—(Ibid, page 432.)I then marched the regiment a short distance to the rear, had the men wipe out their guns, many of them being so dirty they could not load, fill their cartridge-boxes and replenish their canteens with water. We then marched forward into line, and continued in line until after dark, when we fell back in order to get out of reach of the shells from the gunboats.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. D. Venable, commanding the Fifth Tennessee, of Stewart's brigade judging from his report, could not have been part of that puissant force which was about to swoop down upon, throttle and carry of from under the guns of the naval vessels the whole Fedral army after 6 o'clock in the afternoon of an April day; for after having, by a movement of his regiment, as he reports, ‘closed the only avenue of escape’ for General Prentiss, and thus assured his capture, he next flanked to the left about three hundred yards and halted to rest; but, in a few moments, ‘the shelling from the gunboats was so severe as to be unbearable, killing and wounding several of (his) men,’ whereupon he ‘retired to a ravine and remained until dusk, and then moved back and encamped for the night.’ (Rebellion Records, Volume X, Part I, page 434.) Again, Colonel A. W. Campbell, commander of the Thirty-third Tennessee, of the same division (Stewart's), as may be seen, having expended the ammunition of the right wing of his regiment, he halted it until ammunition could be procured, which detained them for some time, ‘after which, advancing toward the river until night, we returned to the cross-roads and bivouacked near the cross-roads.’ (Ibid, page 435.) And now I have to quote the report of General Cheatham, dated April 30, which is wholly irreconcilable with and subversive of the story of the ‘Lost Opportunity’: ‘Broken and routed he (enemy) apparently, from all directions, seemed flying toward the river, and our own forces as generally closing upon him. * * * * ’