[13] General Wise, then confronted by at least two brigades of the enemy (about four thousand five hundred strong), pushed forward in advance of the Haulover or bridgeway between Johns's and Seabrook's island,s and in addition several regiments of infantry were detached from Sullivan's and James's islands to be in readiness for the development of the enemy's purposes.On the night of the 11th ultimo I ordered all our batteries bearing on Morris island to open a heavy simultaneous fire on that portion, as if a cover for an assault, and with the hope of forcing the enemy to withdraw from Johns's island to the protection of his own works. This stratagem seems to have produced the desired effect, or assisted to make him abandon the movement on Johns's island, and withdraw hastily before daybreak, thus releasing and enabling Colquitt's command to reach General Finnegan in time to meet and defeat the enemy at Ocean-Pond, some thirteen miles in advance of Lake City.
In the meanwhile other troops, fast as the means of railroad transportation would enable me, had been dispatched to the theatre of war from the works around Charleston and Savannah, and the positions covering the Savannah railroad. This was done, indeed, to a hazardous degree, but as I informed the Honorable Secretary of War by telegraph the 9th ultimo, I regarded it as imperative to attempt to secure the subsistence resources of Florida.
General Finnegan was also apprised of these reinforcements on the 11th February, and instructed to mancoeuvre meantime to check or delay the enemy, but to avoid close quarters and unnecessary loss of men.
While these reinforcements were en route, the enemy again attempted to delay them by a movement with show of force against Whitemarsh Island, near Savannah, and it became a measure of proper precaution to halt at Savannah two of the regiments on the way to General Finnegan, for the development of the enemy's plans, one of which regiments, indeed, I felt it but prudent to detain there to the present. The want of adequate rolling stock on the Georgia and Florida railroads, and the existence of the gap of some twenty-six miles between the two roads, subjected the concentration of my forces to a delay, which deprived my efforts to that end of full effect. The absence of General Hill making it injudicious for me to leave this State, I directed Brigadier-General Taliaferro to proceed to Florida and assume the command, he being an officer, in whose ability, field experience and judgment, I had high confidence, notknowing at the time that Brigadier-General William M. Gardner, commanding in middle Florida, his senior, had returned from
