Soviet Space Resource Burden

[The Soviet space resources burden and the Soviet command economy were based on its allocation of its resources in the form of tons of material, equipment, personnel, and personnel human power as its currency for each Soviet “Five Year Plan” fiscal planning during the Cold War. -CPV]

RESOURCE BURDEN OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

By John P. Hardt* and George D. Holliday*

1971-1975

I. INTRODUCTION

A. POST-STALIN SPACE DRIVE AN IMPERATIVE

Since its emergence to prominence in the 1950's, the Soviet space program has reflected national economic, political, and military goals to a larger extent than the U.S. program. The correlation of Soviet national objectives in military and civilian space has been facilitated by the apparent centralization of decision-making in the Politburo of the Communist Party.(1) Moreover, the administration of Soviet military and civilian space has been less distinctly separated than in the United States. Consequently, reliance on favored research and development institutions and the more sophisticated military-industrial support industries have placed Soviet space in the favored position with military claimants on resources. In a sense, the old resource allocation choice between "guns and butter" placed space in the preferred position of the former. Under Stalin's rule, it was clear that this broad question of resource allocation choice was not an operative policy issue. Only in the Brezhnev period, especially since 1967, does such a choice appear to have been an active consideration for Party economic decision-makers. In the modern Soviet context, for example, we may say that the decision to build new chemical fertilizer plants or new military or space facilities might result from these broad "guns or butter"-type considerations by the top leadership. (2)

For most of the Stalinist period and the transitional rule of Nikita Khrushchev, resource allocations to the military and space programs were largely given or stipulated for Soviet economic planners. The special personal relationship of Academician Sergey Korolev and Party leader Khrushchev doubtless contributed to the special space priority in the post-Sputnik period. With the passing of the two from the scene politically and physically, the space priority has probably been more institutionalized, and less personalized.

B. EMERGENCE OF SPACE BURDEN IN POST-KHRUSHCHEV PERIOD

As the military claims on investment funds began to be assessed more critically in the late 1960's, the space claims may have come under increasing scrutiny. There appears to be an increasing awareness of the alternative uses of scarce resources in the space program. The sophisticated demands of civilian investment programs for projects such as petrochemical plants appear to have been given increasing attention. In considering these competing demands for resources, the part of the space budget that did not contribute directly to military strategic systems was probably under the most severe pressure.

In assessing the resource burden, we have in mind two rather different kinds of questions:

1. Objectively, what were the quantity and quality of resources made available to the space programs?

2. Subjectively, how did the leadership appear to view the burden of space programs in terms of the options foregone in other allocations—the opportunity costs?

From the former measurement of resources devoted to space, we might also be able to throw some light on the question of the selective efficiency of the-programs. Equivalent allocations to space programs in countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States probably resulted in different outcomes.

The more subjective question of opportunity costs—although more difficult to assess—might provide insights on future program developments, help to explain past space program choices, or indicate a basis for the cooperative program in space. The alternative costs or perception of needs may have influenced Soviet decisions on competing with the United States in the "race to the Moon," choosing between manned and unmanned flights, and assigning priority to development of a space shuttle. Moreover, if the economic gains were deemed sufficient, the political costs of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation may have appeared more tolerable. To be sure, many of these choices were technologically constrained. However, the margin between economic and technological feasibility is difficult to establish with any precision. More funds for research and development might overcome technological constraints.

The objective question is primarily a measurement problem. Attempts to measure, in turn, are limited by the accuracy of Soviet data or the willingness to disclose the data and by problems of translating Soviet measurements—either in physical or monetary terms—into measurements susceptible to international comparisons. If Soviet leaders have been increasingly interested in choice among space and other programs, the accuracy of measurements may be presumed to have improved. However, the limitation on disclosure of information in the Soviet system makes such a judgment difficult to document. The secrecy system has been and continues to be, so pervasive and restrictive that direct access to the kind of information normally available in the West is severely limited. Moreover, the access of many Soviet officials and professional analysts to Soviet data is also sharply restricted. This important information precondition is so crucial in influencing what an outsider may deduce or what most insiders may know, that a detailed discussion of the Soviet State secrecy laws, their current applications, and impact is the first step in our analysis.

II. SOVIET SECRECY

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STALINIST SYSTEM

For students of the Soviet economy, the barriers posed by official secrecy are formidable. Even in areas that have only marginal national security implications, such as crop forecasts, statistics on grain reserves, production of certain valuable minerals, and balance of payments accounts, economic data are closely guarded, and access is apparently limited to a very small number of officials and specialists. The Western observer who wishes to learn about such matters from Soviet publications is required to piece together various bits of related data, make some assumptions about how the Soviet economic system functions, and derive estimates that are often very crude. In military-related activities, such as space spending, this task is even more complicated as the absence of published data is virtually absolute. For example, despite evidence of the existence of a large Soviet space program, no space expenditures are listed in the officially published Soviet budget. Soviet space officials add little to our knowledge of this subject, generally limiting themselves to generalizations about large or increasing space expenditures.

This extreme secrecy is in accordance with the policy followed by Soviet leaders since the late 1920s. The first signs of this policy came when the Soviet Government discontinued the previously rather liberal publication of various statistics related to the economic well-being of Soviet citizens.(3) The concept of "state secret" developed and was codified into law with the apparent goal of not only safeguarding national security but also protecting the regime from disclosure of politically embarrassing information that would reveal its priority system in resource allocations. The scope of information declared to be state secrets grew rapidly in conjunction with the leadership's attempts to develop Soviet military power and to impose economic austerity on the population while pursuing a policy of rapid industrialization.

On April 27, 1926, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. issued for the first time a "List of information Constituting State Secrets." The list outlined three categories of state secrets: military, economic, and "other" (primarily matters relating to foreign policy). (4) In practice it provided the legal basis for Party and Government officials to withhold from public disclosure whatever they deemed necessary. It was eventually superseded by revised lists promulgated on June 8, 1947 and April 28, 1956. The 1947 list was much more detailed and exhaustive than its predecessor. Not only were the types of secret military information more carefully detailed, but several kinds of non-military information were added. Particularly note-worthy was the addition of a new category of classified information: "discoveries, inventions and technical improvements, and research and experimental work in all fields of science, technology and national economy, until they are finally completed and authorized to be published." (5) The new provision reflected a greater awareness by the leadership of the importance of scientific and technical progress to Soviet economic growth and military power.

B. POST-STALIN RETENTION OF SECRECY

The 1956 list provides the present legal basis for administering Soviet secrecy laws. Two recent Soviet textbooks, published in 1970 and 1971, cited the list as being the law in force at that time. (5) While it is somewhat more moderate than the 1947 list, it still includes an imposing array of military and non-military information as state secrets. Virtually any information related to military tactics and strategy, location and number of troops and bases, amounts of armaments and military equipment, and various other military matters are listed. Naturally, since Soviet space activities are carried out in facilities that have military as well as civilian applications, information about them is generally guarded as state secrets.

In addition, a wide range of information of an economic nature is included on the secrecy list. Examples of economic items on the list are indicative of the difficulties in analyzing sensitive economic activities such as space spending: (6)

general information on the location of military-industrial enterprises,

production capacities, plans for production of armaments, military equipment and ammunition and data on the fulfillment of the plans in concrete terms as a whole for the U.S.S.R. all-union and union-republic ministries, chief administrations, and enterprises of all-union significance;

discoveries and inventions of major military significance;

discoveries and inventions of major scientific and national economic significance before the heads of ministries and departments have granted permission for their publication; such other information as may be added by the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to the list of matters subject to state secrecy.

An important feature of this list is its open-ended nature. In practice, the last item in the list has been used as the basis for keeping secret whatever the leadership believes necessary. The application of this provision may also be retroactive. All of which enforces an environment of secrecy.

The penalties for disclosure of state secrets are specified in laws enacted in 1958 as part of a general legal reform in the early post-Stalin period. Four articles in the Statute on State Crimes, Articles 1, 2, 12 and 13 and one article in the Law on Military Crimes, Article 23, provide for a variety of penalties depending on the severity of the crime. Penalties range from death for treason and espionage to confinement for two to five years for smaller offenses, such as, "disclosure of state secrets." (7)

The effect of such penalties is to inhibit any Soviet official from speaking or writing of matters that are routinely publicized in the West, unless prior approval has been obtained from top Party leaders.

One of the valuable aspects of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation has been the leadership's approval of release of certain kinds of information related to the Soviet space program. Such information, however, has not included data on Soviet space spending.

Soviet space allocations and space activities fit largely under the coverage of the pervasive secrecy system. As a result, direct information on either space budgets or activities are difficult to obtain directly from Soviet sources. To be sure, an annual state budget is published with single line items for military and science. Space activities are included in those categories. But there is no reason for confidence in any consistent interpretation on the comprehension, reliability, or comparative meaning of these figures. Likewise, the Soviet published information on space activities from which allocations might be derived are sketchy at best. Indeed, it seems fair to state that the spirit of the Soviet State secrecy laws is an accurate gauge of intent, i.e. allocations to space and accomplishments in space are by and large to be kept strictly secret. For Soviet officials who might wish to obtain access to such information and release it in their published works the criminal penalties of the legal system would seem to be an effective deterrent. Information on space therefore comes largely from four sources:

(1) Activities monitored in the West, especially by the United States.

(2) American intelligence estimates built largely on a complex aggregation of relevant data.

(3) Selective data released by the Soviet authorities largely for prestige purposes.

(4) Information obtained from scientific exchanges such as the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

The last two sources are very selective and incomplete measures of the Soviet space program as a whole, especially over time. As a result, we must rely heavily on the estimates of Soviet space spending of the intelligence agencies in the United States, especially the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. Even though published information by Soviet authorities is limited, the accuracy of Western estimates may be improving due to the effective use of technical means such as satellite surveillance. (8) Supplemented by comprehensive economic data, the process of setting parameters and estimating the scope and structure of Soviet space programs may be reasonably reliable.

III. SOVIET SPACE SPENDING

A. PRIORITY OF SPACE ALLOCATIONS

According to CIA Director William Colby, defense and space spending have been growing at a rate of about 3 percent per annum in the period 1960-1973. As the overall Gross National Product (GNP) grew more rapidly, the share of GNP represented by defense and space fell from 10 percent to between 7 and 8 percent during that time period. (9)

CIA analysts view the Soviet space program as dominated by military objectives and unified in administration. They find that space expenditures rose from about 2 percent of total military expenditures in 1960 to over 11 percent in 1972, with military space accounting for most of the increase. Based on these estimates (7-8 percent of GNP to defense and over 11 percent of defense in space expenditures), we may assume the CIA estimate of space to be just under 1 percent of GNP. (10)

The CIA estimates of Soviet defense and space spending were contested by intelligence analysts in the Defense Department. (11) They recently cited new evidence that these activities are more likely to account for 10-20 percent of Soviet GNP. (12) These revisions appear to have been accepted by the OIA. One might have asked, in reference to the earlier estimates, how the Soviet Union did so much in defense and space with the estimated expenditures. Or how they were able to outspend the United States in most categories of defense and space with a comparable share of a GNP half the size of ours. An answer may be found in the method of costing Soviet programs and converting them to dollar values, allowance for variations in ruble-dollar conversions resulting from Soviet preferential pricing policy for defense and space, and possible understatement of full costs for defense-space programs might raise the defense share to 10-20 percent of their GNP. If one accepts this higher estimate, the share devoted to the space program could be between 1 and 2 percent of current Soviet GNP.

The official Soviet budget adds little to our knowledge of Soviet space and military expenditures. Soviet budget categories are probably incomplete, undoubtedly reflect preferential pricing for the space and military sectors, and, in any case, do not provide sufficient detail to separate space spending from other outlays. However, the general trend in the "science" and "defense" categories of the budget—which probably include most Soviet space expenditures—support the notion of a steadily growing space program. From 1955, two years before the first Soviet satellite, to 1965, the Soviet science budget grew more than five-fold (from 808 million rubles to 4.3 billion rubles).13 It has continued to increase, though at a less spectacular rate, since 1965. (See Table 3-1.) Since 1971, the science and education budgets have been combined. Consequently no separate totals are available.) The officially announced defense budget increased steadily in the 1960's and leveled off in the 1970's.

B. UNIFICATION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SPACE

According to John Paisley of ClA's Office of Strategic Research,it is very difficult to separate Soviet military from civilian space expenditures. Still, he claimed, there is reason to believe that the military part dominates the Soviet program:

We doubt that they have a program that splits the military and civilian. Most of the activities that we know appear to be carried out at military facilities . . .

We think the most dynamic aspect of their space program is the military at the present time. (14)

In response to Senator William Proxmire, in hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, Mr. Colby further explained the military domination of the Soviet space program on grounds of efficiency as well as priority:

Mr. Colby. Now, you know, they have had a terrible time in their civilian space program, and they have had some very bad, bad experiences I mean, a whole string of them have not worked. They lost the astronauts and they put things on various planets that have not worked, and all the rest of it. And we think, as a conclusion, that they put their primary effort in the military arena, although their civilian space programs are given high public visibility.

Chairman Proxmire. In other words, they are including all of their effort in here, and the 2 to 11 percent increase, you think is very largely a military increase. Mr. Colby. Yes, but a lot of it was construction of facilities that have dual purposes, and it is difficult to separate launch pads and things like that into military and civilian facilities. (15)

Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering of the Department of Defense, provided additional views on March 11, 1975.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has maintained an aggressive space program with its major emphasis on support of military operations. While definitive numerical comparisons of their expenditures with our own are difficult to make, we believe that the resources which the Soviets have put into their military space programs over the past three years are much greater than our own com- mitments. (18)

The figures presented for the smaller U.S. military space program are summarized in Table 3-2.

TABLE 3-2.— U.S. CIVIL AND MILITARY SPACE EFFORTS'

[In billions of dollars]

1. New obligational authority per fiscal year.

2.Includes NASA's space effort and space activities of other U.S. Government aeendet—EROA, Commerce, Interior, Agriculture, and NSF.

Source: NASA fiscal year 1976 hearings, p. 476.

No comparable breakdown of Soviet space expenditures is available. The estimate of 1-2 percent of Soviet GNP, if correct, implies a space budget of $7-14 billion in 1974. That estimate suggests a level of expenditures that is considerably larger than the present U.S. program and probably approximates (in real terms) the U.S. space effort at its peak in the 1960's. Furthermore, judging by the ratio of military to civilian launchings, the Soviet Union devotes a much larger proportion of its space budget to military applications than the United States.

C. THREAT OF AMERICAN INFERIORITY

The implications of the higher Soviet commitments and different space objectives are found by Dr. Currie to be a threat of American military inferiority within a decade.

I believe that the Soviet effort right down the line in space has as its primary objective a superior military directed capability. Space is becoming a very pervasive part, as I mentioned, of our national security, and of our military capabilities, and is transitioning right now from providing support strictly in a strategic sense to support also in a tactical sense. I would look forward a decade from now to the time when man in orbit will be able to enhance considerably our military capability and when satellite survivability must be given prime consideration in our programs.

Certainly the demonstrations last year [deleted] show also that they are really proceeding down an independent path of research and development. They are no longer merely reacting to our demonstrations. (17)

Moreover, the programs in which the U.S. still retains leadership, such as the space shuttle with its rendezvous and docking capability, will become increasingly more vulnerable to Soviet military space capability in the Defense Department view. As the Soyuz-Apollo linkup may improve the Soviet capability to make our satellites more vulnerable, Dr. Currie implies the exchange program may further contribute to our vulnerability. (18) However, he does not argue that large military satellites would be less vulnerable than the space shuttle. The argument for the space shuttle is economy without a necessary increase in vulnerability.

IV. BURDEN AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

A. DEFINITION OF BURDEN AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS

Perhaps the truest measure of the economic burden of Soviet space spending is a determination of the Soviet perception of opportunity costs. In other words, how much do Soviet decision-makers value accomplishments in space compared to alternative economic goals that must be foregone? In order to maintain a large space program scarce resources—materials, machinery, scientists and technicians—must be diverted from other sectors of the economy. How important are those other sectors and how are resource allocation decisions made? Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Defense Department, has noted this problem in assessing the burden of Soviet defense spending.

What is critical is a better understanding of how that opportunity cost is perceived by Soviet leadership and society ... To understand the burden of defense in any useful sense we need to know much more about how such conflicting and reinforcing views work themselves out in the Soviet system. The answer to this sort of question depends upon an understanding of the internal bureaucratic and organizational politics of the decision process which determine the allocation of resources . . . the perceived burden of defense may be increasing over time even though defense takes but a constant or declining share of GNP. Therefore, it is impossible to address the problem of the burden, or the Soviet perception of the burden, without knowing how strongly the Soviet leadership in general, or subgroups of it, are attached to some alternative goals that could be obtained by diverting resources from defense even if the efficiency of the shift of resources is low. Until much more progress is made in these broader dimensions of the burden issue, statements to the effect that the burden of defense upon the Soviets is great or small will not be persuasive. (19)

Thus, in estimating the economic burden of the Soviet space program, simple dollar estimates are insufficient. Unfortunately, we cannot determine Soviet perceptions of opportunity costs with great precision. However, our knowledge of Soviet "internal and bureaucratic and organizational politics" does provide a basis for determining whose perceptions of opportunity costs are most important. Moreover, various policy statements and official economic plans give some insights, if not hard evidence, of what priorities are attached to competing economic goals.

B. PARTY PRIMACY IN SPACE POLICY

Who decides or rules in the Soviet Union? In priority objectives, such as military and space programs, the dominant role is clearly played by the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee and particularly by the General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. However, given the size and complexity of the Soviet scientific research effort in these areas, Party leaders undoubtedly rely heavily on scientists for advice on funding priorities. In a speech to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, on the occasion of its 250th anniversary, Brezhnev described the interaction of the Party leadership and Soviet scientists in planning and carrying out scientific programs:

Scientists and specialists in the various branches of the natural sciences, technology and the social sciences have given and are continuing to give the Party enormous help in accomplishing all these tasks and in working out plans and implementing them. For this, the Party gives them all heartfelt thanks.

However, comrades, in the future you will have to work even more, more persistently and more effectively. We have no intention of dictating to you the details of research topics and the ways and means of research—that is a matter for the scientists themselves. But the main directions of the development of science, the main tasks that life poses, will be determined jointly. (20)

Brezhnev's reference to "jointly" determining the directions of scientific research may be a euphemistic reassertion of the Party's preeminent role in this realm. Yet, this moderate formulation probably reflects a growing role for the professional scientist in Soviet science administration. This development represents a gradual departure from the scientists' past subordination to the authoritarian demands or arbitrary whims of the Party leadership.

The significance of an enhanced role for Soviet scientists is that their perception of opportunity costs must have some influence on Party decision-makers who establish economic priorities. Their preferences are weighed against those of other institutional groups, such as the military, industrial managers, and economic planners, by the Party Leadership, which makes the final decisions on the broad allocation of resources.

How do Soviet scientists view the burden of the space program? While this question is not openly discussed in the Soviet press, there is evidence that there are highly divergent views. Some dissident Soviet scientists, like Audrey Sakharov, while not singling out the space program, have publicly opposed the general Party line on resource allocations. Perhaps a more common view among Soviet scientists is that a disproportionate share of science funds are devoted to space. Soviet space scientist, Leonid I. Sedov, writing in 1971, supported large expenditures on space, while complaining that:

"One runs into the point of view that space research is a luxury and that the heavy allocations spent on it should be applied in the satisfying of the critical needs on Earth—the fight against hunger and disease, the development of education, agriculture, and so forth." (21)

This and other references to critics of the space program suggest that Soviet scientists have been active in asserting their views. However, the rising space budget is evidence that scientists who support the space effort have been most influential on the Party leadership. Little has happened in recent years to suggest that Party leaders currently differ from Prime Minister Alexey Kosygin's assessment in 1965:

* * * We don't have any contradictions in the Soviet Union between appropriations for space research and for the needs of the population, or education and such. They are a negligible part of overall expenditure. Space expenses do not detract from the needs of the population. (22)

Thus, budget-cutters have not had the same impact on Soviet space expenditures as in the United States. To some extent, however, _ the shape and content of the Soviet space program may reflect the various competing demands for the investment ruble. There has, for example, been an emphasis on minimizing the most expensive space activities, such as the U.S. Apollo program and manned flight in general. There has also been a concerted effort to emphasize programs with practical economic applications, though the Soviets appear to have been less successful than the United States in this effort.23 Finally, there has been a strong preference for military space missions, suggesting that the priority assigned to space spending has in large part reflected the Party leadership's perception of the military-strategic benefits of the space program. (23a)

C. AN ONEROUS OB TOLERABLE BURDEN OF MILITARY SPACE

The estimates of both the CIA and the Department of Defense indicate a rising volume of outlays, an increasing relative share of space to defense programs, and an increasing share of space to total output (GNP). Assuming most of the current estimates are made on the basis of programs completed and visible, therefore _ representing commitments of some years ago, current commitments since the first Brezhnev-Nixon summit in May 1972 and the initiation of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space are subject to some speculation. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted in congressional testimony that the U.S.S.R. was engaged in a major program for building up their strategic systems. This, if true, may or may not represent decisions or commitments postdating the initiation of the new relationship referred to as detente.

Whether the Soviet leaders will or have committed themselves to relatively and absolutely larger outlays for military and space programs turns on their perception of the utility of an increase in the number and quality of their military and space hardware. The U.S. intelligence community has made widely differing assessments of the political utility to the Soviet leadership of expanding military-space strategic systems. Two widely differing assessments, which might be characterized as the "Soviet superiority" school and the "diminishing marginal political utility" school, illustrate the range of options open to the Soviet leadership. The "Soviet superiority" school contends that:

The Soviet Union has the capacity to expand military-space strategic systems to a level which assures strategic superiority over the United States in the near future. Such strategic superiority can be translated into Soviet political hegemony in various important geographical areas, including West Europe , Asia , and the Mediterranean. Thus, large military-space expenditures may promise such great political benefits that they will be unconstrained by the demands of hard-pressed civilian sectors of the Soviet economy.

The "diminishing marginal political utility" school contends that:

The incremental costs of new military and space programs have become so high and the political utility so low that stabilization or reduction of those priority programs is now considered desirable. In this context the tradeoff between new programs in military space and new civilian investment programs may even favor the latter. At least they would be considered as serious alternatives.

To be sure, these views are oversimplified to suggest the range in official U.S. intelligence assessments of Soviet leadership perceptions. The former school of thought, for example, approximates the views of some Department of Defense observers. A recent Defense Intelligence Agency document asserts:

* * * The expansion of Soviet strategic capabilities, combined with the limited value Western strategists generally accord marginal nuclear advantages, has permitted the Soviets to achieve a nuclear force stature that canceled out long-held U.S. numerical superiority.

The considerable momentum of Soviet nuclear weapons programs holds the promise of attaining a politically meaningful strategic edge. (24)

The "diminishing marginal political utility" school, on the other hand, comes close to Secretary of State Kissinger's contention that:

* * * both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength. (25)

If the "Soviet superiority" view were deemed accurate, the notion of burden, opportunity costs or tradeoffs between military-space programs and civilian investment would not seem very relevant. If military superiority were attainable and its fruits could be translated in meaningful political shifts in power relationships, the Soviet leadership priorities would probably be clearly in favor of the traditional "guns" or military-space programs. However, if the latter perception of rising cost-diminishing utility is accurate, a reduction of relative military-space claims on resources is eminently logical.

Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient knowledge of the Soviet leadership's motivations to determine which of these views is closest to Soviet perceptions. Moreover, we might accept the absolute preference for military-space on quite different ground, i.e. the Soviet leaders may consider themselves inferior and required to press ahead to attain their version of parity. Paradoxically, their view of their inferiority may be assessed in our military planning councils as superiority. This possible Soviet exaggeration of a need for defense against attack from the air may be recently reinforced by the China concern which converted their traditional European ground invasion phobia into a revived two front threat. (26)

D. OPPORTUNITY COSTS: MILITARY-SPACE VS. INVESTMENT FOR GROWTH

Assuming the high marginal cost-low political utility of military-space programs is the Soviet leadership perception we might consider what civilian options are at stake. In preparing for the tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) unveiled by Party directives prior to the 25th Party Congress in February 1976, the requirements for increased investment may run well ahead of the anticipated annual growth rate of about 5 percent. (27)

Some of the pressing claimants for more investment are the following :

1. Development of Siberian oil and natural gas reserves.

2. Construction of the Baykal Amur railroad in the inhospitable sub-Arctic areas of East Siberia and the Far East, coupled with the expansion of materials output (timber, ore, etc.) and industry in the regions opened by the railroad.

3. Expansion of the East Siberian hydroelectric based grid and related energy consuming industries, such as aluminum, steel, and copper.

4. Increased investment in agriculture to open the new non black soil lands to cultivation and to provide more fertilizer and machinery to reduce the harvest losses and augment productivity.

5. Establishment of a modern animal husbandry system for expanded meat output.

6. Expansion of production facilities and infrastructure to permit the extended use of motor cargo transport and passenger car use.

7. Construction of hotels and other tourist facilities to accommodate the 1980 summer Olympics.

8. Expansion of merchant fleets, tanker facilities, port facilities, and fishing fleets to meet transportation and food requirements.

Post-Stalin Soviet leaders have shown an increasing concern about progress in civilian industries, transportation and agriculture. Yet, even with a significant increase in the civilian share of investment funds, it will be difficult to meet the pressing needs of those sectors of the economy. Thus, it would seem clear that the opportunity costs of diverting resources to military and space programs should be very high for Soviet decision-makers. However, if military and space superiority is deemed to be an attainable and desirable goal or defensive needs are overriding, the cost may be bearable. The plans for economic development for the 1976-1980 period, discussed at the 25 th Party Congress, are looked at with considerable interest to estimate what priorities may be assigned to attaining these alternative goals.

E. MILITARY OR CIVILIAN SPACE

If Soviet space and military programs are to be slowed down, one might expect the military space share to retain or expand its portion compared to the civilian space programs, as has been the case in the past. However, if the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative program continues and expands, its focus on civilian programs may provide an incentive for the Soviets to maintain their civilian program. In order to benefit from the American program and to keep the prestige of a proud scientific community intact, Soviet leaders may show an uncharacteristic preference for the visible, civilian program. If, then, the Soviet leaders were to move toward a cooperative U.S.-U.S.S.R .space shuttle program, the civilian space program might be among the higher priority claimants. (28)

V. FUTURE PROSPECTS

The priority accorded Soviet space programs in the planning period ahead will probably depend primarily on the leadership's perception on the economic costs and political benefits of new programs. If considerable political gain is possible in the world arena, the high priority for military space will continue and even increase. If the gains are of questionable value in the international balance of power, the pressing claims of alternative civilian investment programs are likely to dominate. In that environment, serious negotiations as arms limitations seem likely.

If arms limitations are negotiated, further cooperation in space between the United States and the Soviet Union seems likely. In that event, civilian space programs related to the exchanges are probably in for some increase in priority.

References:

(A). SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75, GOALS AND PURPOSES, ORGANIZATION, RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS, ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND SPACE, LAW Vol. II

1. Cf Francis T Miko, Organization and Administration of the Soviet Space Program, in this volume.

2 Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Economy: 1974 Results and Prospects for 1975, March 1975, p. 21.

3. Leon Herman, Varieties of Economic Secrecy in the Soviet Union, Santa Monica, Calif., The Band Corporation, December 1963, P- 2849, p. 5.

4. Sotsialisticbeskaia zakonnost' (Socialist Law), 1926, No. 32, Item 213, cited in George Ginsburgs and Armins Rusis, Soviet Criminal Law and the Protection of State Secrets, in Z. Szirmai, ed., Law in Eastern Europe, Leyden, A. W. Sythofl, 1963. p. 11.

5. Ginsburgs and Rusis, op. cit., p. 28.

5a* Kurs sovetskogo ugolovnogo prava v shesti tomakh. Chast' osobermaia. Tom TV. Gosodarstvcnnye prestupleniia i prestu plenlia protiv sotslalisticheskoi sobst-vennosti (Treatis of Soviet Criminal Law. Special Part, Vol. IV. State Crimes and Crimes Against Socialist Property. Moscow, 1970:213; Sovetskoe Ugo-lovnoe Pravo. Osabennaia Chast' (Soviet Criminal Law. Special Part.), Moscow, 1971: 32-33.

6 A. Valerian and Semen S. Studenkin. Sovetskoe.Administrativnoe Pravo (Soviet Administrative Law), Moscow, Goslurizdat, 1959, cited in Zigurd L. Zile, Robert Sharlet and Jean C. Love, The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection, New York, Praeger, 1972, p. 223-224. The 1956 list of state secrets was renewed by decree of Sept. 15, 1966, F. J. M. Feldbrugge (editor) Encyclopedia of Soviet Law, Leiden: Oceana Publishers, 1973, p. 600.

7. Osnovy ugolovnogo zatamodatel'stva Soiuza SSR i Soiuznykh Respubllk, Zakon ob ugolovnol otvetsvennosti za gosudarstvennye prestupleniia (Basic Criminal Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Articles 1, 2,12 and 13 and Zakon ob ugolovnoi otvetsvennosti za voinskie prestupleniia, Article 23, of December 25,1958, also cited in Ginsburgs and Rusis, op. cit., pp. 32-35.

8. Testimony of William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, in U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1975. Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session, June 18 and July 21, 1975, p. 23. (Hereafter, Allocation, 1975.)

9. Testimony of William Colby. U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government. Allocation of Resources In the Soviet Union and China. Hearings, 93d Congress, 2nd session, April 12,1974, pp. 27-28. (Hereafter, Allocation, 1974.)

10. Ibid., p. 28.

11. Testimony of Lt, Gen. Danlel O. Graham. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, In Allocation, 1975,

12. Ibld., pp. 163-164.

13. SSSR,b Miisterstvo Finansov, Gosudarstvennyy bludzhet SSSR 1 bludzhety soluznykh respublik; statlstlchestay sbomit. (State Budget of the USSR and Budgets of the Union Republics, Statistical Digest) Moscow, 1966, p. 21.

14 Allocation, 1974, pp. 39, 28.

15. Ibid.. p. 28.

16. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Authorization for Fiscal Year 1976 and the Transition Penod-Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session. Feb.-Mar. 1975, Part I, p. 47S. (Here-after, NASA FY 76 Herrings.)

17. NASA fiscal year 1976 Hearings, pp. 501-2.

18. Ibid., p. 502.

19. Allocation, 1975, pp. 164-165.

20. Pravda, October 8, 1975.

21. Novoe Vremia (New Times), February 1971.

22. Interview with James Reston, New York Times, Dec. S, 1965, p. 20.

23. Lani Hummel Raleigh, Soviet Application of Space to the Economy, in Volume One of this report.

23a. Cf, H Kissinger " The defense establishment we have today is the product of decisions taken 10 to 15 years ago", speech before World Affairs Council at Southern Methodist University March 22, 1978 entitled "Foreign Policy and National Security."

24. "Detente in Soviet Strategy." Statement released hv the Defense Intelligence Agency in October 1975.

25. Kissinger briefing to congressional leaders, Congressional Record, June 19,1972, p. S9600.

26. Colby (1975). op. cit.. p. 33.

27. Pravda, December 14, 1975; A. Kosygin, Pravda, March 7, 1976. Although 1-2 percent of the Soviet GNP to space programs may seem small, its funding level may represent the critical margin for attainment of important civilian goals in the new plan.

28. Lani Raleigh, op. cit., in this Volume I of this report.

•Dr. Hardt is senior specialist in Soviet economics and Mr. Holliday is analyst In Soviet economics, Economics Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.