[148] to their front, to prevent the removal of troops to the front of Longstreet, and make real and vigorous advance if Longstreet was at all successful. But, as Fitzhugh Lee says (p. 277), ‘His chariot of war had hardly started before he found his corps team were not pulling together; the wheel horse selected to start it was balky and stubborn, and after stretching his traces, did not draw his share of the load with rapidity enough to be effective.’ At sunrise, General Lee sent a messenger to General Ewell, on the left, to ask whether he could not attack from his flank; but Ewell at daylight found Culp's hill already occupied, and axes and spades were making a fort of that barb of the fish-hook.
At sunrise that morning Meade's divisions were widely scattered. Less than ten thousand of his First and Eleventh corps were on the Cemetery hill. Right and left, were the 8,600 of Slocum's corps. Near at hand was the Third corps of 8,000. At any time before 7 o'clock Lee would have found less than 27,000 men to contest his way. But at 7 A. M., came the Second corps, and at 8 A. M., the Fifth was on the ground. At 9 A. M. came part of the Third, and at half-past 10 the artillery reserve was on the Seminary ridge.
General Lee, in the presence of General Longstreet, directed McLaws to place two divisions in position away to the right, near the peach orchard, and perpendicular to the Emmittsburg road, and to get there without the observation of the enemy. He wished him to envelop the Federal left on the Emmittsburg road and drive him in. He told General A. P. Hill that General Longstreet's line would be on his south, and nearly at right angles to his own line, and directed Hill to move into battle with Longstreet's left. After giving orders in person to Longstreet and Hill, General Lee rode into Gettysburg, to examine Ewell's position on the left. Since 2 o'clock in the morning, Early was in line at the foot of the slope, ready to scale the Cemetery hill, and eager for the order to advance. In Gettysburg, General Lee waited anxiously for the sound of Longstreet's guns. He was exceedingly impatient. ‘What can detain Longstreet,’ he said, ‘He ought to be in position now.’ It was 1 o'clock before General Longstreet set his column in motion, losing three golden hours of sunlight after he was ordered to move. Two more hours were taken in bringing the troops to the position assigned, taking a long circuitous route. It was 4 in the afternoon, when the force was in line of battle before Little Round Top. General Sickles had placed his command on
