[228] was practically done, when, on the return from the Peninsula, his troops were sent forward to join Pope; but the disastrous termination of that campaign prompted the recall of McClellan as the only man who could make the army efficient for the trying emergency. Having accomplished his work of expelling Lee from Maryland, he entered, after a brief repose, on a new campaign of invasion; and it was in the midst of this, and on the eve of a decisive blow, that he was suddenly removed. The moment chosen was an inopportune and an ungracious one; for never had McClellan acted with such vigor and rapidity—never had he shown so much confidence in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable fact that not only was the whole body of the army-rank and file as well as officers—enthusiastic in their affection for his person, but that the very general appointed as his successor was the strongest opponent of his removal.
The military character of McClellan will not be difficult to settle, however much it is yet obscured by malicious detraction on the one hand, or blind admiration on the other. He was assuredly not a great general; for he had the pedantry of war rather than the inspiration of war. His talent was eminently that of the cabinet; and his proper place was in Washington, where he should have remained as generalin-chief. Here his ability to plan campaigns and form large strategic combinations, which was remarkable, would have had full scope; and he would have been considerate and helpful to those in the field. But his power as a tactician was much inferior to his talent as a strategist, and he executed less boldly than he conceived: not appearing to know well those counters with which a commander must work-time, place, and circumstance. Yet he was improving in this regard, and was like Turenne, of whom Napoleon said that he was the only example of a general who grew bolder as he grew older.
To General McClellan personally it was a misfortune that he became so prominent a figure at the commencement of the contest; for it was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the nation's ignorance of war. Taking this into
