We Must Have Won The Vietnam War

On the essential Arts and Letters Daily I noticed a link on the side bar to CIA Studies.I checked a few articles they were well done though with a definite point of view. I found some interesting if unusual comments in a book review of Of Spies and Lies: A CIA Lie Detector Remembers Vietnam by John F. Sullivan, Volume 1 2003. The book is the remebrences of a polygraph eximaner in Viet Nam. The reviewer comments:


Yes, we could have fought it better. Yes, Jack Kennedy’s wish to play Special Forces soldier should have been avoided. Yes, Lyndon Johnson could have spent more time chasing secretaries instead of bomb targets. But the Vietnam War was a war that had to be fought. By the time it was over, the communists’ reach for global supremacy had become tired and bedraggled. Had it not been for the military stand of the United States, all of Southeast Asia might have been overrun by those gritty little North Vietnamese imperialists, and we would have had to stage a second Inchon landing somewhere around Vinh to break the stranglehold. And that, gentle reader, would have cost a lot more than the 58,000 names on the Wall. Maybe we could have saved some of those lives by fighting a better war, but the sacrifices should be considered a major contribution to victory in the Cold War. They were not made in vain.

snip

If it is true that the victors write the histories, we must have won the Vietnam War, because we are writing the histories.


See Also: TET 1968 - A Personal Narrative

Libya

Robert Haddock in an article at Forign Policy warns International airpower will be enough to escalate the civil war in Libya, but not to win it.

After a very short discussion, the U.N. Security Council, led by Britain and France, passed a resolution on March 17 that authorizes the use of military force against Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime and forces. The resolution permits the use of "any means necessary" but prohibits a foreign military occupation of Libya. It specifically calls for a no-fly zone and the use of force to protect civilians. The rapid advance of pro-Qaddafi forces toward Benghazi forced the United States to quickly harden its position. Equally surprising were abstentions by China and Russia, allowing the resolution to pass.

SNIP

Obama administration officials may have thought they would have many more days, or possibly weeks, to organize a multilateral response to the Libyan situation. It seems clear they badly misjudged the timetable pro-Qaddafi forces have been able to maintain.

SNIP

Although the French government boasted that air strikes against Qaddafi's forces would begin within a few hours after the Security Council vote, organizing an air campaign that will have a meaningful effect on Qaddafi's ground forces will take much longer to organize. Most crucial in this regard is Obama's hesitancy to have U.S. military forces in the lead in this operation. Second is the strong desire by Western powers to have Arab military participation (Qatar and United Arab Emirates are mentioned), hopefully in the very first waves of attacking aircraft. Take away the United States, the most powerful and experienced air power, and add in completely inexperienced Arab air forces, and the result will be many long planning meetings as various European and Arab political and military leaders attempt to cobble together a multilateral air force.

SNIP

Although his overseas bank accounts have been seized, Qaddafi already has the necessary money, troops, weapons, and ammunition to sustain a low intensity but brutal campaign against the rebels. The investigation begun by the International Criminal Court has left him and his sons with little choice but to fight on. The United Nations has authorized the wide-ranging use of air power against his regime. Air power will be enough to escalate this war but not enough to win it. Although prohibited for now by the Security Council, "boots on the ground" will eventually be required to remove Qaddafi and his sons from Libya.

Read the entire Article and click on it’s links for more background.

Analysis.

While his word choice of “quagmire” might be a bit hyperbolic he highlights the basic problem.

The basic Western policies of supporting democracy, opposing pigs like Qaddafi, humanitarian protection, maintaining peace or least stability to say nothing of a stable oil supply do not seem to Western political leaders to be supportable by normal political means. It was hoped that the rebels would be able to oust Qaddafi but rather it seems they will lose without outside intervention. The UN Securty Council res0lution is an escalation of the means to obtain this goal.

The Just War Doctrine and plain common sense state there should be a reasonable probability of success for launching a military operation. A no fly zone has about zero possibility of success and limited air strikes slightly better. The only thing that is likely to succeed is a full scale attack, ground sea and air, to effect regime change. As noted in the article this will take more time to set up than exists. While one hopes that the calls for only a no fly zone are based on genuine humanitarian motivations, I can’t help but get the feeling that this is an attempt to put a foot in the door to justify a more serious action later. There is a possibility that after removing Qaddafi it will develop into an insurgency but the quicker the action the less chance of that happening.

I am not at all enthusiastic about this operation, and I really doubt it is mandated by our national interest, but if it is to be a success strike hard and fast, don’t pussy foot around with no fly zones and the like. It will save many lives and much suffering in the long run.

Read the whole article


Related

Libya


Never Again and Again and Again
Rwanda and Darfur Compared


See Also
What is Genocide

Movie Review: Avatar

It seems you cannot have a blog these days without commenting on James Cameron's epic motion picture Avatar. The special effects are tremendous and worth more than the price of the ticket.


The plot is a pretty straight forward a politically oppressed group on the planet Pandora, “the Na'vi”, defeat the human oppressors, with a boy meets girl sub-theme, and some religious evangelization. A common plot line, a little better executed than most movies with this plot line. The trailer gives a pretty good overview of the plot:




CFV 426 - Avatar/Pocahontas Mashup FINAL VERSION from Randy Szuch on Vimeo.
HT: Creative Minority Report

---------

In many ways the film is an unintended commentary on how to make a persuasive film.

1.) Cameron has a Pantheist religious worldview and effectively works it into the plot quietly, more by showing than telling. This is done well enough to subtly influence the audience unless they are paying attention.
2.) He also has political message whose impact is reduced by cardboard characters for the bad guys, and a heavy handed approach so that you don’t miss the point. Since the point is so obvious it pretty much immunizes viewers who are not already true belivers.

A lesson for future filmmakers on how to it.

---------------

While a tribe living in one with nature is a nice picture, on earth that is the most grueling from of poverty; never more than a few days food on hand, no certainty of getting more, high infant mortality, low life expectency, no more possessions than can be carried on one’s back, at the mercy of extreme weather, and predators both animal and human. In reality is anything but idyllic.

The updated “natives with righteous indignation and spears defeat machine guns in a frontal assault” plot device is great cinema; but in reality it would just pile up dead bodies for no purpose no matter how righteous the cause. He should have included a “these are professional actors - do not try at home” disclaimer.

The first human effort to work with the Na'vi is personified by Doctor Grace Augustine, the Director of the Avatar program. She presents an updated White Mans Burden approach to dealing with the Navi.

Take up the Human Peoples burden--
Send forth the best ye breed--
Go bind your children to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild--
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.

But of course the corporate people at home get impatient and send representatives to take a more direct plunder and pillage approach. This sets up the plot. While the soft imperialism of the Avatar program is not as bad as the hard imperialism, I don’t really care for either.

-------------------

The movie also intends to comment on our relations with nature.

From Biology On Line
Ecosystem
Definition
noun, plural: ecosystems
A system that includes all living organisms (biotic factors) in an area as well as its physical environment (abiotic factors) functioning together as a unit.
Supplement
An ecosystem is made up of plants, animals, microorganisms, soil, rocks, minerals, water sources and the local atmosphere interacting with one another.

Environment
Definition
noun, plural: environments
(1) The external conditions, resources, stimuli etc. with which an organism interacts.
(2) The external surroundings including all of the biotitic and abiotic factors that surround and affect the survival and development of an organism or population.
(3) The totality of the surrounding conditions and elements in an individual.

Pandora is an Ecosystem. The human base is an environmental (external) intrusion that is effecting the ecosystem.
/Satiremode=ON.Poor misunderstood Colonel Miles Quaritch,
he's just trying to protect the environment..
/Satiremode=OFF.

Despite the common usage,
1) Generally one does not protect environments - one protects an ecosystems from undesirable environmental effects.
2) There is no such thing as The Environment, an environment is always relative to it’s ecosystem.
(I know, I know, these are pet peeves and I will never win.)

See the movie for the fantastic special effects, remember everything else is an excuse for the special effects.



The real trailer.

Afganistan:Looking at the Surge

Now that President Obama has make His decision to surge* in Afganistan, it is a good time to look at what we can expect. Our forces and those of are allies are streched thin with little in country reserves. It seems there will be a major Taliban offensive come spring, if they don't launch one we will. The surge should provide the troops to deal with it, and counter attack. Personally I think 30,000 (four maybe five regimental/brigade combat teams with support troops) is to few but that is as much as will be available to move by spring. More will certainly need to follow especially to take advantage of what develops by summer. The enemy has no way to develop his actions to Mao Zetung’s mobile phase where they could win a purely military victory. Without doing that they will lose unless the we get tired or lose patience and withdraw. They will try to deny us access to the civilian population and ware down our will to fight and hope they can cause enough hurt that the President will cut his losses in August 2011. The fighting will be in Afghanistan the real war will be in for the hearts and minds of the American political establishment.
[* I do not really like using the word "surge" here. The surge in Iraq was in response to a specific operational situation, Afganistan is a very different and less tractable opertional situation. THis could produce false expectations.]


Some good articles on what to expect.

From General Crystal’s assessment supporting the request for 40,000 additional troops.

The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government and the international community - that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.
Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.

snip

This is a different kind of fight. We must conduct classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex. Three regional insurgencies have intersected with a dynamic blend of local power struggles in a country damaged by 30 years of conflict. This makes for a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.
Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support ofthe people, every action we take must enable this effort. The population also represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people's choices and needs. However, progress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.



Strategy Page is gives it’s description of the plan approved by President Obama.

American commanders believe the 30,000 additional U.S. troops, plus increases in Afghan and NATO forces, will enable the Taliban to be crushed within a year. But after that, Afghanistan will require economic and military assistance for at least twenty years, to bring sustained peace to the country. The plan is to turn over security to the central government within five years. Initially, through the middle of next year, there will be more violence. The Taliban and drug gangs will not go gently into the night. They will resist energetically, many choosing to fight to the death.

It continues with a background and assessment.



Michael Yon describes what he thinks will be one of the critical battles around Kandahar. I think this is good assessment of the opertaional problems, what will happen and what needs to be made to happen.

People are confused about the war. The situation is difficult to resolve even for those who are here. For most of us, the conflict remains out of focus, lacking reference of almost any sort.

Thus he begins an overview of the strategic/operational situation in Afghanistan. I doubt you will find a better analysis.

The most we can do is pay attention, study hard, and try to bring something into focus that is always rolling, yawing, and seemingly changing course randomly, in more dimensions than even astronauts must consider. All while gauging dozens of factors, such as Afghan Opinion, Coalition Will, Enemy Will and Capacity, Resources, Regional Actors (and, of course, the Thoroughly Unexpected). Nobody will ever understand all these dynamic factors and track them at once and through time. That’s the bad news.

The good news is that a tiger doesn’t need to completely understand the jungle to survive, navigate, and then dominate. It is not necessary to know every anthropological and historical nuance of the people here. If that were the case, our Coalition of over forty nations would not exist. More important is to realize that they are humans like us. They get hungry, happy, sad, and angry; they make friends and enemies (to the Nth degree); they are neither supermen nor vermin. They’re just people.

Snip

President Obama and NATO will plan to send tens of thousands more troops. The big fight shaping up will likely unfold in the south, in places like Helmand, Kandahar, and to a much lesser extent, Zabul, and also in other eastern provinces. We could use far more troops, and so other places will be left to fester, but the surge and change of course might be enough to turn the war around. We will find out.

Russians say we repeat their mistakes but they are wrong. The Soviets employed true scorched-earth tactics—the same tactics that many armchair commanders at home would like to employ. Every time the Soviets whacked the Afghan hive, more hornets raged out. Soviets bullied their way around places like Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and were fantastically brutal in Afghanistan, using all the fire they could breathe. Their “Rules of Engagement,” if any, were probably more concerned with conserving ammunition. They tortured.

Soviet abuses enflamed the population and combat ranged from north to south—with much occurring in Kandahar Province, the capital of which is Kandahar City. The Soviets fought in places like Bamian, where today Americans can literally go on vacation. The Lithuanian Ambassador to Afghanistan told me he took some holidays in Bamian and loved it. Last year, I drove about a thousand miles from Jalalabad to Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif and back, and other places, with no problems and no soldiers. Most of the country is not at war. Much of this is a result of our strict “Rules of Engagement” (ROE) which seems to be driving people crazy at home (and many soldiers, too). Many soldiers hate these new ROE, and there is little doubt that we will lose troops due to restrictive ROE. My own thoughts are of little relevance.

He describes the Green zone, the river valleys that have vegetation compared to the vast surrounding desert. This is where the people live and is what must be controlled.

The Green Zone to the right [in his Earth Google shot] is caused by the Arghandab River, just next to Kandahar. The Taliban want Kandahar and are in a good position to get it. The year 2010 likely will mark a true Battle for Kandahar, though it probably will not be punctuated by the sort of pitched battles we saw in places like Mosul and Baghdad. This remains unknown.

Armies from at least three countries have ventured into the Arghandab River Valley: British, followed by Soviets, and more recently Canadians; all were unsuccessful.

Snip

Since the 2001 invasion, U.S. soldiers have come and gone from the Arghandab, but we’ve never had enough soldiers to sit still. More recently, the Canadians made jabs at Arghandab but did not get far. Some people believe the Canadians have been militarily defeated in their battlespace. No US officer has told me that the Canadians have been defeated, and none have denied it. There is no doubt that Canadian troops earned much respect, and that more than 130 paid the ultimate price.

On current course, Canada will have fully retreated by 2011. This is crucial: the enemy realizes that our greatest weakness is Coalition cohesion and they have defeated what was an important partner.

Now it’s mostly down to the U.S. and Afghan forces to saddle Arghandab, or lose Kandahar and if Kandahar probably the war.

A sobering analysis. On the positive side with enough troops and time a positive engagement strategy winning is possible. On the negative side lack of resources, impatience, or allowing frustration and anger to develop into excessive force, can bring defeat.

Read the whole article. I think it will provide a good filter to to view news reports of military action over the next year or so.
HT: Instapundit


For a lower level look at what the battle will be like see his report on embedding with the 2d Battalion of the British Rifle Regiment which seems to be too small of a unit for it’s mission.


Another key part of the battle will be carrying the war to the enemy which will mostly be Special Operations action. The London Telegraph gives a sanitized summary of what will happen.

It will be a tough year.

See also

Maothought or Who is Winning

Obama Says Bomb ’em
Les Solidat Americain dan Afganistan
East Meets West - President Obama in the Middle East
Mr President - Make a Decision
It's Now Obama's War

All my Afganistan posts.

It's Now Obama’s War

Having suggested, with some sarcasm, that the President should make a decision on Afghanistan strategy, I am pleased to note that he has made a decision.

I listened last night on the radio to President Obama’s speech at West Point on our future course in Afghanistan . It came off with his usual excellent presentation, certainly it sounded better than the descriptions of many who saw in on television. The speech had all the right phrasing, aimed at middle of the political spectrum and full of phrases that with high emotional value to the center and right. These would have been more convincing if they were at least not inconsistent with the past perceptions of his personal philosophy.


Obama supporter Charli Carpenter at the Duck of Minerva “But I have some critical reactions too.” and Obama critic Elizabeth Scalia, the Anchoress at First Things “The president is doing the right thing, and he deserves props for it” provide very different but worth while commentary and limited round ups.


His presentation of the conflict’s background was reasonably good, though the nit pickers will have enough material to make them happy. He had the expected up and down playing of things that make the his administration look better and the Bush Administration look bad.

He is going to send thirty thousand of the forty thousand troops that General McChrystal requested, he expects to bring them and most of our troops home in eighteen months, a renewed emphasis on training the Afgan security forces, encouraging reforms in the Afghan Government. The emphasis was on battling al Qaeda, with only passing mention of the Taliban. And no “Blank Checks.”

From a domestic political point of view the eighteen months puts future decisions safely after the 2010 election but well before the 2012 election and is olive branch to his political base who wants a quick withdrawal.

The increase in troops is perquisite for any action if we are going to stay, though I think ultimately the total of the increase will be nearer eighty thousand rather than the forty thousand that was requested. Thirty thousand, in addition to giving the appearance that he is not just rubber stamping General McChrystal’s request, is probably near the maximum that can be deployed in the timeframe he gave, but “unnamed administration sources” are reporting that the amount could be increased. Unless the President has placed unreasonable restrictions on their use, this gives the flexibility General McCrystal needs to respond to and create events.

The primary action will be against the Taliban, while destroying al Qaeda was the reason we went there and is still a leading goal, the road to al Qaeda goes through the Taliban, we need to fight the Taliban to maintain the bases to attack al Qaeda, and in going into Afghanistan we assumed some responsibility for leaving the place better off than we found it, which requires defeating the Taliban. The essential “win the people” part of the insurgency campaign requires that we are in control of the places where the people live and can defend them.

Training and building the Afghan security forces to take over in eighteen months is not going to happen. From the time the US recruits 400 new soldiers, combines them with a cadre of experienced soldiers and graduates an infantry battalion out of the Nation Training Center is nine months. This is in ideal situations with recruits who have the educational background, and already having the experienced soldiers to form the cadre. Building effective security forces is essential, we are having some success but it will take a lot longer than eighteen months. The battalion that starts training today will in two or three years provide cadres for two or three battalions which in two or three more years will provide the cadre for more. That is a little pessimistic, there is some good cadre potential in the Afghanistan Army and not all the security forces need to be fully trained infantrymen, but eighteen months is not enough even if every thing goes well.

The reforms the in Afghan society the President is calling for are going to be as much or more dependent on military success as a perquisite. It will have to be a slow and steady pressure to reform, but pushing to hard and fast and without ensuring the security for them to remain in place will be coounter productive.

Field Marshal helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), said "No battle plan survives contact with the enemy." This plan will survive a little longer than the arrival of the troops, but it places the required resources on the ground - so the actual situation as it develops can be dealt with and also gives us the ability to create the satutation on the ground. Whether he realize it or not, the President has signed a blank check.


My Afghanistan topic.

Book Review: Rome's Greatest Defeat

Two thousand years ago this month the Roman Army in Lower Germany, three legions strong with auxiliaries, was was wiped out, almost to a man. The battle of the Teutoburg Forest is one of Rome’s largest and most famous defeats. Until recently very little was known about the battle, even it’s exact location, except for a few second hand reports from Roman authors. Recently a number of archeological discoveries have shed light on this battle.




Rome’s Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest
Adrian Murdoch
Sutton Publishing, 2006

Murdoch's Bread and Circuses Blog
The Blog's Teutoburg Posts

Imperium Konflict Mythos Official 2000th Anniversary site.
Kalkriese Museum





Adrian Murdoch describes the tangle of political, cultural and military affairs that led to this battle and the consequences. The account of the battle is just a chapter but with a judicious reading of the ancient sources and modern research he presents a very common sense account of the events leading up to the battle , the battle, and it‘s consequences.

Lower Germany was in the process of being integrated into the Empire. Murdoch describes this process, involving a forced change in the culture politics and economy of the province. It was always complicated with winners and losers at many levels of socity and sometimes resulting in a revolt, usually defeated with much bloodshed. He tells the story of Sextus Quinctilius Varus a proven governor, able administrator, and competent general who was apparently under orders to speed up the process; and Arminius a German noble, an officer in the Roman army, and secretly a leader of the anti-Roman faction. Arminius managed to set up an alliance of several tribes, despite opposition in his own and the other tribes, while convincing Varus of his loyalty and preparing a trap for the Roman Army. There was a report of a revolt and Varus and the Army set off to deal with it and marched into the carefully laid trap, for three days they fight to escape and are finally annihilated at the recently discovered battle field at Kalkriese. The defeat rocks the Roman world, and the resulting Roman punitive expedition wrecks the hostile tribes for generations. The Romans make no effort reestablish a permanent presence on the east side of the Rhine. The impact of the failure to Romanize German culture has been debated for centuries. Much later Arminius becomes a hero in the development of German nationalism. Arminius gets the rare distinction of being a general who defeated the Romans: but is not killed by Rome or dies in their captivity.

Defeated generals are always easy targets for blame, Murdoch shows that despite the accusations of incompetence heaped on Varus, he was in fact a competent governor and general, selected for both ability and loyalty the Emperor. He had extensive experience as governor of the tumultus province of Syria. Many of the criticisms of his action are based on 20/20 hindsight but his actions were quite reasonable in the circumstances.

Arminius had learned soldiering from the Romans, but a was also master of the German tribal politics. There were many in the tribes, including members of his own family, who favored cooperation with Romans, ether because they saw an advantage or it was the lesser of two evils. Arminius managed to convince enough of the leadership in the tribes to join him. Since Arminius was a central contact for Roman contact with the Germans he controlled much of the information going to Varus. Murdoch thinks that Varus dismissed the reports that got to him as attempts to draw him into the internal politics of the tribes, which he declined.

Murdoch’s encyclopedic knowledge of the classical world, his easy writing style and common sense analysis provide a clear explanation of the events that is assessable al l readers. This is by far the best of the recent books on this battle that have been published in English. Strongly Recommended.

See Also

Book Review: The Battle That Stopped Rome by Peter Wells
Book Review: Quest for The Lost Legions by Tony Benn

The Advance Guard Fiction

Related
Book Review: Eagle in the Snow
Book Review: The Fall of the Roman Empire




Analysis and opinion.

What happened, this is my assessment.





One thing is certain is that Varus did not get his route from Google Maps, but it is a best case close approximation and gives an idea of what was involved. [See comment from Delta V] He was moving to put down a revolt was in what is now the northern Netherlands or extreme northwest Germany. It is sixty kilometers from Minden to Kalkriese and another ten to Bramsche. 100 kilometers more to the legionary fortress at Haltern or 150 kilometers to the base at Xanten on the Rhine, He would have been expecting to march for about six hours 20 to 24 kilomters a day with column of about 12,000 solidiers, at least the same number of camp followers and 5000 horses or oxen. Quite possibly the advance guard would be marking the evenings camp as the rear guard was exiting last nights camp. Given the large amount of equipment they carried they would have at most five days of food.

This is the shortest route with the least hills, we forget how important that was when everything moved by sore muscles and aching backs. The route is mostly open farmland making it possible for the Army to get at least some of it’s food locally. Tactically it is reasonable ground, with only one real choke point, the narrows at Kalkriese. The other possible routes were longer, had less farm land and more obstacles. I think that the first leg of his march was to the area of modern Bramcshe, where the army would have to spend a day on river crossing. From there he could send his excess baggage back to Haltern or Xanten with a small escort and the tactical part of the Army would move to suppress the revolt. He would have made a prior announcement that he will be buying food at Bramcshe for the next leg of the march. All this assumes he believed he was marching through friendly territory.

The tactical system of the Roman army was a combination of heavy and light infantry supported by cavalry. The legion provided the heavy infantry. The legion can be compared to a steam roller. Nothing could stand in front of it. But it was slow and awkward to move, subject to flank attacks and required an enemy who was willing or forced to stand in front of it. Rough terrain could break it’s formation reducing it’s effectiveness. If the enemy had fortifications the legions engineers would overcome them with time. The other half of the team was the light infantry. This was either Roman auxiliary cohorts or forces provided by allies. They would scout, protect the flanks, clear enemy scouts, and with luck push the enemy under the steam roller. The light infantry would guard the legions march into hostile territory where the legions would attack a political, cultural or economic location that the enemy must defend, i.e. stand in front of the "steam roller" and hope to win. The important thing is that the legions of this period could not act alone they needed their light infantry support. The light infantry could operate alone but they would seldom be able to defeat an enemy unless they out numbered them or they had some unusual advantage. It was the team effort that make the Roman armies formidable. A common statistic in Roman history is the light and heavy forces were approximately equal strength. Varus’s Army did not have enough auxiliaries to provide the light infantry part of the team. The other auxiliary cohorts were garrisoning forts throughout the province. Varus was depending on his German allies to provide the light infantry.



In August Varus received word of the revolt. He started his preparations and called back his scattered garrisons to Minden, which is a good concentration point and possibly his headquarters. I think, since the route was known he had engineers out improving the road and had his German allies secure the route and occupy critical points such as the narrows at Kalkriese (with fortifications?). The word was sent out where he would be buying food along the route. The Allied tribes were called to come join him, either at Minden or Bramsche. The warnings he had received probably seemed to be part of the background noise that happens in any occupied province, but nothing so significant as to arouse suspicion, or make him distrust Arminius.

The Army moved out. I would think they would have made twenty to twenty four kilometers, and built a camp. The next day the advance guard had moved another twenty to twenty four kilometers and was at or close to it’s intended camp for the night when the attacks started. The front of the Army started to set up a camp and the rest closed in on it. There would have been hundreds of little attacks, each not causing much damage but the total would add up. The ground was still open enough that the Romans could move off the road and clear flanks. The baggage trains were probably hurt worse than the troops. This would be a nightmare for Varus and the senior commanders, the Army was spread out along the road there was little they could do to influence the battle. It was a centurions and soldiers battle, if the army was not well disciplined and trained it might not have survived the first day.

In the camp they got ready for the next day. The Army was in trouble but it was not defeated. Wagons and excess baggage were burned. This shortened the length of the column and make it eaiser to bypass obstacles. To make matters worse the fierce autumn German thunder storms started soaking every thing and making the roads much less usable. The Army rested as much as it could, reorganized and came out fighting. They moved a lot slower because they were in a tactical formtion partly off the road, the Germans destroyed advance work of the engineers, the rain, and fighting off constant attacks. By nightfall they would have been lucky to have advanced ten kilometers. they established a new but a vary hasty and improvised camp. The Army knew it was not going to get home. Varus and his top aides committed suicide, the cavalry tried to ride out, some tried to surrender. In the morning the Army moved out in a forlorn hope on broken ground and came to the ambush at Kalkriese. Most of the army perished here. Only a handful got back to Roman territory.


Once Arminius united the tribes and attacked the Army, the Army was lost, every thing else was details. The Army was, at best, seven to ten days march on half rations from nearest fort. The closest possible relief force was at Mainz a months march away. The tactical system was broken, without light infantry the legions would be would be worn down in a series of small actions. They were north of the Wiehengebrige ridge and their bases were on the south side. Forcing any of the gaps in the ridge would require light infantry. A wall had been constructed at Kalkrese, the engineers could defeat it with time, but a retreating army on half rations does not have time. A Gaius Julius Caesar might have brought that army home, but Sextus Quinctilius Varus was simply a competent general in a situation where genius might not have been enough.

The defeat was more political than military. The credit is Arminius’s as a political leader for uniting tribes and the defeat is Varus’s as governor for failing to prevent it.


Note: The exact size of the Army and how much road space it took, can’t be determined from the existing data. I made a number of assumptions, but small changes make big changes in the result. The Roman legions were probably between 2000 and 4000 men present for duty, I think closer to 3000. The auxiliaries were probably another 3000 men. The number of camp followers was usual about the same as the number of soldiers. They other big factor is how wide was the road. I am assuming it was wide enough to march four abreast, which would also be wide enough for a wagon. There would be an interval (size?) between units, necessary to keep the army from bunching up an spreading out on hills and turns. While the Romans were masters at it, moving an Army this size was difficult to manage under the best of circumstances.
For those who want to crunch their own numbers.

Field Manual 21-18 - Procedures and Techniques of Foot Marches

The March

The US Military - An Outside View

Dawn is a Pakistani news service. They recently posted an article by Kamran Shafi on his observations on the American Armed Forces. and the implications for the Pakistani Armed Forces.

I have been to Fort Myer in Virginia with my chum and course-mate Zafar Kayani who was married to Colonel Jo Ann Kayani, now sadly passed on, good and gracious woman. Jo Ann was commander of Headquarters Company, US Army, stationed at Fort Myer and it was my pleasure to visit not only her spartan office but also the canteen where officers ate alongside privates, carrying their own trays and standing in line waiting their turn. Fort Myer serves the Washington D.C. military district and the senior-most officers serving in the Pentagon live there. I have had the pleasure of seeing Gen Colin Powell, then chief of the joint staff, mow his own lawn in one of a row of houses that housed him and other senior generals including the chief of the army staff. The houses were in typically American suburban style: no walls, with sloping lawns running onto the pavements.

Most of all, I was astonished to see that there was no wedding hall anywhere in Fort Myer. Neither was there was any burger joint catering to all comers in any of the officers messes, and none of the mess buildings had bank branches and wedding dress boutiques in them. The US army had not constructed shops all around the fort either, and its soldiers did not sell pastries and bread. I saw no evidence of banks and travel agencies and textile mills and sugar factories and cornflakes-manufacturing mills and estate agencies being run by the US army (or the US navy and the US air force for that matter) in my travels across America. Armed forces stations were just that: armed forces stations with limited access to civilians, and those too who were accompanied by a member of the armed forces or their dependent(s). Neither, and this is important, does the US army run farming operations and get into disputes with the tenant farmers who till the land as share-croppers.

Since one mostly drives in the US to get from point A to B, many were the times that I came upon army convoys on the highways. Every single time the convoy travelled in the slow lane, at the designated speed, the drivers with both hands on the steering wheels, headgear on, looking straight ahead. No slouching, no cigarette hanging from the drooping lower lip Humphrey Bogart style. In the back, if there were soldiers being transported, they sat up straight, headgear on, no slouching, no smoking. And no leering at passing cars either!


Of course, with a closer view I saw the warts he missed, but his comments are appreciated. What he is talking about is an attitude in and out of the military; that is not dependent on this or that defense policy option, this or that weapons system, or budget level. Whatever is done with defense policy maintaining this attitude is vital.

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Read the article, his comments on the current fighting in the Swat and Bruner areas is a different but worthwhile perspective than is given in the American news media.


HT: Pragmatic Euphony who provides a look from an Indian point of view.

Book Review: The Echo of Battle

“Armies always prepare to fight the last war.” The Army is accused of preparing for the Cold War/World War III and then fighting an insurgency in Iraq. The Army is now as prepared, as it ever will be, to fight the war in Iraq. In two years (or hopefully less) this will be the last war. The Army is again ready to fight the last war –Iraq. But in reality we could end up in any of several types of war, and as the 3d Infantry Division found in Baghdad, the type can change overnight. Since the M-2 Crystal Ball is hopelessly stuck in development, how does the US Army determine what the next war will be like, and prepare for it?

Book Review: The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War
Brian McAllister Linn
Harvard University Press





Brian McAllister Linn’s latest book looks at the question of how the Army thinks about preparing for the next war. He identifies three intellectual traditions in the Army with very different ideas on the nature of war, and what will be needed, and how to prepare for it. During peacetime when they look at past wars they see different things that contributed to success or failure, and advocate different virtues approaches and solutions. The Army’s preparations for the next war are based on the interplay of these traditions. All of them have made major contributions and all of them have been the source of significant problems. Officers of each tradition have been excellent commanders and notable failures. When each tradition listens to the lessons past wars and draws conclusions it is influenced by it’s values, thus it hears only The Echo of Battle it expects.

These different traditions have dominated at different times. These are tendencies; individual officers may have ideas that are from two or even all three schools. No tradition has ever been so suppressed that in need it could not reassert itself. Each will propose it’s own explanations for success and failure. The success or (more often) failure of these traditions to interact with each other and larger events provide the intellectual framework how the Army prepares to fight the next war.




The Guardian sees war as in exercise of Science.

War can be reduced to a Science and correct action is deduced. Basically an engineering project, apply the right formulas and win. Victories are explained as the result of good doctrine and equipment, a defeat means there was some defect the doctrine or equipment, a reason for more study of the science of war in the future. The political assumptions of the Guardians are that the world is a cruel and brutal place and war could be imposed on us with no notice. It is usually associated with the assumption that US military policy is defensive, offensive action at the national level is not taken except in response to other countries actions or to defend vital national interests. The 19th century Coast Defenses are the classic example of their influance. Small wars are side shows which divert resources. The purpose of the Army is to deter war more than fight a war. This assumes very little diplomatic or political involvement; some one attacks and we defeat them and let the diplomats sort it out later.

At it’s best it places good equipment in the hands of the troops with good tactical/operational doctrine to use it. At it’s worst, when war is not deterred, it does not have a National Military Strategy to implement the doctrine and equipment it provides.


The Manager sees war as an activity to be Managed.

It sees modern war as the mobilization of societies fielding large armies to win a war for national survival, or a crusade for some great goal. War requires careful planning for the organization and mobilization of society to create a mass army. The use of standardized programs and equipment is the only way to manage these large forces. It tends to de-emphasize human factors. WWII, which was a manager’s war in many respects, is the war where American soldiers started calling themselves GI’s (Government Issue.) The invasion of Northwest Europe in WWII is it's greatest sucess. When a war occurs it dominates all aspects of society. During a war political activity is subordinated to the great goal. Again this assumes very little political or diplomatic involvement and then at the service of the war effort, after the victory the diplomats will work out (dictate) the peace.

At it’s best it enables the deployment of large forces to fight major enemies and ensures that the troops in the field are the best-supplied army in the world. At it’s worst it promotes bureaucratic stagnation, and overlooks the fighting of small wars.


The Hero sees war as a Human endeavor.

People fight wars, thus the traditional military virtues of courage, character, and loyalty are essential to any successful operation. While the Guardians and Managers are engineering and managing for the next war, the Heroes were the line soldiers who fought Indians, pacified the Philippines, chased Poncho Villa, and made the surge in Baghdad. They fought the in front line of all the major wars. They know that a war cannot be considered won if you just win the battle; there has to be a political solution. They also know that without a military victory you cannot get a political solution. They are inclined to value the moral over the material, sometimes to the disregard of modern technology. Their endeavors fall apart for ad hoc design and poor management.

At their best they provide decisive battle leadership and an ability to adapt to whatever they find. At the worst they are the officers in the 1930’s who believed the élan of a cavalry charge could defeat machine guns.




Linn’s concept places a different perspective on debates about preparing for war. Each tradition is not monolithic and can have different viewpoints within it. For example Linn says that the famous Air Corp-Coast Artillery debates were within the Guardian tradition.Debates are often between traditions not old and new, or old and new in a tradition without much reference to others. What may seem to be progressive original “out of the box” thinking may actually be a very conservative exposition of a different tradition.

Of course when a war comes the Army meets a very hardheaded reality, and none of the traditions sees this reality as a whole, thus the Army is often not prepared to fight that war. If the Army is to be prepared to fight the next war, or adapt to the war it finds, rather than what it has prepared for, all three traditions need to be in serious discussion with each other.



Analysis and Opinion

Linn’s concepts bring to mind Russell Weigliey’s The American Way of War a History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy. He builds on Weigliey’s work providing significant new understanding.

Weigliey’s major theme was that when circumstances allow the American Way of War is to seek out and destroy the enemies armed forces and/or ability to wage war. Attrition and indirect strategies are only adopted out of necessity. When the enemies ability to wage war is destroyed the situation is turned over to the politicians and diplomats for a political solution. Both Linn’s Guardian and Manager traditions are different ideas on how to do this. Even the Hero tradition, which sees the need for the political solution sees a military solution as perquisite.

Another of Weigley’s themes was the dichotomy of a Regular Army that thinks it’s mission is to fight European type armies, the most difficult and dangerous opposition, and directs most it’s intellectual effort is how to fight them - but spent most of it’s history as a frontier and later colonial constabulary fighting indians and guerillas, the most common mission. In Linn we see that contrast in greater detail. While their documentary history is not as clear, Linn shows that the Heroes represent a constant intellectual tradition in how to prepare and fight wars, which has made a major contribution to the Army. Weigley writing from the Manager tradition tends to see them as outside the intellectual tradition of the Army.


One thing that struck me was how often the “datum” that was missed by all three traditions in planning for the next war was the future decisions of our political leadership. One of the best examples Linn sites is Lieutenant General John Schofield, then a former General in Chief of the Army saying that “foreign conquest and permanent occupation are not a part of the policy of this country” and just over a year later the US declared war on Spain. Since this was not a policy of the country there was no need to prepare the Army for it. In stating this I think Schofield was not only stating his strong personal and professional values but the prevailing consensus in the country. He would most likely have been pilloried if he had said “foreign conquest and permanent occupation are a part of the policy of this country” To a greater or lesser degree the possible conflicts envisioned by our political leadership, and which the Army was directed to prepare for, were not the ones that developed. But then if the political leadership had envisioned them they may have prevented them.

While Linn limits the topic to the Army’s internal debates, these traditions seem, especially since WWII, to reflect the similar views of the broader defense community and to US perceptions on warfare generally. The traditions exist (and perhaps others) across the Defense Department and broader defense community. Except for breaking discussions into manageable portions I am not sure the Army’s intellectual discussions can be still treated independently of the larger Defense discussion. For example, he sees the Wineberger/Powell Doctrine of fighting only for essential national interests, with popular support, in quick overwhelming decisive campaigns as an expression of the Guardian tradition. But the Rumsfeld “transformation” is also an expression of the Guardian tradition. The difference being the Wineberger/Powell envisioned a key role, in conjunction with the other services, for the Army (a role with which the Army was comfortable, perhaps too comfortable); but Rumsfeld’s vision gave the impression that the eventually the Army would be relegated to base guards and target spotters. This may help explain why the Army did not get along well with Secretary Rumsfeld. I get the impression that pre-9/11 the Army was only a marginal, and perhaps unwelcome, participant in much of the discussions that led to the “transformation” policy. It is not enough that the Army's three traditions are in discussion with each other but they must also be in a serious discussion with their counter parts in the larger Defense community, to ensure the oppertunities and problems of ground combat are taken into account, and the Army receives instructions to prepare for a future war that has a basis in reality.



The Army prior to 9/11 was not prepared to fight the Cold War/World III, as the accusation I began this post claims, it was prepared to execute the Wineberger/Powell doctrine, the last coherent political direction it received. This was useful for “major combat operations" in Iraq: but was not what was needed or the “minor combat operations” that followed. The Runsfeld transformation doctrine weakened the march to Baghdad and except for providing good air support weapons was not much use for fighting the insurgency. Of course an insurgency is a “Hero’s war."




Summary

Best quote from the book. Linn quotes General Tommy Franks saying; “I’m a warfighter, not a manager”. In the footnote he comments “Franks is quite correct in his assessment of his managerial abilities”

This is a well written book that should be mandatory reading for Army officers and any one with a strong interest in military policy. For those who would only read two or three books on the subject The Echo of Battle should be one of them. STRONGLY RECCOMENDED,


Brian McAllister Linn is a History professor at Texas A&M University and the author of U.S.Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War 1899-1902, The Philippine War, Guardians of Empire, The U.S. Army in the Pacific 1902-1940 All of which are excellent. The Philippine War is an example of how military history should be written.


See Also

Reviews of Parameter articles.
Military Culture Wars
War Termination


Other
How Not to Fix the Military

N.B. The pictures other than book cover are US governemnt art and in the public domain.

See Also

Carriers in the West Pacific
How Not to Fix the Military

The Iraq Situation

It has been five years since the invasion of Iraq. It has been almost a year since my last Iraq specific post. So I suppose it is time to look at the way things are going.

Back in February 2005 in An Event Table Not a Timetable I commented on the many calls for a “Timetable” to withdraw from Iraq:

Some are calling for the Administration to publish a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq. The Administration is politely declining to do so.


And so why not?

Any timetable assumes that specific events will happen before any point on the timetable. If the table is published all those who disagree, especially the insurgents, can plan their activities to ensure that the required events cannot happen on time. Even if militarily insignificant every failure to meet the table is a political and psychological defeat. All guerrilla wars are highly influenced by political and psychological factors. Announcing a timetable is a set up for embarrassment at least.


But doesn’t there have to be some sort of basis for planning?

Well yes, but a published timetable is not it. The proper way is to have a table of the desired events. This would underlie a timetable any way, but if the events move forward or backward, or are out of sequence we are not trapped by an artificial artifact.


And going out on a limb I pointed out one of the big events.

This week’s dead tree version [of the Army Times} carries the headline. “Your ‘Ticket Out of Iraq’ - 15,000 troops whose tours were extended are coming home – How fast can the Iraqi soldiers take over for the rest?” There is a four-page spread on different units and experiences in training Iraqi units. The Iraqi units involved are paired with US units. The message is clear “’get these guys trained!’ so we can come home and stay there.”

So how is this going? The Iraqi troops in the articles were “not up to US Army standards” but getting better. The US trainers had good relationships with the Iraqi’s and were confident in their success. The best overall source is from Global Security here and here. It appears that progress is being made - slowly.

And a quote from General Petraeus I had forgotten about “. . . I want to get the hell out of here."


It is symptomatic of the handling of the Defense Department that sending trainers to train the new Iraqi Army did not happen until close to 18 months after the collapse of the old Iraqi Army and the capture of Baghdad.

I spent most of my military time in training units, staffs and schools. Training an Army from the the ground up is a massive job, during a war is not the ideal time and place, even so it has taken longer than I expected.


In July 2007 I ranted about possibility of a A March UpCountry? included an overview of the situation:

The original insurgency of pro-Saddam Baathists has been effectively defeated since the end of 2005. Of course like all insurgencies some idiots will be throwing bombs for years, but it is really an Iraqi police problem at this point. Al Quida is on the run, its policy of trying to get Iraqi support by killing Iraqis, only got Iraqis mad. They may be more than a strict police problem at this point, but AQ is not likely to overthrow an Iraqi government of any type. Since about the beginning of 2006 a number of armed groups that had been sitting out the original insurrengency decided it was time to use force to get a better bargaining position for the final settlement, maybe even settle old scores, and get rid of some competitors. This is a very different dynamic than previously, which could be analyzed in the framework of standard guerilla warfare. Now we have groups that purport to represent major portions of Iraqi society, though if they weren’t armed and willing to kill people it is doubtful how much support they would have. When commentators in the last year or so have been worried that Iraq was slipping into a civil war they are expressing a concern that these groups may be able to pull whole sections of Iraqi society in to combat with other sections. Some of these groups have better outside forign connections than the Baathists which is why we are seeing more foreign (especially Iranian) weapons and other support than the Baathists received

The role of military action is limited but critical. They have to keep all the non-government factions from getting into a military position where they can dictate their terms, hurt them enough that a peaceful settlement will get them more than they have the ability to take by force. This has to be done without alienating the larger groups the militants claim to represent. Basically this is protecting the Iraqi Governments efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. The war will not be won by a straight military victory in the field, but also it can’t be done without military operations. The war can be lost militarily.


Now the the Long War Journal in [the] Iraqi Army presses into Sadr City tells us that

The Iraqi Army said three of its brigades were involved in the operation, and moved into Sadr City in seven convoys. Six of the nine available battalions from the three brigades were pushed into Sadr City. Between 4,000 and 5,000 Iraqi troops are now operating inside Sadr City.
The US military, including the advisory teams, has not entered the northern areas of Sadr City. "No U.S. troops have gone beyond Quds Street," said Lieutenant Colonel Steven Stover, the chief Public Affairs Officer for Multinational Division Baghdad, in an e-mail to The Long War Journal. "This is an Iraqi planned, led, and executed operation. US soldiers are providing advice, intelligence and enabling support."

This is an operation the size of the attack on Fullajah in November 2004. That the Iraqi's are able to launch it pretty much on their own is compelling evidence of a major training success for the Iraqi Army. It was the failure of a similar Iraqi only operation in December 2005-January 2006 that set the events in place that led to the surge. That operation failed because they did not have enough strength and too many of the units were not up to the opposition they faced. With the success of the Iraqi dominated operation in Basra recently it seems that the Iraqi Army has achieved a decent level of maturity.

The Long War Journal adds:

Sadr and his political movement have become increasingly isolated since the fighting began in Basrah, Baghdad, and the South. The Iraqi government, with the support of the political parties, said the Sadrist political movement would not be able to participate in upcoming provincial elections if it failed to disband the Mahdi Army. On April 13, the cabinet approved legislation that prevents political parties with militias from contesting provincial elections this year. The bill is now in parliament for approval. Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the top Shiite cleric in Iraq, said the Mahdi Army was not above the law and should be disarmed. Sadr has refused to disband the Mahdi Army.

Militarily, as noted above the original Baathist insurgency is defeated. Al Quida in Iraq is pretty much confined to the Mosul area and fighting to survive. Most of the Sunni groups have sought a separate peace with the Iraqi Government, and the Sadr forces are the last major Shia holdouts.



Some events that are late by any time table that would have been made in 2005, but real none the less.

Since you can click on my links and see how many predictions I got wrong, I’m not going to make any more.



My Iraq topic posts.

Tet 1968 – A Personal Narrative

The Tet Offensive began forty years ago today.

The Year of the Monkey

Nineteen Sixty-Eight was a strange year. First there was Tet or Vietnamese New Years, the occasion for the North Vietnamese offensive. Then I was in the hospital for a week, which was the week of the Martin Luther King riots. I spent the week lying on my back watching the country burn down on TV. Then there was the Democratic Convention. Some said they would disrupt the convention. The Mayor said he was going to protect the right of people to peacefully hold a political convention. It was clear that if you liked to bash in heads for fun or else have your head bashed that was the place to be. I did not care for either so I stayed home. Generally it seemed like rioting was the recreation of choice that year around the world, the tactics and method of the “sixty- eighters,” if not their stated goals, seemed awfully brown shirtish. There seemed to be general mood that year that things were bad and getting worse. The year wasn’t all bad; I escaped (graduated) from high school and went to college.


The War at Home.

This was the height of the Viet Nam war. Going to school in the morning, right in front of our school bus was the Navy ambulance bus taking casualties from the Air Station to the Naval Hospital. I remember sitting on my parent’s sofa watching the news. Not news of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide idiots that every one takes so serious these days, but regular armies maneuvering divisions and engaged in major battles. Two hundred to three hundred US dead a week, week in week out. North Viet Nam was being bombed, but apparently under so many restrictions it was almost usless. There were negotiations about the shape of the peace table if there were ever real peace negotiations. It seemed a Dien Bien Phu II was shaping up at Khe Shan. A truce had been announced by both sides for the Tet holiday, the question being when and where the North Vietnamese would violate it. They violated it everywhere. Saigon, Hue, Dak To, Da Nang, Pleiku all with enemy forces in the city. The US Embassy in Saigon occupied. The walled citadel of Hue, the old Vietnamese Imperial capital, was lost. News coming so fast you couldn’t absorb it. That week, over seven hundred dead. Like Nine Eleven, everyone was sitting glued to the TV watching the bad news. Unlike Nine Eleven no stories of dramatic escapes and heroic rescues.

On the third day the New York news teams got to Viet Nam to report what happened. I remember watching Walter Cronkite in dirty wrinkled fatigues and a dented helmet reporting how serious things were, if we actually survived this battle you knew the war was lost. Statements by military press officers were ridiculed.

This was a shock wave. The net effect of months of watching heavy fighting on television, the staggering scope of the enemy attack, along with a narrative that said we were defeated even if we survived this battle changed the mood of the country. The next few years are only understandable when you realize we were in a state of national “ongoing traumatic stress syndrome.”

US and South Vietnamese forces defended and attacked to no pattern we saw in the media. The Embassy was recaptured. The Battle of Hue dragged on forever. It was agreed to end the negotiations about negations and have negotiations on the same subjects as the negotiations about negotiations. The war seemed to continue as before. Johnson stopped the bombing of North Vietnam not for any gain but because he thought it would help win the 1968 election. Even so Nixon won the 1968 election.

Nixon invaded Cambodia. This resulted in riots in the US that culminated in the Kent State incident. Next Nixon invaded Laos. In 1972 North Vietnamese tanks crossed the border. To read the newspaper headlines or watch the TV news it seemed things were getting worse. A keystone of Nixon’s policy was the Vietnamazation program of upgrading the South Vietnamese Army and tuning things over to the South Vietnamese. The media reported every problem and generally trashed the program. A company went berserk at My Lai and massacred about a hundred people, apparently covered up by the Army. The Special Forces tried to but failed to liberate some POW’s in North Viet Nam. In 1972 the bombing of North Viet Nam was resumed, including this time the ports and Red River Delta. The press and others were frantic; this was an escalation that would bring China into the war.

But then, almost from no place, the 1972 peace agreement was signed. The US and the North Vietnamese agreed to a cease fire and to mutually withdrawal from South Viet Nam. The US was allowed to keep a very finite amount of advisors and promised to come to the aid of South Viet Nam if North Vietnam went back on the agreement. In the press it seemed like a face saving surrender. There was some doubt that the US would keep its promise. (At this point I remember in our first week of Officers Basic they told us that even if we volunteered we could not go to Vietnam, the mock groan of disappointment was overwhelming.)

Nixon cut corners to be sure he won reelection in 1972 against one of the most unelectable Democratic candidates ever. His burglars were caught at Democratic headquarters in the Watergate Apartments; the step by step investigations eventually forced him to resign in 1974. But he was politically paralyzed long before that, and his successor was, by default, a seat warmer until the 1976 elections.

In 1975 South Vietnam fell. Congress made it clear we would not keep the promise to come to South Viet Nam’s aid. The first wave of boat people came to the US. The second wave was abandoned at sea. South Vietnam was put under a totalitarian regime that rivaled anything of Hitler, Mao or Stalin. The same for Laos. But this was child play compared to what the Khmer Rouge (Communist Party) did in the killing fields of Cambodia.


Bandaging he Wounds

I think three things aided national reconciliation,

- The Independence Bi-Centennial celebration in 1976. This turned everyone’s attention to something all could agree on or at least use the same words if we didn’t agree.
- Richard Nixon and Watergate. He became the scapegoat for every thing from 1954 to 1975. He was guilty of enough that no one cared if he was being accused of things he didn’t or couldn’t have done. “It’s all Nixon’s fault”, even if it wasn’t, was a statement that allowed people to avoid accusing friends neighbors and relatives of supporting the “wrong” side, whichever side that was.
- And a number of myths about the war grew and were accepted. Often not factual, but allowing people to live together, except when one myth challenged another, or worse, was challenged by facts.

And we went from “ongoing” to “post traumatic stress syndrome.”




The Real War

Some of this was apparent at the time, to a political and military geek such as my self, much I learned later.


In 1959 the North Vietnamese Government ordered the Viet Cong to begin military action to take over South Viet Nam. They used the classic guerilla war pattern of Mao Zedung. They were greatly helped because they had much more resources than normal to start up a guerilla campaign. Much of the prepatory work had been done by the old Viet Minh while fighting the French, there was logistic support from North Vietnamese base areas in Laos and Cambodia, the South Vietnamese government had major problems, really the problems of any third world government, but easy to exploit. By 1965 this campaign had progressed to Mao’s third or mobile phase. The South Vietnamese were in a bind. They had no uncommitted reserves. (I think I remember reading at the time that South Viet Nam has one or two battalions available everything else was committed). And the North Vietnamese were massing a mobile force of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese divisions to finish off their victory. If the South Vietnamese army consolidated forces to defeat the mobile units they would abandon a fatal amount of territory, but leaving their forces disbursed meant their units would be destroyed one at a time by the enemy mobile forces.

The solution was the introduction of US combat units to fight the North Vietnamese mobile forces, and have the South Vietnamese deal with the guerillas. (This was the general plan though there were exceptions, such as the Army Special Forces and the Marine CAP platoons, and token South Vietnamese forces always accompanied large US operations.)

The introduction of US troops put the North Vietnamese generals in a bind. They could not defeat the US Army and Marines in the field. Not that they didn’t try. Through 1965, 1966 and into 1967 they launched a number of operations trying to defeat the US forces. They quickly learned that human wave attacks against fire bases using howitzers as shotguns was suicidal. Sometimes they would win against a small unit but they could never win against a force large enough to advance Mao’s mobile war strategy. All they ended up with was massive amounts of casualties; even the small battles they won were often Pyric victories. They needed to change their strategy.


Their problem was Mao’s theory said they had to capture the county side first before moving into the cities. Prematurely moving into the cities would cut them off from their bases and invite destruction. But they were unable to defeat US forces to take over the countryside. There were two proposals considered, to back off the lower level phases of guerrilla war to wear down the US so it would grow tired and withdraw, or launching a major offensive to dislodge the US forces. They decided to take a long shot gamble on the later.

It was always possible to infiltrate the cities but any thing larger than a patrol that could melt into the population could not survive the counter attack. They decided if they infiltrated enough forces into the cities, launched a surprise attack and captured enough critical points they could survive the counter attack and it would be the US forces that were cut off. They expected that there would be a large response to a call for a popular uprising. Success required they obtain firm control over their critical targets in the first twenty-four hours or so isolating the US forces from their bases.

They obtained the initial surprise. We knew what their doctrine was, we believed it was good doctrine, but we did not realize they were so desperate that they would throw it out on a gamble.

They got into the cities, captured large amounts of space. They got control of civilian areas that had no defense force beyond local police. A call for a general uprising was made. The Viet Cong political officers came out and started to organize a new government and had “counter revolutionaries” rounded up and executed.

Many South Vietnamese and US units were isolated, some destroyed. Support units of all types became infantry to survive. But most held until relived or even counter attacked.

There was no popular uprising. The North Vietnamese captured no critical military bases. The combat units in the field turned around and came back to the cities, made sure the bases were secure and cleared the cities. That sounds so easy, it wasn’t. By the third day it was clear the offensive had failed. The North Vietnamese were still in control of what most of what they had captured, but couldn’t take more and were being attacked. There were still several months of fierce fighting to clear the cities and restore the pre-offensive status.

In many areas the defeat of the offensive resulted in the destruction of the local Viet Cong infrastructure. Many Viet Cong units joined the offensive and were lost or seriously damaged. After a few months when units with the name and number of a Viet Cong unit rejoined the fight it was almost exclusively staffed with North Vietnamese. When the local Viet Cong political cadres outed themselves to set up a new government their identities became common knowledge. Killing the counter revolutionaries left a lot of people who wanted revenge for dead relatives and friends. They were known and easy target for Operation Phoenix. In many places vigilantes acting on their own killed them. The Viet Cong’s local political organization never recovered though it took a long time exploit this.

The Vietnamazation program, which really should have started earlier, meant pulling units off line giving them a rest, new equipment, time to train and develop confidence. When it went back on line it was a much better trained, equipped and confident force. They were able to slowly gain control over larger areas of the countryside on their own. By 1972 guerilla activity had ceased to be a major problem in much of South Viet Nam. (I read a news report that in parts of the Mekong delta the per capita rate of guerilla attacks was about the same as the pre-WWII per capita rate of criminal activity.) Aggressive large operations such as the border crossings gradually reduced the North Vietnamese Armies ability to conduct large scale operations in South Viet Nam. When the North Vietnamese crossed the DMZ in a tank assault in 1972 it was the South Vietnamese Army that stopped them.

US units were being withdrawn. Because of the individual replacement policy there were very few unit homecomings to make this visible in the US. A unit was deactivated in place it’s people redistributed and that many replacements were not sent. By 1972 most US combat troops were gone.


Ending the War

So long as North Viet Nam could they would continue to send its armed forces to south to capture South Viet Nam. Attacking North Viet Nam involved risks of escalating the war by bringing in China or Russia to help North Viet Nam. This was a real risk though it probably played larger in Washington’s mind than was the real case. How to convince them? Negotiations by themselves would not do it. Their first and last fallback negotiating position was that they would get complete control of all Viet Nam. Invasion and regime change of North Viet Nam (to use the current term) was politically impossible in the US political situation. Bombing risked intervention and excessive political fallout if not successful in a short period of time.

Nixon’s National Security Advisor (and later Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger had a plan.

The first part was for the vigorous prosecution of the war in South Viet, as well as destroying bases in sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos.
The second was Vietnamazation program to turn the war back to South Viet Nam. This would allow the US to leave at some point.
Third was to give both China and Russia a reason not to intervene if bombing in the North was resumed.
Fourth was to launch a bombing campaign that would make North Viet Nam agree to stop the war in the South.


While it wasn’t obvious in the news Russia and China did not get along. In 1969 they even had a large border fight in Manchuria. China refused to let Russia transship to North Viet Nam across Chinese territory. Most of the equipment that North Viet Nam needed to support the war came from Russia and was unloaded at the port of Hiaphong. China was only able to provide basic infantry weapons and a large manpower pool if they intervened, which North Viet Nam probably did not want because they could not be sure it go away after the war. This was an opportunity. If a strategic bombing program could close Hiaphong Harbor and hit other high value targets, North Viet Nam would not get the weapons it needed to prosecute the war, or maintain a basic economy, and possibly stay in power.

Kissinger opened a diplomatic campaign to make both Russia and China feel they had more to lose by interviewing to support North Viet Nam than if they just left it to it’s own devices. To the Russians he opened a softening of détente including signing the ABM and SALT weapons reduction treaties. To China he offered diplomatic recognition and opening of trade relations. President Nixon’s famous visit to China in 1972, was part of this campaign.

The strategic bombing campaign was started. It closed Haiphong Harbor. Bridges on major highways were destroyed. North Viet Nam had to agree to withdraw in order for their government to survive. But it did not change their goal of taking over the South.

An agreement was signed. POW’s came home. Both sides withdrew. South Viet Nam started to recover from the war. North Viet Nam rebuilt it’s Army. In 1975 they attacked with fourteen divisions from Cambia, Laos, and North Viet Nam. South Viet Nam asked the US for air support, the request was denied despite our promise in the peace agreement. This caused the South Vietnamese Government to panic, and the war was lost. The general opinion is that South Viet Nam could have held with air support and quite possibly without it if they had not panicked.



Collateral Damage

Negotiations had started early in the war. They preliminary negotiations stalled. The North Vietnamese insisted that they and the Viet Cong be separate parties and negotiate with US only. Accepting this would deny that the US was helping a sovereign government against foreign attack. The US insisted that the US and South Viet Nam be separate parities and negotiate with North Viet Nam only. Accepting this would deny that the Viet Cong was an indigenous uprising. Every so often one side would make a proposal that the other found unacceptable, which had an annexed diagram for a table, about the least important part of the proposal. The press only reported on the shape of the table. (After the war North Viet Nam’s military published in their professional journals a number of “how we won articles” that make it clear that the Viet Cong was always an instrument of North Vietnamese policy and never an indigenous movement or independent organization.) After the Tet offensive President Johnson to proposed a plan that sidestepped the issue by ignoring it, thus doing nothing to advance the negotiations or produce peace; and got the North Vietnamese to agree to the proposal by stopping the bombing. Both of which Johnson also believed would help a in the 1968 elections.

The Cold War stand off with the Soviet Union resulted in a de facto policy of what was called Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) though it always seemed to me that something like Massively Asinine Dumbness would be a better name. A central concern was to prevent an escalation of violence to the point where nuclear weapons were used. This concern had a major impact on US military policy during the war. On one hand President Johnson considered a withdrawal or defeat as politically unacceptable. On the other hand the question he asked was how to prevent escalation, not how to end the thing. As a result the Johnson kept the war in “maintenance mode” with no purpose or end in sight. Maybe earlier in the war there was no way to end it without unacceptable escalation, maybe not, but the “no escalation” groupthink prevented serious consideration of how to end the war.

The press’s “investigative reporting” of the My Lai massacre broke the story two weeks after an Article 32 board returned an indictment. Article 32 Board are open hearings, normally that would follow an investigation that would take at least a year. It developed that there had been a few small incidents like this, the Army and Marines investigating and prosecuting whenever there was evidence to convict. The press usually knew about these but did not report them until after the My Lai incident.

Unlike most of today’s news persons, the main news teams in New York had been covering wars since WWII and were usually pretty good military analysts in their own right. In addition to his confidence building style Walter Cronkite of CBS news was one of the best. It is hard to imagine when he made that report from a studio in Saigon, with borrowed fatigues and helmet that he did not understand the actual situation.


Thousands of Vietnamese “boat People” came the US at the fall of South Viet Nam. (Many got on boats and sailed to US ships thus the term.) Later, in response to the communists “reeducation” polices there was a mass emigration from Viet Nam by boat, it was clear if the President ordered the navy to pick them up he would have major confrontation in Congress he could not win, so the Navy was ordered not pick them up, even if the boat was not seaworthy and sinking.


Summation

At a conference after the war a (North) Vietnamese Colonel was asked about the North Vietnamese Army never wining a significant battle against the US military. He responded

“So what.”




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Additional Reading

I wanted to add some more links and hypertext the main post, but

that day that dreaded day

is here. These will have to do.



Hanks Eclectic Meanderings

Maothought or Who is Winning
My summery of Mao’s three phase guerilla war theory.


Wikipedia

Viet Nam War
Tet offensive


South Vietnamese

Viet Quoc
The TET ’68 Offensive
MORE ABOUT THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE
THE HANOI'S 300,000 MIA'S
Why We Lost South Vietnam?

National Congress of Vietnamese Americans

Some Vietnam War Issues Revisited: The Role Played By ARVN

Commonwealth

Digger History (The Tet Offensive 1968)
BBC report 31 January 1968


North Vietnamese

CNN: Interview with General Giap
Tran Van Tra's comments on Tet '68
How North Vietnam Won The War


US Army Center for Military History Published material – Viet Nam

Named Campaigns Viet Nam

AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY VOLUME II THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN A GLOBAL ERA, 1917-2003
Chapter 10. THE U.S. ARMY IN VIETNAM: BACKGROUND, BUILDUP, AND OPERATIONS, 1950-1967
Chapter 11 THE U.S. ARMY IN VIETNAM: FROM TET TO THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL, 1968-1975



VIETNAM STUDIES RIVERINE OPERATIONS 1966-1969
Chapter 9 Tet Offensive of 1968 and U.S. Reaction




Myths

Myths
Who Owns the Viet Nam War


The History Place

Time line thru 1968
Time line from 1969


International Socialist Review
Tet: Turning point in the Vietnam War