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we must therefore set aside the vital activity of
nutrition and growth. Next in the scale will come some form of sentient life; but this too
appears to be shared by horses, oxen, and animals generally.
[13]
There remains therefore what may be called the practical1
life of the rational part of man. (This part has two divisions,2 one
rational as obedient to principle, the others possessing principle and exercising
intelligence). Rational life again has two meanings; let us assume that we are
here concerned with the active exercise3 of the rational faculty, since
this seems to be the more proper sense of the term.
[14]
If
then the function of man is the active exercise of the soul's faculties4 in conformity with rational principle, or at all
events not in dissociation from rational principle, and if we acknowledge the function of
an individual and of a good individual of the same class (for instance, a harper
and a good harper, and so generally with all classes) to be generically the same,
the qualification of the latter's superiority in excellence being added to the function in
his case (I mean that if the function of a harper is to play the harp, that of a
good harper is to play the harp well): if this is so, and if we declare that the
function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of
the soul's faculties and activities in association with rational principle,
[15]
and say that the function of a good man is to perform these
activities well and rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in
accordance with its own proper excellence—from these premises it follows that
the Good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with
excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity
with the best and most perfect among them.
[16]
Moreover, to
be happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one
fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness
1 ‘Practice’ for Aristotle denotes purposeful conduct, of which only rational beings are capable, cf. 6.2.2 note.
2 This anticipation of 13.19 is irrelevant, and states decisively a point there left doubtful. Also on grounds of Greek this parenthesis has been suspected as an interpolation, and perhaps we should leave it out and render the preceding words ‘the practical life of a rational being.’
3 In contrast with the mere state of possessing the faculty.
4 Literally ‘activity of soul’; ψυχή however has a wider connotation than either ‘soul’ or ‘mind,’ and includes the whole of the vitality of any living creature.