[33]
To which the accused might answer, “It
does not necessarily follow that the man whose act
leads to another's death should be condemned forthwith. Were this so, the accuser, witnesses and
judges in a capital case would all be liable to
condemnation. Nor is the cause of death always a
guilty cause. Take for instance the case of a man
who persuades another to go on a journey or
sends for his friend from overseas, with the result
that the latter perishes in a shipwreck, or again the
case of a man who invites another to dine, with
the result that the guest dies of indigestion.”
Quintilian. With An English Translation. Harold Edgeworth Butler. Cambridge. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 1922.
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