[343] and were formidable. Two corps were in position, with a third one in reserve. Three other corps. were in supporting distance between Jonesboroa and Rough-and-Ready. The Twentieth corps alone of Sherman's army had been left in front of Atlanta. These facts were obtained from Captain Buell, a captured officer of Major-General Howard's staff.On the night of the 31st the following dispatch was received in duplicate from General Hood:
headquarters army of Tennessee, Office of the Chief-of-Staff, August 31st, 1864-6 P. M.General Hood directs that you return Lee's corps to this place. Let it march by two o'clock to-morrow morning. Remain with your corps and the cavalry, and so dispose your force as best to protect Macon and communications in rear. Retain provision and ordnance trains. Please return Reynold's brigade, and, if you think you can do so and still accomplish your object, send back a brigade or so of your corps also. There are some indications that the enemy may make an attack upon Atlanta to-morrow.
Lieutenant-General Hardee, Commanding, &c.:Very respectfully, &c.,
F. A. Shoup, Chief-of-Staff.Lee's corps proceeded to Atlanta in obedience to this order, and I remained at Jonesboroa with my corps and a body of cavalry under Brigadier-General Jackson.
It will be seen from the above order, that Lee's corps was not recalled, as General Hood states, with a view of attacking the enemy in flank; but to protect Atlanta from an apprehended attack by Sherman's army, which General Hood, with a marvelous want of information, evidently still believed to be in front of Atlanta.
On the morning of September the 1st, the situation was as follows: General Hood was at Atlanta with Stewart's corps and the Georgia militia; my corps was at Jonesboroa, thirty miles distant,1 and Lee's corps on the road from Jonesboroa to Atlanta, fifteen miles from each place and in supporting distance of neither. The Federal commander, on the other hand, had concentrated his whole army upon my corps at Jonesboro, except the one corps left in front of Atlanta, and was now in position to crush in detail the scattered forces of his unwary antagonist.
My position at Jonesboroa had been taken up on the failure of the attack on the day previous. It was not strong naturally, and there had been little time to strengthen it by art; but it was absolutely necessary to hold this position through the day to secure
