CHAPTER XXXIX
It is here proved that courage is wisdom.Socrates first reverts to the point at which the discussion on ἡδονῆς ἡττᾶσθαι began (359AC): next, Protagoras asserts that ἀνδρεῖοι and δειλοί are willing to encounter opposite things, but Socrates shows that both encounter what they take to be θαρραλέα, i.e., so far, the same things (359CE). Protagoras thereupon objects that ἀνδρεῖοι will encounter e.g. war, while δειλοί will not. Socrates replies by showing that if cowards do not willingly enter upon war, the reason is their ignorance (359E60A). In general, while brave men fear and feel courage honourably, i.e. well, the reverse is true of cowards, owing to their ignorance (360A360B. And since it is through δειλία that men are δειλοί, and we have shown that men are δειλοί through ἀμαθία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν, cowardice is ignorance, and consequently bravery is wisdom, viz. δεινῶν τε καὶ μὴ δεινῶν (360C360E.
18. καὶ ἴτας γ᾽, ἔφη. The recapitulation stops here. ἔφην ἐγώ two lines below is the usual ‘said I’ of narrated dialogue.
20. ἐπὶ τί: so MSS.: the second hand in B reads ἐπὶ τίνα, but cf. below, l. 26, where the question is repeated with ἐπὶ τί. For the common passage from singular to plural the editors compare Phaedo, 58C τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα;
24. δεινά: the MSS. read δειλά by mistake, and so in 360Cbelow δειλῶν three times for δεινῶν.
28. ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις: see on 342B
31. ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἥττω—ἀμαθία οὖσα. The only proof given that we ‘encounter evils believing them to be evils’ was the phrase ἤττω εἶναι ἡδονῆς (for which ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ is here substituted: see on 358C. We have demolished this proof by showing that the phrase means ἀμαθία, and we therefore infer that ἐπὶ ἃ δεινὰ ἡγεῖται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται (δεινά being a subdivision of κακά).
32. ηὑρέθη. The MSS. have εὑρέθη: but see on 315B
37. αὐτίκα: ‘veluti, ne longe hinc abeam’ (Kroschel) and so ‘for example’: a very frequent use in Plato.
38. πότερον—καλὸν ὂν κτλ. Cf. 349E
51. κάλλιόν τε. The MSS. read καλόν τε. Stephanus made the necessary change.
56. καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι. In 350Bff. those who are θαρραλέοι without ἐπιστήμη are called μαινόμενοι by an expressive metaphor. Here the μαινόμενοι— which is suggested, but no more—by the μαινόμενοι in 350Bmdash; are treated as a distinct class: the word is to be understood of literal madmen like Ajax in the play of Sophocles. The word θρασεῖς has an evil connotation as in Laws, I. 630B θρασεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ἀφρονέστατοι σχεδὸν ἁπάντων: Plato could not have said θαρραλέοι here since θαρραλέοι throughout the dialogue is applied also to ἀνδρεῖοι. It would be better to reject (with Kral) both καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς and καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι than only καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς with Sauppe and Schanz; we should then—as throughout this chapter—have only one negative to ἀνδρεῖοι, viz. δειλοί, but we may allow some latitude of expression to Socrates, and καί after οὐκοῦν is slightly in favour of supposing that other classes follow οἱ δειλοί, though it may go with the whole sentence.
67. ἐπένευσεν: Protagoras dies hard: see on Euthyphr. 8A.
75. αὐτός—πέρανον. Gorg. 506C λέγε, ὠγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέρανον.
78. φιλονικεῖν—τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι. For the orthography of φιλονικεῖν see note on 336Eabove. Apparently φιλονικεῖν is not elsewhere used in Plato with the accusative, but the construction is a natural one and occurs in Thucydides: in Rep. I. 338A we have προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.
