It would, indeed, have been quite superfluous to have troubled Beauregard with such an unimportant narrative — especially while Bragg was present and had, doubtless, already stated to Beauregard the essential particulars of the march!
Again, reverting to a common-sense basis, we may assume that, owing to the tempestuous condition of earth and skies at 2 o'clock A. M. on the morning of the 5th of April, 1862, I directed that my division should be divested of all incumbrances in its advance to the field of impending battle.
Further, we may assume that when my division filed into the Bark road its advance was obstructed by a division of General Polk's reserve corps--he being my senior — which had pressed forward contrary to the order of march, encumbered and halting, had “blocked up the road” and rendered the farther advance of my division quite impracticable.
We may now still further assume, with confidence, that the head of my division, left in front, was, after encountering this obstruction, and some time held immovable, conducted into the open field with the view of advancing to its prescribed position on the line of battle as soon as a practicable route could be found through the deep mire and water and intervening forests. In this position my division was found by General Johnston, when he directed the road cleared of Polk's reserves, and ordered my advance, to which my troops responded with notable enthusiasm. Such was the emphatic answer to the inquiry why the head of the missing column (Ruggles's third brigade) was found “stock still out in the open field.” The three brigades advanced along and near the same route and encountered similar obstacles to those stated by General Anderson in his report.
This succinct outline will, it is assumed, stand the crucial test of the sophistry of the first, the casuistry of the second, and the array of facts of the last of my assailants, and every combination of their pigeon-hole batteries in attempting to breach the military record of my division on the battle-field of Shiloh.
Colonel Johnston assumed that there was “some confusion or mistake of orders in Ruggles's division!” I now deny, as I did in August, 1878, “both allegations positively and emphatically.” The troops of my division disclosed neither evidences of confusion nor mistake in the execution of explicit orders, and maintained their proper organization, marched like veterans, and were distinguished for their undaunted bravery in their successive conflicts throughout the great battle of Shiloh--as Johnston's own frequent mention of the conduct of my troops — without honoring, by customary courtesy, my name, as their
