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good and pleasant in
itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and
what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears to be pleasant to all
men.
[8]
We must not argue from a vicious and corrupt life,
or one that is painful, for such a life is indefinite, like its attributes.1 (The point as to pain
will be clearer in the sequel.2)
[9]
But if life itself is good and
pleasant (as it appears to be, because all men desire it, and virtuous and
supremely happy men most of all, since their way of life is most desirable and their
existence the most blissful) ; and if one who sees is conscious3 that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks,
and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of
their exercise, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and
whenever we think, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are
perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we
saw, is sense-perception or thought);
1 i.e., vice and pain.
2 Bk. 10.1-5.
3 αἰσθάνεσθαι is used throughout to denote ‘consciousness’ (as well as, where needed, ‘sensation). At 1170b 11 συναισθάνεσθαι expresses sympathetic consciousness of another's thoughts and feelings; it is probable therefore that in l.4 the compound verb is a copyist's mistake.