Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

But whereas the self-restrained man has evil desires,¹ the temperate man has none; he is so constituted as to take no pleasure in things that are contrary to principle, whereas the self-restrained man does feel pleasure in such things, but does not yield to it. [7] There is also a resemblance between the unrestrained man and the profligate, though they are really distinct: both pursue bodily pleasures, but the profligate thinks it right to do so, the man who lacks self-restraint does not.10.

Again, the same person cannot be at once unrestrained and prudent, for it has been shown² that Prudence is inseparable from Moral Virtue. [2] Also, Prudence does not consist only in knowing what is right, but also in doing it; but the unrestrained man does not do the right.³ （Cleverness on the other hand is not incompatible with Unrestraint—which is why it is sometimes thought that some people are prudent and yet unrestrained—because Cleverness differs from Prudence in the manner explained in our first discourse⁴: as being intellectual faculties⁵ they are closely akin, but they differ in that Prudence involves deliberate choice.） [3] Nor indeed does the unrestrained man even know the right in the sense of one who consciously exercises his knowledge, but only as a man asleep or drunk can be said to know something. Also, although he errs willingly （for he knows in a sense both what he is doing and what end he is aiming at） , yet he is not wicked, for his moral choice is sound, so that he is only half-wicked. And he is not unjust, for he does not deliberately design to do harm,⁶ since the one type of unrestrained person does not keep to the resolve he has formed after deliberation, and the other, the excitable type, does not deliberate at all.