Closer and Majority

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Rabbi Chanina maintains that when the principles of rov, the majority, and karov, close in proximity, conflict with each other, then we follow the principle of majority. And although both principles are of scriptural origin, the principle of majority is superior.

Reb Shmuel Rozovsky is uncertain as to why we would follow that which is “closer.” Is it because that this is a method which clarifies the doubt, for it is more probable that it came from the “closer”? Or perhaps, the probability of coming from the “closer” is just as likely as if it was coming from the “further,” except that there is a halachah that we follow that which is “closer.”

This can be proven from that which Rabbi Chanina said that when there is a conflict between the “majority” and that which is “closer,” we follow the “closer.” If “majority” and “closer” are both logics that clarify to us that which was uncertain, Rabbi Chanina’s halachah would be understandable, for he would be informing us that the clarifier from the fact that it is closer is superior then the clarifier emerging from the majority.

However, the Tosfos HaRosh in Bava Metzia (66b) writes that when we follow a majority that is before us (such as a piece of meat, where we are uncertain if it came from one of the nine stores selling kosher meat, or the one store selling non-kosher meat), that is not because the majority verifies for us that the meat in question came from the kosher shop; rather ,it is the Torah’s law that we follow the majority. Accordingly, if we would say that the logic of following the “closer” is on account of clarification, it would certainly be stronger than a mere “majority.” This proves that following the “closer” is also a Torah law and not based on logic.

If so, the question begs to be asked: How does Rabbi Chanina know that we follow the “closer” and not the “majority”? If they are both halachos without any logic, why is one superior that the other?

He answers that even though they are both halachos and not verifiers, they are distinct from each other. When we follow the majority, the majority resolves the uncertainty. Although the doubt rests before us, the majority is a decider. However, when we follow the ”closer,” it doesn’t resolve the uncertainty at all; it merely tells us that we should not search any longer for where this doubtful item comes from - since we can attribute it to that which is closer. However, when that which is closer conflicts with a majority, it is impossible to assert that the object did not come from that which is further (for the majority tells us that it did); it therefore reverts back to an ordinary case of uncertainty, where we would rule according to the majority.

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Asmachta by har sinai

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It is written in Parshas Yisro [24, 9 – 11]: And Moshe and Aaron, Nadav and Avihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel ascended, and they perceived the G-d of Israel etc., and they perceived G-d, and they ate and drank.

Rashi cites the Medrash Tanchuma: They gazed and peered and because of this were doomed to die, but the Holy One, blessed be He, did not want to disturb the rejoicing of this moment of the giving of the Torah. So He waited to kill Nadav and Avihu until the day of the dedication of the Mishkan, and for the elders until the following incident: And the people were as if seeking complaints… and a fire of Hashem broke out against them and devoured at the edge (the leaders) of the camp.

We can ask: What happened by the sin of the complainers that precisely then, Hashem chose to destroy the elders?

The Chasam Sofer answers based upon our Gemora: Rav Pappa said: An asmachta is sometimes binding and sometimes not. If the lender found the borrower (on the date that the loan was due) drinking beer (at a tavern), it is binding (for he clearly does not care about the forfeiture of his field); if, however, he was trying to procure money, it is not binding.

Rav Acha from Difti asked Ravina: Perhaps he was drinking to dismiss his anxiety (that he could not pay the loan), or perhaps someone else had assured him of the money (to repay it)?

Similarly, it can be said regarding the Jewish people’s acceptance of the torah when they said, “we will do and we will listen.” Seemingly, this should be regarded as an asmachta, and therefore not binding – they were coerced into saying that by the fact that the mountain was placed on top of them.

Accordingly, we can say as follows: when the elders ate and drank, this was a demonstration that they were completely at ease with their decision; they were displaying happiness and joy with the acceptance of the Torah, and that it wasn’t an asmachta at all. So, on the contrary – they were acting properly, and not deserving of a punishment at all! However, by the sin of the complainers, it is written: They travelled from the mountain of Hashem. Rashi explains that they ran away like a child runs when he is leaving school. They were fleeing in order not to receive any more laws. This would then indicate that when they were eating and drinking by Mount Sinai, it was not a sign of happiness, but rather, they were dispelling their anxiety. This was a cause for their demise, and that is why Hashem waited until the time that they demonstrated what their true intentions were.

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