whose special definition is not
very different
1 from the general
definition of ‘man,’ though nevertheless he is really quite distinct
from men in general.
2 （That such persons are only
called unrestrained by analogy is proved by our blaming unrestraint, whether unqualified
or with reference to some particular bodily pleasure, as a vice and not merely an error,
whereas we do not regard those unrestrained in regard to money, etc. as guilty of
vice.）
[
3]
But of those who exceed in relation to
the bodily enjoyments with regard to which we speak of men as temperate or profligate, he
who pursues excessive pleasure, and avoids the extremes
3 of bodily pains such as hunger, heat, cold, and the various pains of touch
and taste, not from choice but against his own choice and reason, is described as
unrestrained not with a qualification—unrestrained as regards these pleasures
and pains—as is one who yields to anger, but just simply as unrestrained.
[
4]
（A proof that
‘unrestrained’ unqualified denotes unrestraint as regards bodily
pleasures and pains, is that we speak of men as ‘soft’ who yield to
these, but not those who yield to anger or the like.） And hence we class the
unrestrained man with the profligate （and the self-restrained with the
temperate）
4 , but not those who yield to anger or the like, because
Unrestraint and Profligacy are related to the same pleasures and pains. But as a matter of
fact, although they are related to the same things, they are not related to them in the
same way; the profligate acts from choice, the unrestrained man does not. Hence we should
pronounce a man who pursues excessive pleasures and avoids moderate pains when he feels
only weak desires or none at all, to be more profligate than one who does so owing to
intense desires; for what would the former do if
he possessed the ardent desires of youth, and felt violent pain when debarred from the
‘necessary’ pleasures?
[
5]
And inasmuch as some desires and pleasures relate to things that are noble and good in
kind （for some pleasant things are desirable by nature, others the opposite,
while others again are neutral—compare the classification we gave above5） : for instance
money, gain, victory, honor: and inasmuch as in relation to all these naturally desirable
things, as well as to the neutral ones, men are not blamed merely for regarding or
desiring or liking them, but for doing so in a certain way, namely to excess
（hence those6 who yield to or pursue, contrary to
principle, anything naturally noble and good, for example those who care too much for
honor, or for their children and their parents—for parents and children are good
things and people are praised who care for them, but nevertheless it is possible even in
their case to go to excess, by vying even with the gods like Niobe,7
or as Satyrus did,8
