Report of operations of Bratton's brigade from May 7th, 1864 to January, 1865.
My brigade formed on the right of the road, and moved down to the court-house, the enemy retiring before us, and abandoning the place without a fight. We then changed front to the left and moved up----road to the Brock road, where Kershaw and Humphries's brigades were fighting. I took position on the right of Kershaw's brigade, where a much needed rest of two or three hours was enjoyed, when the enemy was discovered advancing upon us. This attack, which was probably only a reconnoisance, was easily repulsed with only a loss of two or three to us, but of from forty to fifty to them. In a short time, however, they advanced in two lines, directing their attack to my right, where they supposed there was no force to oppose them. Humphries's brigade and Rodes's division were thrown in just in time to meet them on the extension of my line, my right regiment (the P. S. S., under [548] Colonel Walker), only participated in this fight in which the enemy were repulsed. My skirmishers were sent in pursuit of the broken and retreating masses and succeeded in capturing about one hundred and twenty-five (125) prisoners; night came on and closed this day's operations. On the next morning (the 9th) we were moved to the left across the Brock road, and put in position on the right of our division with my right resting on the Brock road, my line nearly perpendicular to it and and stretching towards the----river. Here again we threw up a little breast work of logs and rails. My three right regiments, First S. S., Colonel Walker, Second Rifles, Colonel Bowen, Sixth South Carolina regiment, Colonel Steedman, had open field in their front, the two left regiments (First South Carolina, Colonel Hagood, Fifth South Carolina, Captain J. B. Lyle), were in the woods. The sharpshooting was incessant, but nothing of importance transpired until the morning of the 12th, when the enemy assaulted us heavily, advancing beautifully in two lines of battle; we held our fire until they were within fifty yards of us, when by a deliberate and well directed volley, a line of their dead was laid down across the entire front of my brigade, with the exception of one regiment, whose fire was well and delibrately put, but the artillery opened a little too soon on this part of the line, and caused the enemy to drop behind a crest just in time to evade the storm of minnie balls; the fusilade continued for some minutes, and strewed the field with dead and wounded from their scattered and flying hordes; many of those in the open field fled in comparative safety behind the crest alluded to above (to their right, our left) to the woods and were massed, partially rallied in front of my two regiments (First and Fifth) still protected by this crest and the woods from our infantry fire. Their position could not be seen from our batteries, but I ordered them to open upon them and directed from my position their fire, which was afterwards found to have become more effective, killing and mutilating great numbers of them. Unfortunately the commander of the battery informed me that his orders were to save ammunition, and to fire only when he was certain of doing execution. I could not be certain of this, and fearing that ammunition might be scarce, ordered him to cease firing and thus saved the lives of many Yankees. They kept up an active fusilade, indeed, a terrific roar of musketry all the while. Our men were quietly awaiting their appearance over the crest. This continued so long (for some hours) that we began to suspect that by some happy mistake they were fighting themselves.
It seemed a heavy battle and we had nothing to do with it. Skirmishers from the First and Fifth regiments were ordered up to the [549] crest to discover what it meant. They found them lying behind the crest firing at what did not clearly appear, but they with great gallantry charged them with a yell, routed and put the whole mass to flight, most preciptate and headlong, capturing some forty (40) prisoners. In their haste and panic a multitude of them ran across a portion of open field and gave our battery and my line of battle on the right a shot at them, the skirmishers too. We kept up a most effective fire upon them and that field also was thickly dotted with their dead and wounded. My picket line was re-established, and thus ended the battle of the 12th on this part of the line. In this battle I had about twelve hundred and fifty (1250) muskets, and lost in killed and wounded not more than fifteen--prisoners none. We destroyed of the enemy, in killed, wounded and prisoners, in my judgment, at least three thousand (3,000). They left about 500 dead in my front, and it is known that they took many dead from the field (all of those remote from our lines). My officers and men behaved to my entire satisfation. The men fired with cool deliberation and great effectiveness. While all behaved well, I cannot pass on from this part of my report without making special mention of Captain Harvey, Fifth South Carolina Volunteers and Captain Wood, First South Carolina regiment. They commanded the skirmishers of their respective regiments in the charge upon the enemy, and executed their orders with an energy and boldness that was worthy of all praise. Not long before sunset I was ordered to report to General Ewell on the right without delay. I moved down as rapidly as possible and found General Ewell in rear of that portion of the line which had been taken from Johnson's division in the morning known as the “mule shoe.” My brigade was put in position to support the withdrawal of some troops of ours from this same “mule shoe.” We lay there under fire, but doing no fighting all night, and were withdrawn about daybreak to a new line constructed during the night some four or five hundred yards in rear. We were in the course of the morning relieved and ordered back to General Field, who held us as reserve for our division until we left this part of the line.
We lost during the night in killed and wounded about seventy men, the enemy's fire was incessant throughout the night.
We did not fire a gun. On the night of the 14th we moved with the division towards the extreme right of our line, and were put into position on the right of Gregg's brigade, which was on the left of the division. On the morning of the 16th erected works but had no fighting here other than a little skirmishing some distance in front of the line. On the evening of the 21st the whole corps marched for Hanover [550] Junction, moving down the Telegraph road. On this severe and weary march, which was almost continuous for twenty-four hours, my brigade was rear guard; nothing of importance occurred. The enemy followed closely upon us, occasionally engaging a squadron of cavalry in our rear, but did not molest any body materially, they rather aided us in driving stragglers before us. We crossed North Anna river about sunset on the next evening, the 22d, and went into camp on the next morning, 23d; one regiment was sent on picket to the railroad bridge over the river, had some sharpshooting with the enemy across the river. The other four rested in a road near by. About midnight I received orders to destroy the railroad bridge, and fall back to a position near to the Junction and fortify, which was done. We remained in this position three or four days, skirmishing and sharpshooting all the while with the enemy, until he retired across the river. Our loss was slight here.
On the morning (the 27th) we moved down the railroad to Ashland, thence passed Atlees to the Totopotamoi creek, near Walnut Grove church, where we relieved some of Gordon's troops, on the 30th day of May. Skirmishing on this line was severe, and our loss was greater than usual. On the evening of 31st day of May we began to slide to the right, and continued to do so until we arrived upon what was afterwards known as the Cold Harbor line. My position on this line covered the road from Mechanicsville to Old Chuch. Our skirmishers were more or less actively engaged while moving from our last position, and after we settled in this, until the enemy left our front, which they did on the night of the 5th of June. We shifted position on the line, and advanced to Totopotamoi swamp one evening, but did not come in contact with the enemy again on this line. On the morning of the 13th we moved to the right, crossed Chickahomony on the McClellan (Cavalry) Bridge, marched through Seven Pines battlefield, where we bivouacked for two days. On the evening of 15th I received orders to move up the Kingsland road to the Varina road, and picket towards the river from Deep Bottom up. We arrived at the place designated about 10 o'clock P. M. We found no enemy in this vicinity, except squads from gunboats lying in the river. I received orders about midday, on the next day, to move across the river at Drewry's Bluff, and rejoin the division, which was moving down the Telegraph road towards Petersburg. I moved in accordance with orders, and found the division in line on the left of, and parallel with the road, preparing to drive the enemy out of our works, which had been abandoned by Beauregard to reinforce Petersburg. I was put in position on the right of the division, near <*> creek, but night coming on, and the [551] woods being dense, only a line of skirmishers was advanced. My skir-mishers occupied a line of works that night, and it was not discovered until next morning that the enemy were still in partial possession of Beauregard's line. About the middle of the day the division made a sort of spontaneous charge, in which only my skirmish line participated, and recovered and re-occupied the line that had been abandoned on the morning before. On the next morning (8th) we were relieved by troops from Pickett's division, and moved across the Appomattox to Petersburg, and were put in position on the line about Battery No. 34; at dark we moved to the left, and relieved troops on the new line, covering the Baxter road, my left resting on the Battery, under which the enemy afterwards sprung a mine. The works here were very imperfect, and the sharpshooting was incessant and active. The enemy was found next morning well entrenched close to our front, and could sharpshoot us from two lines; we suffered for the first two days from this advantage over us, losing heavily; the fire upon us here was incessant, night and day, and the labor of completing the works, added to the heavy guard duty, necessitated by the close proximity of the lines at this point, rendered this probably the severest tour of duty that my men have been subjected to during the war. We made the position comparatively secure, and thought that we inflicted more damage than we received by sbarpshooting, before we were relieved.
We were relieved by Elliott's brigade about day-break on the morning of the 24th, and moved down to the Iron bridge, on City Point road. We remained there in a ravine for four (4) days, during which time one of my regiments, the P. S. S., Colonel Walker, was ordered to report to General Hoke, as a support to some point on his line, against which attack was threatened, the attack, however, was not made, and the regiment was not engaged. I moved it with the rest of the brigade, back to the old position on the Baxter road, on the 28th, relieving Elliott's brigade. A portion of the line was now assigned to the division to hold, and a system of reliefs established, by which each brigade of the division got forty-eight hours rest in every eight days, thus we wore through a weary month of guard duty, mortar-shelling and sharpshooting, watching and waiting for the affray; but no assault was made. Our daily loss was small, but the sum total for the month, particularly when the nature of the wounds is considered, (unusual proportion fatal,) loomed up heavily — aye sadly — many of my noblest veterans, whose kindling eyes had flashed out their staunch heart's enthusiam on so many glorious fields of battle, were stricken from our rolls, as it were by the stealthy hand of the assassin. There is the chill of [552] murder about the casualties of this month, and sad, sad is the regret, when death thus strikes the brave. We lost on this line fifty three killed and seventy-two wounded, many of them mortally.
On the night of the 28th we were relieved, and took cars on the morning of the 29th on the Petersburg railroad for Rice's station; from thence we marched across James river at Drewry's Bluff to the vicinity of Fussel's Mill, and were put in position on the morning of the 30th to meet the enemy, who had made demonstration on that point, but found that he had retired on the night previous. My brigade was moved up during the day along the line of works over New Market Heights and put in position on that line, with its right resting on Four-Mile creek. We remained in this position, with our pickets well out in front, enjoying freedom from the presence of the enemy until the morning of the 13th of August, when the enemy assaulted and, after three efforts, succeeded in driving in my pickets, capturing and killing some of them. It was here that Captain Beatty, of the P. S. S., one of the most efficient officers of this brigade, fell mortally wounded; the enemy in his front were successfully repulsed, he was slain, and some of his men captured by the enemy, who had driven in the pickets on our left and came up in rear of his lines. I mention this as due to the gallant officers and men who were captured there. Our picket line was finally driven in, pretty badly mutilated. The enemy opened a furious cannonade upon our main line, which, however, did not last long. Our skirmishers were advanced, and they threatened his left, resting near the Yarborough house, which, perhaps, induced him to withdraw. While this was occurring here it seems that the enemy were moving heavy columns up the Darbytown and Charles City roads, which necessitated a sliding of the whole division to the left. I was ordered to follow and keep up connection with the brigade on my left. This was done, and night found my brigade with its right resting upon the Drill house and extending along New Market heights beyond the Libby house. On the next morning the affair on the left became more serious. The enemy succeeded in taking a portion of our line about Fussell's Mill. My already attenuated line was depleted to furnish force to drive them out. Two of my regiments — the Fifth South Carolina, Colonel Coward, and Second South Carolina rifles, Colonel Bowen--were sent down without delay, and, I was told by others than themselves, rendered most effective assistance in driving the enemy away and recovering our line. While this was going on on the left the enemy assaulted my line near the Libby house, but were easily repulsed by the picket line, aided by the artillery on the heights. In [553] the afternoon I received orders to take command of the whole line from the left of my brigade to Chaffin's farm. I found on this line the City Battalion, detachments from Scales and Thomas's brigades, and Johnson's old Tennessee brigade, numbering in all about one thousand men. I went out to the picket line to discover what troops were there, and reached Cox's farm, “Signal Hill,” where I had been informed the picket line was established, in time to meet the enemy coming in by way of Double Gates, but could see or hear nothing of our pickets, who ought to have been on this part of the line. I learned afterwards that the line, from some distance to the left of Double Gates to the river, was occupied by detachments from the City Battalion and John-;son's brigade. They unquestionably behaved badly — ran away from their posts, and could not give any intelligible report of what had occurred when they were found, which was not until some time after dark. Knowing little or nothing of the country in front, and only that the enemy were advancing up the Varina road, I immediately moved Johnson's brigade from Four-Mile creek up to B. Aiken's house, to secure Chaffin's from disaster. Night closed in before I found the pickets, and without my learning anything definite of the enemy. During the night, however, I found that the picket line had been disturbed only between where it crossed the Kingsland road and the river, and had it adjusted and ready for an advance at early dawn. I, moreover, discovered by means of scouts that there was no enemy in advance of their usual lines on the left of the Varina road. At daybreak the next morning the pickets on the right (from Johnson's brigade) advanced and found the enemy on Signal Hill throwing up entrenchments. I received orders to dislodge them if I could. During the night three regiments from Pickett's division reported and were put in position near the B. Aiken house, in all about six hundred (600) men. Harris' Brigade was found near the B. Aiken house, and with these troops to hold the line, I thought that I could drive the enemy away with mine, and was making dispositions with this view, when I received orders to suspend operations until further orders. About sunset received orders to proceed, but it would have been impossible to arrange for it by dark. The navy opened upon the enemy during the evening; Johnson's brigade advanced against the hill early the next morning and found it abandoned. Five or six prisoners of various colors and nationalities were captured, several muskets, and a lot of entrenching tools also. The navy claims the credit of driving them from the position, and doubtless aided in producing the result. Something, however, is due to the sharp-shooters of Johnson's brigade, who hugged closely the [554] works of the enemy all day, and effectually prevented their completion. All of the unburied dead left on the hill were killed by minnie balls, and there were several (white); many of the negroes were known to be killed, and it was supposed they occupied the graves found there. Sharp-shooters were thrown well out in the field below Signal Hill, so as to fire upon their line of communication with Dutch Gap, and it was this, in my opinion, that influenced them to leave at night. Our old lines were re-established; remained quiet until I was ordered away.
On the 22nd of August I was ordered to move across the river at Drewry's, and take cars at Rice's station for Petersburg; was held in reserve about the lead-works for several days; moved on to a ravine near Reservoir Hill, and worked at night on fortifications. On the----moved down the Boydton Plank-Road some five (5) or six (6) miles to meet some movement of the enemy, but he retired and we were ordered back that night; marched about two miles, when we were halted, and ordered into camp, where we remained the next day and night, and on the next morning moved back, and were put into camp on Captain Whitworth's farm, near Petersburg. We remained here until September 29th. While encamped here built a line of works along the Squirrel Level road. On the morning of the 29th September received orders to take cars for Rice's station, which we did, and moved thence across the river at Drewry's to the Osborne Turnpike; reached there just before dark, started out from the works near New Market road on reconnoisance, but were ordered back as night was coming on, and went into camp; but about 10 o'clock P. M. received orders to move down Osborne Turnpike towards Battery Harrison, which had been taken by the enemy. We reconnoitered as well as we could at night, and were making dispositions to attack, when orders came to move to the rear of Fort Gilmer and rest. We reached Fort Gilmer a little before daybreak, rested until about 8 o'clock A. M. and were ordered back to the vicinity of Battery Harrison. The preliminaries were arranged for an assault, and the assault ordered at two o'clock P. M. In the meantime the enemy had thrown up a retrenchment, making Battery Harrison an enclosed work. I was to support Anderson's brigade. I occupied a rugged line on the right of Anderson. He was to move out to a ravine in his front and wait for me to file out of my rugged position and form in, in rear of him, (all the details are known to the major-general, but I mention this point for a purpose which will appear presently). I gave full and explicit instructions to my brigade; every officer and man knew exactly what he [555] was to do. Anderson did not stop at the ravine, but passed on. To give my promised support, and carry out my part in the arrangement, it was necessary for my brigade to file out at the double quick, and without halting, or even moderating to quick time, to move by the right flank in line against the enemy. I deplored this, and felt that my men were not having a fair chance, but it was too late to give new orders and instructions. All that was left me to do, I thought, under the circumstances, was to try to carry out the agreed upon arrangement, and this done, my brigade was ordered to follow about one hundred yards in rear of Anderson's, and if they stopped to pass over them, and charge the enemy's works. My orders were obeyed, and my dead close under the enemy's works attest their honest efforts to achieve the object for which they were given. My right regiment, Colonel Walker, was streaming along at a run, unable to gain its position on the line of the brigade. This I halted for an instant, closed its ranks, and put it in on the left against a little redan on the line a short distance in front of the enemy's retrenchments, and it was carried, and much consternation produced among the enemy, who left one face of Fort Harrison, that looking toward B. Aiken's house, and did not occupy it again. But it was too late to help the main assault, that had failed, but it was a diversion, and more — a sort of distraction to the enemy, which saved the lives of many of my retiring men. My shattered ranks were ordered to the rear to reform. I dispatched a staff officer to General Hoke to explain my situation, and to say that I would make another effort in conjunction with him if he would assault. My four repulsed regiments, rallied by their gallant colonels, moved up, sadly reduced in numbers, but with firm and solid tread, as well in hand and obedient to orders as at the beginning. General Hoke assaulted, but so feebly, and was so quickly repulsed that I did not put my regiments in again, but took up a position to support the troops in the redan in case they were assailed by the enemy. After dark, when all my dead and wounded, except those immediately under the works of the enemy, were brought off, the troops were withdrawn to the line of the morning. We failed to take the fort, and there is, therefore, no occasion for praise; but while I think it right that success should be, as it is, the measure of the soldier's merit, I would be ungrateful to the living, and false to my glorious dead, if I did not express my admiration of their heroic conduct in this action. They failed to take the fort, but it was because the difficulties, from beginning to end of the attack, were too much for human valor. Our loss here was severe, summing up in killed and wounded, three hundred and seventy-seven [556] （377). Some of the wounded are prisoners. I took into this action eleven hundred and sixty-five (1,165) muskets and one hundred and twenty-nine (129) officers. The next day we remained quiet, but at dark were advanced to a line that had been selected during the day by the engineers, and entrenched. We remained here strengthening our works until the night of the 6th of October, when we were relieved by General Moore, and moved to the Darbytown road. Early on the morning of the 7th we moved down the Darbytown road and struck the enemy's outposts near Pleasants's house. The Fifth South Carolina regiment, Colonel Coward, was deployed and drove them to their works over the old line. My brigade formed on the left of and perpendicular to the road, some six or eight hundred yards from the works. In a short time, in conjunction with Anderson's brigade, formed on the right of the road, we moved forward. I succeeded in driving them out of the works in my front, and turned upon the flank and rear of those in Anderson's front and drove them from a part of it — indeed, from all of it finally, but was temporarily checked by a flank work. They had no artillery on the line, but a battery was playing on us from a position some four hundred yards in rear of their line, and in an extension of the line of this flank work. This embarrassed our attack, and being concealed by a slight ridge from view, I was unable see what was there, I therefore directed one regiment against the battery, which threw it entirely in rear of the line, and as it rose the ridge, advanced the brigade, and carried the works. With scarce a halt at the works I pressed on at the enemy and artillery, now seen running across the field, for near a mile, when I halted and adjusted my ranks, now somewhat deranged by the succession of charges; the enemy were completely routed. I succeeded in capturing one piece of artillery, the rest got away from me, but was made an easy prey for Gary's cavalry, who did overtake and capture it. I here received orders to march to the right and connect with the division which was moving up the works in a line perpendicular to them. This was done in due time but with great difficulty through dense thickets. The whole, advancing in line, struck the enemy near the New Market road in heavy force and behind log breastworks. My brigade advanced to from fifty to one hundred yards of the works (my line was not parallel to that of the enemy, my right was nearer to them than the left), and I thought at one time that the enemy were leaving my front — I could not see, but their fire slackened. The brigade on my right, however, did not come up, and the enemy in its front poured its fire into me. The brigade on my left fell back and retired entirely from the contest. This somewhat disturbed my left. I [557] was myself on the right, and was wounded a few moments before, but seeing this movement to the rear went towards the left of my line to find it, too, beginning to break away — doubtless because they were abandoned, for the fire was not near so heavy as on the right. I ordered them to fall back to the crest from which we started. The fire on the right was most terrific, but fortunately the balls ranged high and my loss was less than I feared it would be. My regiments were in line thus, from right to left: Walker's on the right, Steadman, Hagood, Bowen, and Coward's on the left. My casualties sum up, in killed and wounded, one hundred and ninety (190). Nearly half of them occurred in the right regiment (Walker's); more than half in my two right regiments (Walker and Steadman's). I lost some of my best officers and men. Captain Quattlebaum, P. S. S., a most faithful officer, who has signally distinguished himself in this campaign, was here shot dead upon the field. Lieutenant William Norris, Fifth South Carolina regiment, a noble man and most worthy officer, was, I fear, mortally wounded, and fell into the hands of the enemy. Lieutenant Lewis, P. S. S., had his leg broken, and was captured. He has been heard from — is doing well, but his leg was amputated. The service has sustained a loss in these three officers. My command behaved to my satisfaction on this occasion, and officers and men have my thanks for their gallant and spirited conduct.
To my staff I am indebted for their prompt and efficient services. I was deprived of the valuable services of my A. A. General, Captain Serrel, early in the action. His horse was killed under him, and he was so much injured by the fall as to necessitate his removal to the rear. Captain Lyle, acting Inspector, and Lieutenant Judge, aide-de-camp, acted with their usual gallantry, and rendered most useful assistance. I left my brigade on the crest from which this last charge was made and did not get back to it until the 20th of November. During my absence it had been engaged twice — on both occasions successfully resisting assaults of the enemy. You are referred to Colonel Walker for a report of these actions. I found it, on my return, on a new line, between the Charles City and the Williamsburg roads, fortifying. Since we have been engaged in erecting winter quarters and strengthening our works, until the 10th December, when we were ordered out to the front on what turned out to be a reconnoisance of the enemy's line about Deep Bottom. Found on New Market heights, between the Libby house and Big Spring, a large isolated fort with ditch and strong abattis around it; this was an outpost, and not the right of their line. Their right rested on the marsh of the Four [558] Mile Creek, below the Kingsland road. An immense area of forest about the Drill house had been filled. The fort and these lines seemed to be thinly manned, but obstructions in the way of felled timber, abattis, &c., were immense. A little after dark we were ordered back to camp. In this day's work I lost eleven men, and one officer, in killed, wounded and missing. We remained quiet in camp fortifying and completing winter quarters, until the night of the 22nd, when we were ordered off in haste to Gordonsville. I left camp at half past 11 o'clock, P. M., and started the first train from Richmond with two regiments, (2nd and 5th,) but did not reach Gordonsville until 10 o'clock, A. M. I moved my two regiments out with all proper speed on the Madison Turnpike, where I was informed by a staff officer, that General Lomax was confronting the enemy. I found him about two miles out and the enemy drawn up from six to eight hundred yards in his front. There was in one place a solid mass of them, covering probably two or three acres of ground. I told him that I had two or three regiments of infantry at hand to assist him, and suggested, that as we could not shift as rapidly as horsemen, that he put us in the position most important to be held. He replied that the position on the Madison Turnpike was the all-important point, and pointing to the massed enemy said, they are now preparing to charge. I immediately put my regiments in position, one on either side of the road, relieving the cavalry, who moved out on the flanks. We were all ready now, and as they were slow about the charge, I sent out a company of sharp-shooters into a tongue of wood, about one hundred and fifty yards in front of our lines, to kill some of them. About this time one of my regiments, by some mistake, and without my orders, opened a scattering fire upon them. Before I could stop it, they made the mass of the enemy deploy, and retire out of range. It (the mass) was not more than six hundred yards from my line, and I might have opened fire upon them with effect, and would have done so, but for the hope and expectation that they would charge us. In a short time they withdrew, taking the road towards Liberty Mills; some of the sharpshooters followed them and took possession of the field, found three wounded Yankees, and two or three dead horses and men, also several bee-gums just opened, but not robbed. The rest of the brigade arrived during the evening and night. On the evening of the next day the whole brigade took cars for Richmond, but owing to the bad condition of the road, did not all reach Richmond until 9 o'clock P. M., on the 25th December. I am happy to report not one single casualty on this expedition. We returned to our old position on the line, [559] and have remained quiet up to date. Our total present at the beginning of the campaign (including quarter-masters, commissaries and surgical departments, was officers, one hundred and fifty (150); men, eighteen hundred and sixty-six (1866); aggregate, two thousand and sixteen (2,016). Our loss during the campaign sums up one hundred and seventy-six (176) killed, one thousand and ninety-four (1,094) wounded, and ninety four missing; aggregate, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (1364). Total present to-day, including quarter-masters, commissaries, and surgical departments, one hundred and thirty-two officers (132), sixteen hundred and eighty-eight (1688) men; aggregate, eighteen hundred and twenty men. We have lost many of our noblest and best officers and men. Accompanying this is a list of casualties since the battle of the Wilderness.
The brigade as a whole has, in addition to the stirring gallantry of the fight proper, displayed a fortitude, endured the fatigues and dangers of this most arduous campaign, with a staunch and sturdy courage, the contemplation of which fills me with gratitude, not unmixed with pride.
While I feel that it is impossible in a report stretching over so much of action to do justice to the many individual instances of meritorious conduct that from time to time occurred, I cannot close without special mention of Colonel Hagood's First South Carolina regiment, and Colonel Coward's Fifth South Carolina regiment. These officers have distinguished themselves by their valor and skill on the field, and general good management of their commands throughout the campaign. Also Captain J. B. Lyle, Fifth South Carolina regiment, who in command of his company, then of his regiment, and afterwards as acting assistant adjutant-general on my staff, was everywhere conspicuous for his courage, energy and zeal.
Respectfully submitted,
