Xliv.
Here I might leave the imputations on Massachusetts. But the case is stronger yet. I have referred to the Stamp Act. The parallel is of such aptness and importance, that, though on a former occasion I presented it to the Senate, I cannot forbear from pressing it again. As the precise character of this Act may not be familiar, allow me to remind the Senate, that it was an attempt to draw money from the Colonies through a stamp tax, while the determination of certain questions of forfeiture under the statute was delegated, not to the courts of common law, but to courts of admiralty, without trial by jury. This Act was denounced in the Colonies at once on its passage, as contrary to the British Constitution, on two principal grounds, identical in character with the two chief grounds on which the Slave Act is now declared to be unconstitutional; first, as an assumption by Parliament of powers not belonging to it, and an infraction of rights secured to the Colonies; and secondly, as a denial of trial by jury in [228] certain cases of property. On these grounds the Stamp Act was held to be an outrage.The Colonies were aroused against it. Virginia first declared herself by solemn resolutions, which the timid thought ‘treasonable;’—yes, sir, ‘treasonable,’—even as that word is now applied to recent manifestations of opinion in Boston—even to the memorial of her twenty-nine hundred merchants. But these ‘treasonable’ resolutions soon found a response. New York followed. Massachusetts came next. In an address from the Legislature to the Governor, the true ground of opposition to the Stamp Act, coincident with the two radical objections to the Slave Act, are clearly set forth, with the following pregnant conclusion:
‘We deeply regret that the Parliament has seen fit to pass such an Act as the Stamp Act; we flatter ourselves that the hardships of it will shortly appear to them in such a light as shall induce them, in their wisdom, to repeal it; in the meantime, we must beg your Excellency to excuse us from doing anything to assist in the execution of it.’
The Stamp Act was welcomed in the Colonies by the Tories of that day, precisely as the unconstitutional Slave Act has been welcomed by imperious numbers among us. Hutchinson, at that time Lieutenant Governor and Judge in Massachusetts, wrote to Ministers in England:
‘The Stamp Act is received with as much decency as could be expected. It leaves no room for evasion, and will execute itself.’
Like the Judges of our day, in charges to Grand Juries, he resolutely vindicated the Act, and admonished ‘the Jurors and the people’ to obey. Like Governors in our day, Bernard, in his speech to the Legislature of Massachusetts, demanded unreasoning submission. ‘I shall not,’ says this British Governor, ‘enter into any disquisition of the policy of the Act. I have only to say it is an Act of the Parliament of Great Britain.’ Like Marshals of our day, the Officers of the Customs are recorded as having made ‘application for a military force to assist them in the execution of their duty.’ The elaborate answer of Massachusetts—the work of Samuel Adams, and one of the corner-stones of our history—was pronounced ‘the ravings of a parcel of wild enthusiasts,’ even as recent proceedings in Boston, resulting in the memorial before you, have been characterized on this floor. Was I not right in adducing this parallel?
The country was aroused against the execution of this Act. And here Boston took the lead.
The opposition spread and deepened, and one of its natural tendencies [229] was to outbreak and violence. On one occasion in Boston, it showed itself in the lawlessness of a mob, of a most formidable character, even as is now charged. Liberty, in her struggles, is too often driven to force. But the town, at a public meeting in Faneuil Hall, called without delay, on the motion of the opponents of the Stamp Act, with James Otis as Chairman, condemned the outrage. Eager in hostility to the execution of the Act, Boston cherished municipal order, and constantly discountenanced all tumult, violence and illegal proceedings. On these two grounds she then stood; and her position was widely recognized.
Thus was the Stamp Act annulled, even before its actual repeal, which was pressed with assiduity by petition and remonstrance, on the next meeting of Parliament. Among the potent influences was the entire concurrence of the merchants, and especially a remonstrance against the Stamp Act by the merchants of New York, like that now made against the Slave Act by the merchants of Boston. Some sought at first only for its modification. Even James Otis began with this moderate aim. The King himself showed a disposition to yield to this extent. But Franklin, who was then in England, when asked whether the Colonies would submit to the Act, if mitigated in certain particulars, replied: ‘No, never, unless compelled by force of arms.’ Then it was, that the great Commoner, William Pitt, said:
[230]‘Sir, I have been charged with giving birth to sedition in America. They have spoken their sentiments with freedom against this unhappy Act, and that freedom has become their crime. Sorry I am to hear the liberty of speech in this House imputed as a crime. But the imputation shall not discourage me. It is a liberty I mean to exercise. No gentleman ought to be afraid to exercise it. It is a liberty by which the gentleman who calumniates it might and ought to have profited. The gentleman tells us America is obstinate; America is almost in open rebellion. I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of slaves, so dead to all the feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit instruments to make slaves of all the rest. I would not debate a particular point of law with the gentleman; but I draw my ideas of Freedom from the vital powers of the British Constitution—not from the crude and fallacious notions too much relied upon, as if we were but in the morning of liberty. I can acknowledge no veneration for any procedure, law, or ordinance, that is repugnant to reason and the first elements of our Constitution. The Americans have been wronged. They have been driven to madness. Upon the whole, I will beg leave to tell the House what is really my opinion. It is, that the Stamp Act be repealed, absolutely, totally and immediately, and that the reason for the repeal be assigned because it was founded on an erroneous principle.’
Thus spoke this great orator, at the time tutelary guardian of American liberty. He was not unheeded. Within less than a year from its original passage, the Stamp Act—assailed as unconstitutional on the precise grounds which I now occupy in assailing the Slave Act—was driven from the statute book.
I call upon you, then, to receive the memorial, and hearken to its prayer. All other memorials asking for changes in existing legislation are treated with respect, promptly referred, and acted upon. This should not be an exception. The memorial simply asks the repeal of an obnoxious statute, which is entirely within the competency of Congress. It proceeds from a large number of respectable citizens whose autograph signatures are attached. It is brief and respectful in form; and, in its very brevity, shows that spirit of freedom which should awaken a generous response. In refusing to receive it or refer it, according to the usage of the Senate, or in treating it with any indignity, you offer an affront, not only to these numerous petitioners, but also to the great right of petition, which is never more sacred than when exercised in behalf of Freedom against an obnoxious statute. Permit me to add, that by this course you provoke the very spirit which you would repress. There is a certain plant which is said to grow when trodden upon. It remains to be seen if the Boston petitioners have not something of this quality. But this I know, sir, that the Slave Act, like vice, is of so hideous a mien, that ‘to be hated it needs only to be seen;’ and the occurrences of this day will make it visible and palpable to the people in new forms of injustice.
