George
Maddox
Beechcraft 58 Baron, Quest Diagnostics Inc., N167TB: Accident occurred August 21, 2009 in Teterboro, New Jersey
Thursday December 12, 2013, 5:51 PM
The
family of a pilot killed in a plane crash four years ago near Teterboro
Airport will receive $7.5 million under a settlement finalized in
Hackensack on Thursday with the owner of the aircraft.
George
Maddox, 54, of Sinking Springs, Pa., was the pilot in command of a
two-seat, twin-engine Beechcraft model BE-58 Baron plane in August 2009.
The plane, owned and operated by Quest Diagnostics, was flying from
Pottstown, Pa., to deliver specimens to a Quest laboratory in
Teterboro.
Sanil Gopinath of Laurel, Md., was the co-pilot. A
lawsuit filed by Maddox’s widow, Lisa, claimed Gopinath, an independent
“contract” pilot, was the one operating the plane at the time of the
crash
Authorities said at the time that the plane approached
Teterboro Airport but aborted a landing and went for a “go-around,” a
standard maneuver that is undertaken if a pilot is not comfortable with
executing a landing. The plane then hit a tree, crossed Route 46 and
burst into flames outside the Mohawk Carpet Co., authorities said.
Maddox suffered severe burns and died two weeks later from his injuries. Gopinath also was injured but survived.
Lisa
Maddox filed her lawsuit in Superior Court in Hackensack in 2011,
claiming that the crash was caused by “operational error” and
“maintenance related failure.”
In claiming Gopinath was the pilot
during the flight, the lawsuit quoted an interview with Gopinath after
the crash, in which he said, “I brought the power down, I made a left
turn, and [Captain Maddox] freaks out, ‘What have you done? You’ve lost
both your engines’.”
The lawsuit claims Gopinath did not have the
proper training or experience to fly the plane and that Quest was at
fault for hiring him.
The settlement, which was formalized
Thursday before Superior Court Judge Brian Martinotti, provides
compensation for Maddox’s wrongful death as well as pain and suffering
before he died.
The agreement also provides that the amount —
after the payment of attorney fees — will be split between Lisa Maddox
and her 11-year-old daughter, Lily. The amount also includes payment of
$60,000 a year for four years for Lily’s college education.
Martinotti
said the settlement was a “fair and reasonable” conclusion to the more
than two years of litigation that involved thousands of pages of
documents and several attorneys.
Lisa Maddox, who lives in
Pennsylvania, attended the hearing Thursday through teleconferencing.
Answering questions from Martinotti, she said she was pleased with the
outcome of the settlement.
Her attorney, Geoffrey Fieger,
declined to comment, saying the settlement deal includes an agreement
among the attorneys not to comment about the case.
Dennis Kadian, the attorney for Quest, also declined to comment.
http://www.northjersey.com
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/projList.cfm?ntsbnum=ERA09LA469
NTSB Identification: ERA09LA469
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, August 21, 2009 in Teterboro, NJ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/16/2011
Aircraft: RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY 58, registration: N167TB
Injuries: 1 Fatal,1 Serious.
NTSB
investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation
and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft
accident report.
The airplane was operating as a corporate flight
transporting medical specimens on a night, visual approach in visual
meteorological conditions when the accident occurred. The flight was
scheduled to be a single-pilot operation conducted under the provisions
of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, and the pilot-in-command
(PIC) had been assigned to the flight. Although the second-in-command
(SIC), also a Quest Diagnostics pilot, was not assigned to the flight,
he asked the PIC if he could accompany him on the flight to gain
familiarization with operations into Teterboro Airport. Typically, the
PIC flies the airplane from the left seat; however, the PIC on this
flight allowed the SIC to occupy the left seat and fly the airplane. The
investigation could not determine if the pilots had coordinated
responsibilities for the flight before departure or if the PIC was
providing additional training to the SIC during the flight.
Radar
data indicated that, while on the base leg of the traffic pattern, the
airplane had an airspeed of about 204 knots, which exceeded the maximum
flap extension speed by more than 50 knots and the maximum landing gear
extension speed by more than 80 knots. According to the SIC, during this
critical portion of the approach to landing, the nonflying PIC remained
focused on providing familiarization of the airport and city
environment to the SIC, who was flying the airplane, and the PIC failed
to monitor the airplane’s airspeed. After the SIC recognized the
airplane’s excessive approach speed close to the runway environment, he
attempted to slow the airplane. However, he inadvertently retarded the
propeller levers and feathered the propellers instead of retarding the
throttle levers. Recognizing the resultant loss of thrust, the PIC
challenged the SIC’s actions and stated that both engines had
experienced power loss. The airplane’s unfeathering accumulators had
been removed; therefore, it was not possible for either pilot to quickly
unfeather the propellers and reestablish engine power. Approaching the
runway centerline at both low altitude and high airspeed and with the
propellers feathered, the pilots were unable to slow the airplane and
descend before overflying the runway. The airplane crossed the runway
threshold at 300 feet and 186 knots (90 knots more than the approach
speed of 96 knots), departed airport property, struck objects, and burst
into flames.
Chairman Hersman and Member Rosekind did not
approve this brief. Chairman Hersman filed a dissenting statement, which
Member Rosekind joined. Member Rosekind filed a dissenting statement,
which Chairman Hersman joined. Member Sumwalt filed a concurring
statement, which Vice Chairman Hart and Member Weener joined. The
statements can be found in the public docket for this accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The
complete loss of thrust due to the second-in-command’s (SIC)
inadvertent feathering of both propellers during a high-speed,
low-altitude approach. Contributing to the accident was the
pilot-in-command’s inadequate monitoring of the SIC’s performance.
Chairman
Hersman and Member Rosekind did not approve this probable cause.
Chairman Hersman filed a dissenting statement, which Member Rosekind
joined. Member Rosekind filed a dissenting statement, which Chairman
Hersman joined. Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement, which Vice
Chairman Hart and Member Weener joined. The statements can be found in
the public docket for this accident.
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/projList.cfm?ntsbnum=ERA09LA469
The Wall Street Journal
By Rob Barry, Tom McGinty and Andy Pasztor
Updated Dec. 11, 2013 10:18 p.m. ET
Foreign
airline crews experienced problems approaching San Francisco
International Airport at a greater rate than U.S. pilots when the
airport's landing guidance system was impaired, a Wall Street Journal
analysis of government data found.
The findings, based on nearly
100,000 flights coming into the busy hub over six months, come as
federal investigators held their first public hearing Wednesday on the
crash last summer of an Asiana Airlines Co. jet in which three people
died and 180 were injured. The pilots' undue reliance on automated
flight systems has emerged as a key factor in that crash.
Asiana,
based in South Korea, had the highest rate during the system outage of
any carrier serving San Francisco for "go-arounds"—approaches broken off
at low altitude before touchdown—the Journal found.
In July, an
Asiana Boeing Co. 777, flying dangerously slow and low into San
Francisco, slammed its tail into a seawall in front of its intended
runway. Investigators of the crash are focusing on pilot confusion about
automated thrust settings, coupled with the cockpit crew's failure to
properly monitor the jetliner's speed and trajectory during the visual
approach in good weather.
At its public hearing, the National
Transportation Safety Board revealed Wednesday that the commander of the
Asiana jet failed to respond to as many as four verbal warnings from a
co-pilot that the aircraft was descending too quickly shortly before
impact. The pilot flying the approach told investigators afterward he
had been "very concerned" about executing the approach to San Francisco
without precise vertical guidance.
Asiana officials said
Wednesday that all company pilots flying into SFO had the required
training, experience and the confidence of management.
The
instrument landing system at San Francisco provides just such vertical
and horizontal guidance, giving pilots detailed visual cues on their
instrument panels if they veer from a safe trajectory. Otherwise, crews
would have to use their own eyes and judgment to line up with a
less-precise array of lights alongside the runway intended to help
pilots stay on the correct path.
Over a five-week stretch leading
up to the July 6 crash, a pivotal component of the system at SFO, as
the airport is known, was out of service on the two busiest runways
because of construction.
During the outage, foreign carriers
broke off landing approaches to go around and try again at a rate nearly
three times as high as their American counterparts, according to the
Journal's analysis. The Journal examined radar data for 95,436
approaches to San Francisco's runways 28L and 28R, and focused on
go-arounds initiated at altitudes of 1,000 feet or lower.
From
Jan. 1 through June 1, the point at which San Francisco's "glideslope"
equipment was taken out of service, non-U.S. carriers executed at least
20 go-arounds at or below 1,000 feet in 5,349 approaches to the two
runways, for a rate of 3.7 go-arounds per 1,000 flights. That is about
37% higher than the 2.7 per thousand for domestic carriers in the same
period.
Once the glideslope shut down, rates rose for both
domestic and foreign carriers, but the increase for non-U.S. airlines
was significantly larger.
Relying on visual approaches without
precise, ground-based guidance, foreign airlines racked up at least 17
go-arounds out of 1,534 approaches, a rate of 11.1 per 1,000 approaches.
By comparison, the rate for U.S. airlines during the same period was
4.3 per 1,000 approaches.
Four of the go-arounds by non-U.S.
carriers involved Asiana, including one executed 400 feet from the
ground just after midnight on the day before the crash. The other three
planes each descended to 200 feet before executing their go-arounds.
An
Asiana spokesman declined to confirm the total, saying "Asiana's policy
is that any pilot can call for a go-around, and can do so without
penalty."
Safety experts cite various reasons for the discrepancy
between U.S. and foreign airlines. Some say foreign crews have less
exposure to SFO's busy airspace; its closely spaced parallel runways;
and the tendency of controllers to boost airport capacity by often
maintaining minimum required spacing between planes. Others see some
foreign airlines playing down manual skills—particularly for pilots
flying widebody planes on long-haul routes—because automated controls
are more fuel-efficient than manual flying.
Pilots can perform
go-arounds for a variety of reasons, including congestion on the ground
or in the air, and a failure to properly align the plane with the runway
late in the approach. In some cases, the aborted landings are ordered
by air-traffic controllers; other times, pilots make the decision to try
again. According to the FAA, go-arounds "are routine, standardized
procedures, and can occur once a day or more at busy airports for
various reasons."
The spate of go-arounds by non-U.S. carriers
may be explored in testimony and documents slated to be released this
week as part of the NTSB's hearing.
"The statistics for
go-arounds are obviously a significant element" as investigators unravel
what happened and why the accident occurred, according to Robert
Francis, a former vice chairman of the safety board. "It's just the kind
of thing the NTSB certainly will be paying a lot of attention to."
Roughly
two weeks after the accident—with part of the ground-based precision
landing equipment still inoperative—the FAA took the unusual step of
publicly prodding pilots of foreign airlines to use satellite-based aids
or other systems as safeguards when landing at SFO.
Air-traffic
controllers also stopped clearing foreign carriers for simultaneous
visual approaches to closely spaced parallel runways, which can distract
pilots. The extra precautions, which didn't apply to U.S. carriers,
were lifted on Aug. 22, the day when SFO's glideslope equipment was put
back into service.
This week, an FAA spokeswoman said the special
procedures were prompted by "an increase in go-arounds at SFO by some
foreign carriers that were flying visual approaches," though she didn't
provide specifics.
The data analyzed by the Journal showed the
flight tracks of all aircraft that approached SFO during the period,
providing each plane's latitude, longitude and altitude approximately
every five seconds. The data didn't include reasons for the any of the
maneuvers those planes made.
Source: http://online.wsj.com
NTSB Identification: DCA13MA120
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 129: Foreign operation of Asiana Airlines
Accident occurred Saturday, July 06, 2013 in San Francisco, CA
Aircraft: BOEING 777-200ER, registration: HL7742
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
This
is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors.
Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has
been completed. NTSB investigators traveled in support of this
investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare
this aircraft accident report.
On July 6, 2013, about 1128
pacific daylight time, Asiana Airlines flight 214, a Boeing 777-200ER,
registration HL7742, impacted the sea wall and subsequently the runway
during landing on runway 28L at San Francisco International Airport
(SFO), San Francisco, California. Of the 4 flight crewmembers, 12 flight
attendants, and 291 passengers, about 182 were transported to the
hospital with injuries and 3 passengers were fatally injured. The
airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The
regularly scheduled passenger flight was operating under the provisions
of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129 between Incheon International
Airport, Seoul, South Korea, and SFO. Visual meteorological conditions
prevailed at the time of the accident.
