14. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν: the interrogation begins here and ἄρα is illative.
15. ἀλλ᾽ οἷον μὴ ὅσιον. So far we are entitled to go, but in τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον (l. 17) the contrary and the contradictory are confused, as is frequently the case in Plato's dialogues: see note on Euthyphr. 7A θεομισές, where are cited Alcib. II, 138D ff., Rep. IV. 437C; add Phileb. 48B ff., where φθόνος is said to be joy at a friend's misfortune because envy of a friend's success implies joy at his ill-luck (cf. ibid. 50A), and Euthyd. 276B οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς; πάνυ γε. Plato was not unaware of the rules of logic in this matter (see Symp. 201E-202A), but the tendency of Greek thought and life was not to rest content with negations; whence words like ἀνωφελής, ἄφθονος acquired a positive significance, and Solon could enact (Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία ch. 8 ad fin.) ὃς ἂν στασιαζούσης τῆς πόλεως μὴ τιθῆται τὰ ὅπλα μηδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν. Part of the argument in the next chapter suffers from the same flaw: see on 332A l. 3.
16. ἀλλ᾽ ἄδικον ἄρα: Heindorf's emendation for ἀλλὰ δίκαιον ἄρα, the reading of the best MSS., which τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον proves to be wrong and shows how to correct. Heindorf's correction was afterwards confirmed by a Paris MS. ἄρα is illative. For τὸ μέν unexpressed (the words are equivalent to ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον ἄρα) before τὸ δέ see on 330Aἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο.