CHAPTER XIX
Socrates endeavours to refute Protagoras and to show that Justice and Holiness are identical. If ὁσιότης is not οἷον δικαιοσύνη, nor δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσιότης, it will follow (says Socrates) that ὁσιότης is ἄδικον and δικαιοσύνη ἀνόσιον. This is absurd, and therefore ὁσιότης is δίκαιον and δικαιοσύνη is ὅσιον. Protagoras will only admit that there is a certain likeness between the two virtues.3. τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια. B and T omit the article, which can hardly be dispensed with, since the assertion was made not of parts of virtue, but of the, i.e. all the parts: see 330Aἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἷον τὸ ἕτερον—; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει κτλ.;
4. οὕτως—ὡς. ὥστε for ὡς would be more usual: cf. Rep. II. 365Dἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. Perhaps the ὡς of Phaedo, 108E πέπεισμαι—ὡς πρῶτον μέν—μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος κτλ. is the same in kind: cf. the old English ‘so as’. Here οὕτως—ὡς with the infinitive is natural in view of τοιοῦτον οἷον in the vicinity: 330Cand D.
9-10. su\—so/s: notice the mock asperity: I expected better things of you.
14. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν: the interrogation begins here and ἄρα is illative.
15. ἀλλ᾽ οἷον μὴ ὅσιον. So far we are entitled to go, but in τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον (l. 17) the contrary and the contradictory are confused, as is frequently the case in Plato's dialogues: see note on Euthyphr. 7A θεομισές, where are cited Alcib. II, 138D ff., Rep. IV. 437C; add Phileb. 48B ff., where φθόνος is said to be joy at a friend's misfortune because envy of a friend's success implies joy at his ill-luck (cf. ibid. 50A), and Euthyd. 276B οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς; πάνυ γε. Plato was not unaware of the rules of logic in this matter (see Symp. 201E-202A), but the tendency of Greek thought and life was not to rest content with negations; whence words like ἀνωφελής, ἄφθονος acquired a positive significance, and Solon could enact (Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία ch. 8 ad fin.) ὃς ἂν στασιαζούσης τῆς πόλεως μὴ τιθῆται τὰ ὅπλα μηδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν. Part of the argument in the next chapter suffers from the same flaw: see on 332A l. 3.
16. ἀλλ᾽ ἄδικον ἄρα: Heindorf's emendation for ἀλλὰ δίκαιον ἄρα, the reading of the best MSS., which τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον proves to be wrong and shows how to correct. Heindorf's correction was afterwards confirmed by a Paris MS. ἄρα is illative. For τὸ μέν unexpressed (the words are equivalent to ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον ἄρα) before τὸ δέ see on 330Aἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο.
20. ὅτι is ‘because’, not ‘that’: see note on l. 22 below.
21. δικαιότης ὁσιότητι. Socrates gives the words the same termination to suggest their closer likeness (‘justness’ to ‘holiness’); δικαιότης is found also in Gorg. 508A as a balance to κοσμιότητα. Plato was fond of this suffix and coined by it the word ποιότης Theaet. 182A.
22. καὶ μάλιστα πάντων—οἷον δικαιοσύνη. Kroschel objects to the emphasis, and inclines to doubt the genuineness of this clause. If ὅτι in l. 20 is translated as ‘because’ and not as ‘that’, the difficulty disappears. ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα in l. 20 thus means simply that δικαιοσύνη is ὄσιον and ὁσιότης δίκαιον (ll. 18-19), which is the meaning also assigned to ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα by Protagoras in his reply (ll. 25 ff.). Socrates (for Protagoras) will reply that δικαιοσύνη is ὅσιον and ὁσιότης δίκαιον for two main reasons: (1) because δικαιότης is the same as ὁσιότης—this he does not much insist on—or because δικαιότης is ὅ τιὁμοιότατον ὁσιότητι—this he insists on more: (2) because δικαιοσύνη is οἷον ὁσιότης and ὁσιότης οἷον δικαιοσύνη—this he insists on most of all (μάλιστα πάντων), and with reason, because it expressly refutes Protagoras' assertion in 330AB. On the other hand if ὅτι is translated as ‘that’, Kroschel's objections can hardly be got over—viz. that ἤτοι ταὐτόν—δικαιοσύνη is not the same as Socrates' reply on his own behalf; that the words are ignored both by Protagoras in his reply and by Socrates himself in 333B and that the emphasis of μάλιστα πάντων is strained and unnatural.
26. ἁπλοῦν: opposed to ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῶ̣ διάφορον εἶναι in 27. Plato uses ἁπλοῦν, as opposed to διπλοῦν, διάφορον, σύνθετον, πεπλεγμένον, ποικίλον and the like, of that which is uniform, simple, true without any difference or qualifications: Bonitz in Hermes, II (1867), 307 ff.
30. μή μοι: see on μὴ οὕτως in 318B
31. τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο—ἐλέγχεσθαι, cf. below, 333Cτὸν γὰπ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι. Here τό, as often, introduces a quotation.
32. τὸ δ᾽ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ τοῦτο λέγω: τοῦτο (cf. l. 31) belongs to the τὸ δ᾽ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ and not to λέγω in the usual sense of τοῦτο λέγω ‘I mean this’.
36. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. Anaxagoras went so far as to say that snow was black (because it is still water, though congealed): Ritter and Preller, § 128, n. b.
37. ὅπῃ: an old emendation for ὃ μή.
42. ταῦτα: the parts of the face.
45. κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὅμοιον. This (the MSS. reading) is successfully defended by Kroschel. The emphasis is on the first part of the sentence (‘it is not right to call what has some likeness like—any more than to call what has some unlikeness unlike—even if the likeness be very small’), to which accordingly κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὅμοιον reverts: compare Socrates' reply, which says nothing of τὸ ἀνόμοιον, in the next sentence. The German editors (except Cron and Kroschel) either reject τὸ ὅμοιον (Schanz, Sauppe, Bertram) or read τὸ ἀνόμοιον ἢ τὸ ὅμοιον (Heindorf) or reject altogether the words οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια (Kral).
