A Woman's Sacrifices and Recital

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Rabbi Yehudah used to expound common terms. For it has been taught in a braisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: A rich person is obligated to bring a rich person’s korban for his wife, and likewise, he is obligated to provide her with the animals for any of her korbanos that she must bring, for the following is what he wrote for her in the kesuvah: My properties are pledged for every claim you may have against me from before up to now.

Rashi explains that it is the husband’s obligation to provide for the sacrifice of his wife, and Rabbi Yehudah rules that when the husband is doing so, he must bring a sacrifice according to his financial status. He cannot claim and say, “My wife has no possessions of her own and she is therefore poor, and I should therefore only be obligated to bring a poor man’s sacrifice for her.”

The Gemora in Nedarim (35b) cites a verse which teaches us that a man is required to bring a korban for his wife, whether she is normal or insane. This, however, is only true regarding sacrifices that are offered for someone who lacks atonement, for these korbanos are different in the following respect: Korbanos are only brought with the owner’s consent; however, a korban, which is brought for one who lacks atonement, can be brought even without the owner’s consent. Therefore, all other korbanos, the woman would be required to bring them; her consent is a necessity.

Rabbi Yaakov Emden in Mor U’Ketziah (47) writes that women, in general, have no connection to korbanos, except for those that are her personal obligations, e.g. the birds of a zavah or for a woman who gave birth.

The Peri Megadim disagrees and writes that they are included in the general sacrifices, and certainly with the recital of the korbanos, which we do nowadays, as a replacement for the actual offering of the sacrifices.

The sefer Toras Hayoledes brings that a woman who gave birth, on the forty-first day if she had a son, and on the eighty-first day if she had a daughter, should recite the verses in Parshas Tazria dealing with the korbanos she would have been required to bring if there was a Beis HaMikdash in existence. And she should conclude with the following prayer, “Master of the Universe, it should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that this recital which I said should be significant and accepted before You as if I actually brought my prescribed sacrifices. And it should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that You should build the Beis HaMikdash speedily in our days.”

The Pischei Zuta discusses if she would be required to recite the passages that deal with the sacrifices that she would bring if she was poor and could afford the animals. For perhaps that dispensation was only in the times of the Beis HaMikdash, when korbanos were being brought; however, now, that we are merely reciting the verses, every woman should say the same thing.

In the siddur Keser Nehura, it is written that on the day following a woman’s immersion in a mikvah for her menstrual impurity, she should recite the passages from Parshas Metzora that deal with those halachos. And she should conclude by saying, “It should be the will of our G-d and the G-d of our forefathers that this recital which I said should be significant and accepted before You as if I actually brought my prescribed sacrifices.”

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B'tuvo

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Rav Nachman says: A person can ask his friend to borrow something “b’tuvo” -- “when good,” and (if his friend acquiesces) borrow it anytime thereafter (even after he returns it, provided that it is in good condition, for that is what he meant when he said “b’tuvo” ).

Rav Mari, the son of the daughter of Shmuel, said: This is only if they made a kinyan to this effect.

The Ritva writes that the main novelty of this halachah, according to Rashi’s explanation, is that we expound his language. We assume that this was the borrower’s intent when he used the word “b’tuvo.”

Tosfos cites an Aruch, who offers a different explanation. If the borrower did a favor for the lender, the borrower may use the borrowed utensil forever.

The Ritva explains: The borrower, after doing a favor to the lender, requests of him to borrow his utensil in exchange for the favor that he did. The novelty of this halachah is that he is not regarded as a renter, even though the utensil is being lent to him in exchange of the favor which he provided. He is, nevertheless, regarded as a borrower.

The Rif suggests an alternative explanation of the Gemora: The borrower said to the lender, “Lend me, on account of your goodness, this utensil that I can use it.” Since a term limit was not mentioned, he may borrow it forever, or until it breaks. The novelty of this ruling is that by adding the words, “your goodness,” he may borrow it forever. This is unlike an ordinary unspecified borrowing, which is only for thirty days.

The Rosh asks: Why do these words make a difference? It is extremely common for someone to say to his fellow, “Can you do me a favor please and lend me a utensil?”

The Sm”a answers that we are referring to a case where the borrower said to the lender, “You are such a good person, one who is not particular at all as to the amount of time your utensil is lent out.” In this case, we assume that he is lending it forever.

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Mezuzah's Protection

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The Gemora cites a braisa: If one rents a house to his fellow, the tenant must provide a mezuzah. And when he leaves, he must not take it with him, unless he rented it from a gentile, in which case, he must remove it when he leaves. And it once happened that a man took the mezuzah away with him, and he buried his wife and two children.

The Gemora asks: Do we relate a story in contradiction of what we had just learned?

Rav Sheishes answers: It refers to the first clause (where he rented from a Jew).

Tosfos writes that there are mazikin - supernatural forces that enter a house bereft of a mezuzah.

The Ritva explains that this punishment was measure for measure. Since he was not concerned about the danger that could befall the future residents (for now, they will not be protected by the mezuzah), he himself suffers, and he is not afforded any protection.

The Kesef Mishnah writes that a mezuzah, which is written correctly, will protect the residents of the house. The protection is not afforded because of the names of Heavenly angels that are written there. And, he concludes, it will only protect a person if it was affixed to the doorpost for the sake of the mitzvah; not if it was placed there solely for protection.

The Maharitz Chayus compares the protection afforded by the mezuzah to the protection that comes from the studying of Torah or the performance of any mitzvah. It would emerge that that there is no greater protection afforded by the mezuzah more than any other mitzvah in the Torah.

Reb Avi Lebovitz points out that seemingly, there will be no protection afforded to a person who is exempt from the mitzvah of mezuzah, and does so anyway. It is not the mezuzah that provides the protection; it is the mitzvah of the mezuzah.

However, the Maharsham cites an opinion of the Shevus Yaakov, who holds that even if one is exempt from placing a mezuzah on a certain doorpost, he may do so for protection purposes, and he would not be called a hedyot.

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Swept Away Olive Trees and Settling in Eretz Yisroel Nowadays

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The Mishna had stated: A river swept away a person’s olives trees and deposited them (together with their roots) in someone else’s field. The owner of the trees says, “My olive tree grew this,” while the owner of the land says, “My land grew this.” They should split the olives.

The Maggid Mishnah writes that that if the olive trees were not uprooted together with their clods of earth, the trees would be regarded as a lost article that is permitted to all. This would be similar to the Gemora above (22a), which states: If a river washed away someone’s beams, timber, or stones, and has deposited them in someone else’s field, they belong to the field owner because the owner has given up hope. Accordingly, in our case, the trees would belong to the landowner, and he would not be required to pay the original owner of the trees at all. However, if they were uprooted together with their clods of earth, since the trees`are growing as a result of his land, it emerges that the tree owner is also contributing towards the growth of the olives; they therefore would divide it.

Alternatively, it can be said that if the trees were uprooted together with their clods of earth, the river cannot sweep them a great distance away from their point of origin, and therefore, the owner does not despair about getting them back.

Settling in Eretz Yisroel Nowadays

The Mishna had stated: A river swept away a person’s olives trees and deposited them (together with their roots) in someone else’s field. The owner of the trees says, “My olive tree grew this,” while the owner of the land says, “My land grew this.” They should split the olives.

A Tanna taught: If he said, “I wish to take back my olive trees,” we do not listen to him.

The Gemora asks: Why is that?

Rabbi Yochanan said: It is because of the significance of settling Eretz Yisroel.

Rabbi Yirmiyah said: For such an answer, a great man is necessary (for we would not have said like this using our own logic).

The Ramban says that this mitzvah is a Biblical commandment. The Rambam omits this mitzvah is his Sefer Hamitzvos. There are those that explain that the Rambam holds that it’s only a Rabbinical mitzvah. Other say that the Rambam holds it is not a mitzvah at all; the only reason why a man can force his family members to move to Eretz Yisroel is because this way, they will be able to fulfill the mitzvos which are dependent upon the Land of Israel.

The Ritva writes that the applications of the Mishna apply to nowadays also. Proof to this is from the fact that Rebbe incorporated these halachos into the Mishna even though he was living in the times after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

Tosfos (Kesuvos 110) cites Rabbeinu Chaim Kohen that there is no mitzvah nowadays because there are many mitzvos there which entail many punishments, and it will be impossible for one to be careful regarding all of them. This can be simply understood to mean that although there might be a mitzvah to live in Eretz Yisroel, it is simply not worth it, for one will lose out by transgressing many aveiros there. Reb Avi Lebovitz (and afterwards I found this logic in the Beis Halevi) explains a little differently: Rabbeinu Chaim is actually describing the mitzvah of living in Eretz Yisroel to be for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzvos that apply there. If one were to live in Eretz Yisroel without properly performing the mitzvos, they are not only losing out on these additional mitzvos; they are also not fulfilling the mitzvah of living in Eretz Yisroel.

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