Moving the Protected Mobility Fleet into Army 2020

The Protected Mobility Fleet procured under UOR process and now destined to bea n important part of Army 2020, is due to be given a new wealth of life and modifications. Mastiff, Ridgback, Wolfhound and, down the weight ladder, Husky, Jackal and Coyote, are all due to get important roles within Army 2020.

In particular, Mastiff and Ridgback are expected to be used to mechanize three large infantry battalions, one for each Reaction Force brigade. Wolfhound will continue to carry on important logistic and support roles.

Sheperd News is reporting that an important program of modifications is due to finished by mid-2016 over the Mastiff, Ridgback and Wolfhound fleets. This program of work includes uplifting the older, worn-out and less performing Mastiff 1 to Mastiff 2 standard, and also includes conversion work to change an unspecified number of Troop Carrying vehicles into Communications and Command vehicles.

The contract notice says: 

Short description of the contract or purchase(s):

Armoured military vehicles. To provide Fleet Conversion services for the Army's Protected Mobility (PM) fleet of vehicles to achieve the correct variant mix to meet the requirements of the Army 2020 (A2020) Force Development Strategy, against the following vehicle types, hereafter known as 'The Platforms'.

Mastiff – all variants,

Ridgback – all variants,

Wolfhound – all variants,

Fleet Conversion.

Currently envisaged deliverables to include, but not be limited to:

— Mastiff Troop Carrying Variant (MAS TCV) to Mastiff Enhanced Communications Variant (MAS ECV) Conversion,

— Ridgback Troop Carrying Variant (RBK TCV) to Ridgback Command Variant (RBK CV) Conversion,

— Wolfhound Explosive Ordinance Disposal (WHD EOD) variant to Wolfhound Military Working Dog (WHD MWD) variant Conversion,

— Mastiff 1 to Mastiff 2 Conversion.

Note that none of the variants mentioned are new. The Mastiff 2 Enhanced Communications Variant is already in service. Work to outfit this variant, as well as the Ridgback Command Variant was done in 2010 by General Dynamics UK.
These variants are among several others that are less known that the standard troop carriers. The MOD in 2010 stated, via DESIDER magazine, that "just under 200" Mastiff 2 had been procured since December 2008, in six variants:

- Troop Carrying Variant (making "more than half" of the fleet)
- Battlefield ambulance
- Protected Eyes
- Interim Electronic Countermeasures
- Interim EOD (at least 23)
- Enhanced Communications Variant



There is even a RAF Regiment variant of the Mastiff, the PRAETORIAN, which in itself very closely resembles the Mastiff PROTECTED EYES, the command vehicle for the Talisman route clearance convoys. They appear to be fitted with the same ROTAS eletro optic sensor turret on telescopic mast and with the same M151 Protector Remote Weapon Station. PRAETORIAN isn't listed among the variants, possibly because it is counted together with Protected Eyes. EDIT: observing the photos better, front crew doors are open, which suggest that PRAETORIAN is built on Mastiff 3, not on Mastiff 2. This could explain why it does not figure among Mastiff 2 variants.

Mastiff 2 Protected Eyes, leading a Talisman convoy during training. Beautiful photo by Rick Ingham, all credits due to him.

A photo of the PRAETORIAN Mastiff. The open crew door is visible, and it suggests that the vehicle is actually built on Mastiff 3, not on Mastiff 2

The Enhanced Communications Variant carries the BOWMAN Enhanced Communications Suite, comprising HF and VHF radio, plus satellite communications. A similar suite equips the Ridgback command vehicle.

Evidently, however, the vehicles available in these specialist variants aren't enough to meet the requirements of the Army 2020 force structure, so a number of conversions are needed. It would appear likely that these conversions will mostly be done to Mastiff 2 and Mastiff 1 uplifted to MK2 standard, leaving the more modern and capable Mastiff 3 (around 100?), which offers greater mobility, for the troop carrying role.

The Mastiff 3 in fact introduced a more powerful engine, assisted by a gearbox with six speeds instead of five. Increased braking power is also available, while comfort and ease of embarkation for the two crew members and eight dismounts is given by a roof height increased by 7 inches and by opening armoured front doors.  

American sources suggest that the UK has bought a total of 314 Mastiff vehicles, all MKs, all variants.
The Wolfhound order total sits at 125, on two separate contracts.
The Ridgback order was for 154 vehicles.
For obvious reasons, it is likely that not all of them will be useable and retained once their use in combat operations in Afghanistan ends.

It is curious to see that Wolfhound EOD variants are apparently considered excess to requirement, while a greater number of Military Working Dogs pods are required. This might indicate that the EOD regiments have settled on different platforms for their needs (Mastiff itself, perhaps?) while the Military Working Dog regiment is happy with its own variant.
Again, both variants are in fact already in service: according to MOD sources, at least 44 pods for the transport of dog kennels have been procured, alongside an unspecified number of EOD pods. The wolfhound is also used for general, tactical transport duties and has also been used in theatre as towing vehicle for the L118 Light Gun. In fact, three variants exist: general purpose flatbed cargo carrier, EOD and Military Working Dog carrier.

The MOD also procured 30 surplus american Cougar 6x6 and 4x4 vehicles, to be used as basic training fleet. The Cougar 6x6 is the base vehicle which, with many extensive modifications, turns into Mastiff, while the 4x4 is the base for Ridgback. These 30 vehicles, known as Cougar Training Vehicles (CTV) might or might not be kept in the long term as training fleet. The uncertainty comes from an earlier contract notice put out by the MOD for the provision of: 

Post Design Services (PDS) including the design and development of modifications and the delivery of associated mod kits, against the following vehicle types, hereafter known as “The Platforms”.

— Mastiff – All variants;
— Wolfhound – All variants;
— Ridgback – All Variants;
— Roll Over Drills and Egress Trainer (RODET);
— Possibly, Cougar Training Vehicles (CTV);
— Possibly, Buffalo – All Variants;
— Possibly, CHOKER Mine roller System.

Note that in the "possible" platforms are not mentioned in the newer contract notice. This could mean a separate contract will eventually follow, but among the possible meanings there is also the intention of the MOD not to continue investing in this valuable equipment. This would be particularly painful in the case of Buffalo Rummage A2 and Rummage A2 MK2 (improved, safer and 1 ton heavier), as these are fundamental pieces of the Talisman route-clearance convoys. Abandoning CHOKER would also be quite a waste of equipment which continues to have a value, was high in demand until very recently and would again be in high demand as soon as the armed forces were once more dealing with the IED and mine menace. 

Buffalo Rummage A2 towing a PANAMA unmanned Land Rover with IED search equipment. The future of the excellent Talisman "system of systems" remains unclear. What is the Army planning to do with it?

Following the evolution of the Protected Mobility Fleet and its ancillary equipment, such as mine rollers and other kit, will be an important (and challenging) part of studying, analyzing and surveying the fate of the British Army.
At least, the variety of combat proven variants already available means that the Cougar-derived family is the perfect base for building a capable fleet covering all the key roles. That's very important because many of these roles truly need modern solutions rolled into service.
It is also important because, while we are promised that FRES UV will replace Mastiff in the mechanized battalions by around 2025, history reminds us that the 6x6 "super-trucks" could end serving the Army for a far longer time.

In the meanwhile, other vehicle fleets are being brough back home, and restored to full efficiency to return in service.

 

News. And not very good ones.

Mid-June should finally bring answers.
And it will be about time, since with the often contraddictory rumors continuing to come out on the press, the future of the Army is by now as murky as it can be. A true mystery, with the reports coming out on the press so far calling in question the sanity of the Defence Chiefs and MoD and throwing a lot of question marks over to the "5 MRBs" plan. The rumors appear to go against the logic and promises of the homogeneous brigades concept, namely where they announce cuts to Cavalry (Formation Reconnaissance Regiments) and Tank regiments: with the brigades expected to have a recce regiment each and "tanks", there is theorically no room for any regiment disbanding from the RAC, as 5 Recce and 5 Tank regiments are needed, and that's the current number of formations as it is. 

Now the latest suggestion is that just 5 Infantry battalions will be lost, with the thick of the cuts being enforced on the Royal Engineers, Royal Artillery and, above all, the Royal Logistics Corps.
This second scenario might overall be the most desirable, depending on the effect it has on the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery, mostly. I have very serious doubts on the viability of a plan that, presumably, gives the almost totality of AS90 guns over to Territorial Army formations, also considering that the TA currently does not work with the AS90 at all, but has the L118 Light Gun instead.
Again, i don't think that much can be cut from the Royal Engineers without the consequences being very serious and very undesirable. 
In October 2011, despite the second tranche of cuts having been announced in August, with the Army of 82.000 regulars being put as new target, the head of the Royal Engineers was still saying that the corp was planning for supporting 5 MRBs, 16AA and 3rd Commando, with the long-term retention of both General Support regiments as well. A very desirable outcome. The Telegraph article calls that in cause, however, suggesting that reality will be very, very different. And that would be a big problem.   

Cuts to the RLC are more realistically manageable with the use of reserves and contractors. In the latter case, it would be an expansion of a practice that already exists, anyway: one of the best examples is the Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) truck management. The HET is made available to the MOD under a 20 years PFI contract signed in 2001 (with a 2.5 years "start up" period) with Fasttrax Ltd, which provides the vehicles, the training for regular army personnel (REME and others) involved in the HET business, the spare parts, and the drivers to the Army. 
The operators and maintainers employed by Fasttrax Ltd are all Sponsored Reserves (SR) that can be mobilised for up to nine months at a time and when 'called up' for an operational deployment, come under army command.  

The press reports curiously paint a situation in which the Army is faced by two extremes: 

- One reports a cut of 11 Infantry Battalions, 5 RAC regiments, and other heavy cuts in combat formations 

- The other talks of a loss of just 5 battalions of infantry and heavy cuts to supporting arms instead

One would hope that, in the middle, an "happy" medium is being built. The first scenario is probably way too harsh on the combat elements, but the second risks creating an army incapable to sustain the battles it picks. 
Surely there can be a more balanced mix of decisions in the restructuring? My position is very clear: i prefer to have 3 instead of 4 Infantry battalions in a brigade, but have the brigade adequately served by a regiment of Engineers and a regiment of Artillery, than have lots of infantry, unsupported. 


The suspect (and in a way the hope) is that the press is drinking from leaks that paint the picture of the two "worst case" scenarios considered in the restructuring project, with the Army probably trying to sit in the middle, to find a smarter solution.

The Army Reform is however, in any case, going to be painful, and it seems, from whichever angle you look at it, that it might well be daring too much. I am impatient to hear the announcement, to see how things are worked out. 



Victim of the book-balancing?
Until Planning Round 2011, the MoD has expended small amounts of money to follow and influence the US Navy work on CEC, Cooperative Engagement Capability, the well known force-multiplier system capable to dramatically enhance the effectiveness of air defence networks by enabling ships to cooperatively detect, track and engage targets.

The little money committed was meant to keep the soup warm, with the Royal Navy desperately trying to secure the adoption of the precious system for its ships. CEC was delayed countless times, with the Type 45 destroyers once expected to get it at build.
More recently, the plan was for the Type 45s to get CEC around 2014, with the Type 26 fitted at build in the 2020s. Now, according to a Jane's headline, CEC seems to have fallen victim to the book-balancing exercise just concluded at the MOD. If confirmed, it would be a nasty blow to the quest of the Royal Navy for improved situational awareness and better interoperability with the US.

The enhancement for a future RN with CEC-fitted Crowsnest AEW platforms, Type 45s and Type 26s ships would have been simply dramatic. If the CEC is not adopted, it makes for a very severe setback.

The worst part is that this is likely to be only the first victim to be named. More programs are likely to have been shelved or delayed to dates to be determined.


Naval Aviation: the training aspect of F35B and F35C
When the Sea Harrier fleet was around, pre-embarkation requirements were described as follows:

- First experience pilot, daytime embarkation
before going on the carrier he had to complete a minimum of 10 training sorties of which 5 from ski-jump/dummy deck for launch and recovery practice.

- For a pilot with previous experience 
the requirements were to fly the monthly minimum Sea Harrier flying hours with sorties from dummy deck “whenever possible”.

The Sea Harrier community was however notoriously small and elitary. All Sea Harrier pilots used to be at sea or on training very often, they were very much active, and went to sea in a constant rotation, so had plenty of practice since they were, basically, always the same ones rotating in and out of deployment. And they were committed full time to carrier skills.

It would be far more interesting to see later requirements for carrier currency when the Joint Force Harrier changed the way things are done and introduced a much greater "on land" time. 

For a comparison, good for some reflection, US Marines, who like RAF squadrons spend quite a lot of time on land, end up doing a lot more training with their Harriers before going at sea. Initial at-sea qualification for day ops, Cat-I weather conditions takes a minimum of 35 vertical landings according to a 2004 USMC manual for AV8B training. In 2008 the minimum was slightly lowered, to 30, but it is still amazingly high. That's more landing cycles than CATOBAR certification requires. 

A pilot of a USMC squadron needs a minimum of 8 vertical landings on a land based dummy deck before being deployed to the ship. Field Carrier Landing Practice is done on a schedule, and re-qualification training can be required after just 30 days.

For training with the F35B and for Field Carrier Landing Practice two land-based dummy LHA decks are being built at Yuma and another at the Eglin F35 Training center. The second is the most interesting since it will almost certainly be now used by british pilots training with the USMC at Eglin. According to the plans, 6 F35B will be based there with the USMC training squadron.  

The above requirements, in addition, relate to embarkation on the carrier at Cat I weather conditions, and in daylight. Then there’s the issue of weather (what about operations in Category II and III?) and night ops, which are more complex and clearly require more experience and training.
The problem of the "RAF goes on ships" approach has been in night and bad weather ops. Just landing their STOVL planes on the deck every now and then won't mean much if the pilots aren't cleared for actual war operations from the aircraft carrier, unless the UK is going to fight only in day hours and with excellent weather...

With the F35B we’ll also have to see what impact Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing eventually has on the training requirements.
The SRVL might prove indispensable to enable operations since even at 5000 lbs, the best case value, the Vertical Bring Back margin of the F35B is way too small. With as much as 1700 lbs being fuel, 3300 pounds of unexpended ordnance aren't much.
It is worth remembering how SRVL was described during the tests: 

Using SRVL F-35B aircraft would approach the carrier from astern at about 60 knots indicated air speed, 35 knots relative assuming 25 knots wind over deck (the maximum speed of a CVF will be 25 knots, so 25kts WOD is achievable even in dead calm) on a steep 5-6 degree glide path. Touch down would be about 150 feet from the stern with a stopping distance of 300 to 400 feet depending on conditions (wet flight deck, pitching ships etc). That would leave around 300 feet of flight deck for margin or even “bolters”. 

The SRVL technique has a significant impact on ship designs and aviation operations, Commander Tony Ray told a conference in February 2008: “We expect to trade some STOVL flexibility for increased bring-back and fuel. We have to .. check for for relevant CV criteria that apply to slower SRVL operations. For example flightpath control will be a far more important flight criteria for SRVL than it has been for STOVL. It is a CV trait creeping in”.

In other words SRVL is a CATOBAR-style approach, just slower and without cables to catch. Its good features are:

- Much less stress on the engine and lift system, allowing it to live longer
- Much improved bring back weight margin

Problem is that SRVL is going to require skills and training. If it is not adopted, the F35B’s combat capabilities will be severely hampered and the life of its engine plant dramatically shortened, with all the costs this implies.
And in addition to the effect on training requirements, please note that 150 feet + 400 feet + plus deck free for bolters means that when a F35B lands with SRVL approach the WHOLE deck, from end to end, has to be clear and any other aviation operation on deck is likely to be stopped entirely, making SRVL effectively more invasive than even arrested CATOBAR landings are.

Of course, CATOBAR skills are expensive, and take training to be acquired and maintained: the point of discussion is the extent of the effective gap between CATOBAR and STOVL training needs.
A good reference document about the US CATOBAR certifications and currency requirements is the US Navy Landing Signal Officer's manual. 

The CATOBAR "training penalty" is here broken down in good detail. For the US pilots, Initial Carrier Qualification comes with 12 Day landings (10 of which arrested) and 8 Night landings (6 arrested). The first night flight should last a minimum of 20 minutes. Carrier Qualification is to be achieved during a period of no longer than 30 days.
After achieving currency, the pilot is ready for service, and needs to keep current by refreshing his qualification by, of course, operating from a carrier.

Depending on the time that passes since he's last been qualified, he has to carry on some training to renew his currency.
If 12 months or more pass from he's last been current, he has to face once more the whole 20 landings ICQ, while if he's last been current 60 days to 6 months earlier, the pilot needs facing a Field Landing Carrier Practice (in this video you can see French naval pilots doing their FLCP - needs a runway, one carrier landing lights aid system, the Landing Signal Officer and, for night FLCP with more than two airplanes in the air, one LSO assistant ), followed by 4 day landings (2 to 3 of them arrested) and 2 night landings. No longer than 5 days should pass between FLCP and the first landing on the aircraft carrier.

A whole table of the time periods and associated training needs is available in the manual in chapter 6.2.

It is to be seen how much of the training advantage of STOVL is real and how much of it is virtual, especially with the F35B.
And with SRVL the assumption “STOVL = better simultaneous helicopter and fast jet ops on deck” goes to hell immediately. 

Ultimately, to say that a RAF land-based squadron will just move out, land on the carrier and be ready to operate from it in conditions other than “light load, perfect weather”, just like that, is a full-out lie and is deliberately misleading. When you hear the gurus of the F35B telling you that is as easy and merry as that, know that you are being fed lies, with reality being, as always, a bit more complex and articulated.



What comes back from Afghanistan?
According to a Daily Mail article, up to 1200 out of around 1900 protected mobility vehicles will be handed over to Afghan security forces or anyway disposed off when the UK withdraws from Helmand.

The vehicles listed for return are Mastiffs, Ridgebacks and "a number" of Jackals (presumably the Jackal 2 will be returned, while the remaining Jackal 1s won't.) Foxhounds will also be all returned to the UK, but there's no telling how many since Foxhound is a bit late and still has not made it to afghanistan in the first place. The article says that "a small number" of Warthogs will be left behind, and this affirmation puzzles me. Some 115 Warthog have been acquired, and most of these are likely in Helmand, so what is the correct interpretation of "small number" is up for debate. Will all Warthogs be disposed off? Will damaged ones be left in situ and handed to the Afghans? Will the Army bring back only a share of its Warthogs, having chosen a niche role for them in the long term plans?
It would be a waste to get rid of the Warthog so soon and after all the money expended, especially since it has proven a good and effective vehicle which, i believe, could certainly find long term roles to fulfill.

No one will miss the Vector and Snatch Land Rovers instead: their age in the British Army is, thankfully, over.

Type 26; the future of the Afghan vehicle fleet, the F35 saga

Type 26 Update: new BAE video

Once again, not very showy and not very good in quality, but there's a new Type 26 video from BAE, released at DSA 2012 in Malaysi,a and it seems to prove some of the good spotters on this blog right: there's a VLS silo in the funnel. This new video shows it well. Its sizes seem to match the main missile silo, which could mean as many as 24 cells. 

 


Congratulations to the several readers who saw it already in the first video i reported: for how much i tried, i personally struggled to see it, but this new video seems to definitely confirm that something's up there.

Hard to imagine the RN finding the money to put VLS in there when they have difficulties funding the main silo, but we at least know that the design offers this chance. Other highlights: the helicopter hangar door is single (no dog kennel as we all hoped) but, to me, it looks a bit narrow. A single, large hangar is a fundamental requisite for helicopter + UAV operations, so i'm hoping in an hangar at least as large as the Type 45's one. 

A question still to be answered is that of the Flexible Mission Deck. Is it still present? The Royal Navy's Yearbook 2011/12 reports that yes, it is still present. Then again, it still shows the old Type 26 photos. BAE's Global Combat Ship webpage is just about as up-to-date regarding images, though, so it might very well not mean that the info is out of date.

As i wrote in the recent article on the Navy's yearbook, the publication reports, about the Type 26:

The yearbook confirms that the Flex Mission Deck is present. Probably sized, according to BAE data, to take up to 11 standard containers or 4 12m boats.

The yearbook also tells us of the current preferred propulsion option, which is for a CODLOG solution on 4 diesels connected to two large electric motors, generating cruise speed as high as 18 knots, with a direct drive gas turbine for sprints of minimum 26 knots.

Other options have been/are considered, including an integrated all electric solution or a wholly diesel one.

In terms of weapons fit, the yearbook is quite clear about the RN's want to fit the Type 26 with a new medium calibre gun, capable of firing long range, precision guided ammunition. It is very much the identikit of the Oto Melara 127/64 with Vulcano ammunition, especially since the BAE 127/54 rival has been badly damaged by the US cancellation of the guided ammunition meant for it.

Fitting TLAM long range land attack missiles is "subject of further studies" (read: we are trying to get money for it, won't be easy), but regardless of the decision on TLAM it remains the RN's ambition to have the Type 26 fitted at build with a large VLS silo (24 cells) in which land attack missiles and the future anti-ship missile would be carried.  

The Type 26 frigate is to "reverse" the Type 45 situation (20% of technology carried through, 80% new kit) by de-risking most of its mission system thanks to the Type 23 mid-life upgrade program.

Type 26 will inherit from the Dukes the Type 997 radar (Artisan 3D), the Type 2087 towed sonar (8x) and its command system will be a derivation of the current DNA(2)/CMS-1.

The adoption of proven, in-service kit for almost 80% of the ship's systems is meant to keep costs and risks down, as there is no margin for error in this crucial program.

  

The future of Mastiff

On 19 April Philip Davies made a question i've been waiting for for a long time, and got an interesting answer:

Philip Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans his Department has to bring all Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound vehicles back to the UK after the British role in Afghanistan has been completed. [102414]

Nick Harvey: It is intended to bring all serviceable Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound vehicles back from Afghanistan but the specific details, including timing and locations, are still to be determined. It is planned to return the vehicles to a number of sites across the UK and wider Ministry of Defence estate. We expect to make decisions on which vehicles will be retained as part of the core equipment programme during the course of the next year.

Philip Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether his Department plans to keep sections of the Army fully trained in the use of Mastiff, Ridgback and Foxhound vehicles for use in future counter-insurgency operations. [102416]

Nick Harvey: It is not yet known which of these of vehicles will be retained as part of the core equipment programme. However, the Army's training programme will continue to reflect their use for as long as there is a requirement to do so.

Unfortunately Davies did not include Warthog and Jackal in his question, and Harvey accurately avoided expanding on the matter himself.

On Foxhound, we pretty much already knew: Foxhound is already considered part of the Core Budget (the second order for 100 vehicles has also been already funded from Core, and not under UOR method), while it is interesting to hear that Mastiff and Ridgback are coming back to the UK.

Somewhat sensibly, the long term future of both will be decided in Planning Round 2013, it seems, after this year's Planning Round gives (hopefully) a clear indication of the force structure that the Army has to develop.

Using a Voyager for VIP transport role?  

It is not a bad proposal. One of the 5 "on-call" Voyagers could well fill this need. And you have to admit that the press and industry do make a good point: if you go abroad to advertise the Airbus products but show up in a chartered Boeing, you don't look very smart.

The Voyager is also an obvious candidate for the UK's eventual participation in the currently tri-national Air Tanker initiative launched within NATO by France, Germany and the Netherlands in order to provide, by 2020, a greater european air tanker capability, based on the Airbus 330 platform, of which France plans a fleet of 14, with orders for the first 5/7 to come next year.

F35 saga

We are still dealing with an unjustified, unspecified inflated carrier conversion cost figure having ballooned from a NAO estimate of 800 million and a MOD allocation of 950 millions to 1.8 billion or even 2 billions, depending on the newspaper talking of it. 

According to the US Navy, the EMALS and AAG cost has not changed, and the modifications to the carrier itself and additional worktime are not worth more than 400 million pounds, meaning that the 950 million allocation is actually still more than valid and also has a margin for cost overgrowth. 

So, from where does the 1.8 billion figure come? 

My personl opinion is that the press got it wrong and it is reporting the figure in an absolutely misleading way. The conversion cost of the single carrier has not increased 8not that much at least!), with 1.8 / 2 billion being the cost of conversion for both hulls. Which would more than fit the only official cost estimations we have, coming from the NAO, the MOD and the US Navy, 3 sources that, in my book, matter a lot more than the Daily Mail. 

This is of course still a cost increase because, as we know, the original 2010 plan was to convert only Prince of Wales and rely on carrier sharing with the french to put the british planes on Charles De Gaulle when the carrier was not available. 

The key point is that Charles de Gaulle is unsuitable for operations with the heavy F35C, as its deck is not adequate. This was first reported in a Parliamentary Defence Committee report, and when i first signaled it, i was ridiculed by many. I stand vindicated now, as the CdG unsuitability is confirmed. 
However, you will agree with me that a lot of things change between being fed with the story that fitting two catapults and 3 wires costs almost as much as building the vessel whole and having that pricetag covering two conversions.  
It would be very important to have clarity on this point.

In absence of an adequate second deck provided by France, converting the second CVF becomes indispensable, and there appears the 1.8 / 2 billion cost figure, with the new, magic question being: is it still worth the price? 

Question which is followed by an even less comfortable: "if it is still worth the price, where the hell do we find all that money in the short term?"

Answering these two questions is the key. 

According to US DoD figures, the F35B will cost 25% more than the C through-life to support.

In terms of acquisition costs, the 2012 figures for the expected Recurring Flyaway Unit Cost (the pricetag of a complete F35 airframe ready to go, but excluding spares, training and support) are: 

F35C - 87 USD million

F35B - 106.5 USD million 

From these figures comes the "600 million pounds" saving that has been reported by the Press several times when the subject is the F35C. The 600 million pounds savings is calculated on an  initial order for 50 airframes.

A Telegraph article reporting of a leaked "top secret" OPEVAL exercise internal at the MOD reports, however, that the F35B limitations in terms of range, payload and availability would require an order of 135 to match the same requirements met by 97 F35C.

The interesting bit is that the "about 100 airframes" target reported by RAF sources would convert to a rather accurate (and very interesting) planned number of 97 F35C. That would be a very excellent number to work with, because it could sustain a good 5 frontline squadrons plus OCU, or Fleet Replacement Squadron in US terms. In economic terms:

cost of 97 F35C = 8439 US million [5241 million pounds, roughly, in today's pounds, so it would fit within the rumored "5 billion budget"]
cost of 97 F35B = 10330.5 US million [6415.2 million pounds]

Difference: 1174.2 million pounds.

Number of F35B theorically achievable with 8439 US million [the budget is more than likely to stay the same, after all] = 79 vs 97 F35C

Difference in million pounds if 135 F35B were to be ordered (will never happen, but if we are to believe the Telegraph this is the number of B it takes to meet the requirements covered by 97 C)

8929 million pounds [135 F35B]
6415.2 million pounds [97 F35C]

2513.2 million pounds of difference.

[135 F35C would cost 7293,6 million pounds, again over 1.6 billion saved]

There is who has already suggested that this report is a "Navy trick" aiming to provide the government with a cost figure that justifies spending for the conversion of the carriers. What can i say, perhaps. Or maybe no. 
The first who argued for the F35C, and we know thanks to Lockheed Martin sources, was the RAF, who's been wanting the C as a Tornado replacement since at least 2005. They might have changed their mind and now want the B very badly, but i do not exactly think so.

Launching accuses of "Navy tricks", though, stinks. And it clashes against a reality which from many years now sees the Navy quite regularly screwed and outplayed, and which is all but denounced by Liam Fox himself, who after the SDSR period at a conference had to bitterly note: 

“Sometimes I get the impression that the Navy is less successful, even less willing, at selling itself than the other services.”

and

“I was accused by some of being the only dark blue suit in the SDSR apart from the First Sea Lord.”

The Navy playing tricks within the MOD? Would be kind of about time they started, but it is unlikely that they have gained any real foothold in the right positions in order to do so, since the still recent past.

I want the best decision to be made. I want two carriers available, and the planes to fly off them also available. My preference goes to the C, for a number of reasons, from its better and smoother progress in the testing and development to the much better weight growth margin which gives it much more helpful breath space to evolve, fix eventual issues yet to be discovered, and reach entry in service as an effective airplane, to the fact that the only "hard" cost figures we have all point to it being a much cheaper and cost-effective choice. 
I also value the flexibility and future-proof nature of a big CATOBAR carrier: future UCAV? It can go aboard. CATOBAR plane? It can go aboard. STOVL plane? It can go aboard. US Navy, USMC, French, Italian airplane? They all can use a big CATOBAR CVF.
Name it, and the big CATOBAR ship almost certainly can do it. 

The bit about UCAV is likely to be particularly important in future. I've talked with B supporters who say that we'll just fit EMCATs from Converteam or, guess it, EMALS, in future, when the drones make up more and more of the UK's airpower (the RAF itself expects that one third of its force will be made up by UAVs in 20 years time!), but to me this sounds absolutely ridiculous. If we are expecting to need catapults in a few years time, then it is absolutely clear that we should get them now, not buy the most expensive and less capable airplane, be constrained by it for 30 years or more will also paying for catapults and wires soon after. 

I recognize, however, that it is not a decision to be taken in isolation. 
The F35B should come with a lower requirement in terms of training for carrier qualification, which is very important to ensure that the RAF can embark with minimum notice. If a genuine assessment of the pros and cons suggests going with the B, i'll be the first wishing the F35B well, for it to work and work well.

However, i want it to be a genuine assessment of all pros and cons. And ideally, since carrier strike is what we want to achieve, we should finally detach the requirement from the RAF desire of spending the most of the time on land, in a comfortable airfield such as Marham, and only bother to go at sea when it really can't be avoided, unless they can provide genuine financial and operational justifications for the arrangement, for example explaining what is a second land-based jet fleet going to add to the defence capability of the UK other than numeric consistency.   
This is the original sin of the whole matter, to me. This (wrong) way of approaching carrier strike, by trying to present CVF as a floating, mobile RAF airport over which the Navy has just 40% of the say.

Sorry, this is just the wrong way of doing things. We are trying to put a land force on a ship, meeting the inexorable issues that this implies, and potentially choosing the "wrong" aircraft in order to make it possible, instead of having a naval force, which can with zero issues (other than, possibly, losing carrier currency is the ops go on and on and on for years, but this is another matter and the Harrier GR9 is there to demonstrate that, in this particular case, the B would not do any better) go on land when necessary.

And we are having to deal with this as a consequence of a dubiously wise maneuver in the SDSR 1998. Time to look into it again, and make an honest analysis of what is really needed and what must be achieved. 

The benefits of re-established naval aviation are clear: 

- Air Cover for the Fleet 
- Independent capability of deploying airpower in a place and time of UK's choosing
- More effective use of available resources thanks to the possibility of going closer to the target

etcetera. 
Given that the airplane and weaponry employed would be the same, primarily-focus the fleet on land negates and reduces the benefits, if anything.

As to the (not very relevant, but very annoying on the other hand) war of words about who-is-lobbying for what, it is worth remembering that in 2006 Tom Burbage, LM director of the F35 program, said that the UK planned a buy of 138 F35, of which 80 would be B, forming 4 Squadrons and an OCU as a replacement for the Joint Force Harrier and to provide the airwing of CVF, with the remaining airplanes forming two more (smaller) squadrons plus an OCU as Tornado replacement for land based deep strike.

It was reported that this entailed a split buy, with the F35B for the carriers and the long-range, higher-payload F35C for the RAF deep strike.

Later on, in 2007, talk for a single type order of 80/85 F35C started to emerge, and it is evident that things evolved from there up to the surprise decision in the SDSR 2010.

Better to be careful when you accuse the "evil" Navy of plotting to support the F35C: for what we know, it appears more likely that the Navy is now scared of having to shoulder a much greater expense than hoped for CVF conversion due to the clear need for two hulls as CdG won't do, and is thus arguing for the B, with at least part of the RAF pressing for the C.

Which makes far more sense when you think that:

A - The Navy pays for CVF - so converting both hulls means, for them, finding more money

B - The RAF pays for the F35 - so C for them means paying a lot less and getting more

Do you really think that the RAF is arguing for a plane that would cost them more and do less, while the Navy eagerly calls for a greater cost to face in the build program?

You might be seeing this upside-down.

It is a very complex and very embarrassing story, in any case, caused first of all by the lack of a clear strategy, by the never-successful mixture of RAF and RN on the naval aviation front, and especially by a lack of understanding of the need for and of the workings of carrier aviation.

I hope the decision which eventually is taken proves to be the correct one, but so far the premises are far from reassuring.

USMC and USN TACAIR agreement and F35 plans

Up to 2011, the USMC was still planning a buy of 420 F35B, for a sole STOVL force. This was, in part, son of the 2001-old prediction (later proved false by a good margin) that the C variant would be the most expensive of the 3.

By 14 March 2011, things had changed, and time was mature for a new Tactical Airpower integration agreement between the US Navy and the USMC, which brought forwards, along with other adjustments, the well-known change from a 420 B order to a 340 B, 80 C USMC order.

The future US Navy air component is to line 35 Strike squadrons, of which 20, out to at least 2030, will fly on the Super Hornet (half on the two-seat F/A-18F and half on the single seat E), with 15 squadrons flying the F35C thanks to an order for 260 airplanes.

The US Navy is standing up a first Fleet Replacement Squadron, with 15 F35C, based on the F35 Integrated Training Center on Eglin air force base, and is finalizing the program for the transition of the legacy F/A-18C fleet to the F35C.

In particular, the transition will start on the West Coast, where, from 2015, the active squadrons on the 18C will start changing airplane. A total of 7 active squadrons will convert to the C on the West Coast, and each squadron will have 10 F35C.

In 2017 they will be joined by the Fleet Replacement Squadron responsible for the West Coast, which will have 30 airplanes.

109 F/A-18C are thus being replaced by 100 F35C, to be all based, almost certainly, on the Leemore air base.

The East Cost squadrons will begin transition to the C in 2019. There should be 8 more active squadrons and another large Fleet Replacement Squadron, even if the plan has yet to be announced. There should also be at least one Reserve Component squadron on the F35C.

A possible utilization of the Navy F35C would thus be:

160 assigned to frontline squadrons (16 squadrons including one reserve sqn - plan still evolving)

75 in Fleet Replacement Squadrons [15 on the ITC, 30 in the West Coast FRS and probably 30 in an East Coast FRS]

25 OEU/Attrition

The USMC will have 21 Active and 3 Reserve squadrons: 5 squadrons (10 airplanes each) will be on the F35C.

The 420 USMC F35s will be used in the following way:

282 airplanes assigned to Active and Reserve squadrons

64 airplanes committed to Training

6 in OEU

68 attrition reserve

The 80 F35C of the Marines will form squadrons on "10 plus" airplanes each, leaving up to 30 for training and attrition.

The 340 F35B are to be assigned to 9 Expeditionary Squadrons, each with 10 airplanes, with the task of supplying airplanes to the 7 Marine Expeditionary Units, for employment on the LHDs and LHA ships.

A normal LHA/LHD detachment will have 6 F35B and 9 pilots. There is thus plenty of airplanes to put machines on each deck.

A further 7 Squadrons, larger, will stand up for land deployment, each with 16 airplanes. Four of these squadrons will be based on Yuma AB.

These squadrons will rotate and one will at all times be located in Japan, on Iwakuni AB: prior to the 2011 TACAIR agreement with the US Navy, this task was covered by F/A-18 squadrons of the Navy on behalf of the Marines.

Last, there will be 3 Reserve Squadrons, all on F35B.

Prior to the 2011 TACAIR deal, the Marines planned, as said earlier, for an all B fleet, which would have lined 3 Fleet Replacement Squadrons, each with at least 20 airplanes.

There is not yet a detailed plan for the FRSs now that the F35C is part of the picture, but a share of the 64 airframes assigned to training will no doubt be made up by the C.

A 20-airplanes Fleet Replacement Squadron on the F35B is part of the Eglin ITC, and two more F35B FRS were planned: i guess that there might still be, but line, perhaps, 15 F35B each instead of 20, with another FRS having the F35C.

The FY2012 Marines Aviation Plan, once published, should explain this: normally, their documents are wonderfully detailed. FY2011 Plan sure is, and it is immensely interesting even though the F35 part is clearly outdated as it is still an all-B plan.

The Naval Aviation Vision 2012, released in January, describes the future of the 10 Carrier Air Wings of the US Navy:

44 Strike Fighers [2x Super Hornet sqn, 12 airplanes each, one two-seat and one single seat]

                            [2x F35C sqn, 10 airplanes each]

5 AEW&C            [1x E2D Hawkeye sqn with 4/5 airplanes]

11 helicopters      [+8 distributed within the battlegroup, all of the MH60R type]

2/3 Carrier On-board Delivery [Greyhound and then future replacement]

4/6 UCAVs           [from 2018 or, more likely, 2020]

5 Electronic Warfare [1x EA-18G Growler squadron with 5 airplanes]

556 Super Hornet are available/on order so to sustain a 20 Squadron force up to 2030.

75 E2D Hawkeye are being purchased for 10 squadrons plus Fleet Replacement Squadron, 1 Reserve Squadron (will continue to use the E2C).

114 EA-18G Growler on order, to sustain 14 Squadrons [10 for the Carrier Air Wings, 4 "Expeditionary", needed also to fill a big hole in EW capability since the termination of the USAF B52 Standoff Jammer Capability], one Fleet Replacement Squadron with 12 airplanes.

The USMC is not getting any Growler: they will use to exhaustion the remaining Prowler, [22 in 4 Squadrons] decommissioning one squadron per year from 2016 onwards. The replacement will be the stealthy Next Generation Jammer, mounted on the F35B (the Navy will use it on the Growler and possibly on the C), and a UAV with an Electronic Warfare payload.