The Twentieth Georgia regiment at the battle of Chickamauga.
The Twentieth regiment of Georgia volunteers reached the vicinity of Ringgold on the night of the 17th of September, 1863. Early on the morning of the 18th it moved along with the brigade to the suburbs of that place, and there remained until about sunset, when we were marched to a point near Reed's bridge, going into bivouac about 12 o'clock that night. The morning of the 19th we crossed at Reed's bridge, and, bearing to the left, took position in front of what I think was the position occupied by Walker's division of reserves. About 2 o'clock P. M. we advanced upon the enemy, and soon became hotly engaged. The enemy slowly gave way before us, for a distance of two miles or more, until our line had crossed, nearly at right angles, the main public road leading from Lafayette, Georgia, to Chattanooga, Tennessee. In the farther edge of this road, near a small framed house, had been planted a battery of four guns. The enemy succeeded in carrying back his cannon, caissons, etc., by [385] hand, after losing several horses and a number of artillerists. At that point we could make no further advance in consequence of greatly depleted ranks and want of artillery on our side, while the enemy was superior to us, five-fold in numbers, in position naturally stronger than ours, rendered stronger still by a rudely constructed breastwork of logs, with three batteries in full play upon our line. That position we held until the firing ceased at nightfall, when, being considerably in advance of the troops on our right, we were withdrawn some three hundred yards, and the whole line ordered to be dressed. The loss in killed and wounded on the 19th was about one hundred; probably one hundred prisoners captured.We lay under arms that night with orders to be ready for action by dawn following, not however to advance and renew combat until firing should be heard nearing us on the right coming down the line, as it was not deemed advisable to press the enemy too hotly below his centre until General Polk's corps had driven his left (our right) across the Chattanooga road, so as to cut off the best road of retreat. For some reason, I have never learned, General Polk's troops did not begin the fight of Sunday, the 20th, before 10 o'clock A. M., or very little before. At the appointed signal we began to advance, and had proceeded but a few hundred yards before coming up with a brigade (I think from Arkansas) at a halt. We passed it, obliquing somewhat to the left, and soon engaged the enemy. Six regiments of infantry were supporting a battery of four (4) guns; at least, in capturing the battery (which we did), six infantry regiments had representatives among the prisoners, besides the artillerists. In charging this battery it was that General Benning had his horse killed under him. With his pocket-knife he cut the traces, etc., of another from a caisson, mounted him bareback, and in a few moments, so mounted, led another charge upon a battery of four (4) guns, which was also captured by his brigade. The officer in command of that battery stood to his post, discharging his pistol as we advanced until we were within twenty feet of him, when he fired at and shot down a private of Captain Breazeal's Company, A (I regret that I cannot recall his name, though I knew him well), who was rushing a few feet in advance (and directly in advance of myself) for the colors. That shot emptied the officer's pistol. Then it was he proposed surrender. Before I could tell him that his conduct was, in effect, raising the ‘black-flag,’ he was riddled with bullets. Flight was as dangerous as standing, and he doubtless determined to do all the harm he could, then take his chances for safety in surrender. I 25 [386] could not have saved him if I would—very sure am I, that I would not if I could. Here there was a cessation of activity on our part for more than an hour, awaiting reinforcements. None came. Collecting our own brigade, along with Law's Alabamians and some of Robertson's Texans, we began advancing, and happily striking the enemy at a weak point, penetrated his line, whereby fully one-fourth of Rosecrans's army was completely cut off. Information was immediately transmitted to the rear, but no advantage was taken of it. Governor I. G. Harris or Judge D. S. Terry can give you full and valuable information upon this point—particularly as to the parties upon whom blame for the failure should justly rest.
Here we lay until about 4 o'clock P. M., when we were ordered to a position up the Chattanooga road to repel an attack from Granger's corps, advancing rapidly, as was reported, from that direction. We found there A. P. Stewart's corps. We took position immediately in his front. Generals Law and Benning (officers of great but most signally unappreciated merit, then and afterwards, by those high in command) rode to the front and, after a hurried reconnoissance, suggested the propriety of bringing up some twenty pieces of artillery and opening upon Granger's advancing forces from directly up the Chattanooga road. It was done with a grand success. If any of his infantry bore part in that evening's fight, it was not in our immediate front—unless, indeed, losing a large number of prisoners may be construed to mean ‘bearing part.’ They fired no muskets, and their cannon did but little damage.
Our loss in the regiment was about fifty on the 20th, among them a most valuable officer. Captain W. W. Breazeal was as modest as a woman, as affectionate as a girl, as brave as a lion, and a truer heart than his never quickened its pulsations at the mention of liberty. The whole brigade was eager for pursuit that night, hungry and worn as the men all were. Pursuit was not ordered then, nor the next day; and so the full fruits of a fairly won victory we were not permitted to taste of.
I never met the Western army except at Chickamauga and at Lookout Valley—that insensate night blunder! saw at Chickamauga what I never saw in Virginia, or Maryland, or Pennsylvania. At Chickamauga we broke the enemy's lines three separate times on the 19th of September in the space of half a mile. They reformed twice in an open, level corn-field without cover from a stinging fire. True, they did not allow us to approach nearer than one hundred yards before breaking. The Virginia troops stood firmer, allowed [387] closer approach, but when once broken, I never knew them to rally under fire. At Second Manassas the Twenty-ninth New York stood until it was necessary to use the bayonet. At Gettysburg four regiments maintained unbroken front until the hostile colors almost kissed.
A large number of prisoners (over one thousand) were captured Sunday, but as Stewart's men had part in the capture, I cannot say what number thereof properly belonged to the brigade. It was at Benning's suggestion that Stewart made any captures at all, however, for I heard it made and Stewart assent.
