In the view which our author has given of the evidence derived from miracles, he makes some concessions which the truth does not appear to require, and which might affect materially the validity of the argument founded upon them. He allows, indeed, that we can easily pronounce concerning any appearance alleged to be miraculous, that it exceeds the limits of human power or knowledge, and consequently implies the introduction of a superior agency; but he does not see any good reason why such miracles (by which term, in this connexion, he intends merely such works as no human being could perform) should not be ascribed to superior created beings, who, for any thing we know to the contrary, may be permitted to interfere in the direction of events in this world, in a manner imperceptible to us, and so as to produce effects which vastly exceed the natural agency of the immediate and visible instruments. Hence, as we know not what degree of power such agents may possess, and have no positive proof that they may not be at the same time depraved and wicked, it would seem that we have no criterion in the nature of the things themselves to enable us to say that any works are properly miraculous, that is, that they afford a direct evidence of a divine commission. In order to determine this point, we have no other resource, according to him, but to compare the alleged revelation with the dictates of our own reason; if that pronounces it to be worthy of the source from which it professes to emanate,
