Finnmark / Norway

Finnmark, Norway's northern most county, is naturally divided along the 122 mile border with Russia by mountainous terrain to the west. There is a very poor road and rail network connecting the northern and southern portions of the country adding to logistics problems. In accordance with a treaty concluded in Paris in 1920, Norway was also awarded sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago to the north. The Norwegian Sea is bounded to the east by the Norwegian coast and the Barents Sea, to the west by a line from Iceland to Spitzbergen and to the south by the North Sea.

Driving from Murmansk, the distance to Russia’s border checkpoint at the Norwegian border is less than 150 kilometers as the crow flies. That is, the distance between NATO and the headquarters of Russia's Red Banner Northern Fleet and the recently established Arctic Strategic Command is less than 150 kilometers. The road distance is about 225 kilometers. In either direction.

The perceptions and misperceptions concerning the strategic context of the GIUK Gap and the Scandinavian High North during the Cold War period 1945-1991 remain important, as many of the geo-strategic considerations of that period remain relevant today. The area has been significant for many centuries despite its apparent remoteness, relative to more southerly regions. Despite the remoteness of Finnmark when viewed from Baltic Lands, the area was of course readily accessible from the open sea. The advent of long-range aircraft, convoy routes and strategic minerals, only served to re-emphasize its long-established importance.

In a region of otherwise severly limited human usefulness, the Pasvik valley through which much of the boundary line runs, includes good farmland, laerchantable timber, and a river rich in fish and useful for floating lumber and for hydro-electric power sites. Apart from the problems to be expected when a navigable watercourse is used as an international boundary, the Pasvik River presents added difficulties because the Soviet Union controlled both banks at Boris Gleb near its mouth. Near the southernmost point in the boundary, both banks are Norwegian territory. Visitors to the Pasvik valley from the Norwegian outer coast are at once struck by the richness of the vegetation in comparison with that of the shore of Varanger Fjord, and of northern Finnmark as a whole.

Climatically the border region is of course exceptionally mild for its latitude, in common with the rest of northern Norway, but the moderating influence of the sea fades rapidly inland. The 10°C. Isotherm runs (summer) is near the aoast;as -isthe annual 0°C. isotherm. The July 12°C. isotherm runs east-west through Boris Gleb with still higher temperature inland to the south. In February this locale is occupied by the -9°C. isotherm. Winters are of course colder still farther south, away from the mild influence of the open sea.

During World War II, Nazi plans to attack the north of the Soviet Union through Norway and Finland included “BLUE BLUE CABLE PLAN”, “NORTHERN DEER PLAN”, “BLACK FOX PLAN” - which called for the capture of the the Murmansk railway to cut off Lend Lease supplies. Norwegian Finnmark was oocupied by very large German forces. Airfields were constructed there as bases from which to bomb convoys on the way to Murmansk, and Petsamo Fjord and Kirkenes became centers of German naval activity.

Staring across the northern border at Norway from the east is Moscow's buildup of military forces in the Kola peninsula. Called the most concentrated area of arms buildup in the world, it clearly indicates the importance Moscow places on the security of this area. The types of forces located in this region, it's obvious that intentions are more than just defensive in nature. The Red Banner Northern Fleet is based on the Kola peninsula at Murmansk.

The Norwegian Sea would be vital to Moscow in a wartime scenario for several reasons. First, it will provide a vital transit lane for submarines to and from the Mediterranean Sea. Second, it will provide a transit lane for the ballistic and cruise missile submarines taking station in the Atlantic Ocean. Third, it will be used by surface groups to stage interdiction efforts against the sea lines of communication between European forces and the US.

Since 1949, NATO relied on Norway to hold the Northern Flank against a Soviet invasion until allied reinforcements arrive. At the April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty signing, Norway was the only member country who shared a border with the Soviet Union. To the Soviets in 1949, Norway's bordered position now conjured wartime possibilities of the worst case imaginable; direct invasion of Mother Russia. Visions of the German invasion during the last war and memories of twenty million lost loved ones touched nearly every family in the Soviet Union. To the NATO countries, loss of Norway represented severance of the lifeline to the west so vital in the case of a protracted global conflict.

Soviet intimidation led to the numerous caveats accompanying Norway's membership in NATO. Since that time, Norway had to wrestle with Soviet intimidation on almost every military decision. In 1960, Norway placed a ban on the peacetime presence of nuciear weapons within its borders. This concession was seen as necessary for the same reasons as the base ban; it was a placating response to the Norwegian's perceived a need to maintain the best possible relationship with its red neighbor.

Joint allied military exercises took place outside Finnmark (the northern most county of Norway). Allied aircraft were not allowed to enter Norwegian airspace east of the 24th degree of longitude - Allied naval vessels were not given admission to Norwegian territorial waters east of the same meridian.

The most significant action taken by the Norwegians in support of the NATO alliance occurred in 1981. Seeing the need for rapid reinforcement of their vastly inferior military force in the event of a Soviet attack, Norwegians requested the pre-positioning of US military equipment on their soil. To the Norwegians, the prepositioning would support its base ban policy in that the quicker U.S. response time eliminated the need for troops on Norwegian soil. Norwegians conceded to place the equipment in the area of Trondheim instead of northern Norway, placing it over 500 miles from the Soviet border.

During the Cold War the stated NATO strategy on the Northern Front involved a phased approach based on an adequate lead time of ten days. Phase one, the transition to war, would see the followinq with reqard to the Northern Flank; U.S. surface and subsurface forces deployinq to operating stations north of the GIUK gap, air reinforcements sent to NATO airfields and U.S. Marines airlifted to join up with prepositioned supplies.

Phase two, seizing the initiative, would take place upon commencement of hostilities. Anti-submarine assets including land and carrier based aircraft, surface ships and submarines would engage the Soviet submarine fleet in the Norwegian and Barents Sea. Carrier Battle Group objectives would be threefold. They would engage and attrite Soviet aircraft at the fringes of the battle group distant support area. Without air superiority over the Norwegian Sea an effective sea control policy would be impossible. The battle grooup would also support the landing of Marines to both repel the Soviet land attack and interdict Soviet land force lines of communication with landings behind enemy lines on the north Norwegian coast. Finally, they would search out and destroy Soviet Action Groups with an eye out for their carriers.

Phase three, carrying the fight to the enemy, would consist of swift defeats of enemy forces, regaining of lost territory, and support of the theater land campaign. Specifically, it would witness a victorious land campaign in Norway, recapturing of Jan Mayen and the Svalbard islands, possible strikes into the Kola peninsula and antisubmarine operations that put the Soviet SSBN's out of action.

From a NATO perspective, control over the area is imperative for it must serve as an operating area for anti-submarine operations by surface, sub-surface and airborne platforms. Thus Norway becomes a pivotal land mass. By controlling Norway, NATO can control the Norwegian Sea. Once this control has been achieved by the allies, the Northern Fleet can be kept bottled up in the Barents Sea, effective anti-submarine and anti-surface operations can be conducted against transiting naval units, and NATO assets can pursue bastioned submarines in northern areas and under the ice cap.

Moscow would have two major objectives. First, they intend to protect their own seaborne strike capabilities (most importantly their ballistic missile submarines) in the areas north of the GIUK gap. Second, they will strive to cut off the NATO sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic. Moscow's overall strategy to be employed in attainment of these objectives would involve control of the the seas north of the GIUK gap. The biggest obstacle to attainment of sea control in this area is Norway's geographical position, which necessitates an offensive strategy.

Invasion options are varied, but all initially involve control of Norwegian coast. The only area for conjecture is how they will get there. One obvious campaign will involve a direct assault by ground forces across the Russian-Norwegian border. They would endeavor to advance over land in order to join up with airborne and naval infantry units who would have conducted a planned simultaneous air/amphibious invasion of the Norwegian coast. This invasion would be supported by air strikes from Kola fields against Norwegian bases in the north. Once coastal airfields were secured, a possible redeployment of Soviet air and naval assets would set the stage for the second phase of the campaign; Norwegian Sea control. This plan would be hampered somewhat by the natural barrier of mountainous terrain encountered during the march west toward the coast.

The initial phase of an alternate campaign might be an advance along a more southerly route through Finland. Although this would involve violation of Finnish neutrality, it may not pose the problems one might imagine. Another option for attack involves violation of Finnish and Swedish neutrality. But an invasion across Sweden, be it amphibious or entirely by land, would be fraught with obstacles.

Poor road aod rail networks almost isolate the battlefield where the most probable initial engagements will occur. Norwegian armed forces are concentrated in areas significantly south of the most probable axis of attack, thus are unable to respond immediately to attacks in the North.

The European Front will surely be the center court attraction. But, a thrust into central Europe makes a simultaneous attack against the Northern Front absolutely necessary. Attacks on the Russian homeland could be carried out without a buffer-state to provide an acceptable reaction time. Moscow would face this situation in the Northern Flank should a fortified Norway remain in the hands of NATO. Russia most likely would attack Norway by land, sea and air across the northern portion of the country. Once the north is isolated, assaults will be staged against southern Norway. Attacks on U.S. prepositioned equipment sites in the southern counties will diminish NATO's ability to reinforce Norway. Simultaneous attacks against Spitzbergen, Iceland, Jan Mayen and Bear Island will secure operating areas throughout the Norwegian and Barents Seas.