainly in this case, the father will be violating this prohibition, for the daughter does not even know the identity of her true husband. Based on these above reasons, it emerges that by accepting the father’s testimony, he would be rendered a rasha, and therefore, his testimony should not be accepted and his daughter would not be regarded as a married woman.

Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, in his sefer Chashukei Chemed questions the above conclusion. He cites several Acharonim who rule that when a man has already been established as a rasha regarding other matters, his testimony can still be valid (provided that he is not disqualified from offering testimony) even though it also renders him a rasha. The Chacham Tzvi (responsa 3) rules that if someone has violated a light transgression in our presence, he would still be believed that he has violated an even stricter prohibition. This is because his testimony is not rendering him a rasha; he already has established himself a rasha. It is for this reason that we will be compelled to accept the father’s testimony that he married off his daughter, for this man has already been established as a rasha. He is desecrating the name of Hashem by using the Torah’s mechanisms for evil purposes and by causing pain and grief to his wife and to his daughter.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Eidim P’sulim

The Gemora learns that even if there are a hundred witnesses that witnessed an event, but included in those witnesses were relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses, then the all the witnesses may not testify. Rebbe clarifies that this is only true when the relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses also gave the warning, but if they merely witnessed an event along with others, they can’t nullify the testimony of the other witnesses. Rashi explains that by giving the warning, they show that they too want to be considered witnesses, therefore they negate the other witnesses’ testimony, since part of the witnesses are disqualified.

Who is considered disqualified for testimony?

1) Relatives - Relatives: There are many different scenarios; we will only touch on a few.

We learn that relatives cannot be considered witnesses from the verse: Fathers shall not die through their sons. The Chachamim derived from this verse that the father cannot die due to testimony from his son, and vice versa. Aside from a son there are other relatives that cannot testify; a) brothers, b) grandson, c) first cousins, d) second cousins. All these cases apply to females as well, meaning a sister cannot testify on a brother and vice versa etc. (Choshen Mishpat 33:2)

If one cannot testify regarding a woman (for example a sister), he is similarly prohibited from testifying for her husband, and conversely, if one cannot testify for a certain man, he also may not testify for his wife (ibid 33:3). However, he may testify for that spouse’s relative (ibid 33:5).

Mechutanim may testify for each other (ibid 33:6).

2) Oivrei Aveirah - One Who Committed a Sin: If one transgressed any prohibition that is punishable by either death or lashes, he is disqualified for testimony until he repents. It makes no difference if he sinned due to desire, or if he sinned as an act of rebellion (ibid 34:2).

If one transgressed a Rabbinic prohibition, he is disqualified only on a Rabbinic level (there are halachic differences between them).

3) Other P’sulei Eidus: A minor is disqualified for testimony, even if he is very bright. One leaves the status of a minor once he shows signs of physical maturity, usually when he turns thirteen years old.

One who is incoherent in a certain issue is also disqualified (ibid 35:8). If he is mentally deranged, he is also disqualified (ibid 35:10).

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Inheritors Reciting Shehechiyonu when they Pay their Father’s Debts

It is ruled in Shulchan Aruch (223:2) that one whose father dies should recite the blessing of dayan ha’emes, the truthful Judge. If there was an inheritance, he should also recite the blessing of shehechiyonu.

The question arises: What would be the halacha if there is an inheritance, but all of the money will be used to pay off the father’s debts? Will the children still recite a shehechiyonu or not?

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 90b) states: We also see that one kesuvah that has a value appropriate for a kesuvah (a dinar of the estate) can also allow for the validity of a second kesuvah (which does not have that value as there is not two dinar in the estate). How is this apparent from the Mishna? Being that the Mishna does not say that the second collection can only occur “if there is an extra dinar (corresponding to this kesuvah).”

Rashi explains: The Mishna taught us that if one set of inheritors is collecting the kesuvah of their mother because her husband died before their mother, this payment is regarded as an inheritance for all of the father’s inheritors, and will therefore be considered as the surplus for the validity of the kesuvah for the male children. Since all inheritors have a mitzvah to repay their father’s debts, they are inheriting it and then paying off the other inheritors. Rashi uses the following expression: There is no greater inheritance than the paying off of the father’s debts.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein states that accordingly, the children will recite the shehechiyonu blessing even though they are left with nothing because there is no greater inheritance than the paying off of the father’s debts.

However, he concludes that there actually is no proof from Rashi for this halachic ruling. Rashi is only explaining the reason why the Gemora considers it an inheritance, and that is because of the logic that there is no greater inheritance than the paying off of the father’s debts. However, in respect to the shehechiyonu blessing, that is a blessing that is only recited when one is rejoicing. Although, one whose father dies and leaves him with an inheritance is not rejoicing at all; he would much rather that his father would not have died altogether (as the Mishna Berura ibid explains), nevertheless, there is a positive result from the inheritance; that is a sufficient enough of a reason to recite the blessing (although it is mixed with pain and anguish). In this case, however, there is no positive advantage to the inheritors with this inheritance at all and therefore, they would not recite the shehechiyonu blessing.

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Just in Time for Chanukah

The Gemora in Shabbos (21b) states that it is a mitzvah to place the menorah for Chanukah at the entrance to one’s house. During the dangerous times, they would light the menorah on the table inside and that would be sufficient.

What would be the halacha nowadays? Can one light the menorah on his table and with that, fulfill his mitzvah? Do we say that since it is not dangerous now, the halacha reverts back to the original ruling that the menorah must be lit facing outside?

The Dvar Yehoshua offers proof from the beginning of Meseches Kesuvos (3b). There it says that during the dangerous times and onward, they would marry on a Tuesday, and the Rabbis did not protest. The Shitah Mekubetzes writes that even after the danger was over, they still married on a Tuesday. This was because there was a concern that it may return to the dangerous times.

Our Gemora (Kesuvos 89a) states: Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: From the time of danger (when the idolaters decreed that mitzvos may not be performed) and onwards, a woman may collect her kesuvah without a get, and a creditor may collect without a pruzbul.

The Rambam in Hilchos shemitah (9:24) rules: If a lender claims that he had a pruzbul and he lost it, he is believed, for from the time of danger and onwards, a creditor may collect without a pruzbul.

The Kesef Mishna explains: Although presently, there is no danger, we do not differentiate between two different times. Accordingly, you might be able to apply the same logic regarding lighting the menorah on a table inside the house even when there is no danger.

The Reshash offers the following comment according to the Kesef Mishna: It is for this reason that the Mishna uses the precise terminology of, “and from the time of danger and onwards.” This teaches us that the halacha is applicable even after the danger is no longer here.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein writes that accordingly, there would be no proof from this halacha to the lighting of the menorah. There, the Gemora states that during the dangerous times, they would light the menorah on the table inside and that would be sufficient. It does not say, “and from the time of danger and onwards.” Therefore, it can be said that one would not fulfill his mitzvah of lighting the menorah if he lights it on the table.

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Timtum Haleiv

The Gemora cites a braisa (Kesuvos 60a): A child may be nursed until he is twenty-four months. From that age and onwards, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing (the Rabbis forbade it); these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua said: He may nurse even for four or five years. If, however, he ceased nursing after twenty-four months and started again, he is to be regarded as one who is nursing an abominable thing.

The Rashba asks: Something that is forbidden on a Biblical level, we are not permitted to provide for a child; however, there is no prohibition to give a child something that is only Rabbinically prohibited. Why would it be forbidden to let the child nurse?

Rav Elyashiv adds: Here, there is not even a Rabbinical prohibition!

He answers: We find that there is a halachic stringency not to allow a child to nurse from an idolater; this may result in timtum. So too, when a child is beyond the age where he should be nursing, if we allow him to nurse, it can lead to timtum.

There is a discussion amongst the Poskim if one eats a permitted item in a time that it is prohibited to eat (such as Yom Kippur, prior to davening or kiddush etc.); does that eating result in timtum or not. However, in our case, Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein asks: The milk is not a forbidden item at all! If we would extract the milk and place it into a utensil, it would be permitted for consumption; the prohibition is only when the child is nursing directly from the mother. Why should we assume that this may result in timtum?

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CIRCUMCISION BEFORE EXECUTION

Tosfos states that if a person would destroy his fellow’s eye while he was killing him, it would not be regarded as if he blinded him and murdered him (in which case, you might think that we should punish him for both actions, by executing him and exacting payment for the eye); but rather, it is considered as if he killed him in a more painful manner. Chashukei Chemed derives from this Tosfos that there is no prohibition to wound a fellow at a time that he is being executed anyway.

Using this principle, it is possible to answer the following question posed by Reb Yosef Engel in Gilyonei HaShas to Avoda Zara (10b). The Gemora states: The Caesar decreed that Ketiah (a gentile) should be put to death. As they were escorting him to the death chamber, a certain matron called out and said, “Woe is to the ship that leaves without paying its taxes first.” Rashi explains: Ketiah was being executed for supporting the Jews; if he would not circumcise himself before his death, he will not merit a portion in the World to Come together with them. Ketiah thereby, fell on top of his foreskin and cut it off. He said, “I now have paid my tax. I will leave this world and enter into the World to Come.”

Reb Yosef Engel asks: It appears that Ketiah did not satisfy all the requirements of conversion, for he didn’t immerse in a mikvah and he didn’t accept the yoke of fulfilling all the mitzvos; if so, shouldn’t there have been a prohibition to cut his foreskin? Isn’t he violating the prohibition of wounding oneself?

In the sefer Shabbos Shaboson, the following novel ruling is brought in the name of Rav Yosef Tzikonovsky: If one is being brought to be executed, he is allowed to circumcise himself even though his brothers had died on account of circumcision (normally, that would preclude a third brother from circumcision). Since he is going to die anyway, he would be permitted to circumcise himself, although the procedure itself can lead to his death. He provides a fascinating source from the Abudraham: It is our custom, when saying the words: “V’omer lach b’damayich chayi,” that we place some of the wine on the lips of the child. This is based upon the Medrash which states that after the sin of the Golden Calf, as some of the Jewish people were being killed, Moshe would circumcise them, Aharon would uncover the foreskin and Yehoshua would give them to drink (from the ashes of the Golden Calf causing them to die). All forty years in the Desert, there was no circumcision because of the burdens of traveling and because the Northern Wind did not blow (which was necessary to heal them). Moshe and Aharon did not want them to die without a circumcision and without accepting the yoke of mitzvos. Yehoshua gave them to drink, leading to their death. We give the circumcised child to drink and say: This circumcision and drinking should lead to life, not death.

Accordingly, Ketiah, could circumcise himself prior to his death, and he needn’t be concerned with the prohibition of wounding himself unnecessarily.

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‘KIM LEIH B’DIRABAH MINEIH’ IN A CASE OF UNCERTAINTY

Reb Akiva Eiger rules that if one seduces an idolater, he is exempt from paying a fine because of the principle of ‘kim leih b’dirabah mineih,’ one incurs the more severe penalty of death and he is not liable for the monetary payments. Since the halacha is: Zealots have a right to kill one who cohabits with an idolater, he will not be required to pay the fine. If, however, it is uncertain if the girl is a Jew or an idolater, he will be liable for the fine because in this situation, the zealots cannot kill him.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman in Koveitz Shiurim (84) learns from here that whenever it is uncertain if the principle of ‘kim leih b’dirabah mineih’ applies, he would still be liable for the payment.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein comments that if not for Reb Elchonon, a distinction could have been made between a court-imposed death penalty and a case where one incurs death by the hands of the zealots. In a case of an uncertainty regarding a court-imposed death penalty, such as one who desecrated Shabbos in a time where it is uncertain if Shabbos has started or not (bein hashemoshos), and at the same time he burned the stalks of his fellow, he would be exempt from paying for the damages. The reason is as follows: Even though, Beis Din cannot administer the death penalty, he would be exempt from paying because he might be liable for death. However, in a case where one does not incur a death penalty; it is a transgression where zealots have a right to kill him. In a case of uncertainty, where he may not be killed, he should certainly be responsible for the monetary payments involved.

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BLACKMAILING FATHER TESTIFIES THAT HE MARRIED OFF HIS MINOR DAUGHTER

The Gemora (Kesuvos 17b – 18a) states: If two witnesses said that they were coerced to testify falsely on account of a threat to their finances, they are not believed.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason for this?

The Gemora answers: It is because that a person is not believed to establish himself as an evil person. (Rashi explains that every witness is assumed to be reliable; by issuing a self-incriminating statement, he will be disqualifying himself from further testimony. Just as a person cannot testify regarding his relative, he may not testify about himself because he is related to himself.)

The following question was raised to the poskim years ago: A man testified in Beis Din that he married off his minor daughter, but he refused to state the identity of this man. His intention was to put pressure on his wife for her to accept a divorce without receiving any alimony payments and to have equal visitation rights for the children. Do we accept his testimony and consider the girl as a married woman?

Rav Eliyahu Pesach Ramnik, Rosh Yeshiva of Ohavei torah in Far Rockaway applied the principle of ‘a person is not believed to establish himself as an evil person’ as the basis for his ruling. He explained: The father, who is testifying that he married off his minor daughter is establishing himself as a wicked person for several different reasons. Firstly, if in truth, he has married her off in order to extort money from his wife, using a mechanism of the Torah in this manner causes a tremendous desecration of Hashem’s name, and if the wife does not concede to his demands, the child will remain an agunah her entire life. This will result in an even bigger chilul Hashem. Secondly, he is transgressing the prohibition of paining another fellow Jew. The pain and the embarrassment that he is causing his wife and daughter to endure is indescribable. Thirdly, the Gemora in Sanhedrin (76a) states that one who marries his daughter to an elderly man transgresses a Biblical prohibition of causing his daughter to sin, since she will not be satisfied in that marriage; certainly in this case, the father will be violating this prohibition, for the daughter does not even know the identity of her true husband. Based on these above reasons, it emerges that by accepting the father’s testimony, he would be rendered a rasha, and therefore, his testimony should not be accepted and his daughter would not be regarded as a married woman.

Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein, in his sefer Chashukei Chemed questions the above conclusion. He cites several Acharonim who rule that when a man has already been established as a rasha regarding other matters, his testimony can still be valid (provided that he is not disqualified from offering testimony) even though it also renders him a rasha. The Chacham Tzvi (responsa 3) rules that if someone has violated a light transgression in our presence, he would still be believed that he has violated an even stricter prohibition. This is because his testimony is not rendering him a rasha, he already has established himself a rahsa. It is for this reason that we will be compelled to accept the father’s testimony that he married off his daughter, for this man has already been established as a rasha. He is desecrating the name of Hashem by using the Torah’s mechanisms for evil purposes and by causing pain and grief to his wife and to his daughter.

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HAPPY ANNIVERSARY

Mazel Tov to Daf Notes on our first year anniversary. We would like to thank all the contributors for their superb efforts in keeping up with the Daf and for all the comments. Our gratitude is also extended to all those throughout the world who have disseminated the Daf Notes and made others aware of this unprecedented tool to studying the Daf in depth. Yasher koach, and HaShem should give us the strength to continue being marbitz Torah, lihagdil Torah ulehadirah.



PLEASE CLICK ANYWHERE ON THIS POST FOR A TRIP DOWN MEMORY LANE, AND PERHAPS YOU'LL FIND A POST THAT YOU MISSED THE FIRST TIME AROUND.

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 18 - HOW MANY WORDS ARE IN THE MEGILLAH?

It was taught in a braisa: If the scribe had omitted letters or verses and the reader read them from memory, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemora challenges this ruling from a different braisa: If letters from the Megillah are partially effaced or torn, if they are still legible, the Megillah may be used, but otherwise it may not be used. The Gemora answers: It is only invalid if the entire Megillah is illegible, however if a Megillah is missing less than half of its letters, it is still valid.

Shulchan Aruch (690:3) rules that it is preferable that the Megillah should be written in its entirety, and if the scribe missed words in the middle, even close to half the Megillah, and he reads the rest by heart, it is only valid b’dieved (after the fact).

The Mishna Berura inquires as to what the halacha would be if the Megillah would be missing exactly half the words. In Sha’ar Hatziyon, he writes that the inference from the Rambam would be that it is invalid and from the Rosh and the Ran, it would seem that the Megillah is valid.

Reb Yitzchak Zilberstein cites that they asked Reb Elyashiv regarding the possibility of this case since they checked and realized that the Megillah does not have an even amount of words, so how could the Megillah be missing precisely half of the required amount of words. Reb Elyashiv answered that the case can be referring to where the Megillah was written in a foreign language which can be valid for people who understand that language.

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Daf Yomi - Megillah 18 - WHICH SURGEON SHOULD HE USE?

The Gemora discusses whether one who knows the Torah by heart would be permitted to write a Scripture scroll without copying from a text. The Gemora states that Rabbi Meir was permitted to write a Megillah from memory because he knew the words fluently by heart.

Reb Elyashiv, cited by Chishukei Chemed ruled on the following inquiry and he derived his ruling from our Gemora.

A person residing in Eretz Yisroel developed a heart issue and he was required to undergo a risky heart surgery. The local doctors said that they do not perform this type of surgery frequently, but they are ninety-five percent confident that the surgery will be a success. There is an expert surgeon outside of Eretz Yisroel who performs this surgery daily and he said that if he would perform the surgery, he would be successful ninety-five percent of the time.

Should this individual travel outside of Eretz Yisroel to have the surgery performed by the expert surgeon? Reb Elyashiv ruled that he should go because that doctor is more accustomed in performing this type of surgery.

The Gemora in Taanis 15a states regarding a communal fast: They would send a chazzan to lead the prayer who was an elder and fluent in the prayers. Rashi explains: One who is fluent in his prayers will not make a mistake.

Our Gemora states that one who is fluent in the words of the Torah will not make a mistake when he is writing the Torah without copying from a text.

This is why it would be preferable to travel to the doctor outside of Eretz Yisroel even though the percentage of success is the same. Someone who is more accustomed to performing this type of surgery will not make a mistake.

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