CHAPTER XXI
Before Socrates has completed his proof that σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη are identical, Protagoras takes occasion to deliver an irrelevant though carefully constructed harangue on ἀγαθά.1. ἐκαλλωπίζετο. Cf. Phaedr. 236D παῦσαι πρός με καλλωπιζόμενος: σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω ὃ εἰπὼν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν; so also τρυφᾶν, cf. Euthyphr. 11 E ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός σοι ξυμπροθυμήσομαι, where see note.
5. ἔστω. Protagoras has already disclaimed this view in 333B
7. ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν: Hirschig suggested ὅ τι ἀδικοῦσιν, but see on 333B Schanz rejects the words, but without sufficient reason.
8. εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες. εὖ is here primarily of success, and κακῶς of failure, but the collocation of εὖ πράττειν with ἀδικεῖν is intended to suggest that the view which Protagoras is defending is a paradox. Plato frequently makes use of the double sense (as we should call it; but see on Euthyphr, 3A) of εὖ πράττειν, εὖ ζῆν and the like, to imply that the virtuous life is the happy one: e.g. Alcib. I, 116B ff.; Rep. I. 353E ff.; Charm. 172A, 173D; cf. Euthyd. 281C.
9. λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθά. Socrates proceeds to elucidate the definition of εὖ in εὖ πράττειν.
11. ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: Xen. Mem. IV. 6. 8 ἄλλο δ᾽ ἄν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον; οὐκ ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη. τὸ ἄπα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅτῳ ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Plato, Rep. II. 379B τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν; ναί.
14. ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι. The martial metaphor in the desiderative ἀγωνιᾶν is carried on by παρατετάχθαι, which is the MSS. reading, and means literally ‘to be set in array’, cf. Thuc. IV. 43. 3 οὗτοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι ἦσαν ἔσχατοι. For the metaphorical use cf. Rep. III. 399B ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμυνουμένου τὴν τύχην. The whole clause describes the outward demeanour of Protagoras, which causes Socrates to fear an imminent personal conflict. Kock's παρατετάσθαι, accepted by Schanz, does not suit, since παρατετάσθαι means ‘to be tired, worn out’, e.g. Euthyd. 303B καὶ γελῶντε καὶ κροτοῦντε . . . ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν, cf. Ar. Clouds, 213. It is noteworthy that συντεταγμένως and συντεταμένως are frequently found as variants in Platonic MSS.
19. οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. The argument is here broken off, and not (in its present form) again resumed. If Socrates had continued, Protagoras would doubtless have asserted that what is ὠφέλιμον for man is for him ἀγαθόν. The argument has therefore been: σωφρονεῖν, it is said, is ἀδικεῖν. But σωφρονεῖν = εὖ φρονεῖν = εὖ βουλεύεσθαι if (but only if) εὖ πράττειν (i.e. ὠφέλιμα πράττειν) accompanies εὐβουλία. In other words ὠφέλιμα πράττειν = ἀδικεῖν is the stage which we have reached—a thesis which it is the object of the Republic and of a large part of the Gorgias to refute.
πολλὰ οἶδ᾽ ἅ. The speech which follows may be from some work by Protagoras (so recently Zeller in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, V, 2, 177), perhaps his περὶ ἀρετῶν, mentioned by Diog. Laert. IX. 8. 55 (since ἀρετή is a general word for excellence). Zeller points out that just as the notion ‘true’ was conceived by Protagoras (in his πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος) as relative, so here the notion ‘good’ is represented as relative and varying with that to which it is relative.
20. ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὠφέλιμα: ἀνθρώποις μέν has no antithesis expressed: were the antitheses expressed in full, the sentence would be very cumbrous, running somewhat as follows: ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ᾽ ἃ ἀνθρώποις μὲν <τὰ μὲν> ἀνωφελῆ ἐστί, καὶ σιτία—μυπία, <τοῖς δὲἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς ὠφέλιμα>, τὰ δέ γε ὠφέλιμα <τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀνωφελῆ>. For μέν without a balancing clause see on τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι in Euthyphr. 3C, and on 330Aabove for τὰ δέ without a preceding τὰ μέν. ἀνωφελῆ is ‘hurtful’, as frequently: see above on οἷον μὴ ὅσιον in 331A With Protagoras' classification of ὠφέλιμα—ἀνωφελῆ—οὐδέτερα cf. Gorg. 467E ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἀγαθόν γ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν (where see Thompson's note) and below, 351D
23. οὐδενί: Schanz follows Naber in reading οὐδέσι against the MSS. both here and in Euthyd. 302C. The plural would be more appropriate here, but what is denied of all individuals is denied of the species, and the dative plural of οὐδείς seems to lack authority.
27. εἰ δ᾽ ἐθέλοις—πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν. Heindorf suggests εἰ δ᾽ ἐθέλεις—the indicative being generally used in this phrase, e.g. Alcib. I, 122B εἰ δ᾽ αὖ ἐθέλεις εἰς πλούτους ἀποβλέψαι κτλ., αἰσχυνθείης ἂν ἐπὶ σαυτῷ—but Goodwin, M.T. p. 188, § 500, quotes a precisely similar example from Thuc. II. 39. 5 καίτοι εἰ π̔αθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ ρόνων μελέτῃ—ἐθέλοιμεν κινδυνεύειν, ρεπιγίγνεται ἡμῖν κτλ. In both examples the present in the apodosis contains a reference to the future.
29. φυτοῖς—πάγκακον. Theophr. Hist. Plant. IV. 16. 5 πολέμιον γὰρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ ἔλαιον) πᾶσι: καὶ ἔλαιον ἐπιχέουσι τοῖς ὑρολείμμασι τῶν π̔ιζῶν: ἰσχύει δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ἔλαιον ἐν τοῖς νέοις καὶ ἄρτι φυομένοις: ἀσθενέστερα γάρ κτλ.
ταῖς θριξὶν—ἀνθρώπου. Arist. περὶ ζῴων γενέσεως V. 5. 785a. 30 ff. says that a mixture of oil and water is a remedy against grey hairs.
33. ἐνταῦθα, i.e. ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.
35. ταὐτόν. This form, not ταὐτό, of the neuter of ὁ αὐτός is almost regular in Plato: see on 314B
37. μέλλει, sc. ὁ ἀσθενῶν: see on 319D
38. ὅσον μόνον ‘just enough to’. Cf. Rep. III. 416E δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς τοσοῦτον, ὅσον μήτε ρεπιεῖναι αὐτοῖς. . .μήτε ἐνδεῖν, Theaet. 161B ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ᾽ ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως.
τὴν δυσχέρειαν—ὄψοις. The nausea is of course that felt by a sick person at the smell of food: so far there is therefore no reason for holding ῥινῶν to be corrupt and reading χυμῶν (as Kroschel formerly read), still less εὐκρινῶν with Bergk. But it is not clear how oil could thus prevent nausea, nor does there seem to be any parallel among the ancients to such a statement. It is known that the ancients (like many modern peoples) used oil in cooking much as we use butter (see Blümner's Privataltherthümer, p. 228), but the present passage seems rather to point to the use of some kind of fragrant oil sprinkled on the food after it was cooked. The Greeks were at all events not unfamiliar with the use of scents in banqueting: see Xen. Symp. II. 2 ff. Kroschel thinks Plato is making fun of Protagoras by putting into his mouth the word ‘ῥινῶν pro πικρῶν vel χυμῶν’, but this view will hardly command assent.
