Is it Mutar to Cheat (just a little)?

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The braisa had stated: If it is an issar less, it is forbidden.

Abaye explains this to mean that the coins cannot be used at its face value if the sela became lacking by an issar more than its price fraud limit.

Rava challenges this interpretation, for if it is even a little more than the limit, it cannot be used at its face value!?

Rather, Rava understands it to mean that if the sela became deficient by an issar to a dinar, it cannot be used any longer at its face value. This would be an anonymous ruling which follows Rabbi Meir’s viewpoint.

Tosfos understands in Rashi that one would be permitted to defraud his fellow if it is less than a sixth, even in a case where he does not intend to return the overcharge. This is because the defrauded party, because it is insignificant, is immediately mochel the “cheater.” It would be permitted to charge exactly a sixth more than its price only if he intends to return the overchatge within the time it would take the other party to show the purchase to a merchant.

The Ritva writes that it is forbidden to defraud your fellow in cases where it is precisely a sixth. This is because people are generally particular regarding these things.

The Ramban maintains that it is forbidden even if it is less than a sixth, for one is not allowed to defraud his fellow whatsoever. If it was less than a sixth, the sages ruled that he is exempt from paying it back. That does not make it permitted.

The Chinuch holds that there is no Biblical prohibition when one defrauds his fellow less than a sixth.

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Oath Taken Outside of Beis Din

Rav Nachman said (Bava Kamma 106) that if a custodian swears falsely outside of Beis Din and afterwards witnesses testify against him, Rav would concede that he is still liable to pay kefel.

Rashi explains that an oath taken in Beis Din is stronger than one taken outside of Beis Din, and if one swears in Beis Din, the claim against him is dissolved.

It is also evident from the Gemora that if the plaintiff jumped up and adjured the custodian to swear before Beis Din had the chance to impose the oath upon him, and afterwards he admitted, Rav would concede that he is liable in paying the extra fifth and to bring a korban asham, but he will not be liable to pay the kefel.

The Rishonim cite Rabbeinu Chananel who explains that one who is Biblically mandated to take an oath in Beis Din, and he swears outside of Beis Din, or he swore in Beis Din before the court imposed the oath upon him, he is not exempt from his obligation and he can be mandated to swear again.

The Ramban and the Rashba disagree and hold that an oath taken outside of Beis Din is regarded as a valid oath and he would not be required to swear again. Our Gemora holds that one is not liable to pay kefel for such an oath, for it is not as strong as an oath imposed by the court.

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Permission to Heal

The Gemora (Bava Kamma 85) states that from the verse, “v’rapo yerapei” teaches us that a doctor is given permission to heal a sick person.

Rashi explains that if not for that verse, I might have thought that the doctor would be forbidden from healing him, for Heaven has decreed that he should be ill; it would be contrary to his destiny. The Torah teaches us that he may be cured.

The Rishonim ask from the Gemora above (81b) which cites a braisa: How do we know that one must return another lost person? The verse says, “And you will return it to him.” Is it not obvious then that a doctor is Biblically obligated to save a person from dying?

The Moishav Zekeinim answers that the Torah is teaching us that the doctor is allowed to charge for his services, for otherwise, I would have thought that since it is a mitzvah, he must do it for free.

Tosfos HaRosh answers that without the extra verse, I would have thought that a doctor may only heal a person when the sickness was man-induced. However, an illness that emanated from Heaven, it would be forbidden for the doctor to heal him, for it might be as if he is nullifying the word of God. The Torah teaches us that all sicknesses may be cured.

Tosfos Rabbi Yehudahh Hachasid explains why the Torah wrote v’rapo yerapei” twice: The Torah is teaching us that a second doctor may heal an ill person even after a first doctor was unsuccessful, for we might have thought that by the fact that the first doctor was unable to cure him, this is a proof that Hashem does not want him healed and it is forbidden for the second doctor to attempt to heal him. The Torah teaches us that even the second doctor is permitted to cure him.

The Hadar Zkeinim answers that if not for the extra verse, we would think that only a person who is drowning, where he is dying at that moment, is it permitted to save him. However, if one is sick and is dying slowly, perhaps it is forbidden to heal him. The Torah teaches us that even this is allowed.

The Ramban adds that this verse is necessary to teach the doctor that he should not say, “Why should I get involved? Perhaps I will err and cause the person to die.” The Torah is telling him that he need not be concerned for this.

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Food for Thought - Kiddushin 59

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*** The Mishna had stated: And similarly, if a man says to a woman, “Become betrothed to me after thirty days,” and someone else betroths her within thirty days, she is betrothed to the second person.

The Ramban writes that the first kiddushin was not totally voided, and therefore, if within the thirty days, the second man dies or divorces her, the first kiddushin will be valid. Proof to this is from the language of the Mishna when it states that she is mekudeshes to the second one, and it does not say that she is not mekudeshes to the first one.

The Rashba disagrees and holds that the action of the second marriage negates the verbal arrangement of the first one. He adds that the language of the Mishna does not prove otherwise, for once we have established that the second marriage is valid; it is obvious that the first one is voided.

*** Ravin Chasida went to betroth a woman for his son, but instead ended up marrying her himself.

The Gemora asks: Doesn’t the braisa say that in such a case what is done is done, but it is a deceptive act?

The Gemora answers: In the case of Ravin Chasida, the girl was not going to be given to his son in any event (the family did not agree to it).

The Gemora asks: He still should have first notified his son that this was the situation before going ahead and marrying her himself!?

The Gemora answers: He was worried that in the interim, someone else would betroth her.

The Ritva asks: Why was he concerned? Doesn’t the Gemora (Moed Katan 18b) say that every day a Heavenly voice pronounces: “The daughter of this individual is designated for that man”?

He answers that this was Ravin Chasida’s second marriage, for he already had a son, and the Heavenly voice only makes this proclamation by a first marriage.

Furthermore, he answers that perhaps someone will marry her as a result of their prayer. The Gemora in Moed Katan even states that another man might desperately want a certain woman as a wife and he cannot bear the fact that she will be married to another man; subsequently he will pray that she dies.

*** The Gemora asks: What is the law regarding someone who interferes with a poor person who is trying to get a loaf? Rabbi Abba answered: He is called an evildoer.

Rashi writes that the poor man saw a loaf that was abandoned by its owner, and he wanted to acquire it for himself. If another person snatches it away from him, he is a wicked man.

Tosfos writes that there is no ethical breach to do this when the item is ownerless, for if the other person will not acquire the loaf, he will not be able to get it anywhere else. He is not required to lose because of the poor man. The poor man only has a claim to the object when he wishes to purchase the item from another; there the poor person can claim that the “snatcher” is ruining his opportunity to profit.

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Honoring Parents; Bein Adam l’Makom, or Bein Adam l’Chaveiro?

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The Gemora (Kiddushin 32a)inquires: From whose money are the needs of the parents provided for? [Do the children pay with their own money, or are they just responsible to ensure that their parents are taken care of?]

Rav Yehudah says: The son must pay for it. Rav Nosson bar Oshaya says: The father must pay for it.

Reb Zeidel Epstein in the sefer Afikei Ayil writes that their argument is based upon the following question: Is the mitzvah of honoring one’s father and mother a mitzvah which is between man and Hashem, and therefore the son would be obligated to use his own money just like any other mitzvah? Or perhaps the mitzvah is one that is between man and his fellow, and therefore one would not be required to use his own money.

The Dvar Yaakov asks: If it is a mitzvah that is between man and his fellow, the son would not be required to disrupt his work in order to honor his father!?

Rather, he explains: Everyone agrees that it is in the category of a mitzvah which is between one man and another, but Reb Boruch Ber explains that even in those mitzvos one would be required to spend money, provided that the money being spent is a part of the mitzvah, such as the mitzvah of giving charity. The dispute in the Gemora is regarding this point. Is the money being spent to honor one’s father a part of this mitzvah, or not?

The Minchas Chinuch writes that if honoring one’s parents is included in the category of mitzvos that are between people, Yom Kippur would not atone for these transgressions unless one would appease his father and mother beforehand.

The Ramban writes that the Ten Commandments were written on two tablets. This illustrates to us that the first five are different than the second five. The purpose of the first five is to honor Hashem. Honoring your parents is included in this category because when one honors his parents he is in fact honoring Hashem, for the parents were Hashem’s partners in the child’s creation.

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Rav Kahana and the Poor Man's Dates

The Gemora (Gittin 61) relates an incident: Rav Kahana was going to Hutzal and he saw a certain person who was throwing sticks at a palm tree so that the dates would fall to the ground. Rav Kahana picked up the dates and ate them. The person said to Rav Kahana, “You saw that I had picked some of the dates with my hand (and therefore it is actual theft for you to take them).”

Rav Kahana said to him: You must be from Rabbi Yoshiyah’s city (who often gave public discourses in the city; that is why you know these halachos). Rav Kahana applied the following verse to Rabbi Yoshiyah: And a righteous man is the foundation of the world.

Tosfos asks: Even if Rav Kahana did not know that the person picked the dates with his hand, he still should not have eaten them!? Why was he not concerned with our Mishna’s ruling that we do not take from the poor in the interest of peace?

Tosfos answers that the man was taking the branches off the tree and the dates were falling off themselves. Rav Kahana thought that the man had no interest in the dates.

The Ramban answers that Rav Kahana thought that he was an idolater and the Mishna did not rule that the produce of an idolater is protected because of harmony.

The Rashba answers that Rav Kahana himself was a poor person (or he was regarded as one since he was traveling). [This answers why he would have been permitted to take the dates that was seemingly reserved for the poor.]

The Meiri writes that the decree of promoting harmony was instituted primarily for a poor person who would be taking for himself and eating in his house; however, the enactment for the interest of peace would not affect a passerby, such as Rav Kahana, who would be eating on the road.

The Vilna Gaon says that this decree was instituted only with respect to olives, but not for dates.

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Kohen takes Precedence, even after Ressurection - Gittin 59

It is written [Vayikra 21:8]: You shall sanctify him, for he offers the bread of your God. And it was taught in the Beis Medrash of Rabbi Yishmael: You shall sanctify him teaches us that in all matters pertaining to holiness, the Kohen takes precedence. He should be the first one called to read the Torah. He should be the first to recite the blessing by a meal. He takes the first portion (if he is dividing something with a Yisroel, the Kohen has the right to choose the first portion).

The Gemora in Megillah records the following incident: Rabbah and Rabbi Zeira ate the Purim meal together. They became intoxicated. Rabbah got up and slaughtered Rabbi Zeira. On the following day, Rabbah pleaded for mercy and he revived Rabbi Zeira. On the next year, Rabbah invited Rabbi Zeira to eat with him. Rabbi Zeira replied: A miracle does not occur at all times.

The Kli Chemda at the end of Parshas Breishis cites a kuntrus called Over Oreach. In this sefer, a question is asked: The Gemora Brochos (46a) records an incident where Rabbi Avahu honored Rabbi Zeira to recite the blessing and cut the bread. The Rashba asks that this is inconsistent with the halachah which states that this honor should be reserved for the host. The Rashba answers: since the meal was on behalf of Rabbi Zeira (he had recovered from a sickness), Rabbi Zeira was considered the host. Why didn’t the Rashba answer that Rabbi Zeira was a Kohen (Yerushalmi Brochos 8:6)? He answers that since this incident happened after the episode of Rabbah with Rabbi Zeira mentioned in Megillah (Rabbah slew him and the following day revived him), Rabbi Zeira lost his sanctity of being a Kohen and did not merit the right of this honor.

The Kli Chemda is greatly perplexed by this answer. Every Kohen is considered a Kohen because his father was a Kohen. It is obvious that he did not lose his relations with his relatives because he dies, so why shouldn’t he be a Kohen? (Rabbi Chaim Berlin cites a Gemora in Sanhedrin, proving that the Kehunah remains even after resurrection.) Perhaps he would have required a new inauguration to serve in the Beis Hamikdosh but he definitely did not lose the status of being a Kohen. He cites proof from the story with Elisha that one does not relinquish his relations with his relatives after he dies.

(Look at the Ramban in the beginning of Parshas Emor, where he writes that a Kohen has certain halachos because he is a descendant of Aharon HaKohen and other halachos are because he is a Kohen himself.)

After his resurrection, would he be required to marry his wife again? Reb Elchonon Wasserman discusses the status of the wife of Eliyahu after he ascended to Heaven without dying.

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Ransoming for more than their Value

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The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 45b) had stated: We do not redeem captives for more than their true value for “the benefit of the world.”

The Gemora inquires: Does “the benefit of the world” (with respect to redeeming the captives for more than their worth) relate to the burden which may be imposed on the community (they will all become impoverished), or to the possibility that the bandits will take more captives? [The difference would be in a case where a private individual, such as a relative, wishes to redeem him.]

Come and hear: Levi ben Darga ransomed his daughter for thirteen thousand golden dinars.

Abaye asked: But are you sure that he acted with the consent of the Sages? Perhaps he acted against their will!

Rashi explains that “more than their true value” is referring to the amount that they would fetch if they would be sold in the slave market.

The Meiri writes that their value is based upon their individual wealth and prominence.

The Radvaz rules that we may ransom any captive with the amount of money that is usual to redeem other captives during that time period.

He adds: It has become the custom to redeem captive for more than their worth in the market, for an elderly person or a minor are not worth more than ten dinars, and nevertheless, they are ransomed for more than one hundred dinars. His explanation why there is no concern that the bandits will take more captives is because the captives are not being ransomed for any more that their gentile counterparts. He concludes that nothing should be told to Klal Yisroel about this, for they are a charitable nation, and it is better for them to remain that way.

Tosfos and the Ramban disagree regarding the halachah if the captive himself is allowed to ransom himself for more money than he is actually worth.

The Gemora in Kesuvos (52b) states: If one’s wife was captured and the kidnappers sought ten times her fair value for redemption, the first time the husband must redeem her. Afterwards, if he wants he can and if he does not want he does not have to. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that we do not redeem captives for more than they are worth for “the establishment of the world” (that captors should not thereby be encouraged to demand exorbitant prices for the ransom of their captive).

This issue had an extraordinary public application about 700 years ago. The leader of Ashkenazic Jewry at the time was Rabbi Meir ben Boruch of Rottenberg. He was imprisoned by a German ruler, Rudolph, whose voracity knew no bounds. Rabbi Meir (known as Maharam Mi’Rottenberg) was imprisoned until his death, and his body was not released. The community did not ransom him, as he himself had ruled. Seven years after his death, a private member of the community paid almost all of his own money to release the body, with the stipulation that he be buried next to him.

There is a question whether according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel a man would be permitted to ransom his wife if the ransom exceeds her worth. The Ritva holds that he may do so, and the Chelkas Mechokeik disagrees.

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An Ignorant Person's Recognition

The Mishna (Daf Yomi: Gittin 27a) had stated: If an agent (who was bringing a get) lost the get and found it immediately, it is still valid. However, if he found it after some time, it cannot be used (for we are concerned that it fell from someone else and it is not the get which he lost). If he found the get in a chafisah or in a deluskema (types of containers), or if he recognizes the get, it is valid.

Rashi explains that if the agent himself found the get (not in a container) and he recognizes it, the get is valid.

Other Rishonim understand the Mishna to mean that the get is valid if he recognizes the container.

The Rashba writes that the get will be valid if the agent found it and claims that he recognizes it. This is true even if the agent is an ignorant person. That which the Gemora says below that an ignorant person cannot be trusted that he recognizes the get is only true when someone else found it and the agent is trying to claim it from him. There, we suspect that he is lying. However, if he himself found the get, he is trusted that he recognizes it, for he has a migu (believe me what I am saying, for if I would want to lie, I could have said a better lie); he could have said that he never lost it in the first place. (The Ritva seems to say that the ignorant person is believed even without the migu.)

The Ramban writes that it is only with respect to a lost article that we do not trust an ignorant person when he claims that he recognizes it. However, with regards to a get, which is a prohibitory matter, he is trusted. (The Magid Mishnah explains that this is because one witness is believed with respect to prohibitory matters.)

There are two glaring questions on the Ramban. Firstly, the Gemora below states explicitly that to return it to someone who claims that he recognizes it by sight, it is only to a Talmudic scholar who would be trusted, but not any ordinary person!? Secondly, a get should be regarded as a davar she’b’ervah, a matter with respect to relations, and two witnesses are required for testimony involving such matters!?

The Toras Gittin answers the first question as follows: When the Gemora states that an ordinary person will not be trusted that he recognizes the get, that is only with respect to the monetary issues of the get; however, with respect to the prohibitions stemming from the get, he will be trusted.

The Maharam Schick answers the second question: The halacha is if a father said, “I accepted a kiddushin for my daughter, but I do not know from whom,” and a fellow comes to us and says that it was him, he is believed and she is married to him. The Ran explains that although ordinarily, a davar she’b’ervah requires two witnesses, here it doesn’t, for his testimony is not in contrast with any preexisting status quo; it is merely a clarification as to whom the father accepted the kiddushin from. One person is sufficient for this. So too, here, the one witness is not testifying on the divorce; rather, he is clarifying for us as to who this get belongs to.

The Oneg Yom Tov answers this question by saying that the concern for two Yosef ben Shimon’s in the same city is only a Rabbinical one, and therefore, although it is a davar she’b’ervah, only one witness is required.

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Post # 1,500!!! Reciting Korbanos in the Morning and the Reason for the Nazir's Chatas

Shulchan Aruch (O”C 1:5) rules that it is beneficial to recite every morning the portions in the Torah dealing with the korban olah, mincha, shelamim, chatas and asham.

The Magen Avraham asks: Shouldn’t the chatas be mentioned before the olah, since the chatas always takes precedence?

The Chidah offers the following answer: The Gemora in Menachos (110a) states that whoever recites the portion in the Torah discussing the korban chatas is recognized as if he offered a chatas on the Altar. This, he explains, is only applicable to the portions of the korban which are burned on the Altar; however, with respect to the portion that is given to the Kohanim, and that which they eat which provides atonement for the owner, the recital of the relevant verses does not help for this. Therefore, he says, that which our Gemora said that a chatas takes precedence over an olah, that is only with respect to the sacrifice; however, with respect to the recital of the korbanos, it is preferable to recite the olah portion prior to the portion dealing with the chatas. When one recites the verses of the chatas, he only receives credit for the portion that was to be brought on the Altar, but he does not receive credit for the portion of the korban which was to be eaten by the Kohanim; however, with the recital of the olah verses, it is regarded as if he offered the entire korban, for an olah is completely burned on the Altar. This is the reason that the olah is recited before the chatas.

The Nazir’s Chatas

The nazir brings three animals; a chatas, olah and a shelamim.

It is not explained why a nazir brings a korban chatas. The Ramban writes that it is for the following reason: A nazir separates himself to serve Hashem in a manner of extreme sanctity. It is only fitting, that after he has reached such a high level, he should strive to remain on that level for the remainder of his life. Since he concluded his nezirus and he reverted back to the desires of this world, he is required to offer a korban chatas to atone for this reversal.

The Meshech Chochmah writes that the accepting of nezirus upon oneself results in the forfeiture of many mitzvos, such as involving himself with the burial of his close relatives, reciting kiddush over wine and making havdalah. Although, a nazir accomplishes much in his abstainment and he is considered praiseworthy for this, he nevertheless is required to bring a korban chatas to atone for the mitzvos that he has lost.

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The Novelty of the Midianite Utensils

The Gemora (Daf Yomi: Nazir 37b) had concluded regarding the emissions of utensils used by idolaters that have been used within twenty-four hours, it is impossible that the absorption is not deemed slightly bad, and although with respect to all prohibitions, such a taste would be permitted, nevertheless, the Torah states that one is prohibited from using such a pot unless it is first scalded.

The Ramban asks: If in regards to those utensils used by idolaters, the flavor is regarded like the substance, how is it possible to say that with respect to other prohibitions, the flavor is not forbidden like the substance? Are the emissions from the idolaters’ utensils a distinct class of prohibition, different from any other prohibitions? The Midianite utensils were forbidden out of the concern that there were non-kosher foods cooked inside of it!

He answers that the Torah elevated its prohibition with respect of utensils that a utensil that absorbed flavor from a forbidden food is forbidden. And although the flavor that will be emitted from this pot will be slightly spoiled, and is not equivalent to the substance, nevertheless the Torah decreed that the flavor is not nullified and is forbidden. This is similar to the halacha that one must immerse in water a utensil purchased from an idolater even though it has not been used. There, if one would use it without immersion, the food would not be forbidden; here, it would be.

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