The class of things that admit of variation includes both things made and actions done.
[2]
But making is different from doing （a
distinction we may accept from extraneous discourses1）. Hence the rational quality concerned with doing
is different from the rational quality concerned with making; nor is one of them a part of
the other, for doing is not a form of making, nor making a form of doing.
[3]
Now architectural skill, for instance, is an art, and it is also a
rational quality concerned with making; nor is there any art which is not a rational
quality concerned with making, nor any such quality which is not an art. It follows that
an art is the same thing as a rational quality, concerned with making, that reasons truly.
[4]
All Art deals with bringing some thing into existence;
and to pursue an art means to study how to bring into existence a thing which may either
exist or not, and the efficient cause of which lies in the maker and not in the thing
made; for Art does not deal with things that exist or come into existence of necessity, or
according to nature, since these have their efficient cause in themselves.
[5]
But as doing and making are distinct, it follows that Art, being
concerned with making, is not concerned with doing. And in a sense Art deals with the same
objects as chance, as Agathon says: “
Chance is beloved of Art, and Art of Chance.
”