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of April, he stated, adding that the loss of the regiment was about one hundred killed and wounded. (Ibid, 625.) And this brings us to General Polk, the last of the three corps commanders of the Confederate army at Shiloh, referred to by Colonel Johnston as having believed that the ‘victory was won and would have been consummated by the capture of Grant's army,’ * * but for Beauregard's ‘order of withdrawal,’ late as it was when that order reached anybody; that is to say, on the very edge of dusk, and before even the partial execution of which the darkness of night had settled upon both armies to such an extent that corps and division and brigade, and even regimental commanders, were separated from their commands until the next morning, and even later.
General Polk, it is to be noted, fixes five o'clock as the time that his ‘line’ attacked the enemy's troops, the last that were left upon the field, in an encampment ‘to his right.’
The attack was made front and flank.
The resistance was sharp but short. (Rebellion Records, Volume X, pages 1 and 409.) This refers to the attack upon and surrender of Prentiss, which Prentiss himself reports took place at 5:30 P. M. The details which General Polk describes as incident to that surrender, including the arrangements for sending two thousand prisoners to the rear, with the disposition of their arms, could hardly have occupied less than half an hour.
That must have made it at least as late as six o'clock before such disposition could be made and leave ‘the field clear,’ as he says it was, before the troops with him—now united with those of Generals Bragg and Breckinridge, as also Cheatham, with one brigade of his own (Polk's) corps—could possibly be ready to advance in that vigorous manner which he asserts must have made it ‘the most brilliant victory of the war,’ as there was ‘an hour or more of daylight still left.’
（Ibid, page 410.) Of course, as the sun went down not later than 6:25 on the 6th of April, on the field of Shiloh, General Polk, writing nearly six months after the battle, indisputably was in error as to the actual hour, as well as to the readiness of his troops for any further vigorous operations that day. However, from my personal knowledge of Generals Polk, Bragg and Hardee, I am led to say that General Polk was the only one of them who could have believed—when he wrote the substance of what I have quoted—that it was still in the power of Confederate forces he specified to have captured what remained of the Federal army, some twenty-odd thousand men at least, exclusive of Ammen's brigade, notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, and notwithstanding that the troops were disarrayed and for the most part out of the
