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Fever Despond.

There is no denying the fact that the course of this war has brought many true Southern men to a condition of depression which is not warranted by the facts, and which, for the sake of the cause, ought to be shaken off. For the sake of the cause, we say — nay, for the sake of their own credit, as patriots and men, let them cheer up, take new resolution and fresh hope; and giving their hands with renewed energy to the struggle, with the blessings of God, a few months will put a new phase on affairs, and destroy the hopes of the enemy in his boasted efforts to ‘"crush out the rebellion."’

It cannot be denied that many things have gone awry. It cannot be denied that our preparations for defence on the water were criminally delayed. It cannot be denied that a long pause of apathy, indolence, dissipation, and recklessness, followed the battle of Manassas. The Government went to sleep, officers, if not soldiers, drank hard and did not a great deal for discipline and less in the way of campaigning, while the enemy worked night and day for our subjugation. Nothing was done worthy of notice in the way of increasing our forces until the beginning of the present year. Up to the time of McClellan's advance upon Manassas, General Johnson was left with no effective force to meet such an army as the enemy brought into the field. Our defensive policy, pushed to an extremes that many thought perilous, became unavoidable for the want of power to pursue a different one. It is true, that our only great achievement on the water was the greatest known to the world; but it is equally true, that the wonderful agent by which it was accomplished has recently been blown up in full view of the enemy which dreaded her and which had repeatedly run from her as they would from Vesuvius while in a state of eruption. All this is true, and more than this, to produce dissatisfaction and complaint. Yet let us look on the other side of the picture.

The best of Governments, in a time like that we are passing through, would be complained of, and the complaints would rise upon every reverse or discomfiture that might occur, however blameless the Government might be. Though ours cannot be fully defended, we know that the men who compose it are true to the cause; that they are the constituted authorities under the Constitution; that under them we must conquer or be conquered, and that we must give them all the support and confidence we can, trusting that they will profit by experience and make every disaster the occasion for improving their measures for defence.

But with all the mistakes and blunders that may be alleged, what is the state of the case? The Southern army has not been defeated anywhere in a field fight in which the enemy was not assisted by his gunboats. The disasters we have met have been all at isolated posts on the water, where the enemy could bring the most approved machinery of his mechanical genius to bear upon our imperfectly-constructed and imperfectly-guarded defences. There, and there only, has he triumphed. It is true, he has gained important advantages by our disasters at these points; but they did not establish for him any such superiority over us as to justify a hope that be would conquer us, or to warrant the fear on our part that we would be subjugated.--They forced us to draw in our lines of defence and concentrate our troops; and they force him, of necessity, to follow after us and to essay our defeat by attacking our army, thus concentrated, away from the element where his only great advantage over us is apparent. In this new phase of the game of the war, if we may judge from the past — If we may take the result of all the great contests with the enemy in the open field as indicative of the future — we may not only be hopeful, but confident. Our armies must triumph. We cannot doubt it. The motives, the men, the situation, all inevitably force the conclusion that victory, undisputed, clear and decisive, must finally be on our side.

The summer is at hand. The waters must fall so as to curtail the power of the too much dreaded gunboats. The diseases of the climate must tell upon the invader. He has more country to guard in the far South, and must be severely harassed and weakened by pestilence. His large armies in various directions, as they have penetrated farther than ever from their homes, must be victualled with immensely increasing difficulty, (indeed we know here how they have already suffered in the Peninsula.) Our sufferings in our own land cannot be so great as his, but we ought to endure and bear more than he can, as we struggle for all that is dear on earth and he only for power and plunder. At such a time, and amidst such discomforts of the enemy, if we only be true to ourselves, if we only be sufficiently active and sagacious, we shall strike blows upon him from which he cannot recover. He is expending all his power and means to subjugate us. We have but to be constant persevering and watchful — never relaxing, never desponding — and he will inevitably break down in his mighty crusade. It cannot be long maintained in such vast proportions. It is a thing impossible.

The first great event will likely be the attempt to take this city. The fight in this vicinity will be a great struggle. Our soldiers are confident, and our people rely upon them and their commanders. Beauregard's great battle, if it does not precede this, will follow soon afterwards. If they are both in our favor they may possibly end the war; at all events, the enemy could not recover from two such defeats this year. Should either or both be against us, we must only gather up the remains of battle and prepare for that prolonged struggle which, with a brave people and unregenerate descendants of the men of the Revolution of '76, must terminate in favor of liberty and independence.

But we repeat, the battles thus far in the field prove that our true and brave Southern men can defeat the enemy with the odds of numbers on his side. The continuation of the war will only continue this illustration in our favor. There is no reason for despondency. We may regret blunders and time lost; but we have the greatest cause for consolation, nay, rejoicing, that we have accomplished so much upon such short notice, and should never fail to remember that in every contest where there was the least semblance of fairness and with the odds always against us, we have proved our power to whip the enemy, and his utter inability to conquer the country.

Let us, therefore, take courage — cheer up — sustain the Government — strengthen and feed the army — stand by the cause to the bitter end, and we shall conquer gloriously, and ere long enjoy the peace and independence which it is to be hoped we shall have merited.

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