September 7th, Monday.—Returned to camp and, when all of the detachments of the regiment had arrived, found that the killed, wounded and missing footed up one hundred and thirty-two, nearly one-fourth of the number taken to Fort Wagner. Besides six of the men left with Lieutenant Brown, three others were missing. When the men were all turned out of the bomb proof on the evening of the 6th, one man complained to me that he was sick and desired to remain in the bomb-proof. Ordinarily, he would have been excused from duty, but it was then impossible. I could not tell him why my orders were so peremptory that he should go with his company on the parapet, because it was not a part of our plan that the men should be informed that we were evacuating the fort. The poor fellow no doubt returned to the bomb-proof, and did not discover that I had not treated him with great harshness till he was captured. The other two could not be accounted for.
I heard to-day full particulars of the plan of attack that was to have been made on Fort Wagner at 9 o'clock this morning. Gilmore and Dahlgren's correspondence was interpreted by our Signal Corps as it was signalled between them. The fleet was to come up at the usual hour and join the land batteries in the bombardment, which was to continue with great fury till 9 o'clock, the hour of low tide. During the cannonade, troops were to be massed behind the last parallel. At the hour appointed for the assault the Ironsides was to run up a red flag. The batteries and ships were at this signal to cease firing. A brigade of infantry was to pass on the beach between the flank wall of the fort and low water and attack us in the rear, while another body of troops came over the last parallel and stormed us in front. The rear walls of the fort could be climbed in many places without much difficulty. Wagner was not constructed with the expectation that an attack would be made from the rear. The ditch in front of the bastion was filled by sand-drifts (the effect of the enemy's shot and shell) for a space almost wide enough to admit a company in line. General Beauregard did not inform us before the evacuation that he knew the enemy's plan of attack, but this knowledge, no doubt, hastened the order to evacuate. The attack from the rear was the plan which I told Colonel Keitt (on the 3d, when I asked him to allow me to increase the force behind the flank wall on the outside of the fort) the enemy would be likely to pursue. I subsequently expressed the same opinion to Colonel Harris, but neither of these officers agreed with me.
September 8th.—The enemy's ironclad fleet came up this morning,
