[269] Commanding-General had approved my plan, and information from him that another of my divisions had been relieved from the lines and could be used in this attack, but it was too late for it to cross the mountain before daylight, and the success of the affair depended entirely upon a night attack and a surprise. To have put two divisions on the west side of the mountain during daylight would have exposed them to an attack from the enemy's entire force, without artillery, and in a position where they could not be reinforced. My object was merely to inflict such damage upon the enemy as might be accomplished by a surprise. That the point was not essential to the enemy at Chattanooga is established by the fact that he supplied his army at that place some six weeks without it.About the 31st of October, Lieutenant-General Hardee, Major-General Breckinridge, and myself, were ordered to examine this position with a view to a general battle. It was decided that an attack was impracticable. That the only route by which our troops could reach the field was a difficult mountain road only practicable for infantry, and entirely exposed to the enemy's batteries on the other side of the river. His positions were connected by a short and easy route, whilst ours would have been separated by a mountain impassable to artillery, except by a detour of some fifty miles, and hardly practicable for infantry.
Our position was so faulty that we could not accomplish that which was hoped for.
We were trying to starve the enemy out by investing him on the only side from which he could not have gathered supplies.
Copies of communications connected with this matter are appended to this report. The reports of the subordinate officers have already been forwarded.
I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. Longstreet, Lieutenant-General.
