The rules of justice based on convention and expediency
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and does not depend on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the first
instance may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been
settled it is not indifferent: for example, that the ransom for a prisoner shall be a
mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep; and any regulations
enacted for particular cases, for instance the sacrifice in honor of Brasidas,1 and ordinances in the nature of special decrees.
[2]
Some people think that all rules of justice are merely
conventional, because whereas a law of nature is immutable and has the same validity
everywhere, as fire burns both here and in Persia, rules of justice are seen to vary.
[3]
That rules of justice vary is not absolutely true, but only with qualifications. Among
the gods indeed it is perhaps not true at all; but in our world,2
although there is such a thing as Natural Justice, all rules of justice are variable. But
nevertheless there is such a thing as Natural Justice as well as justice not ordained by
nature;
[4]
and it is easy3 to see
which rules of justice, though not absolute, are natural, and which are not natural but
legal and conventional, both sorts alike being variable. The same distinction will hold
good in all other matters; for instance, the right hand is naturally stronger than the
left, yet it is possible for any man to make himself ambidextrous.
[5]
1 The Spartan Brasidas detached Amphipolis from the Athenian empire 424 B.C., and fell defending it against Cleon 422. He was worshipped as a hero by the city, ‘with games and yearly sacrifices’ （Thuc. 5.11）.
2 The order of the following sentences seems confused. With the transpositions suggested by Richards, and the emendations given in the critical notes, they will run: ‘But in our world, although there is such a thing as natural law, yet everything is capable of change. For example, the right hand is naturally stronger than the left, yet it is possible for some persons to be born ambidextrous; and the same distinction will hold good in all matters; though what sort of things that admit of variation are as they are by nature, and what are merely customary and conventional, it is not easy to see, inasmuch as both alike are capable of change. But nevertheless some things are ordained by nature and others not.’
3 Perhaps Aristotle wrote ‘though is is not easy.’
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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