Lying reduced to a system.
The letter which we published yesterday, from William H. Vanpolt to his uncle. William H. Seward, is one of the most curious documents which this war has brought to light. It confirms what we have often stated, and what has been very generally believed even before this authentic avowal, that lying has been reduced to a regular system by the Yankee Government, and is recognized by them as among the most effective instruments of warfare.--The Northern papers dare not print anything more than Seward allows them, and Seward does not allow them to print the truth, unless in cases where it may aid the cause of deception, and accomplish all that a direct lie could effect.
It may be said that there is little value in this discovery, since we knew beforehand that the Yankees systematically lied in all their narratives where the truth would be disadvantageous to them. So far as the credulity of the Southern people may be affected, this is true enough. But there is another consideration and that a most important one.--The Yankees have the ear of the world outside of America, and we can very seldom reach it. They have told the most incredible lies about this war, and they have been believed in Europe, until the stern testimony of facts came slowly before the European mind. Europe, for instance, is still under the impression that McClellan gained a great victory at Sharpsburg, merely because he says so, and because it has never heard the other side. When it shall have learned that McClellan remains now where he was one month ago, and that the asserted victory has not advanced the cause he upholds in the slightest degree, it will learn also to estimate the value and extent of his success. But in all future statements of his we fancy the press of Europe will be slow to place the confidence it placed in this one, for the simple reason that the Government he serves, it is now undeniably shown, acts upon the advice of General Scott, and deliberately lies when it speaks of its successes or its defeats.
We trust that our Government never may be induced to adopt this most dishonorable and most dangerous line of policy. Hitherto it has been remarkable for coming even within the line of the strict truth, claiming too little rather than too much. Although this gentler policy may sometimes lead to disappointment on the part of the multitude, it is far preferable to the other. To lie about military affairs is to raise high expectations and great exultation, which, when the truth comes out, as it is sure to do, is always followed by a re-action prejudicial to the cause. Instances of that sort are numerous in history. We have more than once alluded to a very striking one in the history of Rome, where the Consul Sempronius, after having had his army destroyed by Hannibal in the battle of the Treble, sent a false statement to the Senate, who published it to the people. While they were in a state of perfect security, believing that their army had merely fallen back, the Roman people were roused to a pitch of phrensy, succeeded by the deepest despair, on learning the true state of the case from the stragglers who had escaped death or captivity, and came pouring into the city. So fearful was the reaction that the Senate resolved never, if possible, to risk it again; and, when the still more fatal battle of Thrazymene occurred the Consul assembled the people and told them the whole truth, terrible as it was. And they were right. The people have a right to know the worst upon such occasions, and there can be no excuse for not telling it to them. Napoleon was charged by his enemies with not telling the truth to his people.--To ‘"lie like a bulletin, "’ became a proverb throughout Europe. In our admiration of his transcend ant gamins, we had always believed that the charge was false; but since the publication of his letters to his brother Joseph, we are compelled to admit that there was much truth in it. He falsified military details upon principle as General Scott advises to be done. Yet, what advantage did he derive from it? He could not deceive his enemies, who soon learned to believe nothing he said. He deceived even his own people only for a time, for they understood the truth after it had been repeated a certain number of times, and were not taken in by it. Surely, if there ever lived a man who could afford to have the strict truth told with regard to his leads, he was that man. It is difficult to understand what he hoped to gain; but we can see that he must have gained very little. Leipsic, Elba. Waterloo, St. Helena came, in spite of it all and they could but have come had he always adhered to the truth.
When it is necessary to speak at all, it is always best to speak the truth. What have the monstrous fabrications of McClellan done, but rendered the world incredulous to any story he may wish to palm upon its credulity? It could not prevent him from being disgracefully routed around this city and driven under shelter of his gunboats. His last lie will most assuredly recoil upon himself. It may not be prudent always to speak the truth; but in such cases it is best to say nothing.
