9. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους κτλ. Socrates proceeds by reasoning thus: (1) ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι; (2) ἐπιστήμονες are θαρραλέοι (349E l. 16 to 350B l. 25); (3) none who are θαρραλέοι without ἐπιστήμη are ἀνδρεῖοι (350B ll. 25-30). From this he infers that σοφοί (i.e. ἐπιστήμονες) are ἀνδρεῖοι, i.e. that σοφία is ἀνδρεία. The reasoning is far from cogent. In the first place, we have to assume (it is nowhere stated) that θαρραλέοι contains two classes and no more, viz. θαρραλέοι with knowledge and θαρραλέοι without knowledge: the assumption would be (to Socrates) a natural one, since (according to the reasoning in ch. XIX ff.) every one who is not ἐπιστήμων is ἀνεπιστήμων. Now as ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι and no ἀνεπιστήμονες (in the class θαρραλέοι) are ἀνδρεῖοι, it follows that ἀνδρεῖοι are ἐπιστήμονες, but even then the conclusion of Socrates is not warranted— that ἐπιστήμονες are ἀνδρεῖοι, since ἀνδρεῖοι may be only a part of ἐπιστήμονες. Socrates —consciously or unconsciously—covers his erroneous reasoning by another fallacy when about to draw his conclusion in 350B, ll. 31 and 34, where see note.
10. καὶ ἴτας γ᾽, ἔφη: i.e. they not only have θάρρος (which may be quiescent) but they put it into action. In ἰέναι Protagoras contrives to give the derivation of ἴτης: Sauppe refers to the scholiast on Ar. Clouds, 444 ἴτης. ἰταμός, ἀναιδής, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτῶν χωρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀνδρεῖος is coupled with ἴτης in Symp. 203D and with θρασύς in Ar. Clouds, loc. cit.
11. φέρε δή κτλ. This section (from φέρε δή to ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα in l. 16) is intended to prepare the way for the proof of the third proposition (see on l. 9) in 350B see note on l. 29, and cf. Laches, 192C, where the proof that ἄφρων καρτέρησις is not ἀνδρεία is introduced in much the same way: σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα—ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.
14. εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε: ‘as I'm a sane man’. This and similar phrases are frequent in Plato, e.g. Euthyd. 283E, Rep. X. 608D (εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε), Gorg. 511B οἶδα—εἰ μὴ κωφός γ᾽ εἰμι.
τὸ μέν τι—τὸ δέ τι. See on Euthyphr. 12A. Kroschel quotes Phileb. 13C τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας—κακάς.
