M. Tullius Cicero, For Aulus Cluentius
C. D. Yonge, Ed.

Then, also, those five judges, who, hunting for the vague rumours of ignorant men, acquitted him at the time, were unwilling that their clemency should be extravagantly praised; and if any one asked them whether they had sat as judges on Caius Fabricius, they said that they had, if they were asked whether he had been accused of any crime except of that poison which was said to have been endeavoured to be administered to Habitus, they said no; if, after that, they were asked what their decision had been, they said that they had condemned him. For no one acquitted him. In the same manner, if any question had been asked about Scamander, they would certainly have given the same answer, although he was acquitted by one vote; but at that time no one of those men would have liked that one vote to be called his. [106] Which, then, could more easily give an account of his vote,—he who said that he had been consistent with himself and with the previous decision, or he who said that he had been lenient to the principal offender, and very severe against his assistants and accomplices? But concerning their decision I have no occasion to say anything; for I have no doubt, that such men as they, being influenced by some sudden suspicion, avoided the point at issue. On which account I find no fault with the mercy of those who acquitted him. I approve of the firmness of those men who, in giving their judgment, followed the precedent of the previous decisions of their own accord, and not in consequence of the fraudulent trick of Stalenus; but I praise the wisdom of those men who said that to their minds it was not proved, who could by no means acquit a man whom they knew to be very guilty, and whom they themselves had already condemned twice before, but who, as such a disgraceful plan, and as a suspicion of such an atrocious act had been suggested to them, preferred condemning him a little later, when the facts were clearly ascertained. [107] And, that you may not judge them to have been exceedingly wise men merely by their actions, but that you may also feel sure, from their very names, that what they did was most honestly and wisely done; who can be mentioned superior to Publius Octavius Balbus, as to ability more prudent,—in knowledge of law more skillful,—in good faith, in religion, in the performance of his duty, more scrupulous or more careful? He did not acquit him. Who is a better man than Quintus Considius? who is better acquainted with the practice of courts of justice, and with that sense of right which ought always to exist in the public courts? who is his superior in virtue, in wisdom, or in authority? Even he did not acquit him. It would take me too long to cite the virtue of each separate individual in the same manner; and in truth, their good qualities are so will known to every one, that they do not need the ornaments of language to set them off. What a man was Marcus Juventius Pedo, a man formed on the principles and system of the judges of old! What a man was Lucius Caulius Mergus! and Marcus Basilus! and Caius Caudinus! all of whom flourished in the public courts of justice at that time when the republic also was flourishing. Of the same body were Lucius Cassius and Cnaeus Heius, men of equal integrity and wisdom. And by the vote of none of those men was Oppianicus acquitted. And the youngest of all but one, who in ability, and in diligence, and in conscientiousness was equal to those men whom I have already mentioned, Publius Saturius, delivered the same opinion. [108] O, the singular innocence of Oppianicus! when in the case in which he was defendant, those who acquitted him are supposed to have had some ulterior end,—those who postponed their decision, to have been cautious; but every one who condemned him is esteemed virtuous and firm.